10200

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 8:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah

I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is
the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. 


"Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
defilements." 

On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas.

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements.
The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed
run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." 

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
mind." 


If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of
panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by
this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place
the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and
furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of
Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first
statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought.
Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as
luminious mind. 

If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it
would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last
paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of
all khandhas after parinibbana



Kind regards
Ken O



--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang.
> Nikaya. We
> > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the
> ‘luminous mind
> > ’
> > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but
> 
> > since
> > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the
> commentaries, I
> > think. 
> > 
> ===========================
> Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular
> importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To
> me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is
> luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking
> in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as
> bhavanga 
> cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that
> the 
> Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are*
> such 
> things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are
> not 
> mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few
> leaves of 
> knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 

	
10201

From: rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:

> > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned 
to), 
> > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. 
So 
> > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it 
stands to 
> > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, 
i.e. 
> > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
> > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."
> 
> unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate 
being.

Hi Robert,

Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)

Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 

So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
arising, like all other dependent arisings.

I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
and for all?

I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
production from other, and production from both self and other.

Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
opint's I've raised with you here:

http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
	
10202

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 4:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Hi, Ken -

Thank you! Apologies to Herman. I guess he's cute, too! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/20/01 11:28:52 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
ashkenn@y... writes:


> 
> It was Herman.
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > It was Sarah, I think!> 
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/20/01 2:17:12 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Who made up this cute thread name by the way?
> > > 
> > > Robert Ep.
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10203

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:10am
Subject: a pitfall

 	
Kom wrote: 

It is possible for unskillful cittas to mistake something
not Satipatthana to be Satipatthana. As you can see, other
kinds of cittas (including those with attachments and
ignorance) can also have realities as their objects. A.
Sujin mentioned on the India trip that some people mistake
that they are developing Satipatthana because they have
moments that they experience one reality at a time.

N: Dear Kom, thank you for this reminder. What a pitfall it can be: we
think, Ha! now the object is not a concept but a reality such as hardness,
and thus I am developing satipatthana. Oh no, lobha tricks us again. A
paramattha dhamma experienced with lobha. Or maybe there is a moment of sati
and then quickly after that again trying to hold the object. Cittas arise
and pass away so fast. Pa~n~naa must be very keen to discern all those
different moments. 
We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A. Sujin during this trip,
didn't we? Jaran asked how one is sincere (phu trong),and A. Sujin explained
many times how important it is to be sincere as to one's own development,
what one knows or does not know yet.
It is interesting that everybody highlights the points that most impressed
him. Jonothan mentioned several other points. If you have time (and Jaran
also) perhaps you could say more about your own observations and feelings
with regard to what you learnt in India? You inspire me to write more!
Best wishes, Nina. 


10204

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 5:12am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hi, Erik -

Erik, with regard to your post (quoted below), are you saying that you 
don't accept the notion of the unconditioned dhamma, nibbana, as described, 
for example, in the Udana?
In this regard, I'd be interested in knowing your take on the 
following which I wrote to Suan:
"As far as nibbana is concerned, at least nibbana without remnant, I 
see it as consciousness of absence of objects: a luminous, timeless reality, 
permanent in the double sense of being timeless, and of being available at 
all times from within the temporal realms. Nibbana with remnant, the ordinary 

state of the living arahant, I see as based on the luminous, timeless 
nibbana, but with an overlay of conditions which are seen through as empty, 
fleeting shadows."
Incidentally, discernment of an absence can't be said to be 
conditioned by anything, unless one considers an absence to be a thing. On 
the other hand, being a discernment, it is not a nullity either.

With metta,
Howard



In a message dated 12/20/01 12:25:29 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
rikpa21@y... writes:


> Hi Robert,
> 
> Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
> that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
> logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
> an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
> a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
> having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
> conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
> words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
> is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
> as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
> logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
> appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
> a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)
> 
> Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
> not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
> dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
> interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
> words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
> entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
> would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 
> 
> So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
> meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
> are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
> someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
> never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
> interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
> arising, like all other dependent arisings.
> 
> I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
> this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
> separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
> examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
> it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
> and for all?
> 
> I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
> view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
> production from other, and production from both self and other.
> 
> Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
> that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
> subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
> more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
> Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
> you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
> detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
> opint's I've raised with you here:
> 
> http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	

 	 

	
10205

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand how the
process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect' enough to
apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the idea that
the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to directly 'copy'
the object?

In a related question, how does this theory account for the characteristic of the
sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of sense
organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is perceived? It
is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in actually
taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has evolved
through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still imperfect
and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual'
characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is enlightened
is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? There is
no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally I would think
that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather than a
true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 

Best,
Robert Ep.

=======================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Howard & Rob
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Hi Howard.
> > > I guess this comes down to whether the mind is capable of a direct act
> > of
> > > perception without forming a concept. I guess you would say that it
> > is 
> > > possible,
> > > that the rupa can be directly discerned -- is this at the level of 
> > > satipatthana? 
> > > And are there any recorded details as to how the mind functions or
> > reduces 
> > > its
> > > normal extrapolating tendencies during such a pure act?
> > > 
> > ============================
> > I'm afraid I will have to leave this to be answered by those
> > folks who 
> > really know what they are talking about (with regard to Abhidhamma)!
> > ;-))
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> 
> This question has been discussed before (no surprise!), and you may find
> interesting the passage below from a very useful post of Kom's (#7300 in
> the archives)
> 
> Jon
> 
> [Q]: > We don't get an experience of an outer object without a mental
> > interpretation of impressions which are put together by the mind to form
> 
> an image.
> 
> [A]: When one of the 5 sense objects impinges on the sense organ, and
> there 
> is a process of consciousness (the sense-door process) (A) rising to 
> cognize the object, the process of consciousness is said to be
> experiencing 
> the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the object. The mind-door process 
> of consciousness that rises immediately afterward (B), interrupted only by
> 
> some "life-continuity" consciousness, also experience the sabhava of the 
> object. It is only some processes later (extremely short) (C) that the 
> consciousness starts to make an interpretation of the sense object, such 
> as "shapes", "persons", "Robert", etc. 
> 
> The abhidhamma teaching indicates that the consciousness and the 
> mental factors (in your terminology, the mind) at (A) and (B) are 
> cognizing the actual characteristics (sabhava) of the reality (perhaps 
> without thorough penetration), and the consciousness at (C) is cognizing 
> concept (pannatti) of that reality. (A) and (B) cognize the
> characteristics 
> (sabhava) of actual realities, where as (C) cognizes the concept which has
> 
> no sabhava. For us who may not have accumulated enough wisdom, it 
> may appear that (A), (B), and (C) are cognizing the same thing, where as 
> they are actually not.
> 
> This is the brief explanation of how the mind can cognize both what is
> real 
> (with sabhava) and what is unreal (without sabhava) and appear to the 
> person that the dhamma with and without sabhava are ones and the same 
> (while they are not).


	
10206

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:57am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,
I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
explanation either. I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what I
was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for which I
apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out over
and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
discussions.

Robert Ep.

===========

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Sarah -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. Nikaya. We
> > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the ‘luminous mind
> > ’
> > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but 
> > since
> > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the commentaries, I
> > think. 
> > 
> ===========================
> Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as bhavanga 
> cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that the 
> Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are* such 
> things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are not 
> mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few leaves of 
> knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 
> 
> 
> 
> 


	
10207

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Very good, Kenneth. Thank you.

Robert Ep.

=======

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 
> Quote
> Note
> 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of controversy over the
> centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between periods when the mental
> stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises more questions than
> it answers. There is no reference to the bhavanga-citta or the mental
> stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an Abhidhamma treatise,
> the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would the perception of its
> luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind? And further, if
> "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> develop the bhavanga-citta? 
> 
> Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the mind with the
> "consciousness without feature," desribed as "luminous" in MN 49 and DN
> 11, but this interpretation also has problems. According to MN 49, that
> consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable world, not even the
> "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be defiled? And, because it
> is not realized until the goal of the practice is reached, why would the
> perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?
> And again, if "mind" here means consciousness without feature, how could
> the sutta talk of its development? 
> 
> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived
> from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are
> not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice. With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: "And
> furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain -- as with the earlier
> disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters & remains in the fourth
> jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness, neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He
> sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness. Just as if a man
> were sitting covered from head to foot with a white cloth so that there
> would be no part of his body to which the white cloth did not extend; even
> so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright awareness.
> There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by pure, bright awareness."
> From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only
> cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to
> ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
> Unquote
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O


	
10208

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:07am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, upasaka@a... 
> writes:
> 
> 
> > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
> > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly knowable by 
> > 
> > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. 
> =========================
> I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say that "relations 
> are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that they are 
> also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we are not 
> going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For example, one 
> event may immediately precede another. This can be directly observed. We 
> speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between the 
> events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence relation"! ;-) 
> Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related are mere 
> things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the referent of 
> an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an entity. Reifying 
> relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying 
> things-in-relation.

And yet so easy to do.

Just to take a prosaic one:

"We're married". Turning the relation of 'marriage' into an object does what to a
relationship which is an ongoing act of moment-to-moment relationship? Notice the
rising worldwide divorce rate.

Robert Ep.



	
10209

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Very good, Kenneth.
You are in excellent form today.
I think I'll sit back and watch you and Howard for a while.

Sarah, care for popcorn?

Best,
Robert Ep.

==============

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Sarah
> 
> I am not buying the idea that bhavanga citta as said in the commentary is
> the luminious mind bc first the objects of bhavanga citta is not known. 
> 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
> defilements." 
> 
> On this statement, we could said that it is similar to bhavanga cittas.
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is defiled by incoming defilements.
> The uninstructed run-of-the-mill person doesn't discern that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the uninstructed
> run-of-the-mill person -- there is no development of the mind." 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
> mind." 
> 
> 
> If bhavanga citta is indeed the luminious mind, that mean the practise of
> panna should be on bhavanga citta and not on kusala cittas as indicated by
> this sutta. How do we practise bhavanga cittas which in the first place
> the object is not known and it purpose is only life continual and
> furthermore it is a vipaka citta. Hence the my view the interpretation of
> Bhavanga citta is not correct. The commentary, takes on the first
> statement as assuming it as bhavanga citta which I also initially thought.
> Further reading of this sutta, leave me doubting that bhavanga citta as
> luminious mind. 
> 
> If we assume that bhavanga cittas as indeed the luminous indeed, then it
> would imply Nibbana is bhavanga cittas as I infered from the last
> paragraph of the sutta. Then this leave us the problem of cessation of
> all khandhas after parinibbana
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/20/01 1:04:32 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > sarahdhhk@y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang.
> > Nikaya. We
> > > clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that the
> > ‘luminous mind
> > > ’
> > > is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door and
> > > mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, but
> > 
> > > since
> > > (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> > > understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the
> > commentaries, I
> > > think. 
> > > 
> > ===========================
> > Just for the record, not that my take is of any partcular
> > importance, 
> > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial interpretation. To
> > me, 
> > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that the mind is
> > luminous but 
> > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky obfuscated by a cloud 
> > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like gold which is lacking
> > in 
> > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and which manifests its 
> > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed. Also, inasmuch as
> > bhavanga 
> > cittas are nowhere mentioned in the suttas, I find it implausible that
> > the 
> > Buddha is referencing them in this sutta. (Whether or not there *are*
> > such 
> > things is a separate issue. There could be many existent things that are
> > not 
> > mentioned in the suttas, and are even not among the relatively few
> > leaves of 
> > knowledge the Buddha held in his hand.)


	
10210

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Eric,
I will just make a last comment and go read your essay.

If there were such an uncaused and causeless existent, it would as you say have to
be pre-existingly present, unchanging and not interact or change with form. Such
a formless form could only be a core awareness, which would be aware without being
affected by anything, an underlying impersonal field of a kind. You say that one
is a caused and form-ful being, but isn't the point that such a one is not a self,
and not actually a being? Enlightenment would then consist of awakening to this
underlying impersonal state, which shouldn't rightly be called a self, since it is
not personal. The only way in which this relates to Theravada, is that it is a
plausible explanation of the luminous mind temporarily obscured or defiled by
worldly defilements, but not actually affected by them.

Robert Ep.

=============

--- rikpa21 <rikpa21@y...> wrote:
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
> > > But what is not speculative, and can be observed (or reasoned 
> to), 
> > > is that all composed entities lack core, or intrinsic essence. 
> So 
> > > while I understand the gist of what yuo're saying here, it 
> stands to 
> > > reason that if we understand what the "self" is being refuted, 
> i.e. 
> > > independent existence, then we can say, without the lest bit of 
> > > speculation, that there is no such thing as a "self."
> > 
> > unless there is a self that is not a composed entity, or separate 
> being.
> 
> Hi Robert,
> 
> Not sure what you mean here. What phenomenon do you have in mind 
> that are not dependent or composed in some way? The Tibetan 
> logicians, using reasoning alone, for example, reject the notion of 
> an uncomposed entity as an absurdity in at least one way: that such 
> a "self" would have to have to have existed for all time without 
> having changed in the slghtest, given it's absent causes and 
> conditions, and exists independently of all causal things. In other 
> words, it is causeless. And if it is causeless, that also means it 
> is unproduced. This type of "causeless entity" is often referred to 
> as the "sky flower" (or the lotus that magically grows in midair)--a 
> logical absurdity--because it suggests that such a thing could 
> appear independent of any causes and conditions. (Could you imagine 
> a world where things could arise causelessly? Ack!)
> 
> Furthermore, even if such a thing hypothetically existed, it could 
> not interact with any composed entities, because that would imply 
> dependence on those composed entities via the facility of 
> interacting with them--changing and being changed by them, in other 
> words. So the function of interacting means that this "permanent 
> entity" would *have* to be a changing thing, and therefore, it 
> would't be a permanent entity at all, but a changing thing! 
> 
> So whether or not such a thing hypothetically exists is an entirely 
> meaningless proposition from the get-go--at least as far as you or I 
> are concerned. Maybe there is such a permanent, unchanging entity 
> someplace. But you, as a composed and impermanent entity, could 
> never have any knowledge or interaction with it whatsoever, since to 
> interact with it would place it in a position of being a dependent 
> arising, like all other dependent arisings.
> 
> I'm also not sure what you mean by "separate being" here, unless by 
> this too you're implying that there is something that can exist 
> separate and apart from causes and conditions. Can you provide any 
> examples of anything that would fit this bill, and if you can, how 
> it would have any bearing whatsoever on terminating suffering once 
> and for all?
> 
> I've always preferred the "diamond slivers" refutation of such a 
> view, that rejects causeless production, production from self, 
> production from other, and production from both self and other.
> 
> Anyway, since this is an Abhidhamma list and it's been suggested 
> that words not attributable to either the Abhidhamma or its 
> subcommentaries are not in great demand here, I won't expand any 
> more on anatta or dependent origination from the Tibetan 
> Consequentialist logic school's perspective. Rather, I'll just point 
> you at an essay that touches on some of these things in a bit more 
> detail, in hopes that this clarifies a bit more on some of the 
> opint's I've raised with you here:
> 
> http://www.gruntose.com/Info/Quartz/Essays/Auto_Bud.html
> 


	
10211

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Dear Robert,

I wholeheartedly second these questions.

Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type-
thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking
(and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something 
about the camera and the process of development of the photo.

All the best


Herman

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Thanks Jon, good explanation. Although it is hard for me to 
understand how the
> process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object 
is 'perfect' enough to
> apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is 
the idea that
> the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to 
directly 'copy'
> the object?
> 
> In a related question, how does this theory account for the 
characteristic of the
> sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this 
type of sense
> organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is 
perceived? It
> is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' 
in actually
> taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that 
has evolved
> through a physical process to become gradually more refined but 
still imperfect
> and which is also subject to individual variation, take in 
the 'actual'
> characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who 
is enlightened
> is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', 
no? There is
> no direct perception according to this idea. Which is why normally 
I would think
> that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, 
rather than a
> true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> =======================
> 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > Howard & Rob
> > 
> > --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Rob -
> > > 
> > > In a message dated 12/18/01 2:03:35 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > > epsteinrob@Y... writes:
	
10212

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 2:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Ken,

Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before 
it is a thought? 

I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing 
at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on 
in the background.

Thank you for your very clear and well-reasoned recent discussions re 
luminous mind.

All the best

Herman


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Howard and Sarah
> 
> My intepretation why object is one at time for citta is that our 
mind
> could only think at one thing at a time. I believe we could not 
think two
> things at one go in our mind.
> 
> Similarly in my intepretation of Satipatthana Sutta, the objects of
> mindfullness is always one at a time in the present moment to suit 
the
> normal behaviour of our mind.
> 
> Hence in this way, I conclude that a cittas could only grasp one 
object at
> time. 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
	
10213

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 3:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Howard,

Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play 
through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the 
observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is 
the same thing. And an unobserved relationship could be a way of 
describing a concept, perhaps?

All the best

Herman

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/20/01 8:55:51 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
upasaka@a... 
> writes:
> 
> 
> > I think that the relations are every bit as real as the 
> > things-in-relation, and I have no doubt that these are directly 
knowable by 
> > 
> > some means, whether it be by sati, pa~n~na, or whatever. 
> =========================
> I'd like to add a clarification to this. When I say 
that "relations 
> are every bit as real as the things-in-relation," I should add that 
they are 
> also just as "unreal". ;-)) What I'm emphasizing here is that we 
are not 
> going to find any "things" anywhere which are relations. For 
example, one 
> event may immediately precede another. This can be directly 
observed. We 
> speak of this as the relation of direct precedence holding between 
the 
> events. But nowhere will anyone find the "direct-precedence 
relation"! ;-) 
> Relations are "mere" relations, and the "things" which are related 
are mere 
> things-in-relation. Neither of these is a complete fiction, the 
referent of 
> an ungrounded concept, but, likewise, neither of these is an 
entity. Reifying 
> relations is an even stranger hobby, I think, than reifying 
> things-in-relation.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

10214

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 1:39pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi, Herman -

In a message dated 12/20/01 6:05:30 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
hhofman@d... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> 
> Would it be reasonable to say that relationships only come into play 
> through observation of the relationships, and that this is where the 
> observing self comes in, or an observing citta, which in effect, is 
> the same thing.
> 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
From my perspective, nothing exists in any sense outside of the 
*possibility* of being observed. For me, 'to exist' and 'to be observable' 
are one and the same, whether we're talking about relations or anything else.
--------------------------------------------------------------
And an unobserved relationship could be a way of > 
> describing a concept, perhaps?
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I'm not completely clear on your meaning here. But what you write does 
engender several thoughts in my mind. It seems to me that we can distinguish 
between "active concepts" and "inactive concepts", and we can also 
distinguish between "grounded concepts" and "ungrounded concepts". 
By an "inactive concept" I mean the mental structure passed along by 
the mind that serves as the base for an "active concept". For example, we 
have the inactive concept of 'tree' which becomes activated at the time of 
(to speak conventionally) the observing of a tree, the remembering of a tree, 
or the picturing of a tree.
By a "grounded concept" I mean one which is constructed from (usually 
many) similar trains of mindstates involving objects experienced as 
interrelated in various (and often complex) ways. An "ungrounded concept" is 
one not based entirely on possible experience . One case of that, I would 
think would be where the objects subsumed by the concept have been observed 
(or, at least, are observable), but the relations among them, forming the 
mental "glue" of the concept, have not been observed and are not observable 
as holding among the objects. An example of the latter might be the concept 
of 'unicorn'. Horses exist, and horns exist, but, so far as I know, there is 
no instance of a horn growing from the head of a horse. So, the relation, 
while imaginable, is not observable, and the concept 'unicorn' is ungrounded. 
Likewise, the concept of 'person' as a changing assemblage is grounded, but 
the concept of 'self' as a unitary and permanent core associated in some way 
with that changing assemblage is ungrounded.
--------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> All the best
> 
> Herman
> 

==============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10215

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 9:15pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Rob Ep (and comrades),

I’m beginning to regret <sigh> re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms
again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the
night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out
anyway;-(

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
> view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
> explanation either. 

Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit..

> I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what
> I
> was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for
> which I
> apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out
> over
> and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
> discussions.

I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be
your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll
just put it on record;-)

These are three posts I wrote on the subject <Luminous mind/bhavanga cittas>
(out of many):

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337

The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-)
To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe
and type in ‘metta’:
http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/

Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section
and see what you find. 

OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course.

Sarah 
.........................................................................................................................

	
10216

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Dear Robert,
> 
> I wholeheartedly second these questions.
> 
> Your photograph simile is an interesting one. In abhidhamma type-
> thinking the photo says something about reality, to my way of thinking
> (and yours as well, from the sound of it), the photo says something 
> about the camera and the process of development of the photo.

Yes, I think you've put that well. That doesn't mean the camera isn't recording
something of reality, but it is doing it in the form that camera is capable of.

Best,
Robert Ep.



	
10217

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah.
Comments at bottom.

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Rob Ep (and comrades),
> 
> I’m beginning to regret <sigh> re-opening the ‘luminous’ can of worms
> again......especially now I see all your reinforcements joined in during the
> night (more sighs)....however, they (the worms) were beginning to wriggle out
> anyway;-(
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > I don't want to be unduly heartened by my comrade Howard taking this point of
> > view, but it does seem to me that I never fully accepted the commentary
> > explanation either. 
> 
> Hmmm, sounds like you’re more heartened than you care to admit..
> 
> > I am anxious, however, to see it again so I can see what
> > I
> > was or am talking about. I really don't remember it clearly enough, for
> > which I
> > apologize. I don't mean to be asking you to drag the same commentaries out
> > over
> > and over again. i should have a better filing system for these important
> > discussions.
> 
> I know, in addition to shirking all homework assignments, you’d like me to be
> your filing system of what you’re talking about... that’s OK, Rob, but we’ll
> just put it on record;-)
> 
> These are three posts I wrote on the subject <Luminous mind/bhavanga cittas>
> (out of many):
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8281
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8336 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8337
> 
> The third one should give you a good reminder of what you were talking about;-)
> To find other old posts of yours on the topic, I’d suggest you go to escribe
> and type in ‘metta’:
> http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/
> 
> Once there, you can type in a key word like ‘luminous’ in the search section
> and see what you find. 
> 
> OK, now I’ll sit back with the popcorn while you go on a revision course.
> 
> Sarah 

Dear Sarah,
Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for being
a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to discern it
as an empty reality!

Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll do my
homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! <g>

With affection,
Robert Ep.

================


	
10218

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 10:47pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Ken O and Howard,

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" at
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 

Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments and
notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those
earlier posts I just gave the links for:
*****

1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the ancient
Pali commentary:
> maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> bhavanga-citta..
*****

2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same
commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their value when
the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or disagree
when they don’t.
*****

3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have every
confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. We
fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I gave
from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’.
*****

4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is consistent
with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions of
K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
*****

5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
>“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> deep sleep, why is it called luminous?”
.....

As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep, but
whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without sense-door or
mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are no
defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier quotes
from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
.....

“When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
(has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a 
mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just,
O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall
even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has
returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive
knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.”
*****

6. T.B. asks: 
“And why would the perception of its
> luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?”
.....

As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the mind (i.e
the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome states
which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects experienced
with bhavanga cittas in between.

In one of those other posts I wrote:
.....
“In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing cittas and
the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value of
skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think it’s
important to appreciate the context when we read the following:

‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind:
insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it is.

‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come from
without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints that come
from without.’ “
.....

In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in theory) helps
us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state, but
rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
.....

I wrote before:

“In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:

‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever there
is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness is
most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily during
waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ 
*****

7. T.B. asks: “And further, if
> "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> develop the bhavanga-citta?”
.....

There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand. Bhavanga
citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in the
suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala states.
the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma is
essential in this regard.
*****

8. T.B. says:
‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be derived
> from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion are
> not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’
.....

On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very clear that
the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or delusion’.
Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of course they
have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so often, only
arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If there is
not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising skilful
state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a ‘finger-snap’), it
would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 

I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained not only
in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
*****

9.T.B. continues to add that:
> ‘With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: 
.....

On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a permanent
mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to their
‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and concentration
referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state of
wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any bhavanga
cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
*****

10. T.B. adds:
> From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not only
> cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them to
> ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
.....

This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest level
of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of defilements. I
truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
*****

Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea, but
merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the Sangha
since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would admit).

I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other points
(from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send them back
to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know.

Sarah

............................................................................................................




	
10219

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:05pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] a pitfall

 	
Dear Nina,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...]
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 10:11 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [dsg] a pitfall
>
> We had many pertinent, pointed reminders from A.
> Sujin during this trip,
> didn't we?

I did. Hearing the dhamma and the reminders (and a chance
for questions!) from many learned people is probably the
most worthwhile activities that I did in India. Hearing
some of the pertinent points (like anatta, for example)
again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even
started to hear new angles of explanations about Anatta from
K. Jack. Most worthwhile.

The points that came to mind immediately that I really
appreciated hearing:
1) Anattaness: what is anattaness?
2) How panna becomes developed
3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the
dhamma, and noticing the dhamma.
4) How long the road is...

The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the
discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin kept mentioning
about understanding until it "lies next to your bone". I
think I kept asking about it in conventional terms what she
meant by that. Sort of a reminder to me what I must go
through everytime when there is no understanding of
realities.

kom
	
10220

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 20, 2001 11:38pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: 

> Dear Sarah,
> Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for
> being
> a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to
> discern it
> as an empty reality!

Yes, well, that’s a bit how I felt about the regret in re-opening this thread
;-)

> Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll
> do my
> homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! <g>

At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas thread and we’ll still be
discussing the same thread as when he left....<yikes>

Just a couple of BRIEF notes on the Udana quotes from the Cambodian website you
mention:

1. Dabba sutta (Ud V111.10) (2)

You ‘find the ‘unwavering bliss’ of interest here re. the idea that there is
nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining’.

Masefield translates the last few lines as;

‘Just as, for that hammered with an iron-hammer that has progressively died
down, though the fire continues to blaze, a destiny is not known, so for those
who are properly liberated, for those who have crossed the flood that is the
bond of sense-desires, for those who have reached the happiness that is
undisturbed, there is not to be made known a destiny.’

brief com notes:
‘That has progressively died down’ (anupubbuupasantassa); ‘that has, in due
course, died down, burnt itself out, ceased’

‘Just as a destiny is not known (yathaa na ~naayate gati): ‘....or likewise for
some sound that has arisen, that has, in due course, died down, fully subsided,
a destiny is made known nowhere in the ten directions, on account of its having
ceased in a non-relinking fashion due to the cessation of the conditions (that
gave rise to it) 

‘the happiness’, the dying down of all formations reckoned as that nibbana that
is without remnant of substrate,

> ================

For the 2nd Nibbana Sutta (Ud V111, 1)

This is the other one I discussed at length (essential reading for you;-). See
posts:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8895
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8908
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9035
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9038

Firstly, let me remind you that this sutta is about nibbana and not about
parinibbana (you tend to mix them together, I think) Also you’ll see the
phrases you refer to and like are references to other arupa planes of
existence....showing that not only do the conditioned khandhas of the sense
realms not existing in nibbana, but also the non-rupa conditioned realities of
other realms. 

The references to light and so on were to nibbana, not parinibbana. I’ve run
out of steam and need to take care of some office work, otherwise I’d re-check
myself. Maybe you can re-quote the commentary notes on these references that I
gave before;-))))

Thanks Rob,
Sarah
..........................................................................................


	
10221

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Victor and Purnomo,

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello all,
> 
> I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by 
> concept? How does concept come to be?

I was also very glad to see Purnomo's comments.
.....

I just have a few more suggestions:

A. It may be useful to read some of the posts under ‘concepts and realities’ in
‘Useful Posts’ at:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts

B. I recommend the book ‘Realities and Concepts’ by Sujin Boriharnwanaket to be
found on:
http://www.abhidhamma.org/

C. In particular, this extract on the various kinds of concept may help:
http://www.abhidhamma.org/sujin3.htm
.....
<quote>
*****
The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes between six kinds of
concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 

        1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is real, for
example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or sanna (perception) 10.

         2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what is not real,
such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts do not represent absolute
realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and rupa. Thai or foreigner are
not real in the absolute sense, they are conventional realities, sammutti
dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome consciousness) be Thai or foreign?
Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it is a dhamma which has its
own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign.

         3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of the non-existent
based on the existent. There is the expression "the person with the six
abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is not real. Thus this
concept stands for what is real and for what is not real.

         4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of the existent based on
the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's voice". The sound is real,
but the woman is not real.

         5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is real based on
what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu
(eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa (eyesense, a reality
sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana (consciousness) is also a
reality, namely the reality which experiences.

         6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of what is not real
based on what is not real. There is the expression "the kings son". Both king
and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas, conventional realities. 

<end quote>
*****

Sarah
..................................................................................................


	
10222

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 0:36am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...]
> Sent: Thursday, December 20, 2001 11:39 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary
> (Part Two) To Robert
> Epstein
>
> At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas
> thread and we’ll still be
> discussing the same thread as when he left....<yikes>

Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda
panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey
of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the
concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way.
From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a
long quote:

*******
In the “Dhammasangaùi” the citta is called “pure” or
“luminous” (paùèara), and according to the “Atthasåliní”
this refers to the “life-continuum”, bhavanga-citta.
Citta is a reality which arises and then falls away
immediately. The falling away of the preceding citta is a
condition for the arising of the succeeding citta. The citta
which sees arises and falls away, there is not continuously
a citta which sees. Neither is there continuously a citta
which hears, a citta which experiences tangible object or a
citta which thinks. When we are fast asleep and not
dreaming, there are cittas arising and falling away,
succeeding one another. However, at such moments citta does
not experience an object through the eyes, the ears, the
nose, the tongue, the bodysense or the mind-door. The citta
which does not experience an object through any of the six
doors is the bhavanga-citta. This citta keeps one alive, it
maintains the continuity in one’s life as this particular
person. Bhavanga-cittas are arising and falling away until
there is another type of citta arising which experiences an
object through the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the
bodysense or the mind-door. The bhavanga-cittas arise in
between the processes of cittas which experience objects
through the six doors 5 and this goes on continuously until
the end of one’s lifespan as this particular person.

The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of
‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.”
The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
bodysense or mind. Everybody who is fast asleep looks
innocent, pure, he does not experience like or dislike, he
is not jealous, stingy, conceited, he has no loving kindness
nor compassion; thus, unwholesome or wholesome qualities do
not arise because he does not see, hear, experience tangible
object or think. However, it should be known that whenever
the citta which arises experiences an object through one of
the six doors, citta is not pure. The reason is that many
different defilements have been accumulated in the citta and
these condition the arising of pleasure and attachment when
one sees something pleasant, and the arising of displeasure
and annoyance when one sees something unpleasant.

*** end quote ***

Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
likings for ages.

kom
	
10223

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:12am
Subject: Luminous mind

 	
Hi Sarah,

First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries and
Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to
address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious mind on
the basis of the first two statements of the suttas.

Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta
"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
mind." 

We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using
bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it
is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas
could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe
that all cittas could be discern.

What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent self. My
reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of
cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like.

There are two ways to look at it, 

From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as they could
be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed disciples.

For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the state of
mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a
"permanent self). 

It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I think my
position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and
rethinking :).

A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common
in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this
approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one
Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very
difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how the
mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the Mahayana
traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or enlightement
which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a permanent self.

Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how
does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects
(a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details
will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy
:))



Kind regards
Ken O

P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga cittas or
not he will not make such a note. 



> Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered comments
> and
> notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I’ll just add a few notes to those
> earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> *****
> 
> 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the
> ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > bhavanga-citta..
> *****
> 
> 2. Without any doubt, very few ‘Buddhists’ are interested in these same
> commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their
> value when
> the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them or
> disagree
> when they don’t.
> *****
> 
> 3. There are a few of us ‘dinosaurs’ left who, on the other hand, have
> every
> confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
> explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and
> Abhidhamma. We
> fully realise we’re a dying breed, but actually agree with the quote I
> gave
> from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is ‘uniform in sentiment’.
> *****
> 
> 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is
> consistent
> with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), Questions
> of
> K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> *****
> 
> 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> >“....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?”
> .....
> 
> As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the sleep,
> but
> whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without
> sense-door or
> mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there are
> no
> defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my earlier
> quotes
> from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> .....
> 
> “When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act,
> and a 
> mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who
> knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
> Just,
> O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will
> fall
> even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his
> mind has
> returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind
> inactive
> knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream.”
> *****
> 
> 6. T.B. asks: 
> “And why would the perception of its
> > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?”
> .....
> 
> As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding the
> mind (i.e
> the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome
> states
> which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects
> experienced
> with bhavanga cittas in between.
> 
> In one of those other posts I wrote:
> .....
> “In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing
> cittas and
> the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the value
> of
> skilful states even ‘if for just the lasting of a finger-snap’.I think
> it’s
> important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> 
> ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the
> mind:
> insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change it
> is.
> 
> ‘This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that come
> from
> without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of taints
> that come
> from without.’ “
> .....
> 
> In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in
> theory) helps
> us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure state,
> but
> rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> .....
> 
> I wrote before:
> 
> “In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> 
> ‘Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life whenever
> there
> is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of consciousness
> is
> most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs momentarily
> during
> waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.’ 
> *****
> 
> 7. T.B. asks: “And further, if
> > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean to
> > develop the bhavanga-citta?”
> .....
> 
> There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I understand.
> Bhavanga
> citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis in
> the
> suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing kusala
> states.
> the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of abhidhamma
> is
> essential in this regard.
> *****
> 
> 8. T.B. says:
> ‘> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be
> derived
> > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or delusion
> are
> > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of awareness.
> > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.’
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very
> clear that
> the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of ‘greed, aversion, or
> delusion’.
> Without these core roots, there is no ‘becoming’ and no dukkha. Of
> course they
> have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so
> often, only
> arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If
> there is
> not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-rising
> skilful
> state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a
> ‘finger-snap’), it
> would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> 
> I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that explained
> not only
> in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> *****
> 
> 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > ‘With this
> > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: 
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a
> permanent
> mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary to
> their
> ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of awareness and
> concentration
> referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high state
> of
> wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with any
> bhavanga
> cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> *****
> 
> 10. T.B. adds:
> > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that not
> only
> > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for them
> to
> > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on those
> > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be realized.
> .....
> 
> This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this highest
> level
> of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of
> defilements. I
> truly don’t wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> *****
> 
> Howard and Ken O, please know that I’m not asking you to ‘buy’ any idea,
> but
> merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down by the
> Sangha
> since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all would
> admit).
> 
> I don’t want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your other
> points
> (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please send
> them back
> to me again because you’ve considered carefully, I know.
> 
> Sarah


	
10224

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 1:20am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Kom,

It is such a relief to have you back. You obviously realised I needed your
assistance;-)) 

Kom>>>>Thank you bringing in the quote about bhavanga from Milinda
panha and others. You probably know this already, A Survey
of Paramatha Dhammas in Thai as well as Nina's explains the
concepts of cittta (bhavanga) being "Pantara" the same way.
From Nina's version (http://www.abhidhamma.org/Para3.htm), a
long quote:

Thanks so much for adding the quotes from Survey. They helped me a lot and I’m
glad to be reminded. I may have quoted it before, but not in the posts I sent
Rob ep to review. 

I find it very sobering and a condition for calm to reflect how it’s just on
account of the sense-door activity that the kilesa arrise....as soon as there
is seeing or hearing or other sense-door activity, immediately it’s a condition
for lobha and the other defilements to arise so very fast. We think these
sense-door activities last, but when there are bhavanga cittas, there is no
sense door experiencing. In the same way, when there is the sense door
activity, there is no world of concepts.....The abhidhamma helps a lot, doesn’t
it?

I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give you
the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the
Atthasalini one:

**********
Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl:

‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’
‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. But when his sleep has become
light, and he is not yet fully conscious, in that interval it is that dreams
are dreamt. When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
(has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a 
mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. Just,
O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow will fall
even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep his mind has
returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind inactive
knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not dream. For it
is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt. As the miror, O king, are
you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’

**********

“Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of ‘exceedingly pure,’ with
reference to the subconscious life-continuum. So the Buddha has said;-
‘bhikkhus, the mind is luminous, but is corrupted by adventitious corruptions.’
Though immoral, it is called ‘clear’ because it issues (from subconscious vital
conditions) just as a tributary of the Ganges is like the Ganges and a
tributary of the Godhaavarii is like the Godhaavarii” (Atth, 140, p.185 PTSed)

*** end quote ***

Kom>>>>>Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
likings for ages.
......

Great comments, Kom..you’re in really good form.

Sarah
....................

p.s. Jaran, take note of Kom's good example.... maybe with your Thai and pali
skills, you could help translate that passage from the Thai commentary for
Nina;-)

...and Dan, I’ve marked March in my diary, but let me tell you that we just
can’t wait that long ;-( 
...............................................................................................................................


	
10225

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:48am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Sarah,

Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana 
approach to insight? Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as 
having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. As long 
as we remember that it is cittas that think self , and not self that 
thinks cittas, we should be right :-)


Hope you are getting some time of over the silly season :-)

Herman



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Hi Ken O and Howard,
> 
> --- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Howard and Sarah,
> > 
> > I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu on "Luminous" 
at
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> > 
> 
> Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered 
comments and
> notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes to 
those
> earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> *****
> 
> 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that the 
ancient
> Pali commentary:
> > maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > bhavanga-citta..
> *****
> 
> 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in these 
same
> commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound their 
value when
> the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore them 
or disagree
> when they don't.
> *****
> 
> 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, 
have every
> confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations and
> explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and 
Abhidhamma. We
> fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the 
quote I gave
> from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'.
> *****
> 
> 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas is 
consistent
> with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), 
Questions of
> K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> *****
> 
> 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?"
> .....
> 
> As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the 
sleep, but
> whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without 
sense-door or
> mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, there 
are no
> defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my 
earlier quotes
> from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> .....
> 
> "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not 
act, and a 
> mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and he 
who knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are 
dreamt. Just,
> O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow 
will fall
> even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep 
his mind has
> returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind 
inactive
> knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not 
dream."
> *****
> 
> 6. T.B. asks: 
> "And why would the perception of its
> > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?"
> .....
> 
> As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding 
the mind (i.e
> the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and unwholesome 
states
> which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects 
experienced
> with bhavanga cittas in between.
> 
> In one of those other posts I wrote:
> .....
> "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing 
cittas and
> the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the 
value of
> skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I 
think it's
> important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> 
> `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as 
the mind:
> insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to change 
it is.
> 
> `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that 
come from
> without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of 
taints that come
> from without.' "
> .....
> 
> In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in 
theory) helps
> us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure 
state, but
> rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> .....
> 
> I wrote before:
> 
> "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> 
> `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life 
whenever there
> is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of 
consciousness is
> most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs 
momentarily during
> waking life countless times between occasions of active cognition.' 
> *****
> 
> 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if
> > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it mean 
to
> > develop the bhavanga-citta?"
> .....
> 
> There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I 
understand. Bhavanga
> citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire emphasis 
in the
> suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing 
kusala states.
> the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of 
abhidhamma is
> essential in this regard.
> *****
> 
> 8. T.B. says:
> `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can be 
derived
> > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that the
> > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or 
delusion are
> > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of 
awareness.
> > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.'
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it very 
clear that
> the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or 
delusion'.
> Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of 
course they
> have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed so 
often, only
> arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. If 
there is
> not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-
rising skilful
> state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for 
a `finger-snap'), it
> would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> 
> I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that 
explained not only
> in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> *****
> 
> 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > `With this
> > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away 
existing
> > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 
calls "purity in
> > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth 
jhana: 
> .....
> 
> On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a 
permanent
> mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite contrary 
to their
> `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and 
concentration
> referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high 
state of
> wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not with 
any bhavanga
> cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> *****
> 
> 10. T.B. adds:
> > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that 
not only
> > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential for 
them to
> > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow on 
those
> > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be 
realized.
> .....
> 
> This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this 
highest level
> of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of 
defilements. I
> truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> *****
> 
> Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' any 
idea, but
> merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down 
by the Sangha
> since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all 
would admit).
> 
> I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your 
other points
> (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please 
send them back
> to me again because you've considered carefully, I know.
> 
> Sarah
>
	
10226

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 6:38am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Sarah (and Kom)

How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. 
As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of 
Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying 
being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining 
after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana 
Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of 
the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part 
Three). 

As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you 
have taken off some of my burdens. 

Your analysis of Thanissaro Bhikkhu's misconceptions and 
misinterpretations is remarkably good, and freed me of considerable 
workload. 

Well, sorry about my being workload-conscious! You know what I mean.

Sarah, you wrote:

"I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands."

It is very kind of you to have confidence in me. I will try my best 
to offer academically reliable posts here. 

You also wrote:

"Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean 
to interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we 
should try to `account for their actual usage.'"

You are not interrupting the Parinibbana discussion at all. Your 
contributions are very welcome. 

Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three) coming soon, with a new 
treatment of the luminous mind! 


With best wishes,

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > I have gone on and been a bit redundant to underline this point. 
One really
> > needs
> > to deal with the term 'undefined reality' 
> 
> I'll leave these references in Suan's capable hands.
> 
> 
> > Elsewhere the Buddha has made a point of saying that the state of 
Parinibbana
> > 'is
> > not one of darkness', but of light. 
> 
> Would you give the reference for this? 
> 
> >And elsewhere he has said that 'mind is
> > luminous' but defiled by incoming defilements, indicating to me 
at least, if
> > not
> > to others, that the mind is inherently luminous, and that cittas 
are only in
> > a
> > state of ignorance because of a kind of shrouding or delusion. 
It implies
> > that
> > when the delusion is gone, there is still an underlying 
luminosity to be
> > discovered.
> 
> Now, Rob, we had a very long discussion about this sutta in Ang. 
Nikaya. We
> clearly saw that the Pali commentaries made it clear that 
the `luminous mind'
> is referring to the bhavanga cittas arising between the sense-door 
and
> mind-door processes. Reluctantly, I believe you acknowledged this, 
but since
> (in this post and one or two others) you have reverted to your own
> understanding as being, in effect, more reliable than the 
commentaries, I
> think. 
> 
> Meanwhile I'm enjoying your discussion with Suan which I don't mean 
to
> interrupt. I agree that the points should not be ignored and we 
should try to
> `account for their actual usage.'
> 
> Thanks,
> 
> Sarah
> 
> p.s I'll try to show some self-moderation and send that other silly 
sign-off
> you missed off-list.
> 
> All - Pls try to remember to cut off those parts of old posts which 
are not
> necessary for our replies....we all forget sometimes, but many 
people take the
> posts in `digest' form and it does help them.
> 
> ==================
> 
	
10227

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 7:07am
Subject: Re: Luminous mind: To Kenneth Ong

 	
Dear Ken 

How are you?

You wrote:

"This portion of the commentary which I feel is inadequate to
address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious 
mind on the basis of the first two statements of the suttas."

As I need to respond to Robert Epstein and Howard in my Parinibbana 
Subcommentary Series, I have to study the statements of the Buddha 
that mention 'pabassaramidam, Bhikkhave, cittam' and the commentary.

The commentary is very short, yet requires considerable research 
background to understand it, let alone translate it meaningfully in 
natural English. As I will be translating the essential portions of 
it, I also feel the need to write some technical notes on it because 
the translation on its own would not be enough to make sense for 
those who haven't some background in abhidhamma.

As far as I am concerned, the commentary on 'pabassaramidam, 
Bhikkhave, cittam' is not only very adequate, but also very deep and 
involving. You will know this very soon when Parinibbana 
Subcommentary (Part Three) is posted here. You will also see that 
some of your questions:

"how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any 
commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual 
details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I 
sound greedy.." 

will also be automatically solved. The commentary in question is that 
adequate and that involving!


With best wishes

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Sarah,
> 
> First of all, I deeply respected and highly value the commentaries 
and
> Abhidhamma. This portion of the commentary which I feel is 
inadequate to
> address the sutta by just equating bhavanga cittas with luminious 
mind on
> the basis of the first two statements of the suttas.
> 
> Let us revisit the last statement of the sutta
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming 
defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development 
of the
> mind." 
> 
> We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing 
using
> bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
> well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory 
that it
> is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga 
cittas
> could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly 
believe
> that all cittas could be discern.
> 
> What TB sayings is not implying luminious mind as a permanent 
self. My
> reading is that he is equating it with Nibbana or the attainment of
> cessation. Even though we do not know what Nibbana is like.
> 
> There are two ways to look at it, 
> 
> From the Abhidhamma stand point, it could be bhavanga cittas as 
they could
> be possibly be discerned for those who are highly developed 
disciples.
> 
> For the Sutta stand point, it could be pointing to Nibbana or the 
state of
> mind in the attainment of cessation. (there is no implication of a
> "permanent self). 
> 
> It sounds like I am backtracking on my previous email. He he :) I 
think my
> position is rather neutral now after a new more reread of suttas and
> rethinking :).
> 
> A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more 
common
> in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of 
this
> approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. In one
> Mahayana sutta, the Buddha said that defilement to the mind is very
> difficult to discern, only highly developed disciples will know how 
the
> mind (which is luminious) is being defiled. In my view, the 
Mahayana
> traditions tend to equate the luminious mind as Nibbana or 
enlightement
> which I find acceptable as long as there is no notion of a 
permanent self.
> 
> Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation 
how
> does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its 
objects
> (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It 
simply says
> that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
> commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual 
details
> will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound 
greedy
> :))
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O
> 
> P.S. - I don't think TB agree that luminoius mind is bhavanga 
cittas or
> not he will not make such a note. 
> 
> 
> 
> > Thanks for joining in this thread and for your well-considered 
comments
> > and
> > notes by Thanissaro Bhikkhu. I think I'll just add a few notes 
to those
> > earlier posts I just gave the links for:
> > *****
> > 
> > 1. Everyone, it seems, including Thanissaro Bhikkhu, agree that 
the
> > ancient Pali commentary: maintains that "mind" here refers to the
> > > bhavanga-citta..
> > *****
> > 
> > 2. Without any doubt, very few `Buddhists' are interested in 
these same
> > commentaries and those that are, usually refer to and expound 
their
> > value when
> > the interpretation accords with their understanding and ignore 
them or
> > disagree
> > when they don't.
> > *****
> > 
> > 3. There are a few of us `dinosaurs' left who, on the other hand, 
have
> > every
> > confidence in the Pali commentaries and find the interpretations 
and
> > explanations without fail to accord with the Suttas, Vinaya and
> > Abhidhamma. We
> > fully realise we're a dying breed, but actually agree with the 
quote I
> > gave
> > from the Bahiranidana that the Tipitaka is `uniform in sentiment'.
> > *****
> > 
> > 4. Accordingly, the commentary explanation about bhavanga cittas 
is
> > consistent
> > with other commentaries (see Atthasalini quote given in link), 
Questions
> > of
> > K.Milinda and of course with the Abhidhamma itself.
> > *****
> > 
> > 5. Thanissaro Bhikkhu (T.B. from now on) asks:
> > >"....because the commentaries compare the bhavanga-citta to
> > > deep sleep, why is it called luminous?"
> > .....
> > 
> > As I understand, it is not the cittas which are compared to the 
sleep,
> > but
> > whilst in the deep sleep, there are only bhavanga cittas without
> > sense-door or
> > mind-door activity. Without sense-door or mind-door activity, 
there are
> > no
> > defilements apparent. The following was included in one of my 
earlier
> > quotes
> > from K.Milinda (1V,8.36):
> > .....
> > 
> > "When a man is in deep sleep, O king, his mind has returned home
> > (has entered again into Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does 
not act,
> > and a 
> > mind hindered in its action knows not the evil and the good, and 
he who
> > knows
> > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are 
dreamt.
> > Just,
> > O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no 
shadow will
> > fall
> > even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep sleep 
his
> > mind has
> > returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act, and a mind
> > inactive
> > knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not does not 
dream."
> > *****
> > 
> > 6. T.B. asks: 
> > "And why would the perception of its
> > > luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the mind?"
> > .....
> > 
> > As I understand the sutta, the discussion is about understanding 
the
> > mind (i.e
> > the cittas) in terms of understanding the wholesome and 
unwholesome
> > states
> > which arise and fall away rapidly on account of the sense objects
> > experienced
> > with bhavanga cittas in between.
> > 
> > In one of those other posts I wrote:
> > .....
> > "In the 2 suttas in AN, reference is made to the speed of changing
> > cittas and
> > the importance of seeing the danger or unwholesome states and the 
value
> > of
> > skilful states even `if for just the lasting of a finger-snap'.I 
think
> > it's
> > important to appreciate the context when we read the following:
> > 
> > `Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change 
as the
> > mind:
> > insomuch that it is no easy thing to illustrate how quick to 
change it
> > is.
> > 
> > `This mind, monks is luminous, but it is defiled by taints that 
come
> > from
> > without; that mind, monks, is luminous, but it is cleansed of 
taints
> > that come
> > from without.' "
> > .....
> > 
> > In other words, understanding more about bhavanga cittas (even in
> > theory) helps
> > us to realize how there is nothing lasting, no underlying pure 
state,
> > but
> > rapidly changing cittas and sense and mind doorways.
> > .....
> > 
> > I wrote before:
> > 
> > "In the Abhidhammattha Sangaha (111, 8) we read that:
> > 
> > `Bhavanga cittas arise and pass away every moment during life 
whenever
> > there
> > is no active cognitive process taking place. This type of 
consciousness
> > is
> > most evident during deep dreamless sleep, but it also occurs 
momentarily
> > during
> > waking life countless times between occasions of active 
cognition.' 
> > *****
> > 
> > 7. T.B. asks: "And further, if
> > > "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what would it 
mean to
> > > develop the bhavanga-citta?"
> > .....
> > 
> > There is no suggestion of developing bhavanga-citta, as I 
understand.
> > Bhavanga
> > citta are vipaka citta and cannot be developed. The entire 
emphasis in
> > the
> > suttas is to seeing the danger of akusala states and developing 
kusala
> > states.
> > the donosaurs amongst us would say that some understanding of 
abhidhamma
> > is
> > essential in this regard.
> > *****
> > 
> > 8. T.B. says:
> > `> A more reasonable approach to understanding the statement can 
be
> > derived
> > > from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the mind that 
the
> > > meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its luminosity means
> > > understanding that defilements such as greed, aversion, or 
delusion
> > are
> > > not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary part of 
awareness.
> > > Without this understanding, it would be impossible to practice.'
> > .....
> > 
> > On the contrary, I read and understand the Buddha as making it 
very
> > clear that
> > the intrinsic nature of the mind is that of `greed, aversion, or
> > delusion'.
> > Without these core roots, there is no `becoming' and no dukkha. Of
> > course they
> > have nothing to do with awareness. Awareness, sati, as discussed 
so
> > often, only
> > arises with skilful states and cittas. It can know any reality. 
If
> > there is
> > not some understanding of the nature of sati as an occasionally-
rising
> > skilful
> > state that is aware of a specific reality (not lasting for a
> > `finger-snap'), it
> > would truly be impossible for any practice (patipatti). 
> > 
> > I believe this understanding conforms more closely with that 
explained
> > not only
> > in the Suttas, but also in the commentaries and Abhidhamma.
> > *****
> > 
> > 9.T.B. continues to add that:
> > > `With this
> > > understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away 
existing
> > > defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 
calls "purity in
> > > terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> > > concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth 
jhana: 
> > .....
> > 
> > On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and 
a
> > permanent
> > mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite 
contrary to
> > their
> > `uniform sentiment'. The purity of the states of awareness and
> > concentration
> > referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of an exceedingly high 
state
> > of
> > wholesomeness, which again are fleeting (though I believe not 
with any
> > bhavanga
> > cittas in between the mind-door processes in this case).
> > *****
> > 
> > 10. T.B. adds:
> > > From this state it is possible to develop the discernment that 
not
> > only
> > > cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any potential 
for them
> > to
> > > ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening that follow 
on those
> > > acts of discernment would "consciousness without feature" be 
realized.
> > .....
> > 
> > This could be considered controversial in that it suggests this 
highest
> > level
> > of jhana to be an essential ingredient for the eradication of
> > defilements. I
> > truly don't wish to re-open this can of worms too;-)
> > *****
> > 
> > Howard and Ken O, please know that I'm not asking you to `buy' 
any idea,
> > but
> > merely raising the understanding of it which has been passed down 
by the
> > Sangha
> > since the First Council (or at least soon after, as I think all 
would
> > admit).
> > 
> > I don't want to make this post any longer, but if you feel your 
other
> > points
> > (from your other posts) have not been properly addressed, please 
send
> > them back
> > to me again because you've considered carefully, I know.
> > 
> > Sarah

	
10228

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 8:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Herman

--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Ken,
> 
> Just to clarify, does there need to be awareness of a thought, before 
> it is a thought? 

k: You got to excuse me for my amateurish explanation. Furthermore, I
kind of lazy person who do not like to get into too much details studies. 
I assuming that a present thought moment we have are series of cittas that
form it. For pple like me, yes :). For highly developed disciples, every
citta is being discern even before it became the present thought moment (a
series of citta)


> I can certainly agree that there is only awareness of any one thing 
> at any time, but that doesn't mean there isn't a whole lot going on 
> in the background.

k: that is true, there is a whole lot of noise in our background. The
Abhidhamma point is that they are serial process and not simutlaneous
process. All such noises in the background is also a serial process (as
explain in my earlier email). There is a logic to the background noise bc
there are billions of citta in a twinkle of an eye, just imagine of much
brain cells interactions we have just to breath, listen, see....(without
we knowing it). Thus such speed give us an impression when we observe
one thought moment but in the back ground seems that all our senses
happened simultaneously. Similarily like light owes its speed to be of
one colour, but in fact the background of the light is a combination of
seven colours. Furthermore, my assumption is that speed is relative. A
fly speed will mean differently to us and to the fly itself. Speed is a
controlling factor for pple like me but for those highly developed
disciple, I think it is not an issue at all.



Kind regards
Ken O




	
10229

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:13am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom

> The “Atthasåliní” (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> states: “Mind also is said to be ‘clear’ in the sense of
> ‘exceedingly pure’ with reference to the bhavanga-citta.”
> The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> bodysense or mind. 

On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure
since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 



Kind regards
Ken O

	
10230

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:26am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah,

Franking speaking by posting this passage it developed more confusion.


> I was trying to strictly limit my re-quotes in the post, but let me give
> you
> the full K.Milinda one which you may have missed last time and also the
> Atthasalini one:
> 
> **********
> Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl:
> 
> ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’
> ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. 

k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is neither
sleeping or awake. 



>But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious,
in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep
sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into
Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in
its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
> not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.

> Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow
will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep
sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act,
and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not
does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
As the miror, O king,
> are
> you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’


k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a
permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent self.



Kind regards
Ken O

	
10231

From: tikmok <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:28am
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Ken O,

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Kom
> 
> > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of
> > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta."
> > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> > bodysense or mind. 
> 
> On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding pure= 

> since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 

There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi 
function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga, an= 
d 
the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the co-arisi= 
ng 
cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti citta = 

are "identical", although each citta performs a different function.

kom
	
10232

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 9:41am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom,

> Of course, it is easy to like the concept of having pure or
> luminous mind. But when the mind is pure or lumninous, do
> we actually know it? What about when the mind is impure or
> dark with defilments? It is way easier to like something
> that we consider good, desirable, or something that we
> consider to be for our development and our stature (I have a
> pure mind), rather than knowing and understanding the
> reality that appears now. We have been accumulating those
> likings for ages.


k: I belive investigating is a pre-requsite for seeing reality as it is.
Without examine and ascertain concepts for congruity and interpolating
between Sutta and Abhidhamm, then the meaningful purpose of Abhidhamma
will weaken considerably. When we are studying such concepts, I believe
we are not desiring that we prefer a luminious mind than a defile mind, we
are trying to make sense out of its meaning of the sutta in its relation
to Abhidhamma. We are still investigation and learning and not yearning
that luminious mind is our goal, similarily to our investigating of
Nibbana or PariNibbana.



Kind regards
Ken O


	
10233

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
op 20-12-2001 06:27 schreef srnsk@a... op srnsk@a...:

Num: From my Thai 
> Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana.
> ---------------------------
> 
> Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give in/follow
> ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca, samutayasacca,
> nirodhasacca and maggasacca.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa which
> are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8 ariya-magga.
> Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana.
> 
> Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known,
> samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should be
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to
> responsiblity:kicca~nana.
> 
> Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be known,
> is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which should
> be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been
> done:kata~nana.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is
> lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in
> sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly in
> following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana in
> next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana.
> 
> Hope further information from other sources will help more.
>
> Num
> 
>Dear Num, thank you very much for this info. I tried to look it up in the Co to
Abhidhammattha Sangaha, translated by A. Somporn, but I have an incomplete
edition in booklets and could not find it.
Now, I used to think that kata ~naa.na must be lokuttara but in India I
learnt differently. A. Sujin said, when speaking about the highest level
(doy ukkrit, in Pali ugghati is to lift up) kata ~naa.na is lokuttara, but
there are other levels, when vipassana ~naa.na realizes the impermanence and
thus dukkha of dhammas that arise and fall away. It is all so detailed and
subtle. We have to look at the context: you mention the level of anuloma,
arising before gotrabhu, which is followed by lokuttara citta. This is
already "doy ukkrit", according to the highest level.
Also she said, when there is kata~naa.na there are still sacca ~naa.na and
kicca ~naa.na, they develop on and on. One realizes more and more the Truths
that should be known (sacca) and the Truths that are known through the
development of vipassana ~naa.na (kicca), and then there will be the fruit,
kata ~naa.na according to the level that has been reached.
Would you perhaps have time to also look at the Thai Co. I mentioned?
It makes sense to me that she deals with these three in such a dynamic way,
because they are not static, not abstract texbook terms.
I still have on my computer your q. about pakatupanissaya p. from before I
went to India, but I think Sarah answered these?
Then I want to know whether your hand got cured completely? Can you type
without pain? 
Thank you again for the texts, Nina.

	

10234

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:11am
Subject: Concept

 	
Hi Purnomo. Nice to hear from you again. You explained in a very concise way
the difference between concept and paramattha, in a way understandanble to
everybody. I like the way you formulated this,
best wishes, Nina.
	

 	 

	
10235

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 10:17am
Subject: A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi, all -

I expect that some of you may find the title of this post to be 
somewhat displeasing. If so, you have my apologies. Let me explain what I 
mean.
The Abhidhamma, itself, views a stream of consciousness as continuous 
in the sense of being unbroken, without gaps. But that stream is analyzed 
into processes, and the processes into cittas. As I see it, that parsing of 
experience into processes and cittas, while not ungrounded, is still 
conventional. As I understand it, a boundary between processes occurs on the 
occasion of one arammana being replaced by another - a cessation and an 
origination. Within a process, a boundary between cittas occurs on the 
occasion of a cetasika ceasing and/or a new cetasika originating. This sort 
of conceptual parsing is well grounded inasmuch as differences among 
arammanas are discernable as are differences among cetasikas. There is no 
mistaking hardness with warmth or feeling with volition, for example. But 
what differences are considered significant is a matter of convention. I see 
the parsing of experience into processes, and of those into cittas, as not 
different in kind, for example, from our isolating certain groups of 
experiences called 'tables' from out of the entire range of experience. One 
could imagine [and this idea is not original with me - I read it somewhere, 
but have embellished it a bit] a person from some remote tropical island 
coming upon a table for the first time and thinking how odd it is that four 
perfectly useful wooden sticks (or, as his people would call them, "coconut 
smashers") should have been attached to a perfectly serviceable "hut floor".
Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying 
them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there is 
even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are *mere* 
concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. After all, how many of 
us can "see" cessations or originations of cetasikas and arammanas?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10236

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 5:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom,

What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta and I believe
has not answered my question. If we based on the commentary as excerpt
below to describe bhavanga citta as exceeding pure bc it experience no
sense object, then I would said that the first citta of our life continual
will also be exceeding pure bc it also does not experience any sense
object. My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding pure
just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory. Then this
would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since it also
experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to luminious
mind.


Kind regards
Ken O





--- tikmok <tikmok@y...> wrote: > Dear Ken O,
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> > Hi Kom
> > 
> > > The "Atthasåliní" (Expositor I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140)
> > > states: "Mind also is said to be `clear' in the sense of
> > > `exceedingly pure' with reference to the bhavanga-citta."
> > > The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience
> > > an object through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue,
> > > bodysense or mind. 
> > 
> > On this basis, could we say that the patisandhi citta also exceeding
> pure=
> 
> > since to me it also does not experience any sense object. 
> 
> There are 19 possible types of citta that are said to perform patisandhi
> 
> function. For the entire life of a being, the patisanthi, the bhavanga,
> an=
> d 
> the cutti citta are of the same type. In a single life-time, the
> co-arisi=
> ng 
> cetasikas and the object (aramana) of patisandhi, bhavanga, and cuti
> citta =
> 
> are "identical", although each citta performs a different function.
> 
> kom

	
10237

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:00pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi Howard,

> Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
> to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
> nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in reifying 
> them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there 
> is 
> even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are 
> *mere* 
> concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. 

I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. May 
I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole 
or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is 
concept, reality is reality.

Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in 
suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an 
luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not 
practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a 
kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf firmly 
enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can turn 
into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly.



Num


	
10238

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri Dec 21, 2001 2:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi, Num -

In a message dated 12/21/01 10:02:55 PM Eastern Standard Time, srnsk@a... 
writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> > Now, don't get me wrong. The concepts of processes and cittas *seem* 
> > to be quite well grounded ones (as does the concept of table), but, 
> > nonetheless, they are conventions, and there is as much danger in 
> reifying 
> > them as there is in reifying tables, mountains,and persons. Perhaps there 
> 
> > is 
> > even more danger, because for the mass of worldings these concepts are 
> > *mere* 
> > concept, not being a part of our conscious experience. 
> 
> I really appreciate your input here. I completely agree with your point. 
> May 
> I add that the same apply to suttanta/vinaya pitaka, the budhism as a whole 
> 
> or even to sciences, medicine and into daily life. Concept (pannatti) is 
> 
> concept, reality is reality.
> 
> Reminded me of Kom and Nina's posts about pitfall. There is an analogy in 
> suttanta pitaka, sangyutta-nikaya, tayana-sutta, the Buddha said to an 
> luminous god regarding a bhikkhu who enters into a monkshood but does not 
> practice any good and do bad things, like a man grasping a ka-grass-leaf (a 
> 
> kind of grass with a sharp edge leaf), if he not holds the grass-leaf 
> firmly 
> enough. The leaf will make a painful cut on his hand. So good thing can 
> turn 
> into double-edge sword if we do not hold it firmly or correctly.
-------------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding a snake to 
get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you can get the 
snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get the person 
instead!
-------------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> 
> 
> Num
> 
================================
With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10239

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 0:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Suan and Ken O,

Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O.

Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from
the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked
quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you
both may find it interesting to review at:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386
commentary notes translation

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408
sutta translation

Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and
your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation
with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself.

Sarah
..........................................................................................................

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> 
> 
> Dear Sarah (and Kom)
> 
> How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous mind. 
> As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement of 
> Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an underlying 
> being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) remaining 
> after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana 
> Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement of 
> the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part 
> Three). 
> 
> As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you 
> have taken off some of my burdens. 
> 
<snip>

	
10240

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 1:51am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
Dear Ken O,

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah,

> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements.
> The well-instructed disciple of the noble ones discerns that as it
> actually is present, which is why I tell you that -- for the
> well-instructed disciple of the noble ones -- there is development of the
> mind." 
> 
> We are saying that there is development of the mind, developing using
> bhavanga cittas on the basis that you are saying that these
> well-instructed disciple are highly developed ones then the theory that it
> is bhavanga citta could still stand on its ground. Bc bhavanga cittas
> could be discern with highly developed disciples which I strongly believe
> that all cittas could be discern.
.....

Sometimes when we read the texts it seems that all realities should be known.
However, we should remember we are reading about the Buddha’s extraordinary
understanding. Can we expect ‘all cittas’ could be discerned? (Btw, Howard uses
discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless of
whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the sense of
‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with him;-))

You’ll see in the following extract from the com notes I just gave a link for,
that the defilements arise in the javana process in a later sense door or mind
door process. Any understanding also arises in these javana processes only, to
know any reality. This is what is meant development of the mind. It is not
referring to understanding bhavanga cittas specifically, but we need to know
there are these cittas in between other doorways.

*********************
<quote> 
idampi nirupakkilesataaya
parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m.

N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous.
That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.

aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi.

N: ? by oncoming ?(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it,
but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).

upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati
vuccati.

N: ?by defilements<sum>. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called
defiled. 
<end quote>

********************

> A bit off track to the Mahayana traditions. Luminous mind is more common
> in Mahayana rather than the Thervada. Thervada is more cautious of this
> approach due to the subtle implication of a permanent self. 
.....

In Theravada, there is no underlying awareness or luminosity and nibbana is
that reality which is experienced by lokuttara cittas only. Before those
moments it is not experienced in any way.
.....

> Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how
> does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects
> (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
> that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
> commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details
> will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound greedy
> :))
.....

As we won’t be seeing you, that’s OK;-))
I’ll adda couple of links. Kom and Num are also very clued up on the details.
As Suan suggested, it helps a lot to understand some abhidhamma when reading
the Suttas and commentaries. All the details are there, for sure.

Let me suggest you read up on the processes and javana cittas from:

1. Useful Posts - processes
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/files/Useful_Posts
> 
2. Abhidhamma in Daily Life, ch 12 (Bhavanga), 13 (Sense-door and Mind-door
processes), 14 (Javana)
http://www.abhidhamma.org/

Meanwhile I’ll go off for a hike and look in on my return.

As I’ve said before, you’re a natural ‘abhidhammist’ or ‘abhidhammika’ - I
really appreciate your keen interest, intelligent questions and good humour
too;-). 

Sarah
p.s. I apologise for just taking out a few parts from your post
...........................................................................................


	
10241

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Jon,
> Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how
> they fit
> together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that
> cittas and
> Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. 
> 
> Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate
> realities' I
> derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status
> as
> 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all.

Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely carry
their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* dhammas
are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing characteristic of
a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? 

> I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely
> that:

Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have suggested
one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)--

> a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting,
> momentary
> occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or
> namas.

"a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they
actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) 
- as a nama or a rupa, 
- as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature (sabhava --
i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), and 
- as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, anatta)."

> b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or
> aggregate
> arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing
> independently, would
> be considered real or ultimate.

"b/ They are ‘ultimate’ in the sense that they are the final, irreducible
components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an
aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects that are
people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas."

> And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are
> 'not
> real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not
> lasting
> beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they
> are in the
> moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or
> satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly.

"By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' in the
conventional sense because, although having their own characteristic, they
are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. However,
only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in the
moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting quality
or satisfaction."

> Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is
> described.

Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described or
explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that
description or explanation.)

Jon



	
10242

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Thanks, Jon.
> Can you please explain to me within the scheme described below,
> what exactly is a concept, and where is it classified?
> 
> And why is it not a dhamma?
> It would seem to me that a thought, image, idea or concept would also
> have a
> particular content that would identify it. 

Again, you are right on track when you say...

> If I imagine or think of a rupa, is
> that considered completely different than actually mentally apprehending
> one at the moment of seeing? Is this the distinction?

At the moment that consciousness experiences a rupa (hardness, sound etc),
the rupa is directly experienced, while at a later moment of thinking
about the sound the actual rupa is not available to be experienced.

This analysis is useful to know about because, even without us having to
consciously think about it, this sort of thing is going on all the time. 
Every moment of actual sense-door experience is a condition for a whole
lot of thinking about the rupa that has just been experienced.

For example, if the rupa that represents the sound of a person's voice is
experienced, it is only by 'thinking' about that rupa that we can
attribute meaning to the words and significance to the tone of speech etc.

Comparing the 2 kinds of moments--
- at the moment of actual hearing, the object of consciousness/citta is
the *rupa that is sound* (a dhamma)
- at the subsequent moments of thinking about the sound that was heard,
the object of consciousness/citta is *a thought about the sound that had
been heard* (and this is not a dhamma).

At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing an
object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a reality
while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) is
not a reality.

Jon

	
10243

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:06am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Victor

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon,
> 
> Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned phenomenon
> such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is
> unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right
> discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my
> self."

Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* this
'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? 

Jon

	
10244

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:14am
Subject: Back again...

 	
Hi everybody. Remember me?

Anyway, now that the Christmas holidays have come, I've got some extra time on my hands, and why not spend it here 
again?

Regards

Anders Honore
	
10245

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:16am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’
> are not
> > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about
> particular
> > agglomerations of rupas.
> > 
> =============================
> I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the 
> imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental
> constructs, 
> conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical
> objects 
> have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine 
> observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external
> entities, 
> of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else.

I am with you so far, Howard.

> However, 
> those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable.

It depends what you man by 'directly observable'. A thought is of course
the (sole) object of the moment of consciousness that 'thinks' the
thought, and is in that sense 'observed' by the citta. And of course
there are mental factors (such as strong attachment or aversion, perhaps)
accompanying that moment of consciousness, so there is plenty of 'reality'
going on at the time.

'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of a
dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is that
of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly
experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being the
object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts.

> It seems 
> to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer
> to 
> the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept'
> to 
> refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under
> the 
> 4th foundation of mindfulness.

Well, I think all of us are using the term 'concept' to refer to the
thought itself (as opposed the consciousness that 'thinks' the thought),
but I'm not sure why you say it falls under the 4th foundation of
mindfulness. Is there a particular passage in the Satipatthana Sutta you
have in mind?

As I understand the texts --
- the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is real (a
dhamma)
- the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any
individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a
dhamma.

I think the passage from CMA* pasted below is useful.

Jon

*'CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS)
The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide
(The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation
of, the main commentaries to the A-S)

Guide to Ch I, #2 
According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the
conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional
realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and
conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as
living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting
objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The
Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate
validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men,
women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible
realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are
products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by
reason of their own nature.

Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their
own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final,
irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result
from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word
‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ =
ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing.

Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, but are also the
ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame
seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional
realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective
actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that
form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma.

Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person
cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise
attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. 
Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of
ultimate or supreme knowledge.



	
10246

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:33am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right view)

 	
Mike

--- "m. nease" <mlnease@y...> wrote: > Jon,
> 
> Thanks for this great excerpt--hope you'll add it to
> the files. Where you write:
> 
> --- jonoabb <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> 
> > Finally, whereas the role of wisdom in the mundane
> > jhanas is 
> > subordinate to that of concentration, in the
> > supramundane 
> > jhanas wisdom and concentration are well balanced,
> > with 
> > concentration fixing the mind on the unconditioned
> > element and 
> > wisdom fathoming the deep significance of the Four
> > Noble 
> > Truths. [5.4]
> > 
> > [Jon's notes:]
> 
> > 5.4. The primary attribute of a moment of jhana
> > citta is the 
> > degree of concentration on the object at that
> > moment, whereas 
> > the attribute of a moment of magga citta is the
> > wisdom that 
> > pierces the Truths.
> 
> Do you mean, "The primary attribute of a moment of
> [mundane] jhana citta is the degree of concentration
> on the object at that moment, whereas the attribute
> of a moment of magga citta is the wisdom that pierces
> the Truths [in balance with concentration (as well as
> the other path-factors)]? Or have I missed or
> misunderstood something here?

No, your version is spot on. Thanks for the elucidation.

Jon

PS How're the travels going?

	
10247

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:37am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for
> the
> > > Supramundane Path Factors to arise.
> > 
> > Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of
> > satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold
> > Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in
> strength. 
> > This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for
> > supramundane consciousness are developed.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it
> has
> experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the
> others?

As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated
and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual
factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in
the future.

Jon

	
10248

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:41am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of
> > things, but our incorrect understanding of realities.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our
> incorrect
> understanding of realities as they arise.' ?

Yes, it is the development of the correct understanding of realities as
they arise that leads to magga citta, so it must be the incorrect
understanding of those same realities that is at the root of the problem. 
This I think neatly states the situation in its ultimate sense. ;-)) ;-))

However, wrong understanding about realities that has been accumulated
(stored up) can manifest, for example, at moments of thinking when there
is no reality as object of the consciousness. So in more conventional
terms we do talk about a general incorrect understanding of realities (=
wrong view).

Jon


	
10249

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:41am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Dear Mike,

Hope you had a good trip up north.

--- "m. nease" <mlnease@y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah and Howard,
> 
> Thanks for this great quotation. What is 
> 'Nyanaponika's little book on Abhidhamma' exactly?

'Abhidhamma Studies'..an inexpensive book avialable from BPS or Wisdom books

>>.Finally, the individual
> > contributions of all those different perceptual
> > processes have to be remembered
> > and coordinated in order to form the final and
> > complete perception of a rose.”
> 
> Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here),
> he means concept?

I didn't answer before because I think it's a little clear. sometimes
perception or perceptual seems to refer to sanna and sometimes to concept as
you suggest. Anway, the gist was that there are many, many cittas accompanied
by sanna marking their objects (visible object through the eye door and then
many concepts through the mind-door) before the idea or concept of rose is
thought about.

> Ven. Buddhadhatta defines aaramma.na as 'a
> sense-object.' I'm not sure if it's 'abhidammically'
> important (whether a citta can take more than one
> aaramma.na ); provisionally I sidestep the issue by
> thinking of it just as the object taken by a citta.

As I wrote earlier to Howard, arammana can be concept or reality. sometimes
sense-object just refers to objects appearing through the 5 sense-doors in
which case this meaning would be too limited. If it applies to mind-door
objects as well (talking about 6 sense-doors as the texts often do), that's
fine. 

The problem with thinking there can be more than one object at a time is that
then we tend to have the idea of being able to see and hear or see and think or
think of many concepts at the same time. This kind of (wrong) thinking makes
it very difficult for sati to arise, I think.

> Actually, the more I understand (I think) about these
> cetasikas, the more sense the way I've always viewed
> memory seems to make, subjectively, intuitively,
> logically and by way of the various expressions in the
> Dhammavinaya. Otherwise I think I'd have lost
> interest in abhidhamma long ago...

Good, tell us more;-)

See you soon for some live discussion I hope.

Sarah


	
10250

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:15am
Subject: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Herman,

--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> 
> Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana 
> approach to insight? 

It’s a little difficult for me to answer for all dinosaurs, but most the ones I
know well, read and understand that there are examples in the texts of those
realizing nibbana after having attained the highest jhanas and the ‘dry-insight
workders’ who have not attained these highest jhanas. Individual accumulations
are very complicated and therefore even amongst those that have attained
jhanas, there are many, many ‘varieties’ and levels and ways that nibbana is
realized and whether jhanas are ‘used’ at the time of enlightenment. It’s a
complicated area. Rob K and Teng Kee have researched it far more and may add
details. I think most dinosaurs would say there is no rule in this regard, but
I know it’s another controversial area.

>Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as 
> having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. 

I think the reason that the texts make it clear that it is not an essentail
pre-requisite for the development of insight is because this is what the Buddha
taught. Do you understand differently?

>As long 
> as we remember that it is cittas that think self , and not self that 
> thinks cittas, we should be right :-)

I like this quote and reminder and may save it for future use, thanks:-)

> Hope you are getting some time of over the silly season :-)

Today was the first Saturday since the beginning of September that I didn’t
have to teach. Bliss! So I dragged Jon away from his dusty legal tomes in his
office and we went for a beautiful 3hr hike in the hills. This is the best time
of year in Hong Kong - clear sunny, cool days and a chance to put on boots and
gloves for a few days. We have his mother visiting from Adelaide next week and
then Bkk for the weekend. 

Hope you and entourage have a good holiday season and hope you’re not melting
like Azita;-)

Sarah
.................................................................................................


	
10251

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Jon,

I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie 
specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they 
see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being 
described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another 
door, unless you use LSD. 

Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, 
looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour 
experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute 
or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate 
or absolute has relative connotations.

So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour 
blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the 
lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred 
commentaries? ( :-) )

All the best


Herman



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Jon,
> > Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms 
and how
> > they fit
> > together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that
> > cittas and
> > Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. 
> > 
> > Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate
> > realities' I
> > derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a 
status
> > as
> > 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all.
> 
> Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely 
carry
> their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* 
dhammas
> are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing 
characteristic of
> a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? 
> 
> > I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is 
merely
> > that:
> 
> Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have 
suggested
> one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)--
> 
> > a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their 
fleeting,
> > momentary
> > occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or
> > namas.
> 
> "a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they
> actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) 
> - as a nama or a rupa, 
> - as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature 
(sabhava --
> i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), 
and 
> - as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, 
anatta)."
> 
> > b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No 
combined or
> > aggregate
> > arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing
> > independently, would
> > be considered real or ultimate.
> 
> "b/ They are `ultimate' in the sense that they are the final, 
irreducible
> components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an
> aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects 
that are
> people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas."
> 
> > And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that 
they are
> > 'not
> > real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, 
not
> > lasting
> > beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as 
what they
> > are in the
> > moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting 
quality or
> > satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen 
correctly.
> 
> "By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' 
in the
> conventional sense because, although having their own 
characteristic, they
> are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. 
However,
> only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in 
the
> moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting 
quality
> or satisfaction."
> 
> > Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as 
it is
> > described.
> 
> Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described 
or
> explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that
> description or explanation.)
> 
> Jon

	
10252

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Nina

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote: > 
>Dear Jonothan, I was so happy with your post here. This refers to
> what
> I wrote before to you about A. Sujin stressing very much in India (and
> before): sacca ~naa.na, firm foundation knowledge of the truth that has
> to
> be realized, kicca ~naa.na, the task that is development, kata ~naa.na,
> the
> fruit that becomes apparent, but many degrees of these three.
> I want to write about it in my India impressions but this subject is
> very
> difficult, so I am waiting for more details when you are in Bgk. It is
> wonderful Jaran will be there too, he studies commentaries in Thai. I
> give
> you the location in the Thai co : Co to Dhammacakkaa pavattana sutta,
> Mahåvagga, in Thai part 2, p. 426: I got stuck where it states about the
> 12
> aspects, three rounds for four Truths.
> I like your stressing that we should first have a proper understanding
> of
> what the Path is. 
> Nina. 

Thanks for this further reference. I will certainly try to pursue this
while we are in Bangkok (can't guarantee the outcome, though!). It is
something I've never managed to 'get'.

Jon

	
10253

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:47am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Ken O,

last one;-)

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah,
> 
> Franking speaking by posting this passage it developed more confusion.

Yes, it is a little difficult which is why I didn't post it all the first time
I think.

> > **********
> > Qs of K.Milinda, 1V,8,36, Max Muller’s transl:
> > 
> > ‘Ven Nagasena, when a man dreams a dream, is he awake or asleep?’
> > ‘Neither the one, O king, nor yet the other. 
> 
> k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is neither
> sleeping or awake. 

That's right.... no sense-door activity (as I mentioned to Frank before), but
mind-door activity and thinking of concepts.


> >But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully conscious,
> in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep
> sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into
> Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered in
> its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
> > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
> 
> > Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no shadow
> will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep
> sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not act,
> and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows not
> does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are dreamt.
> As the miror, O king,
> > are
> > you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the mind.’
> 
> 
> k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a
> permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent self.

No....just changing cittas (remember yr abhidhamma?)....it just means the mind
is not active anymore...no more concepts and so on, no dreams, no kilesa.
Nothing permanent at all. Just one citta and then another.

Sarah

	
10254

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:47am
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Thanks, Num. This will be useful info to base our discussion on.

Jon

--- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Nina and Jon,
> 
> 
> I don't know this will be any helpful to you or not. From my Thai 
> Abhidhammattha-sagaha, those 3 ~nana were mentioned under anul~om~nana.
> I am 
> going to change into a parrot, OK.
> 
> ---------------------------
> 
> Anul~om~nana is a pa~n~na that acknowledge that one have to give
> in/follow 
> ariyasacca, so one can be detached. Ariyasacca is dukkhasacca,
> samutayasacca, 
> nirodhasacca and maggasacca.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha is nama and rupa
> which 
> are lokiya. Samutaya is tanha, nirodha is nibbana and magga is 8
> ariya-magga. 
> Knowledge at this level is knowing according to the truth:sacca~nana.
> 
> Kicca~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha should be known, 
> samutaya should be let go, nirodha should be enlighten and magga should
> be 
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to 
> responsiblity:kicca~nana.
> 
> Kata~nana is pa~n~na which knows clearly that dukkha which should be
> known, 
> is known. Samutaya which should be let go, is let go. Nirodha which
> should 
> be enlighten, is enlighten and all 8 magga which should be developed, is
> 
> developed. Knowledge at this level is knowing according to what has been
> 
> done:kata~nana.
> 
> 
> Sacca~nana and kicca~nana is ~nana in lokiya level. Kata~nana is 
> lokuttara~nana. The two lokiya~nanas have been already perfected in 
> sakarupekka~nana. So ano~loma~nana is named pa~n~na which knows clearly
> in 
> following through, through ariyasacca. Then nibbana will be an arammana
> in 
> next ~nana, kotarabhu~nana.
> 
> -----------------------------
> 
> Hope further information from other sources will help more.
> 
> 
> Num



	
10255

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Victor

--- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Robert, Howard,
and all,
> 
> If the Buddha used two kinds of speeches, conventional and
> non-conventional,
> I would be interested in knowing some examples of non-conventional
> speech
> that the Buddha used.

There is a useful entry in Buddhist Dictionary under 'paramattha' that
discusses this question. I paste it below (in edited form).

Jon

'Paramattha' 
.. .. ..
"The Buddha, in explaining his doctrine, sometimes used conventional
language and sometimes the philosophical mode of expression which is in
accordance whith undeluded insight into reality. ... Thus, whenever the
suttas speak of man, woman or person, or of the rebirth of a being, this
must not be taken as being valid in the ultimate sense, but as a mere
conventional mode of speech (vohára-vacana).

"It is one of the main characteristics of the Abhidhamma Pitaka, in
distinction from most of the Sutta Pitaka, that it does not employ
conventional language, but deals only with ultimates, or realities in the
highest sense (paramattha-dhammá). 

"But also in the Sutta Pitaka there are many expositions in terms of
ultimate language (paramattha-desaná), namely, wherever these texts deal
with the groups (khandha), elements (dhátu) or sense-bases (áyatana), and
their components; and wherever the 3 characteristics (ti-lakkhana, q.v.)
are applied. The majority of Sutta texts, however, use the conventional
language, as appropriate in a practical or ethical context, because it
"would not be right to say that 'the groups' (khandha) feel shame, etc."

"It should be noted, however, that also statements of the Buddha couched
in conventional language, are called 'truth' (vohára-sacca), being correct
on their own level, which does not contradict the fact that such
statements ultimately refer to impermanent and impersonal processes."



	
10256

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again...

 	
Hi Anders,

Really great to see you back....;-)))

--- Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> wrote: > Hi everybody. Remember
me?

The name rings a bell, I think... 

> Anyway, now that the Christmas holidays have come, I've got some extra time
> on my hands, and why not spend it here 
> again?

Exactly so, no better place to spend them. You'll find most the same old faces
around and many of the same old themes.....;-)) 

Hope you got through all your study assignments with flying colours and look
forward to reading your always challenging and enjoyable posts here. 

You must be pretty snow-bound in Denmark now, right?

Sarah
............................................................................................


	
10257

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:12am
Subject: Re: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Sarah,

The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks 
dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I 
find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the 
Buddha did.

I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. Or is 
that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or 
Teng Kee here, either way)

It is "bloody hot" at present. Air-con is great , especially if you 
own shares in an electricity company as well.

All the best


Herman





--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Herman,
> 
> --- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > 
> > Is it a property of all dinosaurs that they avoid / reject jhana 
> > approach to insight? 
> 
> It's a little difficult for me to answer for all dinosaurs, but 
most the ones I
> know well, read and understand that there are examples in the texts 
of those
> realizing nibbana after having attained the highest jhanas and 
the `dry-insight
> workders' who have not attained these highest jhanas. Individual 
accumulations
> are very complicated and therefore even amongst those that have 
attained
> jhanas, there are many, many `varieties' and levels and ways that 
nibbana is
> realized and whether jhanas are `used' at the time of 
enlightenment. It's a
> complicated area. Rob K and Teng Kee have researched it far more 
and may add
> details. I think most dinosaurs would say there is no rule in this 
regard, but
> I know it's another controversial area.
> 
> >Rejecting an idea because it may be construed as 
> > having some notion of self in it sounds like control to me. 
> 
> I think the reason that the texts make it clear that it is not an 
essentail
> pre-requisite for the development of insight is because this is 
what the Buddha
> taught. Do you understand differently?
> 

> 
> Hope you and entourage have a good holiday season and hope you're 
not melting
> like Azita;-)
> 
> Sarah
	
10258

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:49am
Subject: Clinical Death / Rebirth

 	
Hi all,

Medical and legal opinions vary enormously as to what constitutes 
death. The lack of measurable heart beat and brain activity are not 
decisive indications of cessation of life. The body stays warm for a 
long time after heart beat has stopped. Cellular death is not 
complete for days. Gruesome finds at cemetries have indicated that 
people not yet quite dead have been interred (scratch marks on the 
inside of the coffin).

Yet the Abhidhamma posits a precise moment of death. It is the last 
thought that characterises death. Unless it is the last thought, 
you're not dead. (this sounds like a conceptual definition). Given 
that there is no sense door or mind door activity when the brain 
stops functioning, I presume that it is always the same object held 
by the life-continuum citta when initiating any new life and ending 
any old life.

Perhaps nibbana? 


Herman
	
10259

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 7:10am
Subject: Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah And Nina

 	
Dear Sarah And Nina (and Jim)

How are you?

Thank you, Sarah, for providing me with previous posts with Nina's 
translations.

It is always helpful to consult the results of the hard works of 
dhamma friends like Nina and Jim.

With best wishes to you all,

Suan 




--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan and Ken O,
> 
> Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O.
> 
> Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short 
extracts from
> the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and 
Jim) worked
> quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which 
I think you
> both may find it interesting to review at:
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386
> commentary notes translation
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408
> sutta translation
> 
> Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com 
notes (3) and
> your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's 
translation
> with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself.
> 
> Sarah
> ....................................................................
......................................
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Sarah (and Kom)
> > 
> > How are you? Thank you for raising the issues of the luminous 
mind. 
> > As both Robert Epstein and Howard used this beautiful statement 
of 
> > Gotama the Buddha when they introduced the concept of an 
underlying 
> > being (Robert) or 'a consciousness without objects'(Howard) 
remaining 
> > after the Parinibbaana of an Arahant in response to Parinibbana 
> > Subcommentary (Part Two), I will have to deal with this statement 
of 
> > the Buddha when I write my next Parinibbaana Subcommentary (Part 
> > Three). 
> > 
> > As your posts and Kom's post addressed this issue in advance, you 
> > have taken off some of my burdens. 
> > 
> <snip>
> 
> 
	
10260

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/22/01 4:53:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes to Ken Org:


> (Btw, Howard uses
> discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless 
> of
> whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the 
> sense of
> ‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with 
> him;-))
> 
> 
============================
Yes, you are correct. I frequently use 'discernment' in place of 
'consciousness' as the English for 'vi~n~nana' (whereas some folks use 
'discernment' as the English for 'sati'). The reason I do so is to avoid the 
"substance connotation" often carried by 'consciousness', the sort of 
connotation which lends itself to the error made by Sati (I think it was) who 
said something along the lines that it "is this self-same consciousness which 
is reborn." I came upon this 'discernment' usage in only one place, the book 
The Selfless Mind, by Peter Harvey, and I found it very appealing in its 
clear expressing of a *function*. (Sometimes, when I want to convey the 
slightly different nuance of an entire mindstate, involving not only 
discernment, but other functions as well - basically, a citta, but without 
emphasizing a delimited beginning and ending, I will say 'mindstate' or 
'state of mind' or 'state of consciousness', rather than 'state of 
discernment', which strikes me as "odd".)
Note: All the foregoing is not not a discussion of Dhamma. It is 
merely a clarifiaction of how I have been using language.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10261

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:32am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again...

 	
Hi, Anders -

Welcome back! :-)

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/22/01 5:16:50 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
anders.honore@g... writes:


> Hi everybody. Remember me?
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10262

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:01am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/22/01 5:17:06 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> > In a message dated 12/15/01 2:50:58 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> > jonoabb@y... writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Rupas are not the same as physical objects. ‘Physical objects’
> > are not
> > > dhammas in any sense, but are the terms in which we think about
> > particular
> > > agglomerations of rupas.
> > > 
> > =============================
> > I think this is an important matter. "Physical objects" are the 
> > imagined external entities that are referenced by those mental
> > constructs, 
> > conglomerations of rupas, which *I* mean by concepts. The physical
> > objects 
> > have only conventional existence, though they are based on genuine 
> > observation of rupas and relations among rupas. Imagined external
> > entities, 
> > of course, can not be directly examined, by wisdom or anything else.
> 
> I am with you so far, Howard.
> 
> > However, 
> > those *thoughts* which I call concepts, *are* directly observable.
> 
> It depends what you man by 'directly observable'. A thought is of course
> the (sole) object of the moment of consciousness that 'thinks' the
> thought, and is in that sense 'observed' by the citta. And of course
> there are mental factors (such as strong attachment or aversion, perhaps)
> accompanying that moment of consciousness, so there is plenty of 'reality'
> going on at the time.
> 
> 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of a
> dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is that
> of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly
> experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being the
> object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual 
essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is not 
part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma. The 
second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the impression that 
*everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is the 
distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'?
One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea / 
thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent. We 
*are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me. In 
the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness of 
dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble 
truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts 
about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / 
unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it. This 
was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the suttas the 
four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally.
---------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> > It seems 
> > to me that you (and Nina and Khun Sujin) use the term 'concept' to refer
> > to 
> > the *referents* of constructed thought, whereas I use the term 'concept'
> > to 
> > refer to the thought, itself, something which I think *does* fall under
> > the 
> > 4th foundation of mindfulness.
> 
> Well, I think all of us are using the term 'concept' to refer to the
> thought itself (as opposed the consciousness that 'thinks' the thought),
> but I'm not sure why you say it falls under the 4th foundation of
> mindfulness. Is there a particular passage in the Satipatthana Sutta you
> have in mind?
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
I wrote the foregoing before reading what you just said. What Iwrote 
there is what I have in mind.
--------------------------------------------------------

> 
> As I understand the texts --
> - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is real (a
> dhamma)
> - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any
> individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a
> dhamma.
> 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha* dhammas. It 
seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any 
distinguishable thing.
-------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> I think the passage from CMA* pasted below is useful.
> 
> Jon
> 
> *'CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS)
> The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide
> (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation
> of, the main commentaries to the A-S)
> 
> Guide to Ch I, #2 
> According to the Abhidhamma philosophy, there are 2 kinds of realities—the
> conventional (sammuti) and the ultimate (paramattha). Conventional
> realities are the referents of ordinary conceptual thought (pannatti) and
> conventional modes of expression (vohaara). They include such entities as
> living beings, men, women, animals, and the apparently stable persisting
> objects that constitute our unanalyzed picture of the world. The
> Abhidhamma philosophy maintains that these notions do not possess ultimate
> validity, for the objects which they signify [ie. the living beings, men,
> women, animals etc] do not exist in their own right as irreducible
> realities. Their mode of being is conceptual, not actual. They are
> products of mental construction (parikappanaa), not realities existing by
> reason of their own nature.
> 
> Ultimate realities, in contrast, are things that exist by reason of their
> own extrinsic nature (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final,
> irreducible components of existence, the ultimate entities which result
> from a correctly performed analysis of experience. Hence the word
> ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from ‘parama’ =
> ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing.
> 
> Ultimate realities are not only the ultimate existents, but are also the
> ultimate objects of right knowledge. As one extracts oil from sesame
> seed, so one can extract the ultimate realities from the conventional
> realities. Concepts do not possess ultimacy. It is the objective
> actualities that lie behind our conceptual constructs – the dhammas – that
> form the ultimate realities of the Abhidhamma.
> 
> Ultimate realities are so subtle and profound that an ordinary person
> cannot see them. His mind is obscured by concepts. Only by means of wise
> attention to things (yoniso manasikara) can one see beyond the concepts. 
> Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain of
> ultimate or supreme knowledge.
> 
--------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha dhamma'? 
And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with wisdom, 
because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression that 
the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his 
attention to it. But concepts are an exception?
==============================
With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10263

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 12/22/01 5:37:42 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated
> and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual
> factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in
> the future.
> 
> 
=============================
I don't understand this. What sort of "accumulation" is this? 
Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances. The 
occurrence of an event now is a condition for the occurrence of future events 
or features of such events, but nothing is passed along. It was my 
understanding that abhidhamma simply views cetasikas as arising and ceasing. 
While a given cetasika could be operative through several cittas (i.e. while 
other cetasikas may come and go, the ending and arising of cetasikas [and 
arammanas] marking citta boundaries), it is not a thing to be "passed along", 
but is simply a function which is operative for as long as it takes.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 



10264

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:38am
Subject: RE: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Dear Howard,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...]
> Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of
holding
> a snake to
> get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the
head, you
> can get the
> snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake
will get
> the person
> instead!

Does by any chance the simile mention holding the venomous
snake by its tail? A. Sujin gives this simile often to
illustrate that learning the dhamma for the wrong purpose is
like holding a venomous snake byt its tail. She mentioned
that the right purpose is so that we can understand (with
wisdom, obviously) the realities that are appearing now.

kom
	



10265

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:44am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Ken O,

-----Original Message-----
>Hi Kom,

>What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta
and I believe
>has not answered my question. If we based on the
commentary as excerpt

I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the
inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely,
we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also
said to be exceedingly pure.

>My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding
pure
>just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory.
Then this

I think the point of contention here is the hypothesis that
the commentaries' explanation is unsatisfactory where as
some people believe it is. The inferral to nibbana would
not be possible without the hypothesis. Of this, I am not
knowledgeable to say one way or another, except that I
believe that the commentaries are of exceptional, most
likely unrivaled, qualities in explaining the Buddha's
words.

>would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since
it also
>experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to
luminious
>mind.

Of this, if discussed, we most likely would also revisit
what nibbana is, and how the commentaries are unequivocal
about its being "non-cognizing" nama, not anywhere close to
citta and cetasikas which are cognizing nama.

I believe Suan is about to give an explanation involving
this area. It may allow you to draw your own conclusion.

kom
	
10266

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi, Kom -

In a message dated 12/22/01 11:39:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
tikmok@y... writes:


> Dear Howard,
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...]
> > Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of
> holding
> > a snake to
> > get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the
> head, you
> > can get the
> > snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake
> will get
> > the person
> > instead!
> 
> Does by any chance the simile mention holding the venomous
> snake by its tail?
> 
----------------------------------------------
Howard: 
Yes. I had written that. ;-))
-----------------------------------------------
A. Sujin gives this simile often to> 
> illustrate that learning the dhamma for the wrong purpose is
> like holding a venomous snake byt its tail. She mentioned
> that the right purpose is so that we can understand (with
> wisdom, obviously) the realities that are appearing now.
> 
> kom
> 
========================== 
No doubt, it is the very same simile, though Khun Sujin wasn't my 
source. I imagine it comes from a sutta.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10267

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 9:28am
Subject: RE: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Dear Howard,



> -----Original Message-----
> ----------------------------------------------
> Howard: 
> Yes. I had written that. ;-))
> -----------------------------------------------

You certainly did. Thank you for the correction.

kom
	
10268

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:17am
Subject: luminous mind

 	
Dear Suan and Rob Ep,
I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep but may be
it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward to Suan's
translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I
find the language so difficult, all those composites.
I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the
defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children
interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully understand this,
that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have very many
working hours. 
I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is
bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its
object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the
dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved
in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-door
processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced,
objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But
right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as
conditioned dhammas, no self.
Nina. 
Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the first
part was corrected by Jim:

@at.t.hakathaa

49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti
bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? natthi.

N: As to the ninth,² luminous². Luminous is clear, pure. citta is the
life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? No, it
does not. 

niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa ya.mki~nci
parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati.

N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, or
without colour, is called luminous because of its purity.

idampi nirupakkilesataaya
parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m.

N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous.
That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.

aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi.

N: ³ by oncoming ³(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it,
but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).

upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati
vuccati.

N: ³by defilements². By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called
defiled. 

katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro
vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m
avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena
``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na
sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m labhanti,
eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m.

N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct,
possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents
of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval
thus, ³ they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort
their own children, their pupils, their co-residents², evenso should this
(bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.

aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca
aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m,

N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso
the life-continuum should be seen,

puttaadiina.m
vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne
rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m cittaana.m vasena
uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhava"ngacitta.m
upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti.

N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children
etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of defilement,
corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the
moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature
pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.

*****

50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m.

N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-continuum.

vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne
arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m
tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m
aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti.

N: ³Freed²: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of impulsion,
without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because consciousness
is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and thus it
is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements.

idhaapi yathaa
siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo
``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti
anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne
uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi
vippamuttanti vuccatiiti.

N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, possessed with
good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and
approval, thus, ² they train, encourage, admonish their own children that
these things are indeed wholesome ³, evenso because of the arising of
wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-continuum is
said to be freed of oncoming defilements.

*******
pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa.

N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention.

6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa
N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers.

51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m
bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano.

N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, ³the ordinary
person who is uninstructed², he is the ordinary person who has not heard of
that life-continuum.

agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti.

N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the
teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained
(bhaavaa~neyyo ?). 

yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena
upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi
javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha''nti neva
aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca
khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu
uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa
yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa
adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi.

N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. from the
beginning, as follows: ³This life-continuum indeed that is also pure by
nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that have
arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen², does not understand it,
because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained the truth),
and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, the
causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from study,
does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has no
access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and
accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that should be
engaged in, he has no attainment.

so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa
~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m --
N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and attainment
that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam).

******
	
10269

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] reminders India

 	
op 21-12-2001 08:05 schreef Kom Tukovinit op tikmok@y...:
>>
> Kom: Hearing the dhamma and the reminders (and a chance
> for questions!) from many learned people is probably the
> most worthwhile activities that I did in India. Hearing
> some of the pertinent points (like anatta, for example)
> again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even
> started to hear new angles of explanations about Anatta from
> K. Jack. Most worthwhile.

Nina: Dear Kom: Please could you tell me about Jack's explanations, it may
have escaped me. He always has good remarks.
> 
> Kom: The points that came to mind immediately that I really
> appreciated hearing:
> 1) Anattaness: what is anattaness?
> 2) How panna becomes developed
> 3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the
> dhamma, and noticing the dhamma.
> 4) How long the road is...

Nina: more than ever I found was clinging to self shown, how deeply rooted
this is, with examples from daily life. Yes, the purpose of all our study:
understanding this very moment. When A. Sujin explains about seeing and
visible object it seems always new to me, as if I hear it for the first
time. all such reminders help to consider it more. I believe that just
reading is not enough, we also have to find some time to listen to tapes.
(breakfast time?) You could get the India tapes form Bgk, they are glad to
send them. 
How long the road is: because no self who can do anything. Just listening,
considering. We shall not think of the future, how long it will be, what
counts is only now. And the development of the perfections is important,
all kinds of kusala with the right purpose, no gain for oneself.
By the way, I appreciated Bhante's reminder the other day of the application
of the teachings. One may think and think and no application.

>Kom: The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the
> discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin kept mentioning
> about understanding until it "lies next to your bone". I
> think I kept asking about it in conventional terms what she
> meant by that. Sort of a reminder to me what I must go
> through everytime when there is no understanding of
> realities.

N: I heard the word bone (kraduk), also under the Bodhi tree, but did not
get the whole expression. Is it: understanding has to become deeply
engrained, to become a habit, firmly established? At the same time A. S.
stressed that the development must be very natural, no forcing, thus, it
should not be a heavy burden. I thought so often of Sukin who brought up
before the cheerfulness of Dhamma (achaan rarung). Every day she reminded us
of that. 
Best wishes, Nina. 

	
10270

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:11am
Subject: RE: [dsg] reminders India

 	
Dear Nina,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...]

> > again and again seems to help quite a bit. I have even
> > started to hear new angles of explanations
> about Anatta from
> > K. Jack. Most worthwhile.
>
> Nina: Dear Kom: Please could you tell me about
> Jack's explanations, it may
> have escaped me. He always has good remarks.

I don't think the explanation he gave was different from
what I heard from the tapes from Ajarn Sujin, except that I
have heard him say this so explicitly for the first time
(doesn't mean he hadn't said it before: I just haven't heard
it). He explains Anatta to be the characteristics that are
unchangeable/uncontrollable, e.g., heat cannot be hardness.
This is in contrast with possible other explanations:

1) Non-self because of the impermanence: how could there be
a self if all realities that we take as self rises and falls
away completely and immediately?

2) Anatta as being uncontrolable as all realities that we
take as self are conditioned intricately by other realities.

> > Kom: The points that came to mind immediately
> that I really
> > appreciated hearing:
> > 1) Anattaness: what is anattaness?
> > 2) How panna becomes developed
> > 3) The purpose of hearing about the dhamma, learning the
> > dhamma, and noticing the dhamma.
> > 4) How long the road is...
>
> Nina: more than ever I found was clinging to self
> shown, how deeply rooted
> this is, with examples from daily life.

Yes, this is even more evident if another person who
understand points it out!

> How long the road is: because no self who can do
> anything. Just listening,
> considering. We shall not think of the future,
> how long it will be, what
> counts is only now. And the development of the
> perfections is important,
> all kinds of kusala with the right purpose, no
> gain for oneself.

Thank you for the encouragement, Nina.

> >Kom: The point that I haven't yet deciphered yet was the
> > discussions about "understanding". A. Sujin
> kept mentioning
> > about understanding until it "lies next to your
> bone".
>
> N: I heard the word bone (kraduk), also under the
> Bodhi tree, but did not
> get the whole expression. Is it: understanding
> has to become deeply
> engrained, to become a habit, firmly established?

Yes. I asked her about what she meant by "kao jai jrod
kraduk". The explanation that I remembered was to
understand firmly. She gave an example at that point that
when you ask a person a question, they answer it correctly,
but when you ask the person the same question differently,
they answer it incorrectly. This shows that there is no
understanding, or the understanding is not firm (not jrod
kraduk). She then asked me how firm my understanding was,
and I told her that it depends, because sometimes I am quite
misled, and then she said, until one reaches magga (which
one? Sotapanna? Arahat?), then it shows that one is not
truly firm.

A. Supi explained that he studied the dhammas keeping firmly
in mind that the results manifest only when the causes are
complete/filled. If panna doesn't rise to cognize the
realities, that means one's understandings about the dhammas
at the pannatti level are not enough or are not firm. If
there is no vipassana nana, then panna at the lower/weaker
levels haven't been developed enough for that to happen.
This is so with magga and so on. He said, by understanding
this truly, then one doesn't struggle for
satipathanna/vipassana nana/magga/results to happen.

Thanks again.

kom
	
10271

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:46pm
Subject: Re: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
22-12-01 17:44:57, Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> skrev:

>Dear Ken O,
>
>-----Original Message-----
>>Hi Kom,
>
>>What you have done is describing what is patisandhi citta
>and I believe
>>has not answered my question. If we based on the
>commentary as excerpt
>
>I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the
>inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely,
>we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also
>said to be exceedingly pure.
>
>>My hunch is that the commentaries explanation on exceeding
>pure
>>just bc it experiences no sense object is not satisfactory.
>Then this
>
>I think the point of contention here is the hypothesis that
>the commentaries' explanation is unsatisfactory where as
>some people believe it is. The inferral to nibbana would
>not be possible without the hypothesis. Of this, I am not
>knowledgeable to say one way or another, except that I
>believe that the commentaries are of exceptional, most
>likely unrivaled, qualities in explaining the Buddha's
>words.
>
>>would infer that Nibbana will also be exceeding pure since
>it also
>>experience no sense object. It will then equate Nibbana to
>luminious
>>mind.
>
>Of this, if discussed, we most likely would also revisit
>what nibbana is, and how the commentaries are unequivocal
>about its being "non-cognizing" nama, not anywhere close to
>citta and cetasikas which are cognizing nama.
>
>I believe Suan is about to give an explanation involving
>this area. It may allow you to draw your own conclusion.

Hi, kom. I believe that we've been over this in the past, huh? :-)

My two cents: 
For Nibbana=luminous mind: All conditioned things, including all mind states are ultimately unsatisfactory, and thus cannot 
be said to be really pure. They are also impermanent, and the sutta seems to indicate a rather permanent quality, seeing as 
how the mind retains its luminosity in spite of incoming defilements.

Against Nibbana=luminous mind: The suttas are relative, and so are the words 'pure' and 'mind',. One cannot expect that 
the Buddha covered his ground in all his sermons.

My conclusion: The suttas are relative - so who cares whether it refers to Nibbana or not? What I would deem much more 
relevant is that all of this falls into the realm of speculative knowledge. The Buddha spoke about the higher Jhanas and 
Nibba ana etc, for those with the capacity for realising and actualising these things. Not for mere speculation. The suttas, 
in this regard, are mere signposts, to insure that the practitioner will steer in the right direction: The are not truths in and of 
themselves, but pure conventionalty, adapted to the circumstances of the (in this case rather advanced) practitioner.

If you are not close to being able to investigate the luminous for yourself in this very present moment, then what good will 
speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta ask yourselves are: 

Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in terms of clinging to views and concepts)?

Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my own actual experienced reality)?

Regards
Anders
	
10272

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:32pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again...

 	
Thanks Howard :-)

22-12-01 16:32:48, upasaka@a... skrev:

>Hi, Anders -
>
> Welcome back! :-)
>
>With metta,
>Howard
	
10273

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 2:08pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Back again...

 	
22-12-01 11:54:02, Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> skrev:

>Hi Anders,
>
>Really great to see you back....;-)))

Thanks, sarah.
While it lasts, at least :-) 

> --- Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> wrote: > Hi everybody. Remember
>me?
>
>The name rings a bell, I think... 

I think I've heard of that guy named Anders too. A real showoff, wasn't he?

>Exactly so, no better place to spend them. You'll find most the same old faces
>around and many of the same old themes.....;-)) 
>
> Hope you got through all your study assignments with flying colours and look
>forward to reading your always challenging and enjoyable posts here. 

Ah well, don't expect me to be so talkative these days. I pick my battles more carefully now :-)

>You must be pretty snow-bound in Denmark now, right?

Ah, no. We have snow, but not much. It's starting to thaw now. Sadly...

Nice to hear from you

rgds
Anders
	
10274

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 3:37pm
Subject: Re: Clinical Death / Rebirth

 	
Dear Herman,

I am very interested in this from an ethical point of view. 
Regarding organ transplants from baby to baby, 'fresh' is 
essential......but how to be fresh and still 'clincally dead' from 
a Buddhist point of view? Not much literature available on the 
Australian scene......

http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/bsd/attachb.htm
Determination of death in children less than one year of age

metta,
Christine
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "egberdina" <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Hi all,
> 
> Medical and legal opinions vary enormously as to what constitutes 
> death. The lack of measurable heart beat and brain activity are not 
> decisive indications of cessation of life. The body stays warm for 
a 
> long time after heart beat has stopped. Cellular death is not 
> complete for days. Gruesome finds at cemetries have indicated that 
> people not yet quite dead have been interred (scratch marks on the 
> inside of the coffin).
> 
> Yet the Abhidhamma posits a precise moment of death. It is the last 
> thought that characterises death. Unless it is the last thought, 
> you're not dead. (this sounds like a conceptual definition). Given 
> that there is no sense door or mind door activity when the brain 
> stops functioning, I presume that it is always the same object held 
> by the life-continuum citta when initiating any new life and ending 
> any old life.
> 
> Perhaps nibbana? 
> 
> 
> Herman
	
10275

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:47pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Jon,

Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is:
Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. 
Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. 
Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right 
discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my 
self."

Regards,
Victor

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Victor
> 
> --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon,
> > 
> > Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned 
phenomenon
> > such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is
> > unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right
> > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not 
my
> > self."
> 
> Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* 
this
> 'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? 
> 
> Jon
	
10276

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 5:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hello Sarah,

Please consider carefully the following passage from 
Anguttara Nikaya VII.60, Kodhana Sutta, An Angry Person
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an07-060.html

"...Like oneself, all beings hold themselves most dear,
yet an angry person, deranged,
can kill himself in many ways:
with a sword, taking poison,
hanging himself by a rope in a mountain glen. 

Doing these deeds
that kill beings and do violence to himself,
the angry person doesn't realize that he's ruined. 

This snare of Mara, in the form of anger,
dwelling in the cave of the heart:
cut it out with self-control,
discernment, persistence, right view.
The wise man would cut out
each & every form of unskillfulness.
Train yourselves:
'May we not be blotted out.' 

Free from anger & untroubled,
free from greed, without longing,
tamed, your anger abandoned,
free from fermentation,
you will be unbound."


I am not sure how self-control is not possible in truth. I am not 
sure what conventional usage has to do with self-control.

Regards,
Victor


[snip]
> If we say `Yes, one can control oneself' (to quote from another 
post of yours)
> and know this is merely conventional usage, that's fine. However, 
if we cling
> to an idea that this is possible in truth, it shows the perversity 
of view at
> that moment.
> 
> Thanks for all your challenging posts
> 
> metta,
> Sarah
[snip]
	
10277

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 5:15pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Hello Purnomo,

As I understand it from checking out the dictionary, concept means a 
general idea derived or inferred from specific instances or 
occurrences. It also means something formed in mind, a thought or a 
notion. It seems to me that concept can be categorized as nama, a 
representation.

Regards,
Victor



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." <purnomo9@h...> wrote:
> 
> If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and 
we 'just' 
> make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am 
guarantee 
> that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And 
That's true 
> for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth.
> 
> purnomo--
> 
> >From: "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...>
> >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> >To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> >Subject: [dsg] Concept
> >Date: Wed, 19 Dec 2001 18:19:28 -0000
> >
> >Hello all,
> >
> >I have some questions regarding concept. What does it mean by
> >concept? How does concept come to be?
> >
> >Thank you.
> >
> >Regards,
> >Victor
> >
> >

10278

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 7:22pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah



> Yes, it is a little difficult which is why I didn't post it all the
> first time
> I think.

k: I do not think it is difficult at all.

> > 
> > k: To me, this statement will imply that when a man dreams he is
> neither
> > sleeping or awake. 
> 
> That's right.... no sense-door activity (as I mentioned to Frank
> before), but
> mind-door activity and thinking of concepts.

k: Nope I do not greed there is no sense-door activity if we look at the
statement again and your are using the neither awake portiion to explain
no sense door activity. I am using neither sleeping which means there is a
possibility of sense door activity 

> 
> > >But when his sleep has become light, and he is not yet fully
> conscious,
> > in that interval it is that dreams are dreamt. When a man is in deep
> > sleep, O king, his mind has returned home (has entered again into
> > Bhavanga), and a mind thus shut in does not act, and a mind hindered
> in
> > its action knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
> > > not has no dreams. It is when the mind is active that dreams are
> dreamt.
> > 
> > > Just, O king, as in the darkness and gloom, where no light is, no
> shadow
> > will fall even on the most burnished mirror, so when a man is in deep
> > sleep his mind has returned into itself, and a mind shut in does not
> act,
> > and a mind inactive knows not the evil and the good, and he who knows
> not
> > does not dream. For it is when the mind is active that dreams are
> dreamt.
> > As the miror, O king,
> > > are
> > > you to regard the body, as the darkness sleep, as the light the
> mind.’
> > 
> > 
> > k: Returned home? Return to itself? - sounds like bhavanga citta a
> > permanent dwelling for the mind. Subtely it would imply a permanent
> self.
> 
> No....just changing cittas (remember yr abhidhamma?)....it just means
> the mind
> is not active anymore...no more concepts and so on, no dreams, no
> kilesa.
> Nothing permanent at all. Just one citta and then another.
> 
> Sarah


k: To me I think we are prejudice. When the this passage explain return
home, your position is changing cittas but when i see it it is abt
permanent self. So when I think TB is not talking abt permanent self, you
do not think otherwise as what your have written in msg #10218 (quoted
below).

"9.T.B. continues to add that:
> ‘With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for the fourth jhana: 
.....

On the contrary, this again suggests the idea of self-control and a
permanent mind-state which, as I understand the Teachings, is quite
contrary to their ‘uniform sentiment’. The purity of the states of
awareness and concentration referred to in the simile, refer to cittas of
an exceedingly high state of wholesomeness, which again are fleeting
(though I believe not with any bhavanga cittas in between the mind-door
processes in this case)."



Kind regards
Ken O

	
10279

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 8:07pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom and Sarah

Since Kom said that

> I certainly did, and I think the description confirms the
> inferral that if bhawanga is exceedingly pure, most likely,
> we can infer that the Patisandhi and Cuti citta can be also
> said to be exceedingly pure.

k: Will that implied the luminious mind would include patisandhi and cuti
citta in that sutta we are arguing abt. I think by nature Bhavanga citta
is luminious and not bc it is free of sense objects, then this will also
explain why Nibbana could unlikely not be luminious mind as it is also
deprived of sense objects. 



To Sarah, I requote a passage by Nina.

"A. Sujin often said: when there is bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no
object appears. We do not know its object, as you know it is the same as
that experienced shortly before the dying-consciousness of the previous
life. The bhavangacitta is not involved in outer objects, and thus, no
defilements arise. But when sense-door processes begin, objects are
impinging on the doorways and experienced, objects appear, and on account
of them defilements are bound to arise. But right understanding of them
can be developed so that they are known as conditioned dhammas, no self."

My interpretation is all along that Bhavanga citta could be discerned. If
bhavanga citta could not discerned who knows what is the nature of
bhavanga cittas and there is no way to described bhavanga cittas in the
first place in the commentaries. If we revisit the sutta last passage
again, "well-instructed disciple of the noble ones, there is development
of the mind.", when we talk abt noble ones it usually refers to those who
at least reach first level of arahat (sorry I always lousy at pali names
:)). Two things,

1. luminious mind could be indeed bhavanga cittas as the sutta points
on the development of the mind is refering to the nobles ones and not any
ordinary practitioners.

2. luminious mind could be discerned


To Kom again,

Even if the luminouis mind includes Patisandhi and cuti citta, they still
could be discern by nobles ones.




Kind regards
Ken O



	
10280

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 4:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi again Howard,

<< -----------------------------------------------------------------

Mmm! Great simile. It reminds me of the simile of holding a snake to 
get its venom. If it is held properly, right below the head, you can get the 
snake's venom, but held wrongly, by the tail, the snake will get the person 
instead!
----------------------- >>

I heard about this analogy before as well. Today, I did look the sutta up 
from Thai suttanta-pitaka. Very interesting, Alaguttupamasutra, 
majimanikaya. Briefly, at the beginning there is a bhiikhu who stated that he 
had already understood what the Buddha had taught. He claimed that the 
"dhamma" which the Buddha said that it will harm anyone who associates with 
it, actually does not harm anyone. The Buddha then said that bhikkhu who had 
learned vinaya, sutta and abhidhamma but not considered them carefully with 
panna would not get any wholesome result but can also caused him some even 
more unwholesome deed. Later on the Buddha said about a man who is trying to 
catch a snake but without panna he holds the snake at its tail. So the snake 
will have chances to constrict around his arm and then bite him. 

My personal understanding after I read this sutra is : There are 3 most 
venomous snakes named lobha, dosa and moha. A man who even has a good 
intention, very interested in dhamma and in getting rid of his defilement, 
but do not consider dhamma carefully, at times he will have a chance that he 
will be bitten by those snakes. I do not think dhammavinaya (the Buddha 
teaching) in itself a venom, but an antivenom.

Another point I'd like to raise is I like the way someone called 3 pitaka as 
3 gems. To me these 3 gems need each other, very interdependent on each 
other and cannot understand one without other. So these 3 gems are always 
together, even at times we look into just one gem, but the reflection of the 
other two is always there as well. 

Just my opinion.

Best wishes,

Num
	
10281

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:

> Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how
> does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its objects
> (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It simply says
> that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
> commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual details
> will be very helpful. 

Dear Kenneth,
I think the problem is just that: the bhavanga cittas are *not* defiled. They
are free from any incoming phenomena from eveything that has been said on this
thread, and so the statement that the 'mind is defiled by incoming defilements'
makes no sense regarding bhavanga cittas, as far as I can understand. If anyone
can explain it, I would be happy too.

Best,
Robert Ep.



	
10282

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Thanks again, Jon.

Your further details are helpful in clarifying these ideas.
I appreciate it.

Best,
Robert Ep.

===============


--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Jon,
> > Thank you very much for helping to clarify some of these terms and how
> > they fit
> > together. The idea that dhammas include namas and rupas, and that
> > cittas and
> > Nibbana are also included, is very helpful. 
> > 
> > Now here is where I got confused: if dhammas are the 'ultimate
> > realities' I
> > derived from this that they were 'real', meaning that they had a status
> > as
> > 'entities'. This is obviously not what is meant by 'real' at all.
> 
> Indeed not (and as you know, terms used in the teachings rarely carry
> their convnetional meanings). We need to find out *in what sense* dhammas
> are said to be 'realities' -- what is the distinguishing characteristic of
> a reality (especially vis-à-vis a concept)? 
> 
> > I now take it that what is meant by 'real' and 'ultimate' is merely
> > that:
> 
> Your summary that follows is pretty much on track, but I have suggested
> one or two minor refinements (my version in inverted commas)--
> 
> > a/ they are being discerned as they actually are, in their fleeting,
> > momentary
> > occurence as an aspect of physical or mental reality, ie, rupas or
> > namas.
> 
> "a/ They are *capable of* being discerned (by panna) for what they
> actually are, namely (going from the general to the particular) 
> - as a nama or a rupa, 
> - as having their own distinctive characteristic or nature (sabhava --
> i.e., that which distinguishes, say, visible object from sound), and 
> - as having the 3 universal characteristics (anicca, dukkha, anatta)."
> 
> > b/ they are irreducible to anything other or smaller. No combined or
> > aggregate
> > arisings, such as the complex concept of an object existing
> > independently, would
> > be considered real or ultimate.
> 
> "b/ They are ‘ultimate’ in the sense that they are the final, irreducible
> components of existence. Conventional 'objects' are in fact an
> aggregation of different rupa-dhammas or, in the case of objects that are
> people and creatures, nama-dhammas and rupa-dhammas."
> 
> > And so in a sense by saying they are 'real', one is saying that they are
> > 'not
> > real' in the conventional sense, but only momentary and fleeting, not
> > lasting
> > beyond the moment. In this sense they are accurately seen as what they
> > are in the
> > moment without any conceptual attributions of entity, lasting quality or
> > satisfaction arising with them, and then they would be seen correctly.
> 
> "By saying they are 'real', one is not saying that they are 'real' in the
> conventional sense because, although having their own characteristic, they
> are only momentary and fleeting, not lasting beyond the moment. However,
> only developed panna can see dhammas accurately as what they are in the
> moment, as not having any inherent attributions of entity, lasting quality
> or satisfaction."
> 
> > Thanks again, and I think I may be starting to get the concept as it is
> > described.
> 
> Yes, it is useful to try to understand things as they are described or
> explained in the teachings. (It doesn't mean one has to accept that
> description or explanation.)
> 
> Jon


	
10283

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 10:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Thanks, Jon. One question, below.

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:

> At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing an
> object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a reality
> while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound) is
> not a reality.
> 
> Jon

Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum?

Robert

	
10284

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:04pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > > > 2/ How does mundane Right View/Understanding lay the groundwork for
> > the
> > > > Supramundane Path Factors to arise.
> > > 
> > > Every moment of mundane Right View (i.e. panna of the level of
> > > satipatthana) is accompanied by other mundane factors of the Eightfold
> > > Path. These mundane path factors are accumulated and grow in
> > strength. 
> > > This is how, on my reading of the teachings, the conditions for
> > > supramundane consciousness are developed.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > So a single citta can accumulate and pass on any path factors that it
> > has
> > experienced? And they, in accumulation, lead to the arising of the
> > others?
> 
> As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are accumulated
> and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an individual
> factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again in
> the future.
> 
> Jon

Interesting, Jon. I hadn't realized that. So there are billions of cetasikas
being passed along?

Robert Ep.



	
10285

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: The Two Truths (for Howard)

 	
Dear Jon,
I understand your statement that both arising and conceptual wrong understanding
can be an obstacle. But this leaves me a little confused about what you meant in
your original statement by: 'The root cause of our problems in not our wrong
conceptual grasp of things...' Could you say a word about that? I understand
the second part of the sentence, but I don't understand how wrong conceptual grasp
is not a root cause, yet our 'general accumulated wrong view' about realities is. 
I don't quite have the distinction between those two.....

Best,
Robert Ep.

======================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > > The root cause of our problems is not our wrong conceptual grasp of
> > > things, but our incorrect understanding of realities.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > Can I take it that this last sentence could be finished: "...our
> > incorrect
> > understanding of realities as they arise.' ?
> 
> Yes, it is the development of the correct understanding of realities as
> they arise that leads to magga citta, so it must be the incorrect
> understanding of those same realities that is at the root of the problem. 
> This I think neatly states the situation in its ultimate sense. ;-)) ;-))
> 
> However, wrong understanding about realities that has been accumulated
> (stored up) can manifest, for example, at moments of thinking when there
> is no reality as object of the consciousness. So in more conventional
> terms we do talk about a general incorrect understanding of realities (=
> wrong view).
> 
> Jon



	
10286

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:19pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
> Jon,
> 
> I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie 
> specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they 
> see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being 
> described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another 
> door, unless you use LSD. 
> 
> Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, 
> looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour 
> experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute 
> or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate 
> or absolute has relative connotations.
> 
> So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour 
> blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the 
> lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred 
> commentaries? ( :-) )

Dear Herman,
I agree with much of what you say here, but not about the VW. My understanding is
that arahants prefer Mercedes sports cars, or at the very least a nice Toyota SUV.

Best,
Robert Ep.


	
10287

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:52pm
Subject: RE: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Anders,

I am happy to see you back.

> -----Original Message-----

> Hi, kom. I believe that we've been over this in
> the past, huh? :-)

Yes, both on the luminosity and nibanna. I think the themes
have repeated many times. Some with excellent
references/translations of the commentaries.

> My conclusion: The suttas are relative - so who
> cares whether it refers to Nibbana or not? What I
> would deem much more
> relevant is that all of this falls into the realm
> of speculative knowledge. The Buddha spoke about
> the higher Jhanas and
> Nibba ana etc, for those with the capacity for
> realising and actualising these things. Not for
> mere speculation. The suttas,
> in this regard, are mere signposts, to insure
> that the practitioner will steer in the right
> direction: The are not truths in and of
> themselves, but pure conventionalty, adapted to
> the circumstances of the (in this case rather
> advanced) practitioner.

I wouldn't agree that the Buddha speaks relatively, but on
the other hand, I would be happy with the statement that two
people would certainly interpret it differently.

>
> If you are not close to being able to investigate
> the luminous for yourself in this very present
> moment, then what good will
> speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta
> ask yourselves are:
>
> Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in
> terms of clinging to views and concepts)?
>
> Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my
> own actual experienced reality)?

We almost agree on this point, except the question I would
ask is, would considering the different implications improve
my understanding?

Agreeing on something on the first post on your return.
Now, that is something to be appreciated!

kom
	
10288

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat Dec 22, 2001 11:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind

 	
Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga cittas.
I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in very
clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response is
somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen as too
disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am looking
for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not
always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the Buddha's own
words.

The following is to all who are taking part in this fascinating and controversial
conversation, and hope it is not too lengthy or redundant. 

I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below,
where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their
reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents
themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a working
analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question.

I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to be
corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by
sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and personal
identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they are
totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in that
sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in itself
mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume this
would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in one
form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their
perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So
luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not 'covered
over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory moments.

On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside objects are
not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are filled
with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark clouds
which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away.

To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I don't
see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the mind
that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the 'reputation'
of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's just an
analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the
defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't see
at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the
bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with each
other at all.

Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of
which he was speaking if they were two different groups.

It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or mind
that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see
anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am surprised to
hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators that
the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true?

If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and the
normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like
this, in my admittedly limited opinion:

"The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by incoming
defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming
defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the development of
wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen to be
luminous."

But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" it
is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the idea
that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and thus
the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with discernment and
wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses together in
the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. 

What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the mind,
composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but which
are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently luminous,
seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an underlying
mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a succession
of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, which
all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from defilement
by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more direct
and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and somehow
having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the very
opposite of their condition by definition.

I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical as I
can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion.

Best,
Robert Ep.

================================

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> Dear Suan and Rob Ep,
> I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep but may be
> it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward to Suan's
> translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I
> find the language so difficult, all those composites.
> I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the
> defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children
> interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully understand this,
> that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have very many
> working hours. 
> I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is
> bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know its
> object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly before the
> dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not involved
> in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-door
> processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and experienced,
> objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to arise. But
> right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known as
> conditioned dhammas, no self.
> Nina. 
> Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the first
> part was corrected by Jim:
> 
> @at.t.hakathaa
> 
> 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti
> bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? natthi.
> 
> N: As to the ninth,2 luminous2. Luminous is clear, pure. citta is the
> life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? No, it
> does not. 
> 
> niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa ya.mki~nci
> parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati.
> 
> N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, or
> without colour, is called luminous because of its purity.
> 
> idampi nirupakkilesataaya
> parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m.
> 
> N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous.
> That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.
> 
> aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi.
> 
> N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it,
> but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).
> 
> upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m naamaati
> vuccati.
> 
> N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called
> defiled. 
> 
> katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro
> vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m
> avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena
> ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na
> sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m labhanti,
> eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m.
> 
> N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct,
> possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents
> of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval
> thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort
> their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso should this
> (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.
> 
> aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca
> aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m,
> 
> N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso
> the life-continuum should be seen,
> 
> puttaadiina.m
> vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne
> rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m cittaana.m vasena
> uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi bhava"ngacitta.m
> upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti.
> 
> N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children
> etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of defilement,
> corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at the
> moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by nature
> pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.
> 
> *****
> 
> 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m.
> 
> N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-continuum.
> 
> vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne
> arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m
> tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m
> aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti.
> 
> N: 3Freed2: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of impulsion,
> without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because consciousness
> is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and thus it
> is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements.
> 
> idhaapi yathaa
> siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo
> ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti
> anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne
> uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi upakkilesehi
> vippamuttanti vuccatiiti.
> 
> N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, possessed with
> good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and
> approval, thus, 2 they train, encourage, admonish their own children that
> these things are indeed wholesome 3, evenso because of the arising of
> wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-continuum is
> said to be freed of oncoming defilements.
> 
> *******
> pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa.
> 
> N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention.
> 
> 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa
> N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers.
> 
> 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m
> bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano.
> 
> N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, 3the ordinary
> person who is uninstructed2, he is the ordinary person who has not heard of
> that life-continuum.
> 
> agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti.
> 
> N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the
> teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained
> (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). 
> 
> yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena
> upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi
> javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi upakkili.t.tha''nti neva
> aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca
> khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu
> uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa
> yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa
> adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi.
> 
> N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. from the
> beginning, as follows: 3This life-continuum indeed that is also pure by
> nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that have
> arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen2, does not understand it,
> because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained the truth),
> and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, the
> causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from study,
> does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has no
> access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and
> accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that should be
> engaged in, he has no attainment.
> 
> so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa
> ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m --
> N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and attainment
> that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam).
> 
> ******


	
10289

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:36am
Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind

 	
Personally, I don't believe the commentaries at face value, and I believe that Bikkhu Bodhi has more or less skilfully 
pointed that they are sometimes even dead-wrong as they contradict some suttas. A lot of what is found in the 
commentaries (which are often abidhammically inspired) doesn't rely find backing in the suttas themselves, which, along 
with the Vinaya Pitaka, is the only source I will personally acknowledge as being actually authoritative.
That the commentators were all supposedly Arahants is something I find more credible to be a later invention by the 
supporters of the commentaries, to lend authority to their claims.

That it is not to say that they can't be extremely helpful in clarifying certain points (I have certainly found them to be so), 
but I would personally recommend that they should be taken with a grain of salt

23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> skrev:

>Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga cittas.
>I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in very
>clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response is
>somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen as too
>disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am looking
>for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not
>always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the Buddha's own
>words.
>
>The following is to all who are taking part in this fascinating and controversial
>conversation, and hope it is not too lengthy or redundant. 
>
>I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below,
>where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their
>reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents
>themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a working
>analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question.
>
>I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to be
>corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by
>sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and personal
>identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they are
>totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in that
>sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in itself
>mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume this
>would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in one
>form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their
>perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So
>luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not 'covered
>over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory moments.
>
>On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside objects are
>not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are filled
>with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark clouds
>which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away.
>
>To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I don't
>see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the mind
>that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the 'reputation'
>of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's just an
>analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the
>defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't see
>at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the
>bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with each
>other at all.
>
>Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of
>which he was speaking if they were two different groups.
>
>It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or mind
>that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see
>anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am surprised to
>hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators that
>the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true?
>
>If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and the
>normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like
>this, in my admittedly limited opinion:
>
>"The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by incoming
>defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming
>defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the development of
>wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen to be
>luminous."
>
>But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements" it
>is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the idea
>that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and thus
>the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with discernment and
>wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses together in
>the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says. 
>
>What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the mind,
>composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but which
>are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently luminous,
>seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an underlying
>mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a succession
>of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality, which
>all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from defilement
>by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more direct
>and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and somehow
>having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the very
>opposite of their condition by definition.
>
>I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical as I
>can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion.
	
10290

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:31am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
23-12-01 08:52:23, Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> skrev:

>Dear Anders,
>
>I am happy to see you back.

It's good talking with you as well, Kom.

>> -----Original Message-----
>I wouldn't agree that the Buddha speaks relatively, but on
>the other hand, I would be happy with the statement that two
>people would certainly interpret it differently.

Well, since words in and of themselves are inherently relative (you can only have *this* in relation to *that* - if one, 
changes, then so does the relation to the other and the meaning is lost), I would certainly say that the Buddha speaks 
relatively.

>> Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in
>> terms of clinging to views and concepts)?
>>
>> Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my
>> own actual experienced reality)?
>
>We almost agree on this point, except the question I would
>ask is, would considering the different implications improve
>my understanding?

Okay, so how would considering the different implications change your effective *experience* of reality. Not your 
conceptual understanding of reality as a whole, but your understanding of the present moment and the objects at hand 
discerned in the present moment. That is what really matters, because that is the tool with which you will efface the 
defilements of the mind. 
The Buddhist path is all about knowing your own mind, so that it can be liberated. It is *not* about knowing the minds of 
others (although you will understand the workings of them better, once you get to know your own), or about knowing the 
"rules" the goversn the mind. The "rules" that govern the mind don't contain the actual defilements, your own mind does, 
and it is that which is to be known. The only way to know your own mind is to observe it with clarity, and just discern 
mindfully "Here is desire, here is clinging, here is anger, here is attachment to self" etc., as such things are present in the 
mind. If you try and drag a conceptual model of the mind unto your own mind, your discernment of the mind will be 
obscured, because there is not clear seeing.
A person may have studied the abbidhamma and sutta pitaka a thousand times, and have memorised a thousand causal 
reactionary responses of the mind as found in those scriptures, but if he doesn't know his own mind, it's all gone to waste.
The scriptures are only pointers to help us on the path. We use the experience from studying to our minds to verify what is 
contained in the scriptures, not the other way around.

>Agreeing on something on the first post on your return.
>Now, that is something to be appreciated!

Haha, it sure is!
	
10291

From: Anders Honore <anders.honore@g...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 5:19am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
23-12-01 08:19:11, Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> skrev:

>
>--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote:
>> Jon,
>> 
>> I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie 
>> specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they 
>> see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being 
>> described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another 
>> door, unless you use LSD. 
>> 
>> Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, 
>> looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour 
>> experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute 
>> or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate 
>> or absolute has relative connotations.
>> 
>> So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour 
>> blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the 
>> lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred 
>> commentaries? ( :-) )
>
>Dear Herman,
>I agree with much of what you say here, but not about the VW. My understanding is
>that arahants prefer Mercedes sports cars, or at the very least a nice Toyota SUV.

ROFL! Good one, Robert!
	
10292

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:13am
Subject: Re: luminous mind: To Nina

 	
Dear Nina

How are you?

It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara 
statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and 
sharing your works with all of us.

You wrote:

"I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and 
analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so 
difficult, all those composites."

I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in 
Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write 
technical notes on them, though. 

My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the 
luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. 

However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on 
the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you 
off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to 
include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana 
Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy 
presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to 
follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's 
technical details. 


With regards,

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> Dear Suan and Rob Ep,
> I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep 
but may be
> it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward 
to Suan's
> translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. 
since I
> find the language so difficult, all those composites.
> I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the
> defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children
> interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully 
understand this,
> that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have 
very many
> working hours. 
> I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is
> bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know 
its
> object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly 
before the
> dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not 
involved
> in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-
door
> processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and 
experienced,
> objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to 
arise. But
> right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known 
as
> conditioned dhammas, no self.
> Nina. 
> Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the 
first
> part was corrected by Jim:
> 
> @at.t.hakathaa
> 
> 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti
> bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? 
natthi.
> 
> N: As to the ninth,² luminous². Luminous is clear, pure. citta is 
the
> life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? 
No, it
> does not. 
> 
> niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa 
ya.mki~nci
> parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati.
> 
> N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, 
or
> without colour, is called luminous because of its purity.
> 
> idampi nirupakkilesataaya
> parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m.
> 
> N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus 
luminous.
> That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.
> 
> aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi.
> 
> N: ³ by oncoming ³(defilements). by those that are not conascent 
with it,
> but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).
> 
> upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m 
naamaati
> vuccati.
> 
> N: ³by defilements². By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed 
called
> defiled. 
> 
> katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro
> vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m
> avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva 
antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena
> ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na
> sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m 
labhanti,
> eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m.
> 
> N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good 
conduct,
> possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-
residents
> of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or 
disapproval
> thus, ³ they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish 
or exhort
> their own children, their pupils, their co-residents², evenso 
should this
> (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.
> 
> aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca
> aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m,
> 
> N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, 
evenso
> the life-continuum should be seen,
> 
> puttaadiina.m
> vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne
> rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m 
cittaana.m vasena
> uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi 
bhava"ngacitta.m
> upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti.
> 
> N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the 
children
> etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of 
defilement,
> corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, 
arising at the
> moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by 
nature
> pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.
> 
> *****
> 
> 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m.
> 
> N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-
continuum.
> 
> vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne
> arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m
> tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m
> aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti.
> 
> N: ³Freed²: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of 
impulsion,
> without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because 
consciousness
> is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and 
thus it
> is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements.
> 
> idhaapi yathaa
> siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo
> ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti
> anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne
> uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi 
upakkilesehi
> vippamuttanti vuccatiiti.
> 
> N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, 
possessed with
> good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and
> approval, thus, ² they train, encourage, admonish their own 
children that
> these things are indeed wholesome ³, evenso because of the arising 
of
> wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-
continuum is
> said to be freed of oncoming defilements.
> 
> *******
> pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa.
> 
> N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention.
> 
> 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa
> N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers.
> 
> 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m
> bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano.
> 
> N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, ³the 
ordinary
> person who is uninstructed², he is the ordinary person who has not 
heard of
> that life-continuum.
> 
> agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti.
> 
> N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the
> teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained
> (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). 
> 
> yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena
> upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi
> javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi 
upakkili.t.tha''nti neva
> aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca
> khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu
> uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa
> yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa
> adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi.
> 
> N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. 
from the
> beginning, as follows: ³This life-continuum indeed that is also 
pure by
> nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that 
have
> arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen², does not 
understand it,
> because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained 
the truth),
> and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, 
the
> causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from 
study,
> does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has 
no
> access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and
> accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that 
should be
> engaged in, he has no attainment.
> 
> so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa
> ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m --
> N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and 
attainment
> that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam).
> 
> ******
	
10293

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] reminders India

 	
Hello Nina,

I am not sure how you arrived the idea "no self who can do anything."

Regards,
Victor

[snip]
> How long the road is: because no self who can do anything.
[snip]
	

10294

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:27am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kom and Sarah,


"Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
defilements." 

"Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."


k: The first statement of the sutta is I think of paramount impt. If we
said that it is Nibbana or enlightment, then it the first place how did it
get defiled. To say that our mind is originally luminous, then I believe
this is to assume that there is some kind of a permanent self inside us.
If we say that luminious mind is Nibbana as Nibbana is the object in the
supramundance stage (as indicated by the last passage), it contradicts the
first statement bc Nibbana could never be defiled if not why Buddha reach
that stage in the first instance and then exhort his disciples to do that.
My view is that luminous in this context should be bhavanga citta as it
could discern in the present as a form of developement by noble ones. 


k: Without discerning bhavanga cittas, then we leave a three citta gap in
each sense proccess of 17 cittas. If we total it up, it is a lot of
cittas in a present moment (which consists of billions of cittas). This is
a force to reckon with and notwithstanding such cittas still have latent
tendecies as ignorance in this latent tendecies could only be eradicated
by the last stage of Arahat. Secondly, bhavanga cittas should be very
sutble and unlike kusala or unkusala cittas which have repetition effect
(javana). Thirdly, bhavanga citta is always the initator of all thought
process including vipaka ones. Hence the first stage till before reaching
the last stage of the noble ones, discernment of bhavanga cittas should be
considered impt for the development of the mind in my interpretation of
the last passage of the sutta. 




Kind regards
Ken O



10295

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Nina

 	
Dear Suan,
As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the subcommentary -- and I do
indeed, let me make the following plea:

If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. Though I may
struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, particularly on this
topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide to make that
effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful.

You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy presentation' in a
separate message. 

<deep bow of supplication>

Best,
Robert Ep.

===========================


--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> Dear Nina
> 
> How are you?
> 
> It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara 
> statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and 
> sharing your works with all of us.
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> "I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation and 
> analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so 
> difficult, all those composites."
> 
> I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in 
> Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write 
> technical notes on them, though. 
> 
> My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the 
> luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. 
> 
> However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on 
> the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you 
> off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to 
> include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana 
> Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy 
> presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to 
> follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's 
> technical details. 
> 
> 
> With regards,
> 
> Suan
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> > Dear Suan and Rob Ep,
> > I posted the Co to the sutta on Bhavanga some time ago for Rob Ep 
> but may be
> > it was overlooked, so I post it again. I am really looking forward 
> to Suan's
> > translation, explanation and analysis. I got stuck in the subco. 
> since I
> > find the language so difficult, all those composites.
> > I find the comparison of bhavangacitta to the good parents and the
> > defilements arising at the moment of javana to the naughty children
> > interesting, but I have a feeling that I do not yet fully 
> understand this,
> > that there is more to it. But there is no hurry, I know you have 
> very many
> > working hours. 
> > I would like to say to Rob: A. Sujin often said: when there is
> > bhavangacitta, nothing appears, no object appears. We do not know 
> its
> > object, as you know it is the same as that experienced shortly 
> before the
> > dying-consciousness of the previous life. The bhavangacitta is not 
> involved
> > in outer objects, and thus, no defilements arise. But when sense-
> door
> > processes begin, objects are impinging on the doorways and 
> experienced,
> > objects appear, and on account of them defilements are bound to 
> arise. But
> > right understanding of them can be developed so that they are known 
> as
> > conditioned dhammas, no self.
> > Nina. 
> > Here is the Commentary, but the translation is coarse and only the 
> first
> > part was corrected by Jim:
> > 
> > @at.t.hakathaa
> > 
> > 49. navame pabhassaranti pa.n.dara.m parisuddha.m. cittanti
> > bhava"ngacitta.m. ki.m pana cittassa va.n.no naama atthiiti? 
> natthi.
> > 
> > N: As to the ninth,2 luminous2. Luminous is clear, pure. citta is 
> the
> > life-continuum. But how does there exist indeed a colour of citta? 
> No, it
> > does not. 
> > 
> > niilaadiina~nhi a~n~natarava.n.na.m vaa hotu ava.n.na.m vaa 
> ya.mki~nci
> > parisuddhataaya ``pabhassara''nti vuccati.
> > 
> > N: For anything which may be a certain colour, beginning with blue, 
> or
> > without colour, is called luminous because of its purity.
> > 
> > idampi nirupakkilesataaya
> > parisuddhanti pabhassara.m. ta~nca khoti ta.m bhava"ngacitta.m.
> > 
> > N: It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus 
> luminous.
> > That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.
> > 
> > aagantukehiiti asahajaatehi pacchaa javanakkha.ne uppajjanakehi.
> > 
> > N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent 
> with it,
> > but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).
> > 
> > upakkilesehiiti raagaadiihi upakkili.t.thattaa upakkili.t.tha.m 
> naamaati
> > vuccati.
> > 
> > N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed 
> called
> > defiled. 
> > 
> > katha.m? yathaa hi siilavantaa aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro
> > vaa aacariyupajjhaayaa vaa dussiilaana.m duraacaaraana.m
> > avattasampannaana.m puttaana~nceva 
> antevaasikasaddhivihaarikaana~nca vasena
> > ``attano putte vaa antevaasikasaddhivihaarike vaa na tajjenti na
> > sikkhaapenti na ovadanti naanusaasantii''ti ava.n.na.m akitti.m 
> labhanti,
> > eva.msampadamida.m veditabba.m.
> > 
> > N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good 
> conduct,
> > possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-
> residents
> > of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or 
> disapproval
> > thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish 
> or exhort
> > their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso 
> should this
> > (bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.
> > 
> > aacaarasampannaa maataapitaro viya ca
> > aacariyupajjhaayaa viya ca bhava"ngacitta.m da.t.thabba.m,
> > 
> > N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, 
> evenso
> > the life-continuum should be seen,
> > 
> > puttaadiina.m
> > vasena tesa.m akittilaabho viya javanakkha.ne
> > rajjanadussanamuyhanasabhaavaana.m lobhasahagataadiina.m 
> cittaana.m vasena
> > uppannehi aagantukehi upakkilesehi pakatiparisuddhampi 
> bhava"ngacitta.m
> > upakkili.t.tha.m naama hotiiti.
> > 
> > N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the 
> children
> > etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of 
> defilement,
> > corruption and infatuation, accompanied by desire and so on, 
> arising at the
> > moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by 
> nature
> > pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.
> > 
> > *****
> > 
> > 50. dasamepi bhava"ngacittameva citta.m.
> > 
> > N: With reference to the tenth, consciousness is also the life-
> continuum.
> > 
> > vippamuttanti javanakkha.ne
> > arajjamaana.m adussamaana.m amuyhamaana.m
> > tihetuka~naa.nasampayuttaadikusalavasena uppajjamaana.m
> > aagantukehi upakkilesehi vippamutta.m naama hoti.
> > 
> > N: 3Freed2: because of wholesomeness arising at the time of 
> impulsion,
> > without defilements, corruptions and infatuations, and because 
> consciousness
> > is accompanied by three wholesome roots, accompanied by wisdom, and 
> thus it
> > is indeed freed of the arising of oncoming defilements.
> > 
> > idhaapi yathaa
> > siilavantaana.m aacaarasampannaana.m puttaadiina.m vasena maataadayo
> > ``sobhanaa eteyeva attano puttakaadayo sikkhaapenti ovadanti
> > anusaasantii''ti va.n.nakittilaabhino honti, eva.m javanakkha.ne
> > uppannakusalacittavasena ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m aagantukehi 
> upakkilesehi
> > vippamuttanti vuccatiiti.
> > 
> > N: Here also, just as parents etc., with virtuous conduct, 
> possessed with
> > good behaviour, because of their children, etc. , acquire praise and
> > approval, thus, 2 they train, encourage, admonish their own 
> children that
> > these things are indeed wholesome 3, evenso because of the arising 
> of
> > wholesome consciousness at the time of impulsion, that life-
> continuum is
> > said to be freed of oncoming defilements.
> > 
> > *******
> > pa.nihitaacchavaggava.n.nanaa.
> > 
> > N: Explanation of the chapter on pure intention.
> > 
> > 6. accharaasa"nghaatavaggava.n.nanaa
> > N: Explanation of the chapter on the Snapping of the Fingers.
> > 
> > 51. cha.t.thassa pa.thame ta.m assutavaa puthujjanoti ta.m
> > bhava"ngacitta.m sutavirahito puthujjano.
> > 
> > N: With reference to the first section of the sixth chapter, 3the 
> ordinary
> > person who is uninstructed2, he is the ordinary person who has not 
> heard of
> > that life-continuum.
> > 
> > agamaadhigamaabhaavaa~neyyo assutavaa iti.
> > 
> > N: He is not learned since he has not developed understanding of the
> > teachings nor (any higher) attainment of what should be attained
> > (bhaavaa~neyyo ?). 
> > 
> > yo hi ida.m sutta.m aadito pa.t.thaaya atthavasena
> > upaparikkhanto ``ida.m bhava"ngacitta.m naama pakatiparisuddhampi
> > javanakkha.ne uppannehi lobhaadiihi upakkilesehi 
> upakkili.t.tha''nti neva
> > aagamavasena na adhigamavasena jaanaati, yassa ca
> > khandhadhaatuaayatanapaccayaakaarasatipa.t.thaanaadiisu
> > uggahaparipucchaavinicchayavirahitattaa
> > yathaabhuuta~naa.napa.tivedhasaadhako neva aagamo, pa.tipattiyaa
> > adhigantabbassa anadhigatattaa na adhigamo atthi.
> > 
> > N: (uninstructed)Because he who is investigating this sutta etc. 
> from the
> > beginning, as follows: 3This life-continuum indeed that is also 
> pure by
> > nature, is at the moment of impulsion polluted by defilements that 
> have
> > arisen, such as attachment, etc. that have arisen2, does not 
> understand it,
> > because he has no access (to the teachings) nor has he attained 
> the truth),
> > and since he, as to the aggregates, the elements, the sensefields, 
> the
> > causal genesis, the applications of mindfulness etc. is exempt from 
> study,
> > does not ask questions, and has no discrimination, therefore he has 
> no
> > access to seeing realities as they are, as to realization and
> > accomplishment, and since he does not engage in the practice that 
> should be
> > engaged in, he has no attainment.
> > 
> > so aagamaadhigamaabhaavaa
> > ~neyyo assutavaa iti. svaaya.m --
> > N: He is uneducated with regard to knowledge of the teachings and 
> attainment
> > that should be cultivated. He is such a person (so ayam).
> > 
> > ******


	
10296

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:47am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Kom and Sarah,
> 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind.[1] And it is defiled by incoming
> defilements." 
> 
> "Luminous, monks, is the mind. And it is freed from incoming defilements."
> 
> 
> k: The first statement of the sutta is I think of paramount impt. If we
> said that it is Nibbana or enlightment, then it the first place how did it
> get defiled. To say that our mind is originally luminous, then I believe
> this is to assume that there is some kind of a permanent self inside us.
> If we say that luminious mind is Nibbana as Nibbana is the object in the
> supramundance stage (as indicated by the last passage), it contradicts the
> first statement bc Nibbana could never be defiled if not why Buddha reach
> that stage in the first instance and then exhort his disciples to do that.
> My view is that luminous in this context should be bhavanga citta as it
> could discern in the present as a form of developement by noble ones. 

The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never* defiled, are
they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same problem as
saying that Nibbana is defiled.

Robert Ep.


> 
> k: Without discerning bhavanga cittas, then we leave a three citta gap in
> each sense proccess of 17 cittas. If we total it up, it is a lot of
> cittas in a present moment (which consists of billions of cittas). This is
> a force to reckon with and notwithstanding such cittas still have latent
> tendecies as ignorance in this latent tendecies could only be eradicated
> by the last stage of Arahat. Secondly, bhavanga cittas should be very
> sutble and unlike kusala or unkusala cittas which have repetition effect
> (javana). Thirdly, bhavanga citta is always the initator of all thought
> process including vipaka ones. Hence the first stage till before reaching
> the last stage of the noble ones, discernment of bhavanga cittas should be
> considered impt for the development of the mind in my interpretation of
> the last passage of the sutta. 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O

	
10297

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:41am
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Dear Nina,

<<<<<
Now, I used to think that kata ~naa.na must be lokuttara but in India I
learnt differently. A. Sujin said, when speaking about the highest level
(doy ukkrit, in Pali ugghati is to lift up) kata ~naa.na is lokuttara, but
there are other levels, when vipassana ~naa.na realizes the impermanence and
thus dukkha of dhammas that arise and fall away. It is all so detailed and
subtle. We have to look at the context: you mention the level of anuloma,
arising before gotrabhu, which is followed by lokuttara citta. This is
already "doy ukkrit", according to the highest level.
Also she said, when there is kata~naa.na there are still sacca ~naa.na and
kicca ~naa.na, they develop on and on. One realizes more and more the Truths
that should be known (sacca) and the Truths that are known through the
development of vipassana ~naa.na (kicca), and then there will be the fruit,
kata ~naa.na according to the level that has been reached.
Would you perhaps have time to also look at the Thai Co. I mentioned?
It makes sense to me that she deals with these three in such a dynamic way,
because they are not static, not abstract texbook terms.
I still have on my computer your q. about pakatupanissaya p. from before I
went to India, but I think Sarah answered these?
Then I want to know whether your hand got cured completely? Can you type
without pain? 
>>>>>>>



It is good for me to reread and rethink about this. I like what Kom told me, 
Dhamma is very deep and subtle, also has multiple aspects (naya). The Bhuddha 
pierced through them all with his panna. The great discipline like 
Ven.Sariputta listened to just one sentence but could pierce through 1000 
aspects(naya) of that one sentence. For me, I have to keep listening, 
reading, thinking and reflecting over and over and …….. To me, panna is 
illuminating. No matter how rear, how little, how weak or how shakable it is, 
it is always beneficial. 

My tipitaka CDrom and the online versions do not have any commentaries. I 
think the abhidhammattha-sagaha (abdms) I have, is a 
mahamakutta-rajavitayalau version. I do also have some parichetas by 
Aj.Somporn.

I looked up the dhammacakkappavatana sutra and reread the abdms. The word 
saccanana, kiccanana and katanana were not found in Thai tipitaka, but in the 
dhammacakkaappavatana sutra mentions about 3 rounds of the 4 ariyasacca with 
12 aspects (just not using those 3 words) . The contents in the sutra looked 
like it mentioned by ugghata perspective.

In abdms the word ugghata also has a comparative (ugghata-tara) and 
superlative (ugghata-tama) forms. In PC 7, this 3 round was mentioned under 
sabbha-sagaha with 5-kandha, 5-upadhana, ayatana, dhatu and ariyasacca. The 
middle path and the 2 extreme paths are also mentioned here. Then in PC 9 as 
I mentioned before, this 3 rounds are mentioned first in anuloma-nana. Both 
the sutra and abdms say that if one sees one in four ariyasacca, he also sees 
other three simultaneously. 

Seemed to me that kata-nana is about to begin in anuloma but the other two 
can be accumulated in any level before. As I understand if there is 
kata-nana, the other two will be automatically there as well. It's mentioned 
that this 3-round occurs again in gotrabhu- and magga-nana. I understand 
that only magga and pala-nana are lokuttara, then even paccavekkhana-nana is 
lokiya level again.

Again this is my understanding, sotapatimagga and pala is the first time the 
whole three nana is perfected but there are still more akusala to eliminate, 
so these three nana is not completely perfected yet. I think magga-nana of 
an arahat is ugghata-tama and for sekha-puggalas are in ugghata-tara level.

That what I was able to get from my reading. I am looking forward to hear 
more from you as well as Jon and Jaran in BKK then ( hope I do not put too 
much burden on you, Jon :))

About pakatupanissaya-paccaya, I think I saw Sarah said something about 
it(thanks Sarah). I have been reading more about it, so I think I have some 
more understanding about it.

Rgd my hand, it is doing much better now. I can type and write with no more 
pain. I am also back in playing tennis ( I did not do the cankamma, sorry!). 
I still have to put a buddy-strap on my fingers when I am playing tennis, so 
far I can hit it without any pain.

Thanks for everything. 
Appreciate,

Num
	
10298

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 3:23pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Anders,

Good to have you back :-)

All the best

Herman

> 
> If you are not close to being able to investigate the luminous for 
yourself in this very present moment, then what good will 
> speculating about it do? The questiosn you gotta ask yourselves 
are: 
> 
> Will this reduce my clinging or add to it (in terms of clinging to 
views and concepts)?
> 
> Will this sharpen my discernment (in terms of my own actual 
experienced reality)?
> 
> Regards
> Anders
	
10299

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 3:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> Howard:
> No, I'm not thinking, in this context, of a
> memory as providing an 
> object in addition to the current object. I'm
> thinking of the memory as a 
> subliminal memory *trace* which conditions the
> current object by its presence 
> and is a mental concomitant of the current citta.
> For example, the "memory" 
> of the immediately preceding very soft sound may
> cause the current sound to 
> appear very loud. 

Interesting thought and example...

> But it is only the current sound
> that is the object of the 
> current citta. At other times, a memory may not be
> subliminal, but may be the 
> unique object of the current citta.

. I'm inclined to think that sa~n~naa occurs with
varying strengths from latent (like anusaya), so not
'manifest' at all, to subtle (subliminal?) to very
distinct (no idea if this is good abhidhamma or not). 
Still it makes most sense to me that each of these
moments would occur 'serially', whether truly
discretely or not. Good point though that this
doesn't account for how a previous memory can affect
the subjective experience of something like relative
volume.

mike

	
10300

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 7:08pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Robert Ep

The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never*
> defiled, are
> they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same
> problem as
> saying that Nibbana is defiled.


k: Let me assume that defilements as to sensory objects. To me bhavanga
citta is by nature luminious and not defiled. But when being disturb by
sensory objects, it is considered defiled. In the same way, a clear water
(bhavanga citta) will become cloudy if we start disturbing it by stirring
it (sensory objects). In this way, I believe it is considered defiled. 
But if we fall asleep, bhavanga cittas are no longer affected by sensory
objects, it become luminous again. Just like sand particles settled down,
the water becomes clear again. Water is by nature clear and only through 
mud, sand particles (by stirring them), it becomes defiled.

Sorry I do not quote commentaries bc I know nuts abt them, I basing on
logic and my intuition. 

Hope this helps :).




Kind regards
Ken O



	
10301

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Purnomo,

--- "Purnomo ." <purnomo9@h...> wrote:

> If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our
> experiences and we 'just' 
> make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How
> about you ? I am guarantee 
> that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept'
> for me. And That's true 
> for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth.

Exactly right, I think, except I would say that the
conclusion makes itself--or rather that it forms due
to conditions (sa~n~aa- and sankhaara-khandhas being
of particular importance to this I think).

mike


	
10302

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:25pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> Just for the record, not that my take is of
> any partcular importance, 
> I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial
> interpretation. 

Your take is always of some importance to me, Howard. 
I think it's interesting that we are diametrically
opposed here, especially since we are in such close
agreement, I think, in many other respects. Anyway,
also just for the record, I definitely *do* 'buy'
that commentarial interpretation...

> To me, 
> it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that
> the mind is luminous but 
> for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky
> obfuscated by a cloud 
> cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like
> gold which is lacking in 
> shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and
> which manifests its 
> capacity to shine once the impurities are removed.

...and to me, it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is
*not* saying any such thing, anywhere in the Pali
canon--with this meaning. Hope we can continue to
agreeably disagree, however totally.

mike


	
10303

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:30pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
Hi Sarah


> Sometimes when we read the texts it seems that all realities should be
> known.
> However, we should remember we are reading about the Buddha’s
> extraordinary
> understanding. Can we expect ‘all cittas’ could be discerned? (Btw,
> Howard uses
> discern in the sense of ‘cognizing’ i.e. what each citta does regardless
> of
> whether there is any wisdom accompanying it. You seem to use it in the
> sense of
> ‘being known’ or ‘understood’....you may like to compare notes with
> him;-))

k: In fact all cittas can be discern (even if there is no sati or panna)
due to the universal cetasikas that followed each cittas. 


> You’ll see in the following extract from the com notes I just gave a
> link for, that the defilements arise in the javana process in a later
sense door or mind door process. Any understanding also arises in these
javana processes only, to know any reality. This is what is meant
development of the mind. It is not referring to understanding bhavanga
cittas specifically, but we need to know there are these cittas in between
other doorways.

k: In my view, to know any reality in javana process is what we call the
present moment of now that we currently have. To discount bhavanga cittas
as a development process is not consistent with the sutta. We could not
on one hand saying that it is bhavanga cittas on the first two statements
than says that developement of the mind on the next two statements is not
bhavanga citta. It is contradictary. To be in line with the sutta, it is
meant for the development of the mind for bhavanga cittas and not other
cittas. We know that each suttas could mean a different method of
practise. And that sutta could point that other than looking at javana
process, bhavanga citta should be noted for those who are noble ones. The
gist word of the whole sutta is I think "noble ones". Then the sutta will
be view more in line with Abhidhamma as well as Sutta perspective. 


> > Furthermore, in Abhidhamma, I do not think there is an explanation how
> > does bhavanga cittas actually work (except as life continual), its
> objects (a mystery) and how it is being defiled by the six senses. It
simply says that it is being defiled (or impinge or disturb), is there any
> > commentaries on the intracies on how it being defiled. The actual
> details will be very helpful. Maybe as a Christmas gift to me. (I sound
> greedy :))
> .....
> 
> As we won’t be seeing you, that’s OK;-))
> I’ll adda couple of links. Kom and Num are also very clued up on the
> details.
> As Suan suggested, it helps a lot to understand some abhidhamma when
> reading
> the Suttas and commentaries. All the details are there, for sure.

k: When we talk abt commentaries. I know there are Abhidhamma
commentaries. Are there sutta commentaries (I think there is)? I have
the book dispeller of delusion, is the commentaries on mindfullness is
Abhidhamma perspective or sutta perspective commentaries. Or I have
confused myself with the term commentaries. he he :)

k: Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and everyone in the list.
Enjoy your stay in Bangkok, hmm I disappointed that I could not attend.
One day maybe kamma may work for me, who knows, he he :). 




Kind regards
Ken O

	
10304

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:34pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kenneth,

Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with
Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity',
'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana
(as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to
bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some
underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness.

mike

p.s. I met Ven. Thanissaro a couple of weeks ago--he
has a new book out if anyone's interested, 'Buddhist
Monastic Code Vol. 2'. Good stuff...

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Howard and Sarah,
> 
> I think I like the notes made by Thanissaro Bhikkhu
> on "Luminous" at
>
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an01-049.html
> 
> Quote
> Note
> 1. This statement has engendered a great deal of
> controversy over the
> centuries. The commentary maintains that "mind" here
> refers to the
> bhavanga-citta, the momentary mental state between
> periods when the mental
> stream adverts to objects, but this statement raises
> more questions than
> it answers. There is no reference to the
> bhavanga-citta or the mental
> stream in any of the suttas (they appear first in an
> Abhidhamma treatise,
> the Patthana); and because the commentaries compare
> the bhavanga-citta to
> deep sleep, why is it called luminous? And why would
> the perception of its
> luminosity be a prerequisite for developing the
> mind? And further, if
> "mind" in this discourse means bhavanga-citta, what
> would it mean to
> develop the bhavanga-citta? 
> 
> Another interpretation equates the luminosity of the
> mind with the
> "consciousness without feature," desribed as
> "luminous" in MN 49 and DN
> 11, but this interpretation also has problems.
> According to MN 49, that
> consciousness partakes of nothing in the describable
> world, not even the
> "Allness of the All," so how could it possibly be
> defiled? And, because it
> is not realized until the goal of the practice is
> reached, why would the
> perception of its luminosity be a prerequisite for
> developing the mind?
> And again, if "mind" here means consciousness
> without feature, how could
> the sutta talk of its development? 
> 
> A more reasonable approach to understanding the
> statement can be derived
> from taking it in context: the luminous mind is the
> mind that the
> meditator is trying to develop. To perceive its
> luminosity means
> understanding that defilements such as greed,
> aversion, or delusion are
> not intrinsic to its nature, are not a necessary
> part of awareness.
> Without this understanding, it would be impossible
> to practice. With this
> understanding, however, one can make an effort to
> cut away existing
> defilements, leaving the mind in the stage that MN
> 24 calls "purity in
> terms of mind." This would correspond to the
> luminous level of
> concentration described in the standard simile for
> the fourth jhana: "And
> furthermore, with the abandoning of pleasure & pain
> -- as with the earlier
> disappearance of elation & distress -- he enters &
> remains in the fourth
> jhana: purity of equanimity & mindfulness,
> neither-pleasure-nor-pain. He
> sits, permeating the body with a pure, bright
> awareness. Just as if a man
> were sitting covered from head to foot with a white
> cloth so that there
> would be no part of his body to which the white
> cloth did not extend; even
> so, the monk sits, permeating the body with a pure,
> bright awareness.
> There is nothing of his entire body unpervaded by
> pure, bright awareness."
> From this state it is possible to develop the
> discernment that not only
> cuts away existing defilements but also uproots any
> potential for them to
> ever arise again. Only in the stages of awakening
> that follow on those
> acts of discernment would "consciousness without
> feature" be realized.


	
10305

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 9:57pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Kenneth.
I guess we can get someone else to chime in again on this, but my understanding is
that the bhavanga cittas never make any contact with sense objects and thus are
never defiled. They only get 'turned on' in deep sleep, unconsciousness or death
to ensure the continuity during the 'blank periods' when the conscious mind and
sensory phenomena are absent. So when there is sense object impinging on a citta,
it is never bhavanga citta, it is always the 'waking' citta. When bhavanga citta
awakens, there is never any object there. Bhavanga citta only has as its object
the last object before the previous death, and it never varies, so there is no
chance of any defilement.

If the above is true, by this logic, I cannot see how the bhavanga citta can be
the one referred to in the statement: 'Mind is luminous, but is defiled by
incoming defilements'. It would be quite impossible.

And in fact, the commentaries seems to assume as I do that the bhavanga cittas
cannot be directly defiled. That is why they employ the 'parent and child'
analogy, which says that the waking cittas, which are defiled, ruin the reputation
of the parents, the bhavanga cittas, even though the bhavanga cittas are never
themselves defiled. So in a sense the Buddha could be saying that the bhavanga
cittas are defiled by the other cittas, even though they themselves are actually
*not* defiled. With respect, this seems to be stretching the meaning of the
Buddha's very simple declarative statement quite a bit, in my opinion. 

I look forward to reading a greater part of the commentary on this subject, if
Suan takes on the time-consuming task of translating it, and I hope it will
clarify the above.

Until then, I think it is interesting to note the different 'streams' of cittas
that are taking place on different levels in the human structure, as it is
constructed from moment to moment by a series of changing conditions and events. 
There are the subconsious cittas, the bhavanga cittas; the conscious ones, which
perceive namas and rupas, and the supra-mundane cittas, which discern the reality
of arising namas and rupas and some of which are capable of perceiving Nibbana. 
But as I understand it, it is still the case that only one of these cittas appears
at a time. It is an interesting picture of reality.

Best,
Robert Ep.

============

--- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote:
> Hi Robert Ep
> 
> The problem, again, Ken, is that the bhavanga cittas are *never*
> > defiled, are
> > they? They are defined by being free of defilement, so it is the same
> > problem as
> > saying that Nibbana is defiled.
> 
> 
> k: Let me assume that defilements as to sensory objects. To me bhavanga
> citta is by nature luminious and not defiled. But when being disturb by
> sensory objects, it is considered defiled. In the same way, a clear water
> (bhavanga citta) will become cloudy if we start disturbing it by stirring
> it (sensory objects). In this way, I believe it is considered defiled. 
> But if we fall asleep, bhavanga cittas are no longer affected by sensory
> objects, it become luminous again. Just like sand particles settled down,
> the water becomes clear again. Water is by nature clear and only through 
> mud, sand particles (by stirring them), it becomes defiled.
> 
> Sorry I do not quote commentaries bc I know nuts abt them, I basing on
> logic and my intuition. 
> 
> Hope this helps :).
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Kind regards
> Ken O


	
10306

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Great reminder Sarah, thanks...mike

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:

> The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes
> between six kinds of
> concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see
> Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 
> 
>         1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make
> known what is real, for
> example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or
> sanna (perception) 10.
> 
>          2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which
> make known what is not real,
> such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts
> do not represent absolute
> realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and
> rupa. Thai or foreigner are
> not real in the absolute sense, they are
> conventional realities, sammutti
> dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome
> consciousness) be Thai or foreign?
> Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it
> is a dhamma which has its
> own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign.
> 
>          3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis,
> concepts of the non-existent
> based on the existent. There is the expression "the
> person with the six
> abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is
> not real. Thus this
> concept stands for what is real and for what is not
> real.
> 
>          4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> concepts of the existent based on
> the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's
> voice". The sound is real,
> but the woman is not real.
> 
>          5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> concepts of what is real based on
> what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana
> (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu
> (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa
> (eyesense, a reality
> sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana
> (consciousness) is also a
> reality, namely the reality which experiences.
> 
>          6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis,
> concepts of what is not real
> based on what is not real. There is the expression
> "the kings son". Both king
> and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas,
> conventional realities. 


	
10307

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:16pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Sarah,
I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I would
ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities, but I
thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities. Am I
confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha dhamma,
and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati and
panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of trouble
sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=============

--- "m. nease" <mlnease@y...> wrote:
> Great reminder Sarah, thanks...mike
> 
> --- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> 
> > The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes
> > between six kinds of
> > concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see
> > Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 
> > 
> >         1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make
> > known what is real, for
> > example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or
> > sanna (perception) 10.
> > 
> >          2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which
> > make known what is not real,
> > such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts
> > do not represent absolute
> > realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and
> > rupa. Thai or foreigner are
> > not real in the absolute sense, they are
> > conventional realities, sammutti
> > dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome
> > consciousness) be Thai or foreign?
> > Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it
> > is a dhamma which has its
> > own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign.
> > 
> >          3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis,
> > concepts of the non-existent
> > based on the existent. There is the expression "the
> > person with the six
> > abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is
> > not real. Thus this
> > concept stands for what is real and for what is not
> > real.
> > 
> >          4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> > concepts of the existent based on
> > the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's
> > voice". The sound is real,
> > but the woman is not real.
> > 
> >          5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> > concepts of what is real based on
> > what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana
> > (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu
> > (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa
> > (eyesense, a reality
> > sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana
> > (consciousness) is also a
> > reality, namely the reality which experiences.
> > 
> >          6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis,
> > concepts of what is not real
> > based on what is not real. There is the expression
> > "the kings son". Both king
> > and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas,
> > conventional realities. 


	
10308

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:31pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Sarah,
Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the translations
of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate those
being there, they are quite clear in what they say.

Here is the excerpt I am focussing on at the moment. I have left out the Pali, as
it is available in the dsg files.

My comments follow:

==============

>>It is also pure, because it is unsoiled (by defilements); thus luminous.
That indeed, meaning, that life-continuum.

N: 3 by oncoming 3(defilements). by those that are not conascent with it,
but arise later at the moment of impulsion (javana).

>>N: 3by defilements2. By being soiled by desire etc. it is indeed called
defiled.>> 

>>N: How is that so? For, as parents, teachers or preceptors, of good conduct,
possessed of good behaviour, because of the children, pupils or co-residents
of bad conduct, misbehhaved, disobedient, receive dispraise or disapproval
thus, 3 they neither instill awe to, nor discipline, admonish or exhort
their own children, their pupils, their co-residents2, evenso should this
(bhavangacitta) having a similar consequence be understood.>>

>>N: Just as parents, teachers, preceptors, who are of good conduct, evenso
the life-continuum should be seen,>>

>>N: Just as the acquirement of a bad name for them, through the children
etc., evenso, because of the cittas that are of a nature of being
passionate, hateful, or deluded, accompanied by desire and so on, arising at
the moments of impulsion, evenso is also the life-continuum, that is by
nature pure, indeed soiled, by the oncoming defilements that have arisen.>>

===================

Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. The
bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. They
have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking cittas
are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. There is
no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of the
waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom would the
reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for not
'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an analogy
that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. 

The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that attributes
this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to be
some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the commentary's
viewpoint to be understood. 

Best,
Robert Ep.

==================================================


--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan and Ken O,
> 
> Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O.
> 
> Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from
> the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked
> quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you
> both may find it interesting to review at:
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386
> commentary notes translation
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408
> sutta translation
> 
> Suan, I'll look forward to your next set of Parinibbana sub-com notes (3) and
> your analysis. Ken O, you may wish to quote back some of Nina's translation
> with further comments in the meantime for Nina or Kom or myself.
> 
> Sarah


	
10309

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Dear Kom,

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:

> Then I want to know whether your hand got cured
> completely? Can you type
> without pain?

I think I knew but had forgotten that, perhaps, we
haven't heard from you because of typing difficulty? 
If this is still a problem, I'll be very happy to
transcribe for the list anything you can get to me in
any audio format.

mike


	
10310

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:43pm
Subject: Intro to Vinaya Commentary - words of the Buddha? <6>

 	
Dear Friends,

(Firstly, i apologise that this segment or 'episode' is a little longer than
intended because of the last minute inclusion of the water-snake section in
full)

********************
Smp. = Samantapaasaadikaa. This is the commentary to the Vinaya by
Buddhaghosa

Baahiranidaana, The Inception of Discipline & the Vinaya Nidaana = the
introductory chapter to the Smp., translated by N.A, Jayawickrama 

Atth.=Atthasalini, commentary by Buddhaghosa to Dhammasangini, 1st book of the
Abhidhamma Pitaka, PTS, translated by Pe Muang Tin

Mah.= Mahavamsa., Chronicle of the history of Sri Lanka from the time of the
visit of the Buddha, PTS, translated by W.Geiger. Based on the same ancient
Sinhala commentaries which Buddhaghosa used. Written by Mahanama in Pali around
1000 A.D. but based on the original Mahavamsa Comm.
********************

Just to recap, last time I quoted from the Bahiranidanawhere it discussed the
different emphasis found in the Suttanta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma. With regard to
the Abhidhamma, it said:

> the third, that set out in accordance with reality wherein bengs who conceive
> of an ego and what pertains to it, only in the presence of a pile of
> conditions, are instructed in terms of the absolute truth.......’ <end quote>
> 
> ********************

I’ll continue with just a few more quotes from The Bahiranidana concerning the
division of Suttanta, Vinaya and Abhidhamma as reportedly rehearsed at the 1st
Council. (Identical details are found in the Atth., pp 26-31):

‘Similarly, the first <Vinaya> is called discourse on the various categories of
restraint as in it are discussed all aspects of restraint, which are
diametrically opposed to remissness in conduct; the second <Suttanta>,
discourse on the refutation of heresies as in it is discussed the unravelling
of perverse views, which is diametrically opposed to the 62 heretical theories;
and the third <Abhidhamma>, discourse on the distinction between Name and Form
<nama rupa> as in it is discussed the differentiation of Name and Form which is
diametrically opposed to lust and other evil tendencies.

‘....Hence the training in the higher morality is specifically discussed in the
Vinayapitaka, the training in higher thought in the Suttapitaka, and the
training in higher wisdom in the Abhidhammapitaka...........

‘And in these three (Pitakas) the dhamma, the meaning, the exposition, and the
comprehension are difficult to access to men of little wit and providing no
basis of support even as the great ocean is to hares and such animals; and
hence they are profound. In this manner, herein, should the fourfold
profundity too of each one of them be understood.’

**********

By coincidence, the next extract I already planned to refer to is the same
sutta that Num and Howard have been discussing (Alagadduupama Sutta, Mi,133f)
.It appears after these extracts just quoted on the importance of the 3
Pitakas. Because of the interest, it may be useful to read it in this context.
It can be found in both the Bahiranidana and the Atthasalini. I’ll continue to
use the translation I’ve been using from the Bahiranidana:

‘...One should also elaborate on all topics such as the division of the
learning and how and under what conditions a monk attains whatever (there may
be of) success or failure, the threefold division of the learning in these
three Pitakas should be observed. The modes of learning are three (in number):
that which may be compared to the water-snake, that which aims at release, and
the mode of learning of a treasurer. 

Here, what has been wrongly grasped, and learned by heart for the reproach of
others is comparable to the simile of the water-snake: regarding which it is
said <see sutta ref. above>, "Even as, O monks, a man who is in need of a
water-snake, who seeks for one and goes about searching for one, were to see a
large water-snake, he would seize it by the coils or tail, and that water-snake
were to turn round and bite him in the hand or arm or any other part of his
body, he would, in consequence of that undergo death or pain amounting to
death. What is the reason for it? O monks, it was due to the imporoper
handling of the water-snake. Even in the same way, O monks, some foolish men
in this world commit to memory the Dhamma consisting of sutta, geyya,
veyyakarana, gatha, udana, itivuttaka, jataka, abbhutadhamma, and vedalla. 
Having committed to memory the Dhamma, they do not examine with intelligence
the significance of those teachings. As they do not examine intelligently
their significance, those teachings do not arouse comprehension. They commit
the teachings to memory for the sake of censuring others and freeing themselves
of others’ blame. They do not experience that purpose for the sake of which
(the virtuous) master the Dhamma. Those teachings which have been wrongly
grasped by them are conducive to their disadvantage and misery for a long time.
What is the reason for it? O monks, it is due to the wrong comprehension of
the teachings."

‘Whatever has been well grasped, and perfected, desiring the fulfilment of the
aggregate of moral precepts themselves not with the purpose of censuring others
- it brings about release. Regarding this it is said, "Those teachings being
well grasped by them are conducive to their advantage and happiness for a long
time. What is the reason for it? O monks, it is due to their correct
comprehension of the teachings."

‘Again, whatever a canker-waned sage who has understood the aggregates, rid
himself of the defilements, developed the path, pierced through the state of
mutability, and realized cessation, accomplishes solely for the purpose of
guarding the line of continuity and protecting the linage, this is the mode of
learning of a treasurer.’ <end quote>

**********

Hopefully, we’re all learning here to ‘examine with intelligence the
significance of those teachings’ rather than learning ‘by heart for the
reproach of others’. I quoted these extracts in full because of the interest in
this sutta.

There is further discussion about the danger of the wrong grasp of the Vinaya
and Suttanta. With regard to wrong grasp of the Abhidhamma, it says:

‘ He who is faring ill along in the Abhidhamma over-rides the thoughts on the
nature of things and thinks even of what should not be reflected on. 
consequently he arrives at confusion of mind......’ 

**********
I’ll just skip now to the end of the chapter in the Bahiranidana on the First
council where we read:

‘ Thus, this word of the Buddha which is uniform in sentiment taken as a whole
(without division), and consists of such divisions as the Dhamma and the Vinaya
in the divisions such as those into two and so forth, has been laid down as,
"This is the Dhamma and this is the Vinaya, these are the first, intermediate,
and final sayings of the Buddha, these are the Vinaya, Sutta, and Abhidhamma
Pitakas, these are the Nikayas from Digha to Khuddaka, these are the nine angas
commencing with sutta and these are the 84,000 Units of the Dhamma," was
rehearsed together by the assembly of self-controlled monks with Mahakassapa as
their leader verily observing this distinction.

‘And not only this, but other divers distinctions in compilation to be met in
the three Pitakas, such as the stanzas containing lists of contents, the
arrangement into chapters, noting down the repetitions, and the classification
into kindred sections of ones, twos, and so forth, that into groups of kindred
topics, and into group of fifties and so forth, have been determined when it
was rehearsed together in seven months,

‘And at the conclusion of its rehearsal this great earth trembled and quaked,
shook and shook violently many times over, up to its ocean-limits as though
giving its blessing at the joy produced that this dispensation of the Lord of
Ten Powers had been made by the Elder Mahakassapa to last a period of time
extending 5,000 years. And many wondrous things became manifest. And this is
the First Great Convocation ......’

**********

When I read and write these words, I feel the greatest gratitude and respect
for these great arahats who preserved the Teachings in this way.

The last details regarding the First Council itself and the earth quaking can
also be found at Atth. pp34-35.

**********
It could be said that as these commentaries were both written by Buddhaghosa,
it is not surprising that the details and inclusion of the Abhidhamma
explanations are the same.

Looking at the Mahavamsa, I also don’t find any disparity in details. We read
about the 700,000 leading bhikkhus amongst the ‘khattiyas and brahmans, vessas
and suddas, and gods likewise’ at the Parinibbana. we read about Mahakassapa
pointing ‘500 eminent bhikkhus, who had overcome the asavas, repeaters of the
ninefold doctrine and versed in all its separate parts; but there was one less
because of the thera Ananda....’

It continues with the same details of how they arrived in Rajagaha after ‘they
had made their pilgrimage over Jambudipa (India), consoling here and there the
sorrowing people’ and how they spent the first of the rain-months repairing the
dwellings in Rajagaha. Similar details are given about Ananda’s arahatship, how
Upali was selected to ‘speak for the vinaya’ and Ananda for the rest of the
dhamma with Mahakassapa asking questions and so on.

In the Theravada tradition, the dates and importance of the First, Second and
Third Councils are found mostly in the Bahiranidana, the Smp., references in
the Vinaya itself and the Mahavamsa. As I’ve mentioned, they are all in
conformity.

Without wishing to enter into any debate on the topic (about which I know
nothing;-), I’ll just add a note from Geiger’s introduction to his translation
of Mahavamsa concerning the inclusion of the Abhidhamma in the ‘later
tradition’ accounts of the First Council (especially for Ken O and Rob Ep) :

‘Among the Northern buddhist sources dealing with the first Council I mention
the Mahavastu. Here, in agreement with the southern tradition Kasyapa is given
as the originator of the coucil, the number of the bhiksus taking part is
stated to be 500 and the place the aptaparna grotto near Rajagrha.

‘There is, besides, an account in the second volume of the Dulva, the Tibetan
Vinaya of the Sarvastivadin sect. The fixing of the canon took place,
according to this source, in the following order: 1) Dharma, by Ananda;
2)Vinaya, by Upali; 3)Matrka (i.e.Abhidarma) by Mahakasyapa himself.....

‘Fa-hian and Hiuen-thsang also mention the First Council. The former gives the
number of the bhiksus a 500, the latter as 1,000; the former speaks in a
general way of ‘a collection of sacred books’, the latter expressly mentions
also the redaction of the Abhidharma by Mahakasyapa.’ <end all quotes>

**********
I look forward to discussing more about the commentaries, perhaps, next time. 

Best wishes and happy holidays meanwhile,

Sarah `
..........................................................................................................



	
10311

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A Cautionary Note: The Conventional Nature of Cittas and Processes

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:


> I expect that some of you may find the title
> of this post to be 
> somewhat displeasing. 

Not a bit, speaking for myself...

> If so, you have my apologies.
> Let me explain what I 
> mean.
> The Abhidhamma, itself, views a stream of
> consciousness as continuous 
> in the sense of being unbroken, without gaps. But
> that stream is analyzed 
> into processes, and the processes into cittas. As I
> see it, that parsing of 
> experience into processes and cittas, while not
> ungrounded, is still 
> conventional. 

I agree. I think Sarah's earlier post addresses this
well, notably number 1:

The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes
between six kinds of concepts that are names,
nama-pannatti (see Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 


1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known what
is real, for example the words rupa, nama, vedana
(feeling), or sanna (perception). 
2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which make known
what is not real, such as the words Thai or foreigner.
These concepts do not represent absolute realities,
citta and cetasika which are nama, and rupa. Thai or
foreigner are not real in the absolute sense, they are
conventional realities, sammutti dhammas. Could
akusala citta11 (unwholesome consciousness) be Thai or
foreign? Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a
reality), it is a dhamma which has its own
characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign. 
3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of the
non-existent based on the existent. There is the
expression "the person with the six abhinnas."12 The
six abhinnas are real but person is not real. Thus
this concept stands for what is real and for what is
not real. 
4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of the
existent based on the non-existent. There is the
expression "woman's voice". The sound is real, but the
woman is not real. 
5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis, concepts of what
is real based on what is real. There is the term
cakkhu-vinnana (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu (eye) is a
reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa (eyesense, a
reality sensitive to colour or visible object), and
vinnana (consciousness) is also a reality, namely the
reality which experiences. 
6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis, concepts of
what is not real based on what is not real. There is
the expression "the kings son". Both king and son are
not real, they are sammutti dhammas, conventional
realities. 

I'm just catching up here, so if this was already
posted in response or I'm out of order(!), my
apologies.

mike

	
10312

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Sarah,
Doing some more homework, I have gone to the second link you suggest here and
looked at Nina's very helpful translation of the original 'luminous mind' sutta. 
Her comments also suggest two solutions to me to the interpretation of the sutta
which I think may be helpful also. 

I have interspersed my comments below those of Nina that follow:

===============================================

N: This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is indeed corrupted by
oncoming defilements.

N:The ordinary person who has not learned (the Dhamma, not listened to it)
does not understand it as it really is.

N:Therefore I say that for the ordinary person who has not listened there is
no mental development (literally. free: the ordinary person who has not
listened to the Dhamma has not developed the mind.)

N: This consciousness, monks, is luminous, and it is indeed released from
oncoming defilements.

N: The learned noble disciple understand it as it really is.

N: Therefore I say that the learned, noble disciple has developed the mind.

===============================================
Nina's remarks with my comments follow:

>>Remarks:The upakilesas, defilements arising with the citta (different from the
anusayas, latent tendencies who do not arise with the akusala citta but can
condition akusala), are like visitors from outside. It seems disturbing, but we
have
to note: the ariyan knows the citta as it really is: yathaabutta. One has to
know also akusala citta as it is, otherwise one cannot become an ariyan,
this is stressed in this short sutta.>>

*Robert Ep.:
This is how I hear what Nina is saying:
When one awakens they are disturbed or shocked by the sudden incoming sensory
phenomena and the reactivity of their akusala cittas and tendencies. It seems as
if the 'defiled reality' has come to impinge on the 'pure' reality of sleep, as
reflected in the bhavanga cittas. 

This illusion of a 'mind' which is disturbed by defilements is settled in the
Arahat, who finally is able to enjoy pure cittas in the waking state, and thus the
defiled mind has been resolved.

This interpretation combines the total impact of akusala cittas coming into
consciousness and the purity experienced by the bhavanga cittas. This combined
effect makes some sense to me as an interpretation of the sutta that includes the
bhavanga cittas, but is not limited to them.

One problem, however, with this model of the 'development of the mind' is that it
tends towards a view of the mind as being a real entity that continues from sleep
to wakefulness, experiencing and comparing different experiences of purity and
defilement. Of course, this is accomplished by the accumulations which are passed
on from citta to citta, but the sense of continuity accomplished by this process
may also tend to suggest a continuous mind which is the storehouse of experiences.


Nina's Remarks continued:
>>Yathaabhuuta: bhuuta: that which has grown, is, exists, the truth.
yathaabhuuta: in its real essence, according to the truth.
vippamutta: pamu~ncati: to release.

>>The Atthasalini speaks about the bhavangacitta as being pure, using the word
pa.n.dara (I, Book I, Part IV, Ch II, 140) : "Mind also is said to be clear
in the sense of exceedingly pure with reference to the Bhavanga-citta." Now
I like to quote from Acharn's Survey of Paramattha dhammas where she
explains about the bhavanga-citta which is different from the cittas
experiencing objects impinging on the six doors. She explains that when one
is fast asleep one does not know who one is or where one is, one does not
experience the world. When one wakes up the world appears, one experiences
all the objects impinging on the six doors and then these objects give rise
to defilements. The bhavanga-citta, life-continuum, that has the function of
keeping continuity in the life of an individual, arises when fast asleep and
also in between the processes of cittas. Thus our life, consisting of an
uninterrupted series of cittas, goes on. The bhavanga-citta experiences the
same object as the rebirth-consciousness, and this object is like an echo of
the object experienced shortly before the dying-consciousness of the
previous life. This citta is pure, but it does not mean that there are no
latent tendencies of defilements, anusayas, which lie dormant in the citta.
It is called pure or luminous, because at that moment no defilements arise.

>>I quote: < The citta is pure only at the moment it does not experience an object
through the doors of eyes, ears, nose, tongue, bodysense or mind. Everybody
who is fast asleep looks innocent, pure, he does not experience like or
dislike, he is not jealous, stingy, conceited, he has no lovingkindness nor
compassion; thus, unwholesome or wholesome qualities do not arise because he
does not see, hear, experience tangible object or think. However, it should
be known that whenever the citta which arises experiences an object through
one of the six doors, citta is not pure. The reason is that many different
defilements have been accumulated in the citta and these condition the
arising of pleasure and attachment when one sees something pleasant, and the
arising of displeasure and annoyance when one sees something unpleasant.>

>>The person who is enlightened, the ariyasaavako, has eradicated anusayas by
the development of pa~n~naa of the eightfold Path. It is pa~n~naa which
knows realities as they are, yathaabhuuta, no other way. Anusayas are
eradicated at the different stages of enlightenment, and only the arahat is
freed from all defilements, he has no more latent tendencies of defilements,
no conditions for their arising. Nina.>>

Robert Ep.:
This last idea, that the luminous mind, free of defilements, represents the
condition of the Arahat who has become rid of all latent tendencies towards
defilements, makes a lot of sense. This implies, however, the idea that the mind
is inherently luminous, not just the bhavanga cittas, but the stream of cittas as
a wholeis luminous and pure, and that when the arahant is released from
defilements he is the one in the position to experience the pure, luminous mind
which knows realities as they are.

I think it is possible to draw this conclusion without positing a mind as an
object or entity. All one has to do is see the stream of cittas as being an
inherently pure and luminous process, because of the function the cittas have of
discerning and illuminating objects, which function is obscured by arising
defilements. It would be very much like a dust cloud of moha which keeps the
cittas 'dirty' or 'defiled' in their ability to illuminate objects for the
mundane-level perceiver, whereas the arahant graduates to the true function of
these cittas.

I wonder if this makes sense, or is acceptable to others here? It seems to be
implied in what Nina says here, at least to me. And can still include the
bhavanga cittas in the sense that they form the basis for comparison of the
undefiled and defiled experience in the worldling.

Best Regards, 
Robert Ep.

===================================================

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan and Ken O,
> 
> Thanks for your kind note, Suan, and for your good questions, Ken O.
> 
> Suan, I'm sure it is a lot of work to translate just a few short extracts from
> the commentaries. it may be helpful to be reminded that Nina (and Jim) worked
> quite hard on these same Ang Nik suttas and commentary notes which I think you
> both may find it interesting to review at:
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8386
> commentary notes translation
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8408
> sutta translation


	
10313

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 10:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: 
> 
> > Dear Sarah,
> > Thanks for all your clues, and for accepting the popcorn. I feel guilty for
> > being
> > a mutineer, but knowing that guilt is probably akusala, I am trying to
> > discern it
> > as an empty reality!
> 
> Yes, well, that’s a bit how I felt about the regret in re-opening this thread
> ;-)
> 
> > Yes, I have been very bad about my homework. I am duly chastened......I'll
> > do my
> > homework on this one. As you know, luminosity is my holy grail! <g>
> 
> At this rate, Anders will be paying us his Xmas thread and we’ll still be
> discussing the same thread as when he left....<yikes>
> 
> Just a couple of BRIEF notes on the Udana quotes from the Cambodian website you
> mention:
> 
> 1. Dabba sutta (Ud V111.10) (2)
> 
> You ‘find the ‘unwavering bliss’ of interest here re. the idea that there is
> nothing but cessation in parinibbana and nothing remaining’.
> 
> Masefield translates the last few lines as;
> 
> ‘Just as, for that hammered with an iron-hammer that has progressively died
> down, though the fire continues to blaze, a destiny is not known, so for those
> who are properly liberated, for those who have crossed the flood that is the
> bond of sense-desires, for those who have reached the happiness that is
> undisturbed, there is not to be made known a destiny.’
> 
> brief com notes:
> ‘That has progressively died down’ (anupubbuupasantassa); ‘that has, in due
> course, died down, burnt itself out, ceased’
> 
> ‘Just as a destiny is not known (yathaa na ~naayate gati): ‘....or likewise for
> some sound that has arisen, that has, in due course, died down, fully subsided,
> a destiny is made known nowhere in the ten directions, on account of its having
> ceased in a non-relinking fashion due to the cessation of the conditions (that
> gave rise to it) 
> 
> ‘the happiness’, the dying down of all formations reckoned as that nibbana that
> is without remnant of substrate,
> 
> > ================
> 
> For the 2nd Nibbana Sutta (Ud V111, 1)
> 
> This is the other one I discussed at length (essential reading for you;-). See
> posts:
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8895
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/8908
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9035
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/9038
> 
> Firstly, let me remind you that this sutta is about nibbana and not about
> parinibbana (you tend to mix them together, I think) 

Dear Sarah,
Rather than mixing Nibbana and Parinibbana, I think I just tend to be overly
optimistic about what may be going on in Parinibbana. The clarification of what
in the Buddha's words refers specifically to Nibbana as oppposed to Parinibbana
will be most helpful.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

====================

....Also you’ll see the
> phrases you refer to and like are references to other arupa planes of
> existence....showing that not only do the conditioned khandhas of the sense
> realms not existing in nibbana, but also the non-rupa conditioned realities of
> other realms. 
> 
> The references to light and so on were to nibbana, not parinibbana. I’ve run
> out of steam and need to take care of some office work, otherwise I’d re-check
> myself. Maybe you can re-quote the commentary notes on these references that I
> gave before;-))))
> 
> Thanks Rob,
> Sarah


	
10314

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun Dec 23, 2001 11:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

I think I can answer this one quickly (unlike all the luminous posts sitting in
a queue;-)

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I
> would
> ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities,
> but I
> thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities.

Realities (paramattha dhammas) are namas and rupas that can be directly known
by sati and panna and having lakhana (characteristics), sabhava (essence) and
so on....of course they are all (except nibbana) anicca, dukkha and anatta.

Concepts are ideas or illusions of which there are many kinds as listed,
sometimes based on realities and often not. They are NOT namas and they don't
have these lakhana and sabhava. 

The cittas which think about and experience concepts, on the other hand, ARE
namas and therefore realities which can be known.

It's very important to understand the difference between concepts and
realities. Really it's by developing more sati and panna which know realities
that the difference becomes crystal clear.

I think some of the posts under 'Concepts and Realities' that I mentioned are
very helpful to review. Pls ask anything further as really I'm more at home
here than with the jhanas and bhavangas.....;-))

> Am I
> confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha
> dhamma,
> and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati
> and
> panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of
> trouble
> sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts.

OK, that's fine....It's really great that you don't mind sharing the confusion
that many, many others will also be experiencing..... So none of the concepts
below are namas or can be discerned (in a Howard or a Ken O sense of the word)
AS paramatha dhamma. However, some of them represent realities i.e 1) and 5)
and these realities themselves can be discerned as paramatha dhamma, whether
namas or rupas.

To get 'real' for a moment with an example of a rupa. There can be the concept
of 'sound' or of 'thunder'. The concepts can be thought about, but can never be
the objects of awareness. They never 'exist'. 'Sound' may however represent a
reality (if we've heard the Buddha's Teachings) and that characteristic of
sound itself, when it is heard, can be directly known by sati and panna.
'Thunder', on the other hand, is a concept representing that which is not real
and can therefore never be known.

In the same way, let me give the example of a nama. There can be the concept
of 'hearing' or of. 'speaking'. Again, the concepts themselves can only be
thought about and don't exist. Hearing, however, may represent a reality and
the actual reality of experiencing sound, which is a nama, can be known
directly. 'Speaking' again represents that which is never real and can
therefore never be known by sati and panna.

Hope that clarifies, but very happy to hear more from you.

Sarah
...............................................................................................
> > --- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > > The Abhidhammattha Vibhavani (Book 8) distinguishes
> > > between six kinds of
> > > concepts that are names, nama-pannatti (see
> > > Visuddhimagga VIII, note 11). 
> > > 
> > >         1. Vijjamana pannattis, concepts which make
> > > known what is real, for
> > > example the words rupa, nama, vedana (feeling), or
> > > sanna (perception) 10.
> > > 
> > >          2. Avijjamana pannattis, concepts which
> > > make known what is not real,
> > > such as the words Thai or foreigner. These concepts
> > > do not represent absolute
> > > realities, citta and cetasika which are nama, and
> > > rupa. Thai or foreigner are
> > > not real in the absolute sense, they are
> > > conventional realities, sammutti
> > > dhammas. Could akusala citta11 (unwholesome
> > > consciousness) be Thai or foreign?
> > > Akusala citta is a paramattha dhamma (a reality), it
> > > is a dhamma which has its
> > > own characteristic, it is not Thai or foreign.
> > > 
> > >          3. Vijjamanena avijjamana pannattis,
> > > concepts of the non-existent
> > > based on the existent. There is the expression "the
> > > person with the six
> > > abhinnas."12 The six abhinnas are real but person is
> > > not real. Thus this
> > > concept stands for what is real and for what is not
> > > real.
> > > 
> > >          4. Avijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> > > concepts of the existent based on
> > > the non-existent. There is the expression "woman's
> > > voice". The sound is real,
> > > but the woman is not real.
> > > 
> > >          5. Vijjamanena vijjamana pannattis,
> > > concepts of what is real based on
> > > what is real. There is the term cakkhu-vinnana
> > > (eye-consciousness). Cakkhu
> > > (eye) is a reality, namely the cakkhu-pasada-rupa
> > > (eyesense, a reality
> > > sensitive to colour or visible object), and vinnana
> > > (consciousness) is also a
> > > reality, namely the reality which experiences.
> > > 
> > >          6. Avija amanena avijjamana pannattis,
> > > concepts of what is not real
> > > based on what is not real. There is the expression
> > > "the kings son". Both king
> > > and son are not real, they are sammutti dhammas,
> > > conventional realities. 


	
10315

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hi Victor,

Pls check this other translation for the 'self-control' part you quote: --- 

yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Sarah,

> This snare of Mara, in the form of anger,
> dwelling in the cave of the heart:
> cut it out with self-control,
> discernment, persistence, right view.
> The wise man would cut out
> each & every form of unskillfulness.
> Train yourselves:
> 'May we not be blotted out.' 

PTS, Hare translation:
'thus lurking in the heart is Mara's snare
In anger's loathsome form. But root it out
By insight, zeal, right view, restraint; the wise
Would one by one each evil state root out
And thus in Dhamma would he train himself:
Be not our minds obscured, but anger freed
And freed from trouble, greed and coveting.'


> I am not sure how self-control is not possible in truth. I am not 
> sure what conventional usage has to do with self-control.

I don't have the Pali in front of me, but what is translated in the first copy
by self-control is translated by insight (vipassana?) in the second. There is a
difference, I think between understanding anger to be dug out by self-control
and by insight or pa~n~na. There is no self-anything involved in the latter.
Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can still be understanding
that in reality there is no self and no control, only conditioned realities.

By the way, the full sutta you quote from here is a really excellent one for
reminding us of the value of metta. I can't resist quoting this part before I
go (AN,Bk of 7s, 60, Anger):

**********
'How ugly is an angry man! His sleep
Is comfortless; with fortune in his hands
He suffers loss; and being full of wrath
He wounds by act and (bitter) word. O'erwhelmed
By rage, his wealth he wastes away. made mad
And crazy by his bile, his name's bemired
With odium.(aayasakyan) Shunned and forsaken is
An angry man by friend and relative.
By wrath is loss incurred; by wrath the mind
Is racked. Irate, he knows not that within
Fear is engendered, nor knows the goal.
When anger-bound, man Dhamma cannot see;
When anger conquers man, blind darkness reigns.'

**********
Isn't it so true, that when the mind is 'anger-bound' , the Dhamma is lost.

Thanks, Victor,

Sarah
.................................................................................................................................

	
10316

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote: 

> > Am I right in thinking that, by 'perception' (here),
> > he means concept?
> 
> I didn't answer before because I think it's a little clear. 

I gave a very unclear response when talking about clear and unclear.

Pls read 'unclear' rather than 'clear' in this post sent on 22nd.
S.

	
10317

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 1:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Herman,

I'd much rather talk about visible objects, but you ask me ones about jhanas
instead;-))

--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> 
> The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks 
> dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I 
> find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the 
> Buddha did.

I hope that I would always encourage anyone to develop all kinds of skilful
states and mental development according to what is realitstic and possible
right now. Do we really have the accumulations of the Buddha and his chief
disciples? Is there any understanding now of the difference between wholesome
and unwholesome states? Is there any comprehension as to which moments there is
calm or samatha in a day, what the object is and why these cittas are calm? Is
there any beginning level of understanding the danger of clinging to sense
objects?

>> I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. 

Can there be 'doing it' just by wishing or intending to 'just do it' or just by
concentrating on an object without any undersatanding as discussed?

>Or is 
> that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or 
> Teng Kee here, either way)

I don't think anyone here would suggest that theoretical research or
understanding is the actual development or practice. One great value in the
research may be that by understanding more about the intricacies and the
exceedingly high level of wisdom required, one may realize what extraordinary
levels of skilful states those in the Buddha's time had attained. On the other
hand, some may read these details and feel confident this is what is achievable
today. It just depends;-)

Sarah
...........................................................................................................


	
10318

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 2:25am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Luminous mind

 	
Ken O wrote

>. Or I have
> confused myself with the term commentaries. he he :)

Good one, Ken;-)) I'll have to get back on the rest of this post and a few
others some other time when I can give them the consideration they deserve....
We'll be pretty busy looking after my mother-in-law for the next couple of
days, so let's just see...thanks in advance.

> k: Merry Christmas and Happy New Year to you and everyone in the list.
> Enjoy your stay in Bangkok, hmm I disappointed that I could not attend.

Luckily for us, we've found a few replacements....we'll be meeting up with
quite a few dsg members and other friends and looking forward to meeting Mike
and one other dsg member for the first time;-)) I'm sure you'll be able to join
us another time.

> One day maybe kamma may work for me, who knows, he he :). 

meanwhile it's working out well for you here with all your list-mates :)

Oops, time to go,
Speak soon Ken,

Sarah

	
10319

From: abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:38am
Subject: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends

 	
Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends)

How are you?

Thank you for your request.

Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind 
reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical 
discussions. 

As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries 
on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them 
for general readers.

For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, 
commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only 
reliable sources for all the academic needs. 

You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali 
particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax 
when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. 

Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request 
for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa 
on luminous mind on-list.

Won't be long!

With best wishes,

Suan

http://www.bodhiology.org



--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> Dear Suan,
> As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the 
subcommentary -- and I do
> indeed, let me make the following plea:
> 
> If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. 
Though I may
> struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, 
particularly on this
> topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide 
to make that
> effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful.
> 
> You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy 
presentation' in a
> separate message. 
> 
> <deep bow of supplication>
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ===========================
> 
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Dear Nina
> > 
> > How are you?
> > 
> > It is very kind of you to re-post your translations of Anguttara 
> > statements on the luminous mind. Thank you for your efforts and 
> > sharing your works with all of us.
> > 
> > You wrote:
> > 
> > "I am really looking forward to Suan's translation, explanation 
and 
> > analysis. I got stuck in the subco. since I find the language so 
> > difficult, all those composites."
> > 
> > I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in 
> > Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write 
> > technical notes on them, though. 
> > 
> > My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the 
> > luminous mind in the form of the technical notes. 
> > 
> > However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary 
on 
> > the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to 
you 
> > off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and 
to 
> > include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana 
> > Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy 
> > presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult 
to 
> > follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in 
Tiikaa's 
> > technical details. 
> > 
> > 
> > With regards,
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > http://www.bodhiology.org
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> > > Dear Suan and Rob Ep,

	
10320

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/24/01 12:25:36 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> 
> > Just for the record, not that my take is of
> > any partcular importance, 
> > I, for one, definitely don't "buy" that commentarial
> > interpretation. 
> 
> Your take is always of some importance to me, Howard. 
> I think it's interesting that we are diametrically
> opposed here, especially since we are in such close
> agreement, I think, in many other respects. Anyway,
> also just for the record, I definitely *do* 'buy'
> that commentarial interpretation...
> 
> > To me, 
> > it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is saying that
> > the mind is luminous but 
> > for defilements which cover it, rather like a sky
> > obfuscated by a cloud 
> > cover, a sky which, in itself, is clear, or like
> > gold which is lacking in 
> > shine only when corrrupted as part of gold ore, and
> > which manifests its 
> > capacity to shine once the impurities are removed.
> 
> ...and to me, it is *crystal clear* that the Buddha is
> *not* saying any such thing, anywhere in the Pali
> canon--with this meaning. Hope we can continue to
> agreeably disagree, however totally.
> 
> mike
> 
==================================
Always happy to agree or disagree with you, Mike. As far as this 
particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the time that you and I will 
"meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask him about it! (Actually, 
there wouldn't then be any need to ask. ;-)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10321

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:31am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike (and Ken) -

In a message dated 12/24/01 12:35:14 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> 
> Hi Kenneth,
> 
> Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with
> Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity',
> 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana
> (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to
> bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some
> underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While I do see nibbana without 
remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that is not what I was 
referring to. All I meant with regard to the Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that 
it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. The defilements are 
adventitious. The mind, *in and of itself*, is luminous in the sense of being 
undefiled; when defilements are present the mind appears dark, its light 
blocked; but when defilements are supressed or removed (in jhana in the case 
of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or without remant) it shines 
forth. If the mind were inherently defiled, then freedom would be impossible. 
The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that defilements are insubstantial, 
inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities in the gold ore of mind 
which *can* be fully removed.
--------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> mike
> 
> p.s. I met Ven. Thanissaro a couple of weeks ago--he
> has a new book out if anyone's interested, 'Buddhist
> Monastic Code Vol. 2'. Good stuff...
> 
=============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10322

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:05am
Subject: RE: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Dear Mike,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: m. nease [mailto:mlnease@y...]
>
> I think I knew but had forgotten that, perhaps, we
> haven't heard from you because of typing difficulty?

Thanks for the concern and offer, but it was Num who was
having difficulty. Here's his response:

>Rgd my hand, it is doing much better now. I can type and
write with no more
>pain. I am also back in playing tennis ( I did not do the
cankamma, sorry!).
>I still have to put a buddy-strap on my fingers when I am
playing tennis, so
>far I can hit it without any pain.

The reason that I am not so active is because of my
occupation with other things, both good and not so good.

Thanks again for the concern.

kom
	
10323

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Hi Sarah.
So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or not.
For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a concept, no?
Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be
experienced as an object?

The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of hardness', is
the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? Is the citta that
then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'],
itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept, not a
reality.

And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones are
considered namas, only 1 and 5?

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

======================

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> I think I can answer this one quickly (unlike all the luminous posts sitting in
> a queue;-)
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > I agree with Mike that this is a helpful and excellent list. Based on it, I
> > would
> > ask you for a clarification: Jon has said that concepts are not realities,
> > but I
> > thought that concepts were namas and that they *were* considered realities.
> 
> Realities (paramattha dhammas) are namas and rupas that can be directly known
> by sati and panna and having lakhana (characteristics), sabhava (essence) and
> so on....of course they are all (except nibbana) anicca, dukkha and anatta.
> 
> Concepts are ideas or illusions of which there are many kinds as listed,
> sometimes based on realities and often not. They are NOT namas and they don't
> have these lakhana and sabhava. 
> 
> The cittas which think about and experience concepts, on the other hand, ARE
> namas and therefore realities which can be known.
> 
> It's very important to understand the difference between concepts and
> realities. Really it's by developing more sati and panna which know realities
> that the difference becomes crystal clear.
> 
> I think some of the posts under 'Concepts and Realities' that I mentioned are
> very helpful to review. Pls ask anything further as really I'm more at home
> here than with the jhanas and bhavangas.....;-))
> 
> > Am I
> > confused? Can a nama such as the ones below be discerned as a paramatha
> > dhamma,
> > and if so, what are the concepts which are not eligible as objects for sati
> > and
> > panna? I keep hanging on this theme, because I seem to be having a lot of
> > trouble
> > sorting out the 'real' from the 'unreal' as regards concepts.
> 
> OK, that's fine....It's really great that you don't mind sharing the confusion
> that many, many others will also be experiencing..... So none of the concepts
> below are namas or can be discerned (in a Howard or a Ken O sense of the word)
> AS paramatha dhamma. However, some of them represent realities i.e 1) and 5)
> and these realities themselves can be discerned as paramatha dhamma, whether
> namas or rupas.
> 
> To get 'real' for a moment with an example of a rupa. There can be the concept
> of 'sound' or of 'thunder'. The concepts can be thought about, but can never be
> the objects of awareness. They never 'exist'. 'Sound' may however represent a
> reality (if we've heard the Buddha's Teachings) and that characteristic of
> sound itself, when it is heard, can be directly known by sati and panna.
> 'Thunder', on the other hand, is a concept representing that which is not real
> and can therefore never be known.
> 
> In the same way, let me give the example of a nama. There can be the concept
> of 'hearing' or of. 'speaking'. Again, the concepts themselves can only be
> thought about and don't exist. Hearing, however, may represent a reality and
> the actual reality of experiencing sound, which is a nama, can be known
> directly. 'Speaking' again represents that which is never real and can
> therefore never be known by sati and panna.
> 
> Hope that clarifies, but very happy to hear more from you.
> 
> Sarah
>

10324

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:24am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Sarah,
I think three things are true:
1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it is
extremely difficult to approach such refined states.

2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who are
familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who has
lectured and taught on them quite a bit.

3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary* to
develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of discernment,
sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state. Is
this correct?

Best,
Robert Ep.

============

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Herman,
> 
> I'd much rather talk about visible objects, but you ask me ones about jhanas
> instead;-))
> 
> --- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > 
> > The way I read the Tipitaka is that the Buddha and all of his monks 
> > dwelt in the jhanas day in day out, every opportunity they got. I 
> > find it strange that there is subtle discouragement to do as the 
> > Buddha did.
> 
> I hope that I would always encourage anyone to develop all kinds of skilful
> states and mental development according to what is realitstic and possible
> right now. Do we really have the accumulations of the Buddha and his chief
> disciples? Is there any understanding now of the difference between wholesome
> and unwholesome states? Is there any comprehension as to which moments there is
> calm or samatha in a day, what the object is and why these cittas are calm? Is
> there any beginning level of understanding the danger of clinging to sense
> objects?
> 
> >> I doubt whether jhana can be researched other than by doing it. 
> 
> Can there be 'doing it' just by wishing or intending to 'just do it' or just by
> concentrating on an object without any undersatanding as discussed?
> 
> >Or is 
> > that what you meant? ( no intention to cast aspersions on Rob K or 
> > Teng Kee here, either way)
> 
> I don't think anyone here would suggest that theoretical research or
> understanding is the actual development or practice. One great value in the
> research may be that by understanding more about the intricacies and the
> exceedingly high level of wisdom required, one may realize what extraordinary
> levels of skilful states those in the Buddha's time had attained. On the other
> hand, some may read these details and feel confident this is what is achievable
> today. It just depends;-)
> 
> Sarah
>
...........................................................................................................
> 

	
10325

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:42am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends

 	
Dear Suan,
I both understand your reluctance to have the commentaries criticized, and also
thank you for your willingness to do so for the education of those who are
sincerely interested. I happen to fall into both categories, as I sometimes may
debate points in the commentaries, while still sincerely desiring to learn. 

I am sensitive to the feelings of those who take the commentaries as part of the
Canon, and perhaps this type of debate is not always appropriate. If there are
points that should not be argued, I would be happy to just listen and learn in
those cases and not bring up doubts on the list. 

In any case, I greatly appreciate your sub-commentaries and any parts of the
actual commentaries that you share with us.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

================================

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> 
> Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends)
> 
> How are you?
> 
> Thank you for your request.
> 
> Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind 
> reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical 
> discussions. 
> 
> As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries 
> on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them 
> for general readers.
> 
> For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, 
> commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only 
> reliable sources for all the academic needs. 
> 
> You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali 
> particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax 
> when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. 
> 
> Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request 
> for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa 
> on luminous mind on-list.
> 
> Won't be long!
> 
> With best wishes,
> 
> Suan
> 
> http://www.bodhiology.org
> 
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > Dear Suan,
> > As much as I appreciate your snappy presentation of the 
> subcommentary -- and I do
> > indeed, let me make the following plea:
> > 
> > If you do make the translation for Nina, please post it on-list. 
> Though I may
> > struggle with the commentaries, I am anxious to read them, 
> particularly on this
> > topic. I think we would all benefit from seeing it, if you decide 
> to make that
> > effort, and I for one will certainly be grateful.
> > 
> > You could do it as a separate post, and then do your 'snappy 
> presentation' in a
> > separate message. 
> > 
> > <deep bow of supplication>
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ===========================
> > 
> > 


	
10326

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 9:46am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike (and Ken) -
> 
> In a message dated 12/24/01 12:35:14 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> mlnease@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Hi Kenneth,
> > 
> > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree with
> > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity',
> > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to jhana
> > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to
> > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some
> > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic consciousness.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While I do see nibbana without 
> remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that is not what I was 
> referring to. All I meant with regard to the Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that 
> it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled. The defilements are 
> adventitious. The mind, *in and of itself*, is luminous in the sense of being 
> undefiled; when defilements are present the mind appears dark, its light 
> blocked; but when defilements are supressed or removed (in jhana in the case 
> of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or without remant) it shines 
> forth. If the mind were inherently defiled, then freedom would be impossible. 
> The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that defilements are insubstantial, 
> inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities in the gold ore of mind 
> which *can* be fully removed.
> --------------------------------------------------------------

Dear Howard,
In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure,
undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind
separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one thing,
and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its 'content'
impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining mind as a
substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate from its
content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or consciousnesses, the
pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top.

Best,
Robert


	
10327

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: subcommentary Pali

 	
op 23-12-2001 16:13 schreef abhidhammika op abhidhammika@y...:

difficult, all those composites."
> 
> I have tranlated the portions of commentary I am about to use in
> Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Three). I still need to write
> technical notes on them, though.
> 
> My idea is to write a kind of my own modern subcommentary on the
> luminous mind in the form of the technical notes.
> 
> However, if you would like me to translate the Pali subcommentary on
> the commentary portions, please let me know. I could send them to you
> off-list. As you know, the Tiikaa passage is a bit lengthy, and to
> include translation of the whole passage in the Parinibbana
> Subcommentary series would compromise the purpose of the snappy
> presentation of my arguments. The readers would find it difficult to
> follow my arguments as their minds could be bogged down in Tiikaa's
> technical details.
>
Dear Suan,
It is so kind of you to offer to translate the subco, and I like Kom's
suggestion of moving this to another forum, to your convenience either to
Abh or to palistudy. Even if you could translate only the difficult words
and constructions of the subco, now and then just a few terms, it would be
of great help so that I can continue working on it. I would not like to
cause trouble so that you work late at night.
With many thanks, best wishes from Nina.
	
10328

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind

 	
> 
> 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 
>> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga
>> cittas.
>> I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in
>> very
>> clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response
>> is
>> somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen
>> as too
>> disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am
>> looking
>> for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not
>> always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the
>> Buddha's own
>> words. 
>> 
>> I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below,
>> where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their
>> reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents
>> themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a
>> working
>> analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question.
>> 
>> I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to
>> be
>> corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by
>> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and
>> personal
>> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they
>> are
>> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in
>> that
>> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in
>> itself
>> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume
>> this
>> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in
>> one
>> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their
>> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So
>> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not
>> 'covered
>> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory
>> moments.
>> 
>> On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside
>> objects are
>> not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are
>> filled
>> with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark
>> clouds
>> which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away.
>> 
>> To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I
>> don't
>> see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the
>> mind
>> that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the
>> 'reputation'
>> of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's
>> just an
>> analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the
>> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't
>> see
>> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the
>> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with
>> each
>> other at all.
>> 
>> Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of
>> which he was speaking if they were two different groups.
>> 
>> It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or
>> mind
>> that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see
>> anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am
>> surprised to
>> hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators
>> that
>> the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true?
>> 
>> If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and
>> the
>> normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like
>> this, in my admittedly limited opinion:
>> 
>> "The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by
>> incoming
>> defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming
>> defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the
>> development of
>> wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen
>> to be
>> luminous."
>> 
>> But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements"
>> it
>> is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the
>> idea
>> that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and
>> thus
>> the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with
>> discernment and
>> wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses
>> together in
>> the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says.
>> 
>> What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the
>> mind,
>> composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but
>> which
>> are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently
>> luminous,
>> seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an
>> underlying
>> mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a
>> succession
>> of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality,
>> which
>> all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from
>> defilement
>> by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more
>> direct
>> and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and
>> somehow
>> having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the
>> very
>> opposite of their condition by definition.
>> 
>> I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical
>> as I
>> can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion.
>
Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I appreciate
your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of
your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India trip.
Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks.
We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up.
But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we
could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations, some
pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not always
seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I
reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too
far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that
bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and that
the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num:
this is just my own thinking.
As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed
pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also
know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself
knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can appear
to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can
appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to
sati and pa~n~naa. 
Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and
hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are
demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is bhavangacitta
no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But it
is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an
object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta
experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that
sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own
conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing experiencing
sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was
nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the
difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is
experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course, it
is not easy.
Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your
family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist and
your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina.
	
10329

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/24/01 12:48:27 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Dear Howard,
> In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure,
> undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind
> separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one 
> thing,
> and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its 
> 'content'
> impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining 
> mind as a
> substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate 
> from its
> content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or 
> consciousnesses, the
> pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top.
> 
> 
============================
When the mind is defiled, it is defiled and not pure. The point is 
that it is not *essentially* defiled. The mind is *always* pure only in the 
sense that any defiled state is a passing state, not inherent, and, 
ultimately, permanently removable. Admittedly, my talk of the mind "in and of 
itself" was not well formulated. I only meant that the mind is freeable from 
defilement. The defilements can be removed, and the mind - that is, all the 
mental functions - can still operate, and, now, cleanly, smoothly, and 
without impediment. My only point as to what the sutta says is that the mind 
is not essentially defiled. It's no different when we speak about diamonds. A 
diamond in the rough is dull and unattractive; it doesn't shine. But it *can* 
shine. It needs to be polished. If the obscuring covering couldn't be rubbed 
away, the diamond would be inherently dull and of no interest. But it is 
inherently pure *in the sense that* it can be made to shine.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10330

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> Always happy to agree or disagree with you,
> Mike. 

Back at you Howard.

> As far as this 
> particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the
> time that you and I will 
> "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask
> him about it! 

What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the
idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! 
Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. 

mike

	
10331

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:12pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:

> Always happy to agree or disagree with you,
> Mike. 

Back at you Howard.

> As far as this 
> particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the
> time that you and I will 
> "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask
> him about it! 

What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the
idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! 
Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. 

mike

	
10332

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 10:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/24/01 6:13:02 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> 
> > Always happy to agree or disagree with you,
> > Mike. 
> 
> Back at you Howard.
> 
> > As far as this 
> > particular issue is concerned, I look forward to the
> > time that you and I will 
> > "meet the Buddha", however many aeons off, to ask
> > him about it! 
> 
> What an odd notion (though I must say I don't mind the
> idea of rebirth in the sasana of a living Buddha...)! 
> Thanks for the good wishes, just the same. 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Mike!! You should know me better! I was speaking metaphorically. By 
"meeting the Buddha" I meant becoming enlightened. ;-))
--------------------------------------------------------

> 
> mike
> 
============================
With (not so) metaphorical metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10333

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike (and Ken) -
> mlnease@y... writes:

> > Hi Kenneth,
> > 
> > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree
> with
> > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity',
> > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to
> jhana
> > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to
> > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some
> > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic
> consciousness.
>
-------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While
> I do see nibbana without 
> remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that
> is not what I was 
> referring to. All I meant with regard to the
> Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that 
> it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled.

Yes--the question is, to which mind (citta) does it
refer? 

> The defilements are 
> adventitious. 

So is mind free from defilement. In fact it is nearly
infinitely rarer than mind with defilements.

> The mind, *in and of itself*, is
> luminous in the sense of being 
> undefiled; 

Again, which mind? I would agree that patisandhi-,
bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas are relatively
undefiled, may be called pure, luminous or
whatever--but only because the latent defilements 'in'
them are not manifest for the moment. The latent
defilements are present in all of them. Nibbaana is
not citta--it is aarammana, not arrammanika, that
which takes the aarammana.

> when defilements are present the mind
> appears dark, its light 
> blocked; but when defilements are supressed or
> removed (in jhana in the case 
> of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or
> without remant) it shines 
> forth. 

Apples and oranges, I think--jhana is a citta,
nibbaana is not. No doubt jhana-citta can be
described as 'luminous', 'pure' etc., because of the
suppression of defilements. Magga-citta (which takes
nibbaana as aarammana) presumably even more so,
because of the absence of even subtle defilements.

> If the mind were inherently defiled, then
> freedom would be impossible.

There is no 'mind' to be inherently defiled or
undefiled, except conventionally speaking--just cittas
arising and subsiding, some with and some without
defilements--but nearly 100% with at least latent
defilements and most with medium to coarse
defilements.

> The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that
> defilements are insubstantial, 
> inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities
> in the gold ore of mind 
> which *can* be fully removed.

Certainly defilements are insubstantial, inessential,
and impermanent--just like paramis, indriyas and so
on. It would be nice if that were true only of the
ugly factors but not of the beautiful ones, but this
is not the case. Why nibbaana, the end of rebirth, 
is such a worthy goal...

mike

	
10334

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 3:47pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] FW: three rounds

 	
Dear Kom,

--- Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> wrote:

> Thanks for the concern and offer, but it was Num who
> was
> having difficulty. 

Thanks for the correction.

> The reason that I am not so active is because of my
> occupation with other things, both good and not so
> good.

Glad for the former.

Attached is what I have of the Survey so far...

mike



	
10335

From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala <beyugala@k...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 4:11pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 734

 	
Dear Nina,
It is so wonderful to read your letters and comments each time in the
digests, even though I have a very hard time keeping up with them. Have
been "lurking" for too long. Was extremely sorry to have had to cancel going
to India at the last moment, and so I look forward to reading your comments
and thoughts about that trip.

But, in following the present discussion on bhavangacittas, a question arose
on whether the bhavangas are luminous and without defilements or not. This
discussion then lead me to ask the following: If the aramana (object) of the
bhavangacittas of a particular lifetime is the very last javanacitta of the
previous lifetime, and that object is then either akusala vipakacitta or
kusala vipaka citta (for non-arahats), would not the bhavangacittas
themselves either be akusala vipakacitta or kusala vipakacitta, the same as
their aramana? And, if that is so, then can bhavangacittas be understood as
defiled/not-defiled, just like vithi cittas (that arise in
sense-door/mind-door processes)?

with metta and joy for the new year,
Betty
_________________________________>
> Dear Howard,
> In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure,
> undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind
> separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind'
one thing,
> and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its
'content'
> impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining
mind as a
> substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate
from its
> content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or
consciousnesses, the
> pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top.
>
> Best,
> Robert

> Message: 6
> Date: Mon, 24 Dec 2001 19:10:35 +0100
> From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...>
> Subject: Re: luminous mind
>
>
> >
> > 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> >
> >> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the
bhavanga
> >> cittas. . ..
> . . .From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by
> >> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and
> >> personal
> >> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore,
they
> >> are
> >> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure,
and in
> >> that
> >> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would
in
> >> itself
> >> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I
assume
> >> this
> >> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness
in
> >> one
> >> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of
their
> >> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another.
So
> >> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not
> >> 'covered
> >> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted
sensory
> >> moments. . ..
. . .but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the
> >> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I
don't
> >> see
> >> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity
of the
> >> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact
with
> >> each
> >> other at all.
> >>
> >> > Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I
appreciate
> your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of
> your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India
trip.
> Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks.
> We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up.
> But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we
> could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations,
some
> pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not
always
> seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I
> reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too
> far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that
> bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and
that
> the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num:
> this is just my own thinking.
> As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed
> pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also
> know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself
> knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can
appear
> to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can
> appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to
> sati and pa~n~naa.
> Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and
> hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are
> demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is
bhavangacitta
> no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But
it
> is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an
> object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta
> experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that
> sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own
> conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing
experiencing
> sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was
> nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the
> difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is
> experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course,
it
> is not easy.
> Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your
> family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist
and
> your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina.

	
10336

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 0:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike -

C'mon, Mike! If the Buddha could speak conventionally, can't I? Should 
my speech be more precise than his? Not every conventional phrase requires 
unpacking. 
As worldlings, "we" (hmmm, guess I'd better be careful ;-) pass along 
from mindstate to mindstate dispositions to thinking in terms of "me" and 
"mine"and in terms of separate, self-existent realities, and we pass along 
subliminal dispositions to grasp at and push away these things. And, yes, 
this is at the subliminal (anusaya) level, and, much of the time these 
dispositions are manifest as outflowings (asava). All the foregoing is 
"defiled mind". After enlightenment, mind is undefiled. That is to say, no 
more of the three poisons - whoops, that's not too conventional is it? ;-) 
After enlightenment, *no* cittas carry ignorant dispositions. 
BTW, how many cittas have you actually observed? (How about the 
"patisandhi-, bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas" that you talk about below?) 
I'm not aware of having observed any cittas myself at all, though I'm aware 
of being conscious, of discerning hardness, softness, colors, tastes, 
feelings, emotions, thiughts, etc. I have observed desire and aversion, I 
have caught myself (whoops, better be careful!) thinking about DSG, for 
example, and trees, and people as if they really *were* something. I catch 
myself being unmindful (but with that catching, I save myself for the 
moment). But I can't ever recall catching a glimpse of a citta. Isn't it a 
bit odd to stand on one's head avoiding all empirical talk while at the same 
time talking about things like cittas which we have never, ever observed? We 
debate whether or not it is the bhavanga cittas constitute luminous mind, 
when the Buddha never taught anyone about bhavanga cittas, and we wouldn't 
know one if it sidled up to us and gave us a deep bow! 
Isn't there a bit of a danger in getting caught in a realm of 
unobserved "ultimate realities" that the Buddha never presented in any of the 
teachings given by him to multitudes of people over 45 years and recorded in 
the Sutta Pitaka, but shunning what we actually do experience? I personally 
think there is such a danger.

With conventional metta (something actually felt, not a theoretical "ultimate 
reality"),
Howard

In a message dated 12/24/01 6:43:07 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, Mike (and Ken) -
> > mlnease@y... writes:
> 
> > > Hi Kenneth,
> > > 
> > > Thanks for this interesting quotation. I agree
> > with
> > > Ven. Thanissaro that 'luminosity', 'purity',
> > > 'brightness' etc. in the suttas often refers to
> > jhana
> > > (as in Howard's pure gold, e.g.) rather than to
> > > bhavanga. Nowhere do I think it refers to some
> > > underlying, boundless, luminous, cosmic
> > consciousness.
> >
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > Ahh! But that's not what I mean either. While
> > I do see nibbana without 
> > remnant as timeless, boundless, luminous etc, that
> > is not what I was 
> > referring to. All I meant with regard to the
> > Pabhassara (sp?) Sutta is that 
> > it says that the mind is not *essentially* defiled.
> 
> Yes--the question is, to which mind (citta) does it
> refer? 
> 
> > The defilements are 
> > adventitious. 
> 
> So is mind free from defilement. In fact it is nearly
> infinitely rarer than mind with defilements.
> 
> > The mind, *in and of itself*, is
> > luminous in the sense of being 
> > undefiled; 
> 
> Again, which mind? I would agree that patisandhi-,
> bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas are relatively
> undefiled, may be called pure, luminous or
> whatever--but only because the latent defilements 'in'
> them are not manifest for the moment. The latent
> defilements are present in all of them. Nibbaana is
> not citta--it is aarammana, not arrammanika, that
> which takes the aarammana.
> 
> > when defilements are present the mind
> > appears dark, its light 
> > blocked; but when defilements are supressed or
> > removed (in jhana in the case 
> > of suppression, or permanently in nibbana with or
> > without remant) it shines 
> > forth. 
> 
> Apples and oranges, I think--jhana is a citta,
> nibbaana is not. No doubt jhana-citta can be
> described as 'luminous', 'pure' etc., because of the
> suppression of defilements. Magga-citta (which takes
> nibbaana as aarammana) presumably even more so,
> because of the absence of even subtle defilements.
> 
> > If the mind were inherently defiled, then
> > freedom would be impossible.
> 
> There is no 'mind' to be inherently defiled or
> undefiled, except conventionally speaking--just cittas
> arising and subsiding, some with and some without
> defilements--but nearly 100% with at least latent
> defilements and most with medium to coarse
> defilements.
> 
> > The point to this sutta, as I see it, is that
> > defilements are insubstantial, 
> > inessential, and impermanent, rather like impurities
> > in the gold ore of mind 
> > which *can* be fully removed.
> 
> Certainly defilements are insubstantial, inessential,
> and impermanent--just like paramis, indriyas and so
> on. It would be nice if that were true only of the
> ugly factors but not of the beautiful ones, but this
> is not the case. Why nibbaana, the end of rebirth, 
> is such a worthy goal...
> 
> mike
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10337

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:20pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind

 	
Dear Nina,
Thank you for your very nice note. I appreciate you taking the trouble, while so
busy, to help me understand some of your sense of the commentaries and how to
relate to them. Your notes on bhavanga cittas was extremely interesting. It
hadn't occured to me that the bhavanga cittas were filling in the spaces and
keeping the continuity between individual sense-door moments. So they are really
present and doing their job all the time. It is also interesting to note that
although one cannot know the object of the bhavanga-citta, the possibility of
knowing when the bhavanga-citta is present would give an important clue to when
the sense-door moments are taking place or not. It would seem to be one important
boundary in trying to discern the arising and falling of namas and rupas. All of
that of course is way ahead of me.

I will try to keep this in mind while considering some of the 'luminous mind'
commentary, if Suan is kindly able to translate some of it along with his next
sub-commentary. 

Thanks much to you and Lodewijk for your appreciative note on my family's mixed up
religious orientation!! : ) I sincerely wish you both the best! And thanks
again for your whole message!

Regards,
Robert Ep.

==================================

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> 
> > 
> > 23-12-01 08:58:03, Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> > 
> >> Thanks, Nina, for posting the Commentary on the luminosity of the bhavanga
> >> cittas.
> >> I found it very helpful to review it and as usual, the commentators speak in
> >> very
> >> clear language, which is quite helpful. What I am going to say in response
> >> is
> >> somewhat challenging what I have read, however, and I hope it won't be seen
> >> as too
> >> disrespectful. I am trying to thrash out some of these issues, and I am
> >> looking
> >> for the logic in them. I have great respect for the commentators, but do not
> >> always accept their interpretation 'automatically' as I hope I do the
> >> Buddha's own
> >> words. 
> >> 
> >> I understand the analogy of the children and parents in the commentary below,
> >> where the parents [bhavanga cittas] could be said to be defiled because their
> >> reputation is ruined by the delinquent children, even though the parents
> >> themselves are never directly defiled, but it doesn't seem to me to be a
> >> working
> >> analogy for the actual consciousnesses in question.
> >> 
> >> I plead ignorance if I misuse any of the categories, but I will be happy to
> >> be
> >> corrected. From what I understand, the bhavanga cittas are never touched by
> >> sense-objects, since they only arise to maintain the life-continuum and
> >> personal
> >> identity when the sense-doors have 'closed' in deep sleep. Therefore, they
> >> are
> >> totally sealed off from any incoming defilements. They remain pure, and in
> >> that
> >> sense, could certainly be said to be 'luminous'. This luminosity would in
> >> itself
> >> mean that the consciousnesses in question have a certain 'light' and I assume
> >> this
> >> would be the light of the mind, the light of consciousness or awareness in
> >> one
> >> form or another. Consciousnesses shed their light on the object of their
> >> perception or thought, and thus 'discern' it to one degree or another. So
> >> luminosity would make sense in regard to a consciousness that was not
> >> 'covered
> >> over' with a lot of 'junk', such as ignorance and misinterpreted sensory
> >> moments.
> >> 
> >> On the other hand, the cittas that are defiled by contact with outside
> >> objects are
> >> not said to be the luminous ones. These are the naughty children who are
> >> filled
> >> with ignorance, wrong thoughts and mis-perceptions, which are like dark
> >> clouds
> >> which cover their luminosity until they are cleared away.
> >> 
> >> To me, no matter how you slice it, you still have the same problem, and I
> >> don't
> >> see the commentaries actually addressing it. The sutta speaks clearly of the
> >> mind
> >> that is luminous being defiled. The commentary can only say that the
> >> 'reputation'
> >> of the bhavanga cittas is ruined by the delinquent children. I know it's
> >> just an
> >> analogy, but I don't see how the bhavanga cittas are implicated at all in the
> >> defilement of akusala cittas [if that is the right term to use], and I don't
> >> see
> >> at all how the defiled cittas have anything to do with the luminosity of the
> >> bhavanga cittas. They are just completely separate and have no contact with
> >> each
> >> other at all.
> >> 
> >> Surely, the Buddha would have been clear enough to name the two categories of
> >> which he was speaking if they were two different groups.
> >> 
> >> It makes a lot more sense in reading the sutta to say that the same cittas or
> >> mind
> >> that is luminous is the one that is being temporarily defiled. I don't see
> >> anything in the commentary that reasonably explains this away. I am
> >> surprised to
> >> hear that there is general agreement among the current living commentators
> >> that
> >> the luminous mind refers to the bhavanga cittas. Is this true?
> >> 
> >> If the Buddha was referring to the bhavanga cittas as the luminous ones and
> >> the
> >> normal waking cittas as the defiled ones, he would have to say something like
> >> this, in my admittedly limited opinion:
> >> 
> >> "The consciousness of the mind in sleep is luminous as it is untouched by
> >> incoming
> >> defilements. The consciousness of the waking mind is defiled by incoming
> >> defilements. The waking consciousness can be purified through the
> >> development of
> >> wisdom and the consciousness that has been purified thus will surely be seen
> >> to be
> >> luminous."
> >> 
> >> But when he says "Mind is luminous and it is defiled by incoming defilements"
> >> it
> >> is a simple statement of a pure mind that has been defiled. I can accept the
> >> idea
> >> that a citta arises with defilements which obscure its potential clarity and
> >> thus
> >> the defilement must be cleared away for that citta to 'shine' with
> >> discernment and
> >> wisdom. But I cannot see any way to put two disparate consciousnesses
> >> together in
> >> the statement, so that it is interpreted to be the opposite of what it says.
> >> 
> >> What puzzles me more is why it is even seen as necessary. To say that the
> >> mind,
> >> composed of a string of cittas that have the potential to see clearly but
> >> which
> >> are deceived by moha and misinterpretation, is defiled but is inherently
> >> luminous,
> >> seems to be completely reasonable. It does not necessarily posit an
> >> underlying
> >> mind that is an object or entity. It can easily be interpreted to be a
> >> succession
> >> of cittas which carry defilements, thus obscuring their luminous quality,
> >> which
> >> all consciousnesses have potentially, and which then must be freed from
> >> defilement
> >> by sati and panna. And this interpretation seems to me to be much more
> >> direct
> >> and make a lot more sense, than bringing the bhavanga cittas into it and
> >> somehow
> >> having to figure out how they have something to do with defilement -- the
> >> very
> >> opposite of their condition by definition.
> >> 
> >> I hope I have not spoken too strongly, but I am just trying to be as logical
> >> as I
> >> can. And I hope that it is all in the service of a worthwhile discussion.
> >
> Nina: Dear Rob Ep, I read your post with great interest and I appreciate
> your serious and enthusiastic study of the Dhamma. I cannot go into all of
> your points, since I am so busy writing my Impressions about our India trip.
> Shall we wait for Suan who is an expert? I can make a few remarks.
> We are trained to think in a logical way, it is the way we are brought up.
> But when we read the commentators (you are not disrespectful at all) we
> could try to fathom what their intention was: giving some explanations, some
> pointers, so that we better undertsand the Tipitaka. To us it may not always
> seem to be logical, but, it can help us to come closer to reality. I
> reflected again on the similes: maybe we should not try to carry these too
> far in all details but take them as they are: pointing out that
> bhavangacitta cannot be akusala nor kusala, that it is only vipaka, and that
> the javanacittas are kusala cittas or akusala cittas. To speak with Num:
> this is just my own thinking.
> As you say, bhavangacitta can be known, it can be known by developed
> pa~n~naa. When I asked A. Sujin whether we (or rather pa~n~naa) can also
> know its object she said no. This makes sense to me. Bhavangacitta itself
> knows its object. Bhavanga-citta has its own characteristic that can appear
> to sati and pa~n~naa, after it has fallen away its characteristic can
> appear, but its object does not have a characteristic that can appear to
> sati and pa~n~naa. 
> Also in India we discussed the bhavangacitta. It seems that we can see and
> hear at the same time, but these arise in different processes which are
> demarcated by bhavangacittas (more than three). When there is bhavangacitta
> no outer object appears: she said: nothing appears, there is nothing. But it
> is amazing that when the ear-door process begins and hearing arises, an
> object, in this case, sound appears. It can appear, that is, citta
> experiences it. Take sound now: it appears and no "I" who can change that
> sound, it has its own characteristic, it arises because of its own
> conditions. When sound appears, it shows that there is hearing experiencing
> sound. No "I" who can change the hearing either. Before that there was
> nothing, and then there is something. In this way A. Sujin explained the
> difference between bhavangacitta and the moment an outer object is
> experienced again. Gradually we can learn the difference. But of course, it
> is not easy.
> Lodewijk said that I should tell you that we enjoyed your story about your
> family celebrating Christmas each in his own way: your wife as a Baptist and
> your daughter coming home from school singing Shalom. Best wishes, Nina. 


	
10338

From: egberdina <hhofman@d...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 7:43pm
Subject: The weather

 	
Hi all,

Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to experience 
the weather?

No.

Are cold, hot, wet, windy etc verbal phenomena?

No.

Are there phenomena described by words such as cold, hot, wet, windy?

Yes.

Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to describe 
the weather?

Only if you want to describe the weather in terms of the commentaries 
and subcommentaries.

Is it necessary to describe the weather?

Only if you believe that you are separate from the weather, and that 
describing it will give you a level of control over it.

Will cold, hot, wet, windy etc be more better experienced after 
studying the commentaries and subcommentaries?

No, you will be confusing a weathermans's autobiography with the 
weather, and thus won't know anything about the weather.

Will the weather cease once you have understood it and you die?

Don't be stupid.

Once you have understood the weather, will you still get cold, hot, 
wet, windy?

Yes.

Will it matter?

No.

Does it matter now?

No, you only think it does.

Does the sun go around the earth?

Read the commentaries and report back.

Merry Christmas and a happy New Year


Herman
	
10339

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 2:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] The weather

 	
Hi, Herman -

The foregoing is a very amusing post, and is one with which I have 
much sympathy. One small point, though: With regard to "Does the sun go 
around the earth? Read the commentaries and report back.", in this case our 
own observation will tell us "Yes, the sun *does* go around the earth", and 
only by reading the "commentaries" of the astronomers do we learn 
differently. So, my point is what? It is that there are extremes at both 
ends, and that it is generally good to avoid extremes.

With cautious and limited scepticism, and much metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/24/01 10:44:16 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
hhofman@d... writes:


> Hi all,
> 
> Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to experience 
> the weather?
> 
> No.
> 
> Are cold, hot, wet, windy etc verbal phenomena?
> 
> No.
> 
> Are there phenomena described by words such as cold, hot, wet, windy?
> 
> Yes.
> 
> Does one need to study commentaries and subcommentaries to describe 
> the weather?
> 
> Only if you want to describe the weather in terms of the commentaries 
> and subcommentaries.
> 
> Is it necessary to describe the weather?
> 
> Only if you believe that you are separate from the weather, and that 
> describing it will give you a level of control over it.
> 
> Will cold, hot, wet, windy etc be more better experienced after 
> studying the commentaries and subcommentaries?
> 
> No, you will be confusing a weathermans's autobiography with the 
> weather, and thus won't know anything about the weather.
> 
> Will the weather cease once you have understood it and you die?
> 
> Don't be stupid.
> 
> Once you have understood the weather, will you still get cold, hot, 
> wet, windy?
> 
> Yes.
> 
> Will it matter?
> 
> No.
> 
> Does it matter now?
> 
> No, you only think it does.
> 
> Does the sun go around the earth?
> 
> Read the commentaries and report back.
> 
> Merry Christmas and a happy New Year
> 
> 
> Herman
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10340

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 8:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/24/01 12:48:27 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dear Howard,
> > In the moment when a defilement arises, at that moment, where is the pure,
> > undefiled mind which is like the 'gold' in the 'ore'? Can there be a mind
> > separate from its content, whether defiled or undefiled? Is the 'mind' one 
> > thing,
> > and the 'defilement' something else? Is the 'citta' pure, but its 
> > 'content'
> > impure? Just wondering how one would posit this without either defining 
> > mind as a
> > substrate that lasts beyond the moment, or a substance that is separate 
> > from its
> > content, or without causing a separation into 'two minds' or 
> > consciousnesses, the
> > pure mind and the experience of impurity, superimposed on top.
> > 
> > 
> ============================
> When the mind is defiled, it is defiled and not pure. The point is 
> that it is not *essentially* defiled. The mind is *always* pure only in the 
> sense that any defiled state is a passing state, not inherent, and, 
> ultimately, permanently removable. Admittedly, my talk of the mind "in and of 
> itself" was not well formulated. I only meant that the mind is freeable from 
> defilement. The defilements can be removed, and the mind - that is, all the 
> mental functions - can still operate, and, now, cleanly, smoothly, and 
> without impediment. My only point as to what the sutta says is that the mind 
> is not essentially defiled. It's no different when we speak about diamonds. A 
> diamond in the rough is dull and unattractive; it doesn't shine. But it *can* 
> shine. It needs to be polished. If the obscuring covering couldn't be rubbed 
> away, the diamond would be inherently dull and of no interest. But it is 
> inherently pure *in the sense that* it can be made to shine.

Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of opposite
tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta is
referring to the mind and its potential.

But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the mind
and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough that is
covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an
underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a thing has
a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? 

If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the
defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the rough. The
diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the defilements
is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous with
its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if such
should arise, but it will not be the same one. 

I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying continuous
awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then become
undefiled?

Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making here. 
Forgive me sharing my thought process.

Best,
Robert Ep.




	
10341

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon Dec 24, 2001 6:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 12/24/01 11:19:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of 
> opposite
> tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta 
> is
> referring to the mind and its potential.
> 
> But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the 
> mind
> and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough 
> that is
> covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an
> underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a 
> thing has
> a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? 
> 
> If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the
> defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the 
> rough. The
> diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the 
> defilements
> is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous 
> with
> its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if 
> such
> should arise, but it will not be the same one. 
> 
> I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying 
> continuous
> awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then 
> become
> undefiled?
> 
> Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making 
> here. 
> Forgive me sharing my thought process.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
==============================
The term 'mind' is a conventional one, no better or worse than the 
Pali 'nama'. It is a general term for a variety of functions, including 
discernment, feelings, volitions, ... well, you know the list. When these 
functions involve ignorance, craving, and aversion we say that "mind is 
defiled". When not, not. The defilements can be permanently removed. The 
Buddha said that, and I happen to believe it. Dirty diamonds and gritty gold 
are metaphors for this. As is the case with all metaphors, they can't be 
pushed too far. They are aids to thinking, and no more. But as far as 
providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of 
such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the 
slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being 
conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, 
and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the 
Buddha in which he discussed cittas, and, for sure I'll have to defer to 
those who have, wherever one can find such folks, to give such an analysis.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10342

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 4:22am
Subject: Re: [dsg] The weather

 	
Hi again, Herman -

In a message dated 12/24/01 10:55:25 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:


> Hi, Herman -
> 
> The foregoing is a very amusing post, and is one with which I have 
> much sympathy. 
==========================
Actually, the *foregoing* was EMPTY! I meant to say the *following*. 
(Of course, empty things are important in Buddhism! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10343

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 10:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Hello Sarah,

I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" and "there is no 
control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas "there is no self" 
and "there is no control."

On one hand you say you often use self-control. On the other hand, 
you say that in reality there is no control. I am not sure what you 
mean here.

If interested, you might want to refer to
Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda 
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a specific 
reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed that there 
is no self.

Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha taught 
that conditioned phenomenon is not self.

Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays.

Regards,
Victor


> Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can still be 
understanding
> that in reality there is no self and no control, only conditioned 
realities.
	
10344

From: Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 0:29pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Victor,

Sotapatti-magga, the first level of enlightenment,
eliminates the wrong view of self, which is the root of all
other wrong views. A sotapanna and above no longer has the
wrong view of self.

Access to insights has suttas related to the views:
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index-subject.html#ditthi
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-178.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn109.html#sel
fview
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html#sel
fid
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn41-003.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-001.html
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-047.html

If you have the complete translation of Digha Nikaya, the
Buddha listed all the different wrong views in details in
Dighanikaya->Brahmnajala Sutta (DN1).

I am sure there are many more suttas discussing the wrong
view of self, and its oppposite, anataness, in many more
suttas in many different variations than listed here, since
this is the first most fundamental kilesa that needs to be
eradicated.

kom

> -----Original Message-----
> From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...]
> Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2001 10:59 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta
>
>
> Hello Sarah,
>
> I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self"
> and "there is no
> control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas
> "there is no self"
> and "there is no control."
>
> On one hand you say you often use self-control.
> On the other hand,
> you say that in reality there is no control. I
> am not sure what you
> mean here.
>
> If interested, you might want to refer to
> Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44
-010.html

If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a
specific
reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed
that there
is no self.

Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha
taught
that conditioned phenomenon is not self.

Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays.

Regards,
Victor


> Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can
still be
understanding
> that in reality there is no self and no control, only
conditioned
realities.





	
10345

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 2:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up.

mike

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike -
> 
> C'mon, Mike! If the Buddha could speak
> conventionally, can't I? Should 
> my speech be more precise than his? Not every
> conventional phrase requires 
> unpacking. 
> As worldlings, "we" (hmmm, guess I'd better
> be careful ;-) pass along 
> from mindstate to mindstate dispositions to thinking
> in terms of "me" and 
> "mine"and in terms of separate, self-existent
> realities, and we pass along 
> subliminal dispositions to grasp at and push away
> these things. And, yes, 
> this is at the subliminal (anusaya) level, and, much
> of the time these 
> dispositions are manifest as outflowings (asava).
> All the foregoing is 
> "defiled mind". After enlightenment, mind is
> undefiled. That is to say, no 
> more of the three poisons - whoops, that's not too
> conventional is it? ;-) 
> After enlightenment, *no* cittas carry ignorant
> dispositions. 
> BTW, how many cittas have you actually
> observed? (How about the 
> "patisandhi-, bhavanga-, cuti- and jhana-cittas"
> that you talk about below?) 
> I'm not aware of having observed any cittas myself
> at all, though I'm aware 
> of being conscious, of discerning hardness,
> softness, colors, tastes, 
> feelings, emotions, thiughts, etc. I have observed
> desire and aversion, I 
> have caught myself (whoops, better be careful!)
> thinking about DSG, for 
> example, and trees, and people as if they really
> *were* something. I catch 
> myself being unmindful (but with that catching, I
> save myself for the 
> moment). But I can't ever recall catching a glimpse
> of a citta. Isn't it a 
> bit odd to stand on one's head avoiding all
> empirical talk while at the same 
> time talking about things like cittas which we have
> never, ever observed? We 
> debate whether or not it is the bhavanga cittas
> constitute luminous mind, 
> when the Buddha never taught anyone about bhavanga
> cittas, and we wouldn't 
> know one if it sidled up to us and gave us a deep
> bow! 
> Isn't there a bit of a danger in getting
> caught in a realm of 
> unobserved "ultimate realities" that the Buddha
> never presented in any of the 
> teachings given by him to multitudes of people over
> 45 years and recorded in 
> the Sutta Pitaka, but shunning what we actually do
> experience? I personally 
> think there is such a danger.
> 
> With conventional metta (something actually felt,
> not a theoretical "ultimate 
> reality"),
> Howard
> 


	
10346

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 1:35pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up.
> 
> mike
> 
===========================
No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! 
I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, 
because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as 
an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and 
heart transformed. 
I'm afraid that over the months I have reacted badly to the inte
llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have fully participated in. 
I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all, I've now taken out my 
unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in a recent post to my 
"comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit further, please.
I have tired so much of opinions, theories, and philosophical 
investigations into questions which have come to appear to me like "How many 
cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because such intellectual 
philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and is something that I had 
finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular meditation and an ongoing 
mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've gotten back to the old 
"living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from any steadiness in my 
meditation practice, and the results have not been good. Oh, I can use words 
well, and I can reason well. But this has become a substitute for the 
practice that had come to serve me so well. This is a personal matter, and it 
calls for me to change things for myself. 
But my response has been quite poor! Instead of easing off on the 
intellectual discussions and putting more effort into the regularity of my 
practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent. There is absolutely no 
reason at all for me to have directed any of my discontent towards you, or, 
for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on this list! You have my 
sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very sorry. Please excuse me.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10347

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 7:31pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
I understand, Howard, and I certainly take your point.

: )

Hope you are having happy Holidays!

Regards,
Robert

========

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 12/24/01 11:19:08 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > Well, I understand your meaning Howard, and I know I'm taking a sort of 
> > opposite
> > tack here, since I am one of the people who think the 'luminous mind' sutta 
> > is
> > referring to the mind and its potential.
> > 
> > But to be rigorous, it seems interesting to me to look at this idea of the 
> > mind
> > and see what is really there. If the mind is like a diamond in the rough 
> > that is
> > covered with defilements and is potentially 'pure', it seems to posit an
> > underlying mind that is a thing. How is it that something that is not a 
> > thing has
> > a different potential than it has now? Am I being overly nit-picky here? 
> > 
> > If it is the potential of pure mental functions, that could exist if the
> > defilements were not there, this is not quite like the diamond in the 
> > rough. The
> > diamond that is undefiled is *really there* under the dirt. Under the 
> > defilements
> > is there a separate citta that is not defiled? Or is the citta synonomous 
> > with
> > its defilement of the moment? Later it will be replaced by a pure citta if 
> > such
> > should arise, but it will not be the same one. 
> > 
> > I am one of those who believes in the possibility of an underlying 
> > continuous
> > awareness, but in lieu of that, what would be there to be defiled and then 
> > become
> > undefiled?
> > 
> > Anyway, I feel a bit confused, so I hope there are some points worth making 
> > here. 
> > Forgive me sharing my thought process.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> ==============================
> The term 'mind' is a conventional one, no better or worse than the 
> Pali 'nama'. It is a general term for a variety of functions, including 
> discernment, feelings, volitions, ... well, you know the list. When these 
> functions involve ignorance, craving, and aversion we say that "mind is 
> defiled". When not, not. The defilements can be permanently removed. The 
> Buddha said that, and I happen to believe it. Dirty diamonds and gritty gold 
> are metaphors for this. As is the case with all metaphors, they can't be 
> pushed too far. They are aids to thinking, and no more. But as far as 
> providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of 
> such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the 
> slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being 
> conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, 
> and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the 
> Buddha in which he discussed cittas, and, for sure I'll have to defer to 
> those who have, wherever one can find such folks, to give such an analysis.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


	
10348

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 7:50pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Friends,
I found Thanissaro Bikkhu's essay on 'No-Self/Not-Self' very worthwhile in this
discussion. Here's the link: 

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/modern/thanissaro/notself2.html

Best,
Robert Ep.

========================

--- Kom Tukovinit <tikmok@y...> wrote:
> 
> Dear Victor,
> 
> Sotapatti-magga, the first level of enlightenment,
> eliminates the wrong view of self, which is the root of all
> other wrong views. A sotapanna and above no longer has the
> wrong view of self.
> 
> Access to insights has suttas related to the views:
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/index-subject.html#ditthi
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/anguttara/an04-178.html
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn109.html#sel
> fview
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn148.html#sel
> fid
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn41-003.html
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-001.html
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn22-047.html
> 
> If you have the complete translation of Digha Nikaya, the
> Buddha listed all the different wrong views in details in
> Dighanikaya->Brahmnajala Sutta (DN1).
> 
> I am sure there are many more suttas discussing the wrong
> view of self, and its oppposite, anataness, in many more
> suttas in many different variations than listed here, since
> this is the first most fundamental kilesa that needs to be
> eradicated.
> 
> kom
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...]
> > Sent: Tuesday, December 25, 2001 10:59 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta
> >
> >
> > Hello Sarah,
> >
> > I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self"
> > and "there is no
> > control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas
> > "there is no self"
> > and "there is no control."
> >
> > On one hand you say you often use self-control.
> > On the other hand,
> > you say that in reality there is no control. I
> > am not sure what you
> > mean here.
> >
> > If interested, you might want to refer to
> > Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44
> -010.html
> 
> If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a
> specific
> reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed
> that there
> is no self.
> 
> Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha
> taught
> that conditioned phenomenon is not self.
> 
> Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> > Even if we use self-control which I often do, there can
> still be
> understanding
> > that in reality there is no self and no control, only
> conditioned
> realities.


	
10349

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 8:39pm
Subject: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary)

 	
Dear Howard,
Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and your
relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which counts in
the final analysis, who we really are at this moment.

I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they arise,
and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal love -
the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is suffering
that we all share.

Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is for the
quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part of what
we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha outlined. 
But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same path. 
There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. 
Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally disagree. 
But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of your
practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return to
yourself in a sense and know your path anew. 

And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to yourself --
and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here <slight
smile> -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened in terms
of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual discussions. 
Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the Dharma, but
maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by contemplation
and study. 

But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are going to
become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it all
show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' our
practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start out
from scratch every day. Approached in the right way, this can be liberating.

I hope you will begin your sitting again. I hope I will too. I hope you will see
that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering or
holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of everything
and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we hold
onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift. I hope my
speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean it, and
believe it can be applied now to this moment of living.

This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering and am
happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I hope
you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or ask for
my phone number.

In Friendship,
Robert Ep.

===================================

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike -
> 
> In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> mlnease@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up.
> > 
> > mike
> > 
> ===========================
> No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! 
> I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, 
> because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as 
> an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and 
> heart transformed. 
> I'm afraid that over the months I have reacted badly to the inte
> llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have fully participated in. 
> I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all, I've now taken out my 
> unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in a recent post to my 
> "comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit further, please.
> I have tired so much of opinions, theories, and philosophical 
> investigations into questions which have come to appear to me like "How many 
> cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because such intellectual 
> philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and is something that I had 
> finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular meditation and an ongoing 
> mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've gotten back to the old 
> "living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from any steadiness in my 
> meditation practice, and the results have not been good. Oh, I can use words 
> well, and I can reason well. But this has become a substitute for the 
> practice that had come to serve me so well. This is a personal matter, and it 
> calls for me to change things for myself. 
> But my response has been quite poor! Instead of easing off on the 
> intellectual discussions and putting more effort into the regularity of my 
> practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent. There is absolutely no 
> reason at all for me to have directed any of my discontent towards you, or, 
> for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on this list! You have my 
> sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very sorry. Please excuse me.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


	
10350

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 8:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Howard,

Not to worry--I get as impatient with empty theorizing
as anyone (if not more so)--unless I agree with it of
course. No apologies necessary--thanks for the
thoughtful response just the same.

mike

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Mike -
> 
> In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern
> Standard Time, 
> mlnease@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up.
> > 
> > mike
> > 
> ===========================
> No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! 
> I've always tended towards "living in my
> head". In recent years, 
> because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma,
> appreciated and practiced by me as 
> an empirical *path*, and not as one more
> "philosophy", I've found my life and 
> heart transformed. 
> I'm afraid that over the months I have
> reacted badly to the inte
> llectual theorizing on DSG, an activity that I have
> fully participated in. 
> I've reacted to it with aversion. But worst of all,
> I've now taken out my 
> unhappiness on you (in my reply) - and even a bit in
> a recent post to my 
> "comrade" ;-)), Robert E. Let me explain a bit
> further, please.
> I have tired so much of opinions, theories,
> and philosophical 
> investigations into questions which have come to
> appear to me like "How many 
> cittas can dance on the head of a pin?", because
> such intellectual 
> philosophizing has not been a good "path" for me and
> is something that I had 
> finally gotten away from, replacing it with regular
> meditation and an ongoing 
> mindfulness practice. But, for a while now, I've
> gotten back to the old 
> "living in my head" pattern, I've gotten away from
> any steadiness in my 
> meditation practice, and the results have not been
> good. Oh, I can use words 
> well, and I can reason well. But this has become a
> substitute for the 
> practice that had come to serve me so well. This is
> a personal matter, and it 
> calls for me to change things for myself. 
> But my response has been quite poor! Instead
> of easing off on the 
> intellectual discussions and putting more effort
> into the regularity of my 
> practice, I've just concocted increasing discontent.
> There is absolutely no 
> reason at all for me to have directed any of my
> discontent towards you, or, 
> for that matter, towards any of the lovely folks on
> this list! You have my 
> sincere apology. It's not you. It's me. I'm very
> sorry. Please excuse me.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


	
10351

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:13pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 12/25/01 10:32:19 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> I understand, Howard, and I certainly take your point.
> 
> : )
> 
> Hope you are having happy Holidays!
> 
> Regards,
> Robert
> 
===========================
Thanks, Robert. I wish you all the best as well!

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10352

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:50pm
Subject: Re: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary)

 	
Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 12/25/01 11:39:53 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
epsteinrob@Y... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and 
> your
> relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which 
> counts in
> the final analysis, who we really are at this moment.
> 
> I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they 
> arise,
> and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal 
> love -
> the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is 
> suffering
> that we all share.
> 
----------------------------------------------------------
Yes, I feel the same.
----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is 
> for the
> quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part 
> of what
> we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha 
> outlined. 
> But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same 
> path. 
> There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. 
> Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally 
> disagree. 
> But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of 
> your
> practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return 
> to
> yourself in a sense and know your path anew. 
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
A wonderful point, Rob.
--------------------------------------------------------

> 
> And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to 
> yourself --
> and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here <
> slight
> smile> -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened 
> in terms
> of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual 
> discussions.
> 
------------------------------------------------------------
Actually, there have been clarifications for me of various sorts. I've 
really gained much from DSG, and I hope to continue to do so. (The problem is 
not in the list.)
------------------------------------------------------------ 
> 
> Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the 
> Dharma, but
> maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by 
> contemplation
> and study. 
> 
> But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are 
> going to
> become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it 
> all
> show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' 
> our
> practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start 
> out
> from scratch every day.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Yes. Mistakes are easily made and wrong directions easily taken. It's 
a kind of gift (maybe a Christmas present ;-) when life shows this to you.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Approached in the right way, this can be liberating.> 
> I hope you will begin your sitting again.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks. I have. Now I must continue.
------------------------------------------------------------
I hope I will too. I hope you will see> 
> that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering 
> or
> holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of 
> everything
> and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we 
> hold
> onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift.
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Thanks, Rob, for a good teaching.
-------------------------------------------------------------
I hope my> 
> speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean 
> it, and
> believe it can be applied now to this moment of living.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Not at all abstract and philosophical, but obviously from your heart. 
And, please, I don't want anything I've said to lend even the slightest 
"chill" to anyone's inclination to be as abstract and philosophical as they 
find useful! My inclinations and disinclinations are mine alone, and I don't 
wish to impose anything on anyone! I particularly regret the tone of my post 
to Mike, and would undo it if only I could.
-------------------------------------------------------------

> 
> This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering 
> and am
> happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I 
> hope
> you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or 
> ask for
> my phone number.
> 
----------------------------------------------------------
Thank you, Rob. You have been most kind. (By the way, I have received 
a private post (off list) from another DSG list member which also was 
wonderfully supportive, and for which I am most appreciative.)
----------------------------------------------------------

> 
> In Friendship,
> Robert Ep.
> 
=============================
With much metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10353

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 10:52pm
Subject: apologies and so on

 	
Dear Howard (& Mike),

May I just add a short note to say how much I've (and everyone else I've spoken
to) always greatly appreciated your contributions on dsg. None of this (Ie
inderstanding of dhamma) is easy for anyone - far too much moha and ditthi
around for that - and most of us get a bit (or more) impatient or 'rattled' at
times. Howard, you're an exemplary list-member and model of good nature because
it's so rare for any of this frustration to show. 

I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season and
thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely.

Very best wishes, always to you both,

Sarah
==================================================


--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Mike -
> 
> In a message dated 12/25/01 5:53:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> mlnease@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > OK, Howard, never mind--sorry I brought it up.
> > 
> > mike
> > 
> ===========================
> No, I'M sorry, and I SHOULD be! 
> I've always tended towards "living in my head". In recent years, 
> because of the Buddha's wonderful Dhamma, appreciated and practiced by me as 
> an empirical *path*, and not as one more "philosophy", I've found my life and


10354

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 5:53pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi, Mike -

In a message dated 12/25/01 11:43:28 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
mlnease@y... writes:


> Hi Howard,
> 
> Not to worry--I get as impatient with empty theorizing
> as anyone (if not more so)--unless I agree with it of
> course. No apologies necessary--thanks for the
> thoughtful response just the same.
> 
> mike
> 
=========================
Ahhh, you make me breathe easily! Thank you so much, my friend, for 
your very kind understanding and acceptance.

With much metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 


	
10355

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue Dec 25, 2001 6:03pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] apologies and so on

 	
Hi, Sarah -

In a message dated 12/26/01 1:53:26 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard (& Mike),
> 
> May I just add a short note to say how much I've (and everyone else I've 
> spoken
> to) always greatly appreciated your contributions on dsg. None of this (Ie
> inderstanding of dhamma) is easy for anyone - far too much moha and ditthi
> around for that - and most of us get a bit (or more) impatient or 'rattled' 
> at
> times. Howard, you're an exemplary list-member and model of good nature 
> because
> it's so rare for any of this frustration to show. 
> 
-------------------------------------------------------------
Howad:
Thank you so much, Sarah. As usual, you are genuinely sweet and 
supportive.
------------------------------------------------------------ 

> 
> I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season and
> thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely.
> 
----------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
The same to you and Jon. I wish you both and your loved ones a season 
of much peace and a new year filled with all that you wish for yourselves.
---------------------------------------------------------

> 
> Very best wishes, always to you both,
> 
> Sarah
===========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10356

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah.
> So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or
> not.

No. A concept is always a concept (whichever kind) and never turns into a
reality.

> For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a
> concept, no?

It is the kind of concept that represents a reality. (vijjamaana pa~n~natti)

> Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be
> experienced as an object?

Both (i.e. concept and reality). Panna is real when it arises and performs its
task of ‘understanding’. There is no need for a name at this time. Yes it can
itself (being a reality) not only be eperienced as an object but also be known
by sati and panna as it has its characteristic and ‘nature’. Of course it could
also be experienced by unwholesome mind-states too.

> The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of
> hardness', is
> the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? 

Yes, the ‘experiencing’ (i.e. citta with accompanying cetasikas) is always a
nama. Exactly right with regard to hardness. The ‘experiencing’ through the
body-sense is a nama and the hardness, which is only ever experienced, is a
rupa. Later the javana cittas which ‘run’ through the object are also
namas.Then there may be thinking about the ‘hardness’. The thinking would then
consist of more namas, but the idea about the past rupas is now a concept. 
(I’m trying to keep it fairly simple here;-)

>Is the citta
> that
> then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'],
> itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept,
> not a
> reality.

Yes, you’re getting very ‘warm’ (thinking of Xmas guessing party games now;-)
yes, the thinking, the interpreting (more thinking with sanna and so on) are
all namas. As you say, the ‘table’ is a concept and in this case in a different
category of concepts from panna because ‘table’ never exists.

> 
> And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones
> are
> considered namas, only 1 and 5?

Concepts are never namas. I think you mean, which ones represent namas? Then
the answer would be as you say, 1) vijjamaana pa~n~nattis and 5) vijjamaanena
vijjamaana pannattis.

Thes are just the concepts that are names (naama pa~n~natti). It gets more
complicated, but perhaps I’ll refer you to 3 excellent archive posts for more
details first and then you can ask Jon, myself or anyone else if you have more
questions about these (now I know you take your homework seriously, Rob;-)) The
third link answers the last question in detail, I think:

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/2918
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3362
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3494


Hoping you and your family are having a pleasant holiday. We just had a lovely
long leisurely lunch sitting outside on the Peak with Jon’s mother and her
friend.

Sarah
======================================================



	
10357

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Thanks Jon, good
explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand
> how the
> process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect'
> enough to
> apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the
> idea that
> the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to
> directly 'copy'
> the object?

All cittas (moments of consciousness) experience an object, and the cittas
that see or hear experience in particular the rupas that are visible
object or sound. 

Indeed, the cittas that experience visible object or sound have as their
specific function the *seeing* or *hearing* of the visible/auditory
object, in the sense of experiencing it 'in its bare immediacy and
simplicity' [CMA - full extract pasted below].

> In a related question, how does this theory account for the
> characteristic of the
> sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of
> sense
> organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is
> perceived? It
> is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in
> actually
> taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has
> evolved
> through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still
> imperfect
> and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual'
> characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is
> enlightened
> is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? 
> There is
> no direct perception according to this idea.

A minor clarification here, Rob. The sense-organ, being a rupa, does not
experience /perceive the sense-object. That perception is the function of
the citta discussed above. The sense-organ is of course one of the
necessary conditions for the arising of the sense-door consciousness, but
the functions of seeing, hearing etc are performed by cittas, not rupas.

> Which is why normally I would think
> that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather
> than a true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 

It is the cittas that arise in the processes that follow the bare
perceiving of the sense-door object that have what you term a 'sense-door
result' as their object.

I hope this helps.

Jon

['CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS)
The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide
(The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation
of, the main commentaries to the A-S)]

Ch I, #8. Analysis of Functions (Guide)

"In a cognitive process at the sense doors, … there arises a citta which
directly cognizes the impingent object. 

"This citta, and the specific function it performs, is determined by the
nature of the object. If the object is a visible form, eye consciousness
arises seeing it; if it is a sound, ear consciousness arises hearing it,
and so forth. 

"In this context, the functions of seeing and hearing, etc., do not refer
to the cognitive acts which explicitly identify the objects of sight and
hearing, etc., as such. They signify, rather, the rudimentary momentary
occasions of consciousness by which the sense datum is experienced in its
bare immediacy and simplicity prior to all identificatory cognitive
operations."


	
10358

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> I think three things are true:
> 1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it
> is
> extremely difficult to approach such refined states.

Just so.If there is no ‘beginner’ level of samatha bhavana in daily life, why
would one think that ther can be any highly developed jhana practice. Just as
we might say, if there is no understanding of namas and rupas now, clearly and
distinctly as they are, why would one have the idea there can be any
understanding or realizing of nibbana?

For both kinds of development, there has to be clear understanding of the
difference between skilful and unskilful mind-states, including and especially
at those times of concentrating on an object, I think. 

> 2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who
> are
> familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who
> has
> lectured and taught on them quite a bit.

I’m sorry but I can’t comment on this one.

> 3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary*
> to
> develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of
> discernment,
> sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state.
> Is
> this correct?

When the Buddha talks about the necessary conditions for developing vipassana,
he refers to hearing the Teachings, considering, putting into practice and so
on. I don’t believe he ever says ‘develop jhana’ first. He does encourage us,
however, to develop all kinds of skilful states. He also says that these states
along with all other realities are not self. In other words, they are not
developed by ‘wishing’ or ‘trying to do’ or ‘concentrating on an object’
without any understanding. It’s certainly true that many monks in the Buddha’s
day had already developed the highest jhanas. It wasm’t by coincidence that the
Buddha was born at that time in India where exrtraordinarily high levels of
wisdom and wholesomeness where apparent. 

I’ve talked quite a bit about how I understand metta can be developed. Let me
just mention another object of samatha: ‘earth kasina’. In theory, we could
sit cross-legged and focus on a lump of earth and develop a higher and higher
state of concentration. I don’t believe, however, there would be any wholesome
concentration, calm or understanding attained. If, on the other hand, naturally
in daily life we happen to reflect for a moment on the importance we attribute
to all our possessions, which we believe we own, when in reality, they are just
‘earth’ and don’t belong to anyone. At the end of life, if not before, we lose
them all and yet this ‘earth’ is what we fight and argue about and which we
hold so very dear. We crave for pleasant feelings and cling so much to sense
objects i.e. to rupas. Samatha development is the detachment from this craving.
Just a little wise reflection may condition moments of calm now without any
special effort at all. 

As I was writing the last segment on the Intro to the Vinaya, there were
conditions for moments of calm as I reflected on the extraordinary wisdom and
compassion of the arahats who spent 7mths reviewing the Teachings at the 1st
Council. Their work was done, but for the sake of generations to come (like us
here) they painstakingly organised and categorised the Tipitaka and the earth
quaked at these extraordinary deeds. This would come under reflection on the
Sangha, I believe. When I started writing, I had no intention or wish to
experience these few moments of calm or samatha. It was just by conditions. A
few moments later, there were tears in my eyes reflecting some attachment and
aversion. The kilesa 'defile' so very, very quickly.

I'm not sure my 'rambles' clarify anything.

Seems like a Rob Ep day today;-)

Sarah
============


	
10359

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Herman

--- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Jon,
> 
> I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie 
> specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they 
> see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being 
> described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another 
> door, unless you use LSD. 
> 
> Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, 
> looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour 
> experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute 
> or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate 
> or absolute has relative connotations.
> 
> So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour 
> blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the 
> lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred 
> commentaries? ( :-) )

An interesting example you give here, Herman ;-))

I would agree that, speaking in purely conventional terms, no 2 persons
ever experience the same thing in the same way, even if they are equally
endowed with understanding and sensory perception.

However, in terms of the ultimate realities about which you ask, we cannot
talk about 2 people seeing or hearing the same thing. This is because the
citta of the sense-door experience has as its object simply a rupa 
(visible object or sound) that arises by virtue of conditions that are
beyond that person's control. Each moment of sense-door experience is a
moment of vipaka (result of kamma), and the object experienced by a person
at a given moment depends on, among other things, their past kamma. So
even if, in conventional terms, 2 people are looking at or listening to
the same thing, the moment-to-moment seeing or hearing of rupas will be
determined by factors that are unique to each individual.

But it is what is in common at such moments that is the subject of the
Buddha's teaching. The actual experiencing of visible object or sound by
the relevant sense-door consciousness is a universal experience common to
all beings that have the appropriate faculty, no matter in what shape
those faculties are. And the same goes for the processes that follow
those experiences. This is the subject, the 'field', of the development
of understanding leading to breaking the link with samsara.

To summarise, it is of the nature of things that:
- when 2 people are seeing/hearing 'the same thing at the same time'
(speaking conventionally), it's a safe bet that in terms of ultimate
realities there is no conformity in the *actual objects being experienced*
on a moment-to-moment basis
- however, in terms of the *different kinds of consciousness and their
objects* that are experienced in this lifetime, there is total and
universal conformity among all beings

So colour-blindness does not preclude an understanding of the true nature
of the visible object appearing at the present moment. Given the choice
between a commentary written by the person with perfect vision but weak
understanding, and one written by the colour-blind person with good
understanding, I'd take the latter any day (regardless of their taste in
cars).

Jon


	
10360

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
………………..
> > 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of
> a
> > dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is
> that
> > of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly
> > experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being
> the
> > object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts.
> > 
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual 
> essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is
> not 
> part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma.

I'm not sure whether 'sabhaava', as used in the texts, is coterminous with
'lakkhana', but that is indeed how I think of it. 

BTW, I believe that to those coming from a Mahayana background the words
'individual essence' tend to convey an idea of 'entitiness', but in the
texts they carry no such connotation.

> The second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the
impression
> that 
> *everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is
> the 
> distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'?

I think that to say *everything* is a dhamma is a little too sweeping. As
far as I know, the term 'dhamma' always has a specific meaning, although
that meaning varies according to the context.

In the context of the realities that are to be or can be known by
awareness and understanding, the terms 'dhammas' and 'paramattha dhammas'
can be used interchangeably. In the suttas, the term 'khandhas' is
frequently used in a similar context, and the meaning of khandhas and
paramattha dhammas is coterminous, except that the latter includes nibbana
also.

> One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea /
> 
> thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent.
> We 
> *are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me.
> In 
> the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness
> of 
> dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble
> 
> truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts
> 
> about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / 
> unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it.
> This 
> was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the
> suttas the 
> four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally.

While I agree that in the suttas the Four Noble Truths are presented in
conventional terms, I would not agree that they are mere ideas or
concepts.

However, that question aside for the purposes of the present discussion
(to be taken up on another day?), the other descriptions given in the
Satipatthana Sutta for the 4th foundation of mindfulness (Five Hindrances,
Aggregates, Sense-bases, Factors of Enlightenment) all clearly refer to
realities and not concepts, as I understand them. So even on you own
interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as the
only possible 'concept' anyway?

…………………..
> > As I understand the texts --
> > - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is
> real (a
> > dhamma)
> > - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any
> > individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a
> > dhamma.
> > 
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha*
> dhammas. It 
> seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any
> 
> distinguishable thing.

'Dhammas' can be found to have different meanings in different contexts,
but I think the important thing from our point of view is that the Buddha
did distinguish between 'realties' and 'concepts' and it is importatnt to
know in any particular context whether he was talking about one, the other
or both.

……………………..
> > Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the domain
> of
> > ultimate or supreme knowledge.
> > 
> --------------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha
> dhamma'? 
> And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with
> wisdom, 
> because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression
> that 
> the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his
> 
> attention to it. But concepts are an exception?

A citta that has a concept as its object can be accompanied by wisdom and,
in that case, the concept is the object of the wisdom too, since all
mental factors take the same object as the citta they accompany.

However, a concept cannot be the object of a citta that is accompanied by
*wisdom of the level of satipatthana*. Only a reality can be the object
of such a citta, since the function of wisdom of this level is to
understand something about the true nature of realities.

Jon

PS The distinction discussed just above helps in understadning one of the
essential differences between bhavana of the level of samatha and bhavana
of the level of vipassana.


	
10361

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 12/22/01 5:37:42 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> 
> > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are
> accumulated
> > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an
> individual
> > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again
> in
> > the future.
> > 
> > 
> =============================
> I don't understand this. What sort of "accumulation" is this? 
> Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances. The 
> occurrence of an event now is a condition for the occurrence of future
> events 
> or features of such events, but nothing is passed along. It was my 
> understanding that abhidhamma simply views cetasikas as arising and
> ceasing. 
> While a given cetasika could be operative through several cittas (i.e.
> while 
> other cetasikas may come and go, the ending and arising of cetasikas
> [and 
> arammanas] marking citta boundaries), it is not a thing to be "passed
> along", 
> but is simply a function which is operative for as long as it takes.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

I mean, for example, that every moment of, say, attachment that arises is
accumulated and passes from one citta to the next (this is what we mean by
the latent tendency for attachment). All other mental factors (including,
for example, sanna/memory) are similarly accumulated and passed from one
citta to the next.

Jon


	
10362

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:12am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Victor

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon,
> 
> Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is:
> Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. 
> Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. 
> Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my 
> self."

While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is surely
more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this
understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just repeating the
words of the suttas.

Jon

> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > Victor
> > 
> > --- Victor Yu <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon,
> > > 
> > > Thank you. Whether it is hard to realize or not, conditioned 
> phenomenon
> > > such as consciousness or perception is impermanent, is
> > > unsatisfactory/dukkha, is to be seen as it actually is with right
> > > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not 
> my
> > > self."
> > 
> > Yes, I wouldn't argue with what you say. But we need to know *how* 
> this
> > 'right discernment' is to be developed. Any suggestions? 
> > 
> > Jon



	
10363

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Thanks, Jon. One
question, below.
> 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> 
> > At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing
> an
> > object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a
> reality
> > while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound)
> is
> > not a reality.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum?

A nama is a reality that experiences an object. In the instance given
above, the citta/moment of consciousness is a nama. 

Cetasikas (mental factors that accompany a citta) are also namas, since
they experience an object too, namely, the same object as the citta they
accompany. So all cittas and cetasikas are namas.

In the language of the suttas, namas are the 4 khandhas other than
rupa-kkhandha. These are:
2. Vedana/feeling [a cetasika]
3. Sanna/perception or memory [a cetasika]
4. Sankhara/the formations [the 50 cetasikas other than the preceding 2]
5. Vinnana/consciousness [citta]

Jon


	
10364

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the
> translations
> of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate
> those
> being there, they are quite clear in what they say.

I’m very impressed;-)
===================

> Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. 
> The
> bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. 
> They
> have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking
> cittas
> are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. 
> There is
> no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of
> the
> waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom
> would the
> reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for
> not
> 'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an
> analogy
> that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. 

As Nina said, I think we have to be careful not to take the analogy too far.
Having said that, I find it very interesting too.

As I understand, just as the bad child may spoil the reputation of the parent
due to a lack of comprehension (by society) of where the fault really lies and
confusing parent and child together, perhaps we can say that the kilesa give
the entire mind states or process of phenomena a bad reputation through
ignorance of the real state of affairs.

In our ignorance, we notice someone’s anger and think they are an ‘angry
person’. There is no comprehension that dosa just arises in a few javana
cittas. With no understanding of ‘pure’ bhavanga cittas between processes, they
are all sullied by those cittas with dosa. 

It doesn’t seem convoluted to me, but then I just accept the commentary
interpretation and don’t try to analyse too much. The commentary makes it clear
that the kilesa that defile the mind are arising in the later javana process,
so there’s no idea of pure and impure cittas together or of vipaka and javana
cittas together (none of which would make any sense).

Like you, I'm very interested to read the sub-commentary and translation in due
course too.

When we read the Buddha’s descritptions of realities in fine detail in the
Abhidhamma and sometimes in the Suttas, it is a description rather than a
prescription as Jon and Dan pointed out before. Accumulations vary so much and
so there is no rule at all as to which realities will become known at any given
time. Bhavanga cittas may be known by someone’s panna and not another’s. It
doesn’t matter at all. 

> The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that
> attributes
> this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to
> be
> some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the
> commentary's
> viewpoint to be understood. 

For many years (read decades) I used to just ‘switch off’ when I heard about
bhavanga cittas....Like you say, it just seemed too convoluted. In the last
year, I’ve been hearing explanations and considering in ways that are very
helpful for me at this time. Again, there’s no rule, but since you asked or
suggested another interpretation, the topic has come up... 

Often I use an alarm-clock to wake up and probably because I’ve been talking
with Ken O about sleep and bhavangas, I’ve been noticing how as soon as the
alarm rings, the worlds of eye-door, ear-door, mind-door with lots of lobha,
dosa and panatti are so apparent within seconds. Occasionally there’s a little
awareness, but usually there is just the grasping, aversion, the stories and
the ignorance instantly.

Always fun talking to you, Rob,

Sarah


==================================================


	
10365

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Eightfold Path (esp. right effort)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 

> > 
> > As I understand it, Rob, all mental factors (cetasikas) are
> accumulated
> > and passed from one citta to the next. The accumulation of an
> individual
> > factor in this manner is one of the conditions for its arising again
> in
> > the future.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> Interesting, Jon. I hadn't realized that. So there are billions of
> cetasikas
> being passed along?

In a manner of speaking. As Howard has pointed out in a recent post to
me, 'Cetasikas (and cittas) are functions or operations, not substances'. 
So it would be more correct to say that the cumulative effect of all
preceding cetasikas is being passed along at each moment of citta.

Jon


	
10366

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:31am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Num

Thanks for a very informative post.

Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you
mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? I
would be interested to know where I can read more about this.

Jon

--- srnsk@a... wrote: > Hi Howard,
> 
> <<< There is then the question of whether the 
> content of a memory is considered to be an arammana or not. In order for
> the 
> experience of continuity to occur, it is necessary, it seems to me, for
> the 
> memories of past cittas to occur simultaneously with the current citta
> (else 
> such memories are already gone).
> 
> In that case, it becomes important whether 
> or not the content of a memory is considered an arammana, for if it is,
> then 
> there is more than one arammana per citta. >>>
> 
> 
> Let me put in my two cent worth comments. As I understand, the sanna
> and 
> citta in the same citta always have the same aramma. From the 4
> characters 
> of things, sanna manifest as registration (marking), retention,
> retrieval and 
> recall. Citta is a leader in knowing and sanna is a leader in its
> subset of 
> function. Sanna can mark and register pretty much every aramma
> paramattha, 
> pannatti and from my reading nibbhana.


	
10367

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 4:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Seasons greetings (was, apologies and so on)

 	
Howard

> > I hope you and your family have a pleasant and relaxing holiday season
> and
> > thank you for sharing your feelings so sincerely.
> > 
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> The same to you and Jon. I wish you both and your loved ones a
> season 
> of much peace and a new year filled with all that you wish for
> yourselves.
> ---------------------------------------------------------

Thanks Howard, and the same to you and yours.

I hope it's a good year for you (on and off the list), with understanding.

Jon

	
10368

From: Purnomo . <purnomo9@h...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 4:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear, too

I am interested to discuss 'concept'. So I wrote it. Before, I just see and 
read, no respond, because,
1. My knowledge is so small
2. I am not interested.

Colour is not absolute. Try, your friend and you make simulate. You ask your 
friend, "what colour is an apple?" What your friend answer is his/her 
experience. Maybe is same with you. But 'image' of his/her colour is not 
same with you.

nice see you
purnomo


>From: "egberdina" <hhofman@d...>
>Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept
>Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 10:17:46 -0000
>
>DEar Purnomo,
>
>I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again.
>A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible
>object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his
>computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly
>connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is
>not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the
>customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know,
> I'm colour blind"
>
>So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing
>the absolute colour?
>
>All the best
>
>
>Herman




	
10369

From: Purnomo . <purnomo9@h...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 5:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear, friend

thank you. I'm so glad and surprise because you 'praise' me. I like your 
books. You are my favourite. Your books is so advance and almost make me 
difficult to understand it. And thank you for all my friend who give me some 
books so my knowledge of dhamma grow up.

Nice,
purnomo


>From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...>
>Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
>Subject: [dsg] Concept
>Date: Fri, 21 Dec 2001 19:11:40 +0100
>
>Hi Purnomo. Nice to hear from you again. You explained in a very concise 
>way
>the difference between concept and paramattha, in a way understandanble to
>everybody. I like the way you formulated this,
>best wishes, Nina.




	
10370

From: Purnomo . <purnomo9@h...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 6:15am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Hello, friend

I agree.

-purnomo


>From: "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...>
>Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
>Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept
>Date: Sun, 23 Dec 2001 01:15:10 -0000
>
>Hello Purnomo,
>
>As I understand it from checking out the dictionary, concept means a
>general idea derived or inferred from specific instances or
>occurrences. It also means something formed in mind, a thought or a
>notion. It seems to me that concept can be categorized as nama, a
>representation.
>
>Regards,
>Victor
>
>
>
>--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Purnomo ." <purnomo9@h...> wrote:
> >
> > If we seek a 'Concept', we have to collect all our experiences and
>we 'just'
> > make a conclusion. That is a concept--for me. How about you ? I am
>guarantee
> > that is different. Why ? Because that is 'concept' for me. And
>That's true
> > for me not you. So, concept is not absolute truth.
> >
> > purnomo--

	
10371

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:08am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Hi, Jon -

Thank you for the following informative post. 
At one point you ask, with regard to the possibility of concepts being 
among the objects discussed in the 4th foundation of mindfulness: "So even on 
your own interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as 
the only possible 'concept' anyway?" With regard to this, I would say that, 
yes, these seem to be the only concepts dealt with there. But I certainly do 
see them as concepts.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 12/26/01 4:11:54 AM Eastern Standard Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> Howard
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> ………………..
> > > 'Observableness' in this sense is not the distinguishing criterion of
> > a
> > > dhamma. The distinguishing characteristic mentioned by the texts is
> > that
> > > of having an individual essence that is capable of being directly
> > > experienced by sati/panna. Mere observableness, in the sense of being
> > the
> > > object of citta, is common to both dhammas and concepts.
> > > 
> > -------------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > Two questions here, Jon. For one, I assume that by "individual 
> > essence" here you merely mean characteristic/lakkhana? More than that is
> > not 
> > part of what *I* consider to be compatible with the Buddha's Dhamma.
> 
> I'm not sure whether 'sabhaava', as used in the texts, is coterminous with
> 'lakkhana', but that is indeed how I think of it. 
> 
> BTW, I believe that to those coming from a Mahayana background the words
> 'individual essence' tend to convey an idea of 'entitiness', but in the
> texts they carry no such connotation.
> 
> > The second question is with regard to 'dhamma'. I was under the
> impression
> > that 
> > *everything* is a "dhamma" in the Buddha's usage. If not, then what is
> > the 
> > distinction between just plain 'dhamma' and 'paramattha dhamma'?
> 
> I think that to say *everything* is a dhamma is a little too sweeping. As
> far as I know, the term 'dhamma' always has a specific meaning, although
> that meaning varies according to the context.
> 
> In the context of the realities that are to be or can be known by
> awareness and understanding, the terms 'dhammas' and 'paramattha dhammas'
> can be used interchangeably. In the suttas, the term 'khandhas' is
> frequently used in a similar context, and the meaning of khandhas and
> paramattha dhammas is coterminous, except that the latter includes nibbana
> also.
> 
> > One more point: When I say "concept" I am talking about an idea /
> > 
> > thought / mental construct, and not about its real or imagined referent.
> > We 
> > *are* aware of concepts in that sense, even with wisdom it seems to me.
> > In 
> > the four foundations of mindfulness, the fourth foundation, mindfulness
> > of 
> > dhammas, surely does include concepts. Included there are the four noble
> > 
> > truths. These are *ideas*, ideas which convey critically important facts
> > 
> > about the world expressed by the Buddha, ideas involving suffering / 
> > unsatisfactoriness, its cause, its ending, and the means for ending it.
> > This 
> > was reiterated time and again in the suttas. And everywhere in the
> > suttas the 
> > four noble truths are presented they are done so quite conventionally.
> 
> While I agree that in the suttas the Four Noble Truths are presented in
> conventional terms, I would not agree that they are mere ideas or
> concepts.
> 
> However, that question aside for the purposes of the present discussion
> (to be taken up on another day?), the other descriptions given in the
> Satipatthana Sutta for the 4th foundation of mindfulness (Five Hindrances,
> Aggregates, Sense-bases, Factors of Enlightenment) all clearly refer to
> realities and not concepts, as I understand them. So even on you own
> interpretation, Howard, wouldn't that leave the Four Noble Truths as the
> only possible 'concept' anyway?
> 
> …………………..
> > > As I understand the texts --
> > > - the moment of consciousness that has as its object a thought is
> > real (a
> > > dhamma)
> > > - the thought itself, however, is a mere mental construct lacking any
> > > individual characteristic capable of being experienced, and is not a
> > > dhamma.
> > > 
> > --------------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > Again, then, I must ask what dhammas are not *paramattha*
> > dhammas. It 
> > seems to me that in the suttas, the Buddha uses 'dhamma' to refer to any
> > 
> > distinguishable thing.
> 
> 'Dhammas' can be found to have different meanings in different contexts,
> but I think the important thing from our point of view is that the Buddha
> did distinguish between 'realties' and 'concepts' and it is importatnt to
> know in any particular context whether he was talking about one, the other
> or both.
> 
> ……………………..
> > > Thus ‘paramattha’ is described as that which belongs to the 
> domain
> > of
> > > ultimate or supreme knowledge.
> > > 
> > --------------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > So, in Abhidhamma, 'paramattha' is redundant in 'paramattha
> > dhamma'? 
> > And also, are you saying that the Buddha could not know concepts with
> > wisdom, 
> > because concepts are not paramattha dhammas? I was under the impression
> > that 
> > the Buddha was able to see *everything* with wisdom, just by turning his
> > 
> > attention to it. But concepts are an exception?
> 
> A citta that has a concept as its object can be accompanied by wisdom and,
> in that case, the concept is the object of the wisdom too, since all
> mental factors take the same object as the citta they accompany.
> 
> However, a concept cannot be the object of a citta that is accompanied by
> *wisdom of the level of satipatthana*. Only a reality can be the object
> of such a citta, since the function of wisdom of this level is to
> understand something about the true nature of realities.
> 
> Jon
> 
> PS The distinction discussed just above helps in understadning one of the
> essential differences between bhavana of the level of samatha and bhavana
> of the level of vipassana.
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
10372

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am
Subject: lost tapes

 	
Dear Robert, did you find the tapes? If not I copy again, now I have the
right code, best wishes, Nina.
	
10373

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am
Subject: chatting about India

 	
Dear Kom, I want to chat some more with you about India. You wrote:
A. Supi explained that he studied the dhammas keeping firmly
in mind that the results manifest only when the causes are
complete/filled. If panna doesn't rise to cognize the
realities, that means one's understandings about the dhammas
at the pannatti level are not enough or are not firm. If
there is no vipassana nana, then panna at the lower/weaker
levels haven't been developed enough for that to happen.
This is so with magga and so on. He said, by understanding
this truly, then one doesn't struggle for
satipathanna/vipassana nana/magga/results to happen.

I find this very good, reminding us about conditions. What else can we do
now but listening, studying, considering, verifying in daily life now what
we learnt. I also found it helpful that A. Sujin said: understanding leads
to detachment from the beginning to the end, stressing detachment so often.
I was reminded that even reading the scriptures and wishing to gain
understanding is often done with an idea of self.
You were more in the back of the bus, near A. Supi and next to Jonothan.
What else did you discuss? I better ask now, otherwise those good reminders
are gone. I appreciated the many personal talks, waiting in the Hotel hall
for the bus, or after dinner in a smaller group, or in a teashop along the
road when the drivers had to rest. Also hearing the tapes in the bus,
anumodana for your help to bring them to the front of the bus. Near the
Bodhitree I had a really good "alley walk" (cankamma) with Jonothan, a
higher lane all around the place. Jonothan said, " let us walk, and we can
pay repect at the same time." When talking on Dhamma it is also a subject of
samatha, dhammanusati as you know. It is very natural, no need to sit.
Best wishes, Nina.
	
10374

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am
Subject: Three Rounds

 	
Dear Num, Thank you for your further info. In the Co to the
Dhammacakkhapavattana Sutta the three ~naa.nas are dealt with expressively.
Now another text: Debates Commentary,( to Kathavatthu, I also have the
Thai), Ch 20, VI, Some thought that all the twelve constituent parts were
lokuttara, but this has been refuted. Here the English translation is not
clear: the diversity of insight as to nature: sacca, the need to do, kicca,
and the being done, kata, respecting each truth.
I looked at my India notes: I understood from A. Sujin: there is even kata
~naa.na at the first stage of vipassana ~naa.na, but not fulfilled. The
nature of dukkha is penetrated more when there is mahaavipassana ~naa.na,
when the arising and falling away of dhammas has been realized. We can say,
when realities are seen as just elements, dhatus, at the first vipassana
~naa.na, there is some fruit of the development, something has baan done,
kata, but the development has to go on and on.
Best wishes, I am glad you can play tennis again, Nina.
	
10375

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am
Subject: non-self, to Victor.

 	
Dear Victor, you wrote: how do you digest that there is no self doing
anything. Lodewijk, my husband, said, tell him that I do not digest it
either. That is very honest, because so long as we are not sotapanna we have
not digested the fact that there is no "I" who can do anything as to the
development of understanding, it is all dependent on many conditions.
You have asked the same question about non-self many times to different
people, and maybe you were not satisfied with the answers. You are looking
for something but have not found it.
We heard A. Sujin say in India: "We say there is no self, but do we
understand realities as nama dhamma and as rupa dhamma? " We should be very
sincere as to the answer.
I think debates on words such as self and non-self, thus, thinking of words
cannot help to really understand what nama and rupa are. These have to be
investigated as they occur in our life now.
This is different from just thinking of words. We can even leave out the
words self and non-self, but try to find out more about our life, do you
like this better? I do not know what you are interested in, what you like to
study. 
I discussed with Lodewijk Pavlov reactions, it tells us something about the
uncontrollability of realities. For us, there is someone who always provokes
us so that it becomes nerve racking. I know that is lack of patience. There
are moments that dosa becomes so strong, but all such happenings are
conditioned. When you suddenly feel violent pain, there is painful feeling
and immediately there is bound to be aversion with unpleasant feeling. Can
you change this? No Victor who is the owner of such sensations, it is
because of conditions. Now you are reading on the computer, but there is
also seeing, different moments because of conditions. Seeing and thinking,
maybe with aversion, who knows, but they all arise because of different
conditioning factors. You hear a noise from outside, can you change this? Do
you own hearing or what you hear? Can you control it? You could verify this.
Gradually we may understand more about conditions for the dhammas that
arise, and finally you may understand that there is no Victor who really
exists, but that there are only fleeting, insignificant phenomena. But to
really understand this thoroughly is a long way of development. Only the
enlightened person has no more doubts.
You often quote suttas, and of course it is good to read them. But it is not
easy to understand suttas, so much more is implied than we would think. We
read about seeing and hearing and we may let it go, but, these should be
investigated so that we gain more understanding of all these phenomena. If
we neglect this we shall not understand the suttas. Jon said in India:
realities are not what we think they are. We interprate the world and
ourselves wrongly without realizing it.
Your question was a good reminder for me of the long way we have to go in
order to understand realities.
Best wishes, Nina.
	
10376

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:24am
Subject: Re: [dsg] luminous mind

 	
op 25-12-2001 01:11 schreef Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala op
beyugala@k...:

In following the present discussion on bhavangacittas, a question arose
> on whether the bhavangas are luminous and without defilements or not. This
> discussion then lead me to ask the following: If the aramana (object) of the
> bhavangacittas of a particular lifetime is the very last javanacitta of the
> previous lifetime, and that object is then either akusala vipakacitta or
> kusala vipaka citta (for non-arahats), would not the bhavangacittas
> themselves either be akusala vipakacitta or kusala vipakacitta, the same as
> their aramana? And, if that is so, then can bhavangacittas be understood as
> defiled/not-defiled, just like vithi cittas (that arise in
> sense-door/mind-door processes)?
> 
>Dear Betty, How nice to hear from you. I understand how difficult it is with
all your social obligations to keep up with all the posts.
As to the object of the bhavangacitta, this is the same as that experienced
by the last javanacittas before dying in the previous life. This again
depends on the kamma that will produce the next rebirth. In our case, thus
in the case of birth as a human, this object is a pleasant object. Then the
last javanacittas were kusala cittas and experienced that object through one
of the six doors (see Visuddhimagga for details). Now, the
rebirth-consciousness takes this same object, but that citta is vipakacitta,
in our case, kusala vipakacitta experiencing a pleasant object. Thus, that
citta is vipaka, but the object experienced by it is not vipaka. We use the
word vipaka just for the citta experiencing an object. Thus, if we keep this
in mind it is not so difficult to understand that the bhavangacitta is
luminous, nothing to do with the uncoming defilements at the moment of
javana. It only experiences its object throughout life, it is merely vipaka,
not doing anything, passive. This citta arises in deep sleep without dreams,
and also in between the processes there are extremely short moments of deep
sleep. No possibility for kusala or akusala at such moments, is there?
Some people use the word subconsciousness or they think of a citta that
stores up experiences, but this is not possible. Bhavangacittas arise and
fall away and are part of the series of cittas, a series that is not
interrupted (contiguity condition, anantara paccaya). As such they play
their part just like the other cittas to condition the latent tendencies to
carry on from moment to moment.
Best wishes, from Nina.
	
10377

From: Mom Bongkojpriya (Betty) Yugala <beyugala@k...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] color blindness

 	
Dear Herman,
Its nice to be able to participate on the list again, after being so far
behind in the reading of the daily digests. If a person is "color blind", he
still sees color, even if it is just varying shades of black and white.
Color is color, no matter what "color" it is, and so it is still a paramatha
dhamma, an absolute reality, a rupa, and not a concept. Only a totally blind
person, whose eye base (ayatana, not the physical eye which is a concept) is
not "working" (vipaka) and therefore cannot "pick up" visible object, color.

Hope this clarifies the point.
with metta,
Betty

> >From: "egberdina" <hhofman@d...>
> >Reply-To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> >To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> >Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept
> >Date: Thu, 20 Dec 2001 10:17:46 -0000
> >
> >DEar Purnomo,
> >
> >I haven't seen your name for a long time! Nice to hear from you again.
> >A question for you. I understand that seeing colour is seeing visible
> >object as it is. Today I had to help a customer who thought his
> >computer monitor was not working. When a monitor is properly
> >connected it has a little green light showing, when the monitor is
> >not receiving video signal the light is orange. I asked the
> >customer, "Is the light green or orange" he said "I don't know,
> > I'm colour blind"
> >
> >So is colour absolute? And when/how do you know that you are seeing
> >the absolute colour?
> >
> >All the best
> >
> >
> >Herman
> >
	
10378

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 6:54am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Memory, Objects, and Continuity

 	
Hi Jon,

> Do you have any references on the 4 manifestations of sanna that you
> mention --'registration (marking), retention, retrieval and recall'? I
> would be interested to know where I can read more about this.
> 


The bottom-line of how I came up with those descriptions is from multiple 
sources. Hmm, let me tell you how I came up.

I have been reading lakkhanaticcatuka, (four characters: {characteristics 
(lakkhanam: specific or generic attribute) function (rasa: function or 
achievement), manifestation (paccupat-thana: manifestation, appearance or 
effect) and proximate cause (padatthanam) }), from various sources, English, 
Pali and couple of different translations of these 4 characteristics in Thai, 
from Milindapanha, a little bit from my tipitaka online search. And I have to 
admit that I also reflect about it from my background, my training and 
practice at work.

I cut this from Nina's "Cetasikas": 
" {The Atthasalini (I, Part IV, Chapter 1, 110) states about sanna: 
...It has the characteristic of noting (In Pali: sanjanati, cognizing well) 
and the function of recognizing what has been previously noted.}". Which is 
consistent with pali description that I have in my Thai abdms. 

I think Nina put it together very nicely, from the same page, 
" { The Visuddhimagga (XIV, 130) gives a similar definition. We can 
use the words perceiving, noting, recognizing and 'marking' in order to 
designate the reality, which is sanna, but words are inadequate to describe 
realities. We should study the characteristic and function of sanna. 
Sanna is not the same as citta which is the 'leader' in 
cognizing an object. As we have seen, sanna recognizes the object and it 
'marks' it so that it can be recognized again. This is explained by way of a 
simile: carpenters put tags or signs on logs so that they can recognize them 
at once by means of these marks. This simile can help us to understand the 
complex process of recognizing or remembering. What we in conventional 
language call "remembering" consists of many different moments of citta and 
each of these moments of citta is accompanied by sanna which connects past 
experiences with the present one and conditions again recognition in the 
future. This connecting function is represented by the words 'recognition' 
and 'marking' (1 See Abhidhamma Studies, by the Ven. Nyanaponika, 1976, page 
70, where it is explained that the making of marks and remembering is 
included in every act of perception.) when the present experience has fallen 
away it has become past and what was future becomes the present, and all the 
time there is sanna which performs its function so that an object can be 
recognized. If we remember that sanna accompanies every citta, we will better 
understand that the characteristic of sanna is not exactly the same as what 
we mean by the conventional terms of 'recognition', 'perception' or 'marking' 
. Each citta which arises falls away immediately and is succeeded by the next 
citta, and since each citta is accompanied by sanna which recognizes and 
'marks 'the object, one can recognize or remember what was perceived or 
learnt before. }"

To me noting, marking or the term I usually use in my work, registration 
point to same thing to make a mark of the input for later recall. Rasa or 
function as quoted above "recognizing what has been previously noted", which 
I use the word "recall". I put it the word retention and retrieval to fill 
the process between noting and recall. And I think that's part of sanna as 
well. When some one has memory problem, the way I was trained is where on 
the process has pathology. Registration problem is usually from attention 
span, level of consciousness. Recall usually with neuropathology or at times 
psychological. Anterograde amnesia is when one cannot retain new information 
and retrograde amnesia is when one cannot retrieve what had been retained 
before. 

The following I cut from online abdms by Nárada Thera, Vájiráráma, Colombo. I 
think he put the examples from Milindapanha, Atthasalini and Visuddhimagga 
together.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
4. Saññá - Sam + ñá, to know, (Compare Latin cognoscere, to know.)
The meaning of this term widely varies according to the context. To avoid 
unnecessary confusion, it is best to understand the specific meaning used in 
the particular connection as a universal mental state. 

The chief characteristic of saññá is the cognition of an object by way of a 
mark as blue etc. It is saññá that enables one to recognize an object that 
has once been perceived by the mind through the senses. "Its procedure is 
likened to the carpenter's recognition of certain kinds of wood by the mark 
he had made on each; to the treasurer's specifying certain articles of 
jewelry by the ticket on each; to the wild animal's discernment in the 
scarecrow of the work of man." 

Saññá, therefore, means simple sense perception. 
"Perception," according to a modern Dictionary of Philosophy, "is the 
apprehension of ordinary sense-objects, such as trees, houses, chairs, etc., 
on the occasion of sensory stimulation." 

Perception is not used here in the sense employed by early modern 
philosophers such as Bacon, Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz. 

As one of the five khandhas (Aggregates) saññá is used in the sense of 
perception. 

Could it be that memory is due to this saññá? 

Saññá, viññána and paññá should be differentiated from one another. Saññá is 
like the mere perception of a rupee coin by a child. By its whiteness, 
roundness and size it merely recognizes the coin as a rupee, utterly ignorant 
of its monetary value. A man, for instance, discerns its value and its 
utility, but is not aware of its chemical composition. Viññána is comparable 
to the ordinary man's knowledge of the rupee. Paññá is like the analytical 
knowledge of a chemist who knows all its chemical properties in every detail. 

----------------------------------------------------------------------

I feel like word or term have limitation but it impotant in communication. 
Even sanna is appearing here and now but word cannot describe it all.

Further input and feedback are appreciated. 

Num




	
10379

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 0:19pm
Subject: Re: To Howard on Christmas Day (was: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary)

 	
: )

Robert Ep.

===========

--- upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, Rob -
> 
> In a message dated 12/25/01 11:39:53 PM Eastern Standard Time, 
> epsteinrob@Y... writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Dear Howard,
> > Thank you for sharing your thoughts and feelings about your practice and 
> > your
> > relationship to the discussions on this list. It is our humanity which 
> > counts in
> > the final analysis, who we really are at this moment.
> > 
> > I like to take note of the meanings of the different holidays, when they 
> > arise,
> > and to me Christmas is about fellowship, good will [metta], and universal 
> > love -
> > the common qualities that we all have as human beings, one of which is 
> > suffering
> > that we all share.
> > 
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> Yes, I feel the same.
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > Maybe the reason why you're here is similar to what it is for me: it is 
> > for the
> > quality of the relationships, the good-hearted people who are here. Part 
> > of what
> > we share is also a sincere desire to follow our true path as the Buddha 
> > outlined. 
> > But what is often hard is for us to accept that we don't all have the same 
> > path. 
> > There are places where we can share and there are places where we diverge. 
> > Somehow we think that we have to agree with each other or else totally 
> > disagree. 
> > But this is a lesson to all of us. The discomfort of being pulled out of 
> > your
> > practice teaches you what your practice is, and thus you suffer and return 
> > to
> > yourself in a sense and know your path anew. 
> > 
> ---------------------------------------------------------
> A wonderful point, Rob.
> --------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > And in taking stock and clarifying what you need to do to be true to 
> > yourself --
> > and I'm sure everyone will forgive my conventional use of 'self' here <
> > slight
> > smile> -- you may notice that things have changed, that more has happened 
> > in terms
> > of clarification by being here at dsg than just having intellectual 
> > discussions.
> > 
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> Actually, there have been clarifications for me of various sorts. I've 
> really gained much from DSG, and I hope to continue to do so. (The problem is 
> not in the list.)
> ------------------------------------------------------------ 
> > 
> > Everyone here is trying in their own way to fulfill the promise of the 
> > Dharma, but
> > maybe some of us need to meditate more, and some of us progress by 
> > contemplation
> > and study. 
> > 
> > But this is all part of the flow of life that we have to accept if we are 
> > going to
> > become the unchanging observer of all that changes in life. What does it 
> > all
> > show, Howard? That life can't be controlled, that we can't even 'maintain' 
> > our
> > practice -- all we can do is reestablish it from moment to moment and start 
> > out
> > from scratch every day.
> > 
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Yes. Mistakes are easily made and wrong directions easily taken. It's 
> a kind of gift (maybe a Christmas present ;-) when life shows this to you.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Approached in the right way, this can be liberating.> 
> > I hope you will begin your sitting again.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Thanks. I have. Now I must continue.
> ------------------------------------------------------------
> I hope I will too. I hope you will see> 
> > that your present state is inevitable, that it is not in stopping suffering 
> > or
> > holding onto practice that our equanimity lies, but in letting go of 
> > everything
> > and standing steadily on the shifting ground under our feet. Whatever we 
> > hold
> > onto will fall apart. Whatever we let go of will return as a gift.
> > 
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Thanks, Rob, for a good teaching.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> I hope my> 
> > speaking does not come off as abstract and philosophical. I really mean 
> > it, and
> > believe it can be applied now to this moment of living.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> Not at all abstract and philosophical, but obviously from your heart. 
> And, please, I don't want anything I've said to lend even the slightest 
> "chill" to anyone's inclination to be as abstract and philosophical as they 
> find useful! My inclinations and disinclinations are mine alone, and I don't 
> wish to impose anything on anyone! I particularly regret the tone of my post 
> to Mike, and would undo it if only I could.
> -------------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > This is my wish for you on Christmas Day -- I am sorry for your suffering 
> > and am
> > happy to stand with many others here as your sangha in a time like this. I 
> > hope
> > you will do the same for me. If you need to talk, just drop me a line or 
> > ask for
> > my phone number.
> > 
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> Thank you, Rob. You have been most kind. (By the way, I have received 
> a private post (off list) from another DSG list member which also was 
> wonderfully supportive, and for which I am most appreciative.)
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> 
> > 
> > In Friendship,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> =============================
> With much metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 


	
10380

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Dukkha (was, Concepts)

 	
Hello Jon,

It is good that you understand that:
Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. 
Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. 
Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right 
discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my 
self."

Regards,
Victor

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Victor
> 
> --- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Jon,
> > 
> > Please understand conditioned phenomenon as it actually is:
> > Conditioned phenomenon is impermanent. 
> > Conditioned phenomenon is unsatisfactory/dukkha. 
> > Conditioned phenomenon is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not 
my 
> > self."
> 
> While I understand the meaning of what you are saying, there is 
surely
> more to it than this. Did the Buddha give any clues as to *how this
> understanding is to be developed*? Otherwise, one is just 
repeating the
> words of the suttas.
> 
> Jon
> 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
 
	
10381

From: <srnsk@a...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 8:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Three Rounds

 	
Dear Nina,


> In the Co to the
> Dhammacakkhapavattana Sutta the three ~naa.nas are dealt with expressively.
> Now another text: Debates Commentary,( to Kathavatthu, I also have the
> Thai), Ch 20, VI, Some thought that all the twelve constituent parts were
> lokuttara, but this has been refuted. Here the English translation is not
> clear: the diversity of insight as to nature: sacca, the need to do, kicca,
> and the being done, kata, respecting each truth.
> I looked at my India notes: I understood from A. Sujin: there is even kata
> ~naa.na at the first stage of vipassana ~naa.na, but not fulfilled. 

I will try to read the Co. when it's available to me then. Kathavatthu is 
something way above my head to read. I do not think I can read that without 
Co. The more I read Co., the more I feel it is very consistent with tipitaka. 
There are definitely some reorganization, and at times some new words or 
terms were introduced. I do not agree with everything in it (mainly because 
I do not understand it). I really admire and appreciate the hard work of the 
writers. 

For now, I will keep your information in my information bank and will think 
about it more later.

Thanks and appreciate.

Num


	
10382

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 1:51pm
Subject: Re: non-self, to Victor.

 	
Hello Nina,

Thank you replying.

Please consider very carefully about whether the Buddha taught "there 
is no self who can do anything." Also, I would be very interested to 
learn about some specific reference, if there is any, from the 
discourse that would support view "there is no self who can do 
anything."

Regards,
Victor
	
10383

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 2:16pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] some more about metta

 	
Dear Victor,

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: > Hello Sarah,
> 
> I am not sure what you mean by "there is no self" and "there is no 
> control," and I am not sure how you got the ideas "there is no self" 
> and "there is no control."

Did you read my coments on the Mulapariyaya Sutta? Did these help at all in
this regard?

> On one hand you say you often use self-control. On the other hand, 
> you say that in reality there is no control. I am not sure what you 
> mean here.

When I mentioned I often use "self-control", I was talking about using these
words only, which I should have put in quotation marks. Again as I discussed in
the post on the M.Sutta, it just depends whether one is using the words
conventionally for convenience or whether one really believes there is
self-control. Kom added a good response and I've already said plenty on this
theme;-)

> If interested, you might want to refer to
> Samyutta Nikaya XLIV.10, Ananda Sutta, To Ananda 
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> If possible, if would be helpful if you could find a specific 
> reference from the discourses in which the Buddha claimed that there 
> is no self.
> 
> Please be very careful not to misrepresent what the Buddha taught 
> that conditioned phenomenon is not self.
> 
> Thank you for replying, and Happy Holidays.
> 

Thank you for the reference and the reminder. I have a feeling we're going
round in a circle here;-)

Happy Holidays and best wishes for the New Year to you too, Victor.

Sarah

 	
10384

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Purnomo,

As I understand it a naama is characterized by its
ability to experience an object. 

For example, tactile consciousness (kayavi~n~naa.na)
experiences tangible object, heat for example--feeling
(vedanaa) arising with tactile conciousness
experiences feeling, (pleasant or unpleasant in this
case). So kayavi~n~naa.na, a citta, and vedanaa, a
cetasika, are both experiencing the same object
(aarammana), heat--they are both naamas (heat is a
ruupa, it doesn't experience anything). Of course,
many other cetasikas arise at the same time as
vedanaa, all experiencing the same aarammana.

The concept of pleasant or unpleasant heat arises
afterwards but doesn't experience anything, it is an
idea made up of memories of the experiences. To me,
this is important only because the experiences
(naamas) and the things they can experience
(aarammanas, naamas or ruupas) can be the objects of
satipa.t.thaana and so can produce the kind of
understanding (sati-pa~n~naa) that destroys
defilements. Concepts can't be the objects of
satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this kind of
understanding.

This is the way I see it, anyway.

Always nice to see you here, Purnomo,

mike


	

 	 

	
10385

From: m. nease <mlnease@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 3:52pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] non-self, to Victor.

 	
Dear Nina,

What an excellent post, thanks. Good to be reminded
that what I think of as 'insight' into the
characteristics is really just conceptual, not
liberating at all.

I also liked your reference to Pavlov. I don't often
find much in common between science and the Dhamma,
but operant conditioning is an exception I think--the
idea of conditioned response has a great deal in
common with accumulated kamma and sankharakkhandha for
example, I think. It helps to see 'accumulation' as
condtion--even though only conceptually, of course.

mike

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> Dear Victor, you wrote: how do you digest that there
> is no self doing
> anything. Lodewijk, my husband, said, tell him that
> I do not digest it
> either. That is very honest, because so long as we
> are not sotapanna we have
> not digested the fact that there is no "I" who can
> do anything as to the
> development of understanding, it is all dependent on
> many conditions.
> You have asked the same question about non-self many
> times to different
> people, and maybe you were not satisfied with the
> answers. You are looking
> for something but have not found it.
> We heard A. Sujin say in India: "We say there is no
> self, but do we
> understand realities as nama dhamma and as rupa
> dhamma? " We should be very
> sincere as to the answer.
> I think debates on words such as self and non-self,
> thus, thinking of words
> cannot help to really understand what nama and rupa
> are. These have to be
> investigated as they occur in our life now.
> This is different from just thinking of words. We
> can even leave out the
> words self and non-self, but try to find out more
> about our life, do you
> like this better? I do not know what you are
> interested in, what you like to
> study. 
> I discussed with Lodewijk Pavlov reactions, it tells
> us something about the
> uncontrollability of realities. For us, there is
> someone who always provokes
> us so that it becomes nerve racking. I know that is
> lack of patience. There
> are moments that dosa becomes so strong, but all
> such happenings are
> conditioned. When you suddenly feel violent pain,
> there is painful feeling
> and immediately there is bound to be aversion with
> unpleasant feeling. Can
> you change this? No Victor who is the owner of such
> sensations, it is
> because of conditions. Now you are reading on the
> computer, but there is
> also seeing, different moments because of
> conditions. Seeing and thinking,
> maybe with aversion, who knows, but they all arise
> because of different
> conditioning factors. You hear a noise from outside,
> can you change this? Do
> you own hearing or what you hear? Can you control
> it? You could verify this.
> Gradually we may understand more about conditions
> for the dhammas that
> arise, and finally you may understand that there is
> no Victor who really
> exists, but that there are only fleeting,
> insignificant phenomena. But to
> really understand this thoroughly is a long way of
> development. Only the
> enlightened person has no more doubts.
> You often quote suttas, and of course it is good to
> read them. But it is not
> easy to understand suttas, so much more is implied
> than we would think. We
> read about seeing and hearing and we may let it go,
> but, these should be
> investigated so that we gain more understanding of
> all these phenomena. If
> we neglect this we shall not understand the suttas.
> Jon said in India:
> realities are not what we think they are. We
> interprate the world and
> ourselves wrongly without realizing it.
> Your question was a good reminder for me of the long
> way we have to go in
> order to understand realities.
> Best wishes, Nina.


	
10386

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 5:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Sarah,
It's getting a little clearer, I hope.

A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama.
A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a real
object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. 

But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that concept
as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct?

A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with sati
and perhaps with panna, but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality -- that
thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha, and is
a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct?

Thanks,
Robert

==========

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Hi Sarah.
> > So concepts that directly reference a reality are realities themselves? Or
> > not.
> 
> No. A concept is always a concept (whichever kind) and never turns into a
> reality.
> 
> > For example, if I say the word 'panna', it is a word that refers to a
> > concept, no?
> 
> It is the kind of concept that represents a reality. (vijjamaana pa~n~natti)
> 
> > Is panna a concept or a reality? Is panna considered 'real'? Can it be
> > experienced as an object?
> 
> Both (i.e. concept and reality). Panna is real when it arises and performs its
> task of ‘understanding’. There is no need for a name at this time. Yes it can
> itself (being a reality) not only be eperienced as an object but also be known
> by sati and panna as it has its characteristic and ‘nature’. Of course it could
> also be experienced by unwholesome mind-states too.
> 
> > The 'experience' of a rupa is itself a nama? In the 'experience of
> > hardness', is
> > the experience a nama, and the hardness experienced a rupa? 
> 
> Yes, the ‘experiencing’ (i.e. citta with accompanying cetasikas) is always a
> nama. Exactly right with regard to hardness. The ‘experiencing’ through the
> body-sense is a nama and the hardness, which is only ever experienced, is a
> rupa. Later the javana cittas which ‘run’ through the object are also
> namas.Then there may be thinking about the ‘hardness’. The thinking would then
> consist of more namas, but the idea about the past rupas is now a concept. 
> (I’m trying to keep it fairly simple here;-)
> 
> >Is the citta
> > that
> > then 'thinks about' and 'interprets' what it has seen, ['oh that's a table'],
> > itself a nama? I am clear that the 'table' in that equation is a concept,
> > not a
> > reality.
> 
> Yes, you’re getting very ‘warm’ (thinking of Xmas guessing party games now;-)
> yes, the thinking, the interpreting (more thinking with sanna and so on) are
> all namas. As you say, the ‘table’ is a concept and in this case in a different
> category of concepts from panna because ‘table’ never exists.
> 
> > 
> > And in the list below, is this a list of all types of concepts? Which ones
> > are
> > considered namas, only 1 and 5?
> 
> Concepts are never namas. I think you mean, which ones represent namas? Then
> the answer would be as you say, 1) vijjamaana pa~n~nattis and 5) vijjamaanena
> vijjamaana pannattis.
> 
> Thes are just the concepts that are names (naama pa~n~natti). It gets more
> complicated, but perhaps I’ll refer you to 3 excellent archive posts for more
> details first and then you can ask Jon, myself or anyone else if you have more
> questions about these (now I know you take your homework seriously, Rob;-)) The
> third link answers the last question in detail, I think:
> 
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/2918
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3362
> http://groups.yahoo.com/group/dhammastudygroup/message/3494
> 
> 
> Hoping you and your family are having a pleasant holiday. We just had a lovely
> long leisurely lunch sitting outside on the Peak with Jon’s mother and her
> friend.
> 
> Sarah


	
10387

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 8:59pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Rob Ep,

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> It's getting a little clearer, I hope.

Good!
> 
> A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama.

Right!

> A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a
> real
> object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. 

Mmmm, yes the Universe is a concept and and the “Universe’ is not a real
object. Even if it were a concept of a real object, it would not be a citta.
The reason that neither a concept or a rupa is ever a citta is because a citta
is a reality which experiences an object which concepts and rupas don’t do.

> But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that
> concept
> as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct?

Yes, spot on! (Cittas in the mind-door process only).

> A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with
> sati
> and perhaps with panna, 

Mmmmmm, sati arises with all kusala (wholesome) cittas and panna with any
related to bhavana (mental development). So if there is wise reflection about
concepts, like now hopefully, this reflection will be accompanied by sati and
panna. However, as Jon wrote in a post yesterday, if it is sati of
satipatthana, accompanied by panna, the object can only be a reality and never
a concept. So there is no ‘knowing’ a concept, because a concept doesn’t exist
except in our imagination. Sati and panna know that at these moments the
reality is thinking which can be understood precisely.

>but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality --
> that
> thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha,
> and is
> a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct?

Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ citta
which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi at these
moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ cetasika
(to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated.

I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed,

Speak soon,
Sarah
==========


	
10388

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:20pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Dear Howard,

I don’t wish to bring up points that you may prefer to have a ‘break’ from and
quite understand if you prefer not to respond to this note. I also hope I’m not
taking this comment of yours to Rob Ep too much out of context:
..........
Howard: “But as far as 
providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in terms of 
such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the 
slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being 
conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds, smells, 
and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by the 
Buddha in which he discussed cittas.........<snip>"
....................

What I just wish to humbly say is that perhaps you underestimate what ‘your’
panna knows and perhaps the terminology has caused some communication
difficulty. If we forget for a moment the word ‘citta’ and instead talk about
tasting, it may sound a little more real;-) I’m sure we’ve all had plenty of
experience ‘tasting’ over the holiday. At the moments of tasting the tastes
(which are amongst the objects there is some awareness of, you mention), aren’t
these just momentary phenomena discerning (yr usage) the tastes? The
experiencing, the tasting, is different from that which is tasted. We are used
to think ‘I’m tasting the turkey of fried rice (in Jon’s case)’ when really
isn’t it just an experiencing of the rupa at that moment? 

So, even it it’s intellectual understanding at this moment, if it’s right and
skilful, it must be accompanied by sati and panna at this level which
understand the nature of this citta, tasting. So it is for seeing, hearing,
smelling, touching and thinking. These are the cittas that really can be known
directly at this moment, not just by thinking about them either. (Of course,
when we talk about bhavanga cittas, it is bound to be at an intellectual level
only, unless panna has been highly developed.)

I hope this doesn’t sound too ‘clumsy’..I’m having trouble finding the right
words today.

In the Ang Nik suttas being discussed on the luminous thread (1-10), we read:
‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the mind...’
and later read ‘Monks, if for just the lasting of a finger-snap a monk indulges
a thought of goodwill, such an one is to be called a monk. Not empty of result
is his musing..’It goes on to talk about the ‘power’ of skilful and unskilful
states of mind. 

In other words, we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the little wise
reflection andawareness that occurs in a day. There’s no need to feel
discouraged if there is less wise attention than we’d like.

This morning we had a mini-personal drama. In a nutshell, there was some
uncertainty about whether Jon's mother would be able to continue with her trip
and leave Hong Kong which would have meant one or both of us having to cancel
our planned trip to Bangkok to stay and take care of her. So ‘my rapidly
changing mind’ was having moments of genuine concern for my mother-in-law,
aversion to all this news and worry, attachment to ‘me’ and ‘my’ plans and so
on. A few moments of kusala cittas, but many more moments of akusala cittas
with many vipaka cittas such as seeing and hearing in between. 

This is daily life and facing up to and getting to know the different cittas,
cetasikas and rupas just a little. Just one ‘finger-snap’ of awareness at a
time. 

Fortunately the repeat blood-test gave a good result and we can all continue
with our plans. Again there were moments of gladness for my mother-in-law and
more attachment to ‘me’ and my plans and of course more seeing, hearing,
tasting and so on. 

Howard, I haven’t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses
‘citta’, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested, I
believe it is synonymous with ‘mano’ and ‘vi~n~nana’ which may be more commonly
used, I’m not sure. I’d just like to finish with these translation notes by
Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta is
discussed in a sutta. 

I’ll just sign off first and hope I've helped rather than hindered or
aggravated the proliferations;-))

Best wishes,

Sarah

(p.s. Rob Ep: I’ve just noticed this line which may be relevant to my post to
you yesterday, I’m not sure :”when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty” -)
*********************
Extract from Gayan’s post (8896):

2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N

" dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. 
tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho
bhikkhave
caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram,
tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam,
diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati.
citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta visujjhanti.
naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam yathayidam
bhikkhave
tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva cintitaa.
tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. "


monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra (
sanskrit ) )
yes venerable sir.
monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind )
monks , ( so) the mind is more
'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed) than
that carana ( which is also thought by the mind )

[ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a
thing existed those days ]


monks every moment you should observe the mind.
for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga, dosa,
moha.
when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty
when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned.


monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully displayed)
category of beings than this animal category,
monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself.
this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom,
so monks you should observe it every moment.


--------------------------------------------------

discussing above sutta, 
when one enjoys a carana citta like above, the enjoyment comes because of
raaga , dosa , moha.
The carana is displayed in the mind and the end product is helped by the
raaga, dosa, moha dirt that has been there in the mind for a long time.

Like a Movie,-> the same movie can be enjoyed by different persons with
diffrent mind states.
But the movie 'they' are seeing is different from eachother, because the
movie created in the minds differ according to the person's mind state.(
with diffrent intensities of raaga, dosa, moha )

<end quote from Gayan>
********************


	
10389

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:55pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] A rupee for your rupa

 	
I understand Jon, and appreciate the clarification, but it seems to me that this
notion of a 'direct perception' of the rupa by the citta through the sense-door,
takes for granted that the 'sense organ' is 'accurate'. Why would an evolutionary
device that is more-or-less evolved to approximate an external object give a truly
representative impression of an actual object? I would think it would be
imperfect in many ways.

If I see an object, my binocular vision takes two images and combines them to get
a three-dimensional image which represents neither actual 'ocular photos' taken. 
If a fly sees the same image, it gets hundreds [I forget how many] images shaped
by the particiular structure of that sense-organ. Are these *both* accurate
though different? Does the human eye somehow have a 'perfect' image of the object
which the fly does not?

Best,
Robert Ep.

===================

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> 
> 
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Thanks Jon, good
> explanation. Although it is hard for me to understand
> > how the
> > process that arises in the sense door to cognize the object is 'perfect'
> > enough to
> > apprehend it 'transparently' without any influence of its own. Is the
> > idea that
> > the sense organ consciousness is like a photograph and is able to
> > directly 'copy'
> > the object?
> 
> All cittas (moments of consciousness) experience an object, and the cittas
> that see or hear experience in particular the rupas that are visible
> object or sound. 
> 
> Indeed, the cittas that experience visible object or sound have as their
> specific function the *seeing* or *hearing* of the visible/auditory
> object, in the sense of experiencing it 'in its bare immediacy and
> simplicity' [CMA - full extract pasted below].
> 
> > In a related question, how does this theory account for the
> > characteristic of the
> > sense organ itself which by its very nature and design as 'this type of
> > sense
> > organ rather than that' will influence the way the sense object is
> > perceived? It
> > is not believed, I would think, that the sense organs are 'perfect' in
> > actually
> > taking in the sense object. In what way does a sense organ that has
> > evolved
> > through a physical process to become gradually more refined but still
> > imperfect
> > and which is also subject to individual variation, take in the 'actual'
> > characteristic of the object, or the rupa itself? Even someone who is
> > enlightened
> > is still perceiving 'visible object' through a 'human eye process', no? 
> > There is
> > no direct perception according to this idea.
> 
> A minor clarification here, Rob. The sense-organ, being a rupa, does not
> experience /perceive the sense-object. That perception is the function of
> the citta discussed above. The sense-organ is of course one of the
> necessary conditions for the arising of the sense-door consciousness, but
> the functions of seeing, hearing etc are performed by cittas, not rupas.
> 
> > Which is why normally I would think
> > that the sense-door process really picks up a sense-door result, rather
> > than a true 'rupa' or actual object-moment. 
> 
> It is the cittas that arise in the processes that follow the bare
> perceiving of the sense-door object that have what you term a 'sense-door
> result' as their object.
> 
> I hope this helps.
> 
> Jon
> 
> ['CMA' = Bhikkhu Bodhi, 'A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma' (BPS)
> The Abhidhammattha Sangaha of Acariya Anuruddha, with explanatory guide
> (The explanatory guide is compiled from, but is not a direct translation
> of, the main commentaries to the A-S)]
> 
> Ch I, #8. Analysis of Functions (Guide)
> 
> "In a cognitive process at the sense doors, … there arises a citta which
> directly cognizes the impingent object. 
> 
> "This citta, and the specific function it performs, is determined by the
> nature of the object. If the object is a visible form, eye consciousness
> arises seeing it; if it is a sound, ear consciousness arises hearing it,
> and so forth. 
> 
> "In this context, the functions of seeing and hearing, etc., do not refer
> to the cognitive acts which explicitly identify the objects of sight and
> hearing, etc., as such. They signify, rather, the rudimentary momentary
> occasions of consciousness by which the sense datum is experienced in its
> bare immediacy and simplicity prior to all identificatory cognitive
> operations."


	
10390

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 10:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: jhanas for Herman

 	
Dear Sarah,
I thought it was a great ramble.
Thanks for sharing your wise words.

Robert Ep.

======

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > I think three things are true:
> > 1/ You are clearly not *against* developing the jhanas, just saying that it
> > is
> > extremely difficult to approach such refined states.
> 
> Just so.If there is no ‘beginner’ level of samatha bhavana in daily life, why
> would one think that ther can be any highly developed jhana practice. Just as
> we might say, if there is no understanding of namas and rupas now, clearly and
> distinctly as they are, why would one have the idea there can be any
> understanding or realizing of nibbana?
> 
> For both kinds of development, there has to be clear understanding of the
> difference between skilful and unskilful mind-states, including and especially
> at those times of concentrating on an object, I think. 
> 
> > 2/ I think it is also clear that there are *some* teachers alive today who
> > are
> > familiar with the jhanas and their practice, such as Ajahn Brahmavamso, who
> > has
> > lectured and taught on them quite a bit.
> 
> I’m sorry but I can’t comment on this one.
> 
> > 3/ I think the final point is that you are saying that it is not *necessary*
> > to
> > develop these advanced states in order to progress on the path of
> > discernment,
> > sati and panna, that these qualities are independent of any particular state.
> > Is
> > this correct?
> 
> When the Buddha talks about the necessary conditions for developing vipassana,
> he refers to hearing the Teachings, considering, putting into practice and so
> on. I don’t believe he ever says ‘develop jhana’ first. He does encourage us,
> however, to develop all kinds of skilful states. He also says that these states
> along with all other realities are not self. In other words, they are not
> developed by ‘wishing’ or ‘trying to do’ or ‘concentrating on an object’
> without any understanding. It’s certainly true that many monks in the Buddha’s
> day had already developed the highest jhanas. It wasm’t by coincidence that the
> Buddha was born at that time in India where exrtraordinarily high levels of
> wisdom and wholesomeness where apparent. 
> 
> I’ve talked quite a bit about how I understand metta can be developed. Let me
> just mention another object of samatha: ‘earth kasina’. In theory, we could
> sit cross-legged and focus on a lump of earth and develop a higher and higher
> state of concentration. I don’t believe, however, there would be any wholesome
> concentration, calm or understanding attained. If, on the other hand, naturally
> in daily life we happen to reflect for a moment on the importance we attribute
> to all our possessions, which we believe we own, when in reality, they are just
> ‘earth’ and don’t belong to anyone. At the end of life, if not before, we lose
> them all and yet this ‘earth’ is what we fight and argue about and which we
> hold so very dear. We crave for pleasant feelings and cling so much to sense
> objects i.e. to rupas. Samatha development is the detachment from this craving.
> Just a little wise reflection may condition moments of calm now without any
> special effort at all. 
> 
> As I was writing the last segment on the Intro to the Vinaya, there were
> conditions for moments of calm as I reflected on the extraordinary wisdom and
> compassion of the arahats who spent 7mths reviewing the Teachings at the 1st
> Council. Their work was done, but for the sake of generations to come (like us
> here) they painstakingly organised and categorised the Tipitaka and the earth
> quaked at these extraordinary deeds. This would come under reflection on the
> Sangha, I believe. When I started writing, I had no intention or wish to
> experience these few moments of calm or samatha. It was just by conditions. A
> few moments later, there were tears in my eyes reflecting some attachment and
> aversion. The kilesa 'defile' so very, very quickly.
> 
> I'm not sure my 'rambles' clarify anything.
> 
> Seems like a Rob Ep day today;-)
> 
> Sarah

	
10391

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Hi Mike

> Concepts can't be the objects of satipa.t.thaana, so can't produce this
kind of understanding.

k: I beg to differ. I think concepts are the prelimnary stage for
satipatthana. Without realising concepts as it is, then deeper level of
satipatthana could not be established. Only through satipatthana the mind
becomes much "sharper" present moments become more and more minute. then
paramatha dhamma could be understand through breaking down of concepts. 
the concept level started with the study of body parts, slowly to other
namas. As in the book of dispeller of delusion, the study of body parts
is discussed at great length, i think even such discussion at length is 
of paramount importance for the precendent study of paramtha dhamma. The
study of concepts are impt bc we are still living at the conceptual world.
Through detail studying then there is a possiblity of studying paramtha
dhammas. Till then, the investigating of paramatthas dhammas is could
only be applied on conceptual level (i.e. a series of cittas to constitute
the present moment we have) and not at paramttha dhamma level (citta by
citta). 

Merry Christmas and A happy new year to you :)


Kind regards
Ken O


> 
> This is the way I see it, anyway.
> 
> Always nice to see you here, Purnomo,
> 
> mike
> 

	
10392

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:01pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Ultimate realities (and khandhas)

 	
Dear Jon,
Due to pleasantly synchronistic conditions arising, your answer to Herman here has
answered the question I just asked in my last post to you. The rupa is
experienced directly by the citta and it doesn't matter whether it's an 'accurate'
reflection of a 'real external object' [probably because there's no such things --
just momentary rupas arising]. What matters is that the rupa will be shaped by
the kammic predispositions of the sense-door moment, and this is all that is
necessary to get one's *real rupa* in the moment. It is not *the* rupa, it is the
appropriate rupa for that citta in that moment.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=======

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Herman
> 
> --- egberdina <hhofman@d...> wrote: > Jon,
> > 
> > I am wondering if the quality of ultimate realities are subjective ie 
> > specific to each self. The colour blind person will see whatever they 
> > see, it is irreducible, it is colour, which is not capable of being 
> > described in other terms, not capable of being sensed through another 
> > door, unless you use LSD. 
> > 
> > Likewise, the non-colour blind person will see specific colour, 
> > looking at the same object as the colour blind person. Yet the colour 
> > experience will be different. In this way there is nothing absolute 
> > or ultimate about seeing the object as it really is, unless ultimate 
> > or absolute has relative connotations.
> > 
> > So two arahants, sitting in a VW at the traffic lights, one colour 
> > blind, one not colour blind, will see two different realities as the 
> > lights change. I wonder which one will write the preferred 
> > commentaries? ( :-) )
> 
> An interesting example you give here, Herman ;-))
> 
> I would agree that, speaking in purely conventional terms, no 2 persons
> ever experience the same thing in the same way, even if they are equally
> endowed with understanding and sensory perception.
> 
> However, in terms of the ultimate realities about which you ask, we cannot
> talk about 2 people seeing or hearing the same thing. This is because the
> citta of the sense-door experience has as its object simply a rupa 
> (visible object or sound) that arises by virtue of conditions that are
> beyond that person's control. Each moment of sense-door experience is a
> moment of vipaka (result of kamma), and the object experienced by a person
> at a given moment depends on, among other things, their past kamma. So
> even if, in conventional terms, 2 people are looking at or listening to
> the same thing, the moment-to-moment seeing or hearing of rupas will be
> determined by factors that are unique to each individual.
> 
> But it is what is in common at such moments that is the subject of the
> Buddha's teaching. The actual experiencing of visible object or sound by
> the relevant sense-door consciousness is a universal experience common to
> all beings that have the appropriate faculty, no matter in what shape
> those faculties are. And the same goes for the processes that follow
> those experiences. This is the subject, the 'field', of the development
> of understanding leading to breaking the link with samsara.
> 
> To summarise, it is of the nature of things that:
> - when 2 people are seeing/hearing 'the same thing at the same time'
> (speaking conventionally), it's a safe bet that in terms of ultimate
> realities there is no conformity in the *actual objects being experienced*
> on a moment-to-moment basis
> - however, in terms of the *different kinds of consciousness and their
> objects* that are experienced in this lifetime, there is total and
> universal conformity among all beings
> 
> So colour-blindness does not preclude an understanding of the true nature
> of the visible object appearing at the present moment. Given the choice
> between a commentary written by the person with perfect vision but weak
> understanding, and one written by the colour-blind person with good
> understanding, I'd take the latter any day (regardless of their taste in
> cars).
> 
> Jon


	
10393

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:05pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 'Self' as object of discernment (and khandhas)

 	
Thanks, Jon, I think I'm getting it.

Robert Ep.

=====

--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Thanks, Jon. One
> question, below.
> > 
> > --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > > At both moments there is citta/consciousness (a reality) experiencing
> > an
> > > object. In the former case the object of the citta (sound) is a
> > reality
> > > while in the latter case the object of the citta (thought about sound)
> > is
> > > not a reality.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > Okay, I may be dense, but then what is a nama in this continuum?
> 
> A nama is a reality that experiences an object. In the instance given
> above, the citta/moment of consciousness is a nama. 
> 
> Cetasikas (mental factors that accompany a citta) are also namas, since
> they experience an object too, namely, the same object as the citta they
> accompany. So all cittas and cetasikas are namas.
> 
> In the language of the suttas, namas are the 4 khandhas other than
> rupa-kkhandha. These are:
> 2. Vedana/feeling [a cetasika]
> 3. Sanna/perception or memory [a cetasika]
> 4. Sankhara/the formations [the 50 cetasikas other than the preceding 2]
> 5. Vinnana/consciousness [citta]
> 
> Jon


	
10394

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:06pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Sarah

By the way, what happen to Gayan. It is been a long time, I have seen his
translation of the sutta which I find very beneficial. I hope he is well
and happy


Best regards
Ken O

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote: > Dear Howard,
> 
> I don’t wish to bring up points that you may prefer to have a ‘break’
> from and
> quite understand if you prefer not to respond to this note. I also hope
> I’m not
> taking this comment of yours to Rob Ep too much out of context:
> ..........
> Howard: “But as far as 
> providing the nitty gritty details of what, exactly, is the case in
> terms of 
> such hard-to-find things as cittas, well, there's no way that I have the
> 
> slightest idea. As I said a while ago to Mike, while I'm aware of being 
> conscious, and of experiencing feelings, emotions, sights, sounds,
> smells, 
> and tastes, I've never experienced a citta, and I never read a sutta by
> the 
> Buddha in which he discussed cittas.........<snip>"
> ....................
> 
> What I just wish to humbly say is that perhaps you underestimate what
> ‘your’
> panna knows and perhaps the terminology has caused some communication
> difficulty. If we forget for a moment the word ‘citta’ and instead talk
> about
> tasting, it may sound a little more real;-) I’m sure we’ve all had
> plenty of
> experience ‘tasting’ over the holiday. At the moments of tasting the
> tastes
> (which are amongst the objects there is some awareness of, you mention),
> aren’t
> these just momentary phenomena discerning (yr usage) the tastes? The
> experiencing, the tasting, is different from that which is tasted. We
> are used
> to think ‘I’m tasting the turkey of fried rice (in Jon’s case)’ when
> really
> isn’t it just an experiencing of the rupa at that moment? 
> 
> So, even it it’s intellectual understanding at this moment, if it’s
> right and
> skilful, it must be accompanied by sati and panna at this level which
> understand the nature of this citta, tasting. So it is for seeing,
> hearing,
> smelling, touching and thinking. These are the cittas that really can be
> known
> directly at this moment, not just by thinking about them either. (Of
> course,
> when we talk about bhavanga cittas, it is bound to be at an intellectual
> level
> only, unless panna has been highly developed.)
> 
> I hope this doesn’t sound too ‘clumsy’..I’m having trouble finding the
> right
> words today.
> 
> In the Ang Nik suttas being discussed on the luminous thread (1-10), we
> read:
> ‘Monks, I know not of any other single thing so quick to change as the
> mind...’
> and later read ‘Monks, if for just the lasting of a finger-snap a monk
> indulges
> a thought of goodwill, such an one is to be called a monk. Not empty of
> result
> is his musing..’It goes on to talk about the ‘power’ of skilful and
> unskilful
> states of mind. 
> 
> In other words, we shouldn’t underestimate the power of the little wise
> reflection andawareness that occurs in a day. There’s no need to feel
> discouraged if there is less wise attention than we’d like.
> 
> This morning we had a mini-personal drama. In a nutshell, there was some
> uncertainty about whether Jon's mother would be able to continue with
> her trip
> and leave Hong Kong which would have meant one or both of us having to
> cancel
> our planned trip to Bangkok to stay and take care of her. So ‘my rapidly
> changing mind’ was having moments of genuine concern for my
> mother-in-law,
> aversion to all this news and worry, attachment to ‘me’ and ‘my’ plans
> and so
> on. A few moments of kusala cittas, but many more moments of akusala
> cittas
> with many vipaka cittas such as seeing and hearing in between. 
> 
> This is daily life and facing up to and getting to know the different
> cittas,
> cetasikas and rupas just a little. Just one ‘finger-snap’ of awareness
> at a
> time. 
> 
> Fortunately the repeat blood-test gave a good result and we can all
> continue
> with our plans. Again there were moments of gladness for my
> mother-in-law and
> more attachment to ‘me’ and my plans and of course more seeing, hearing,
> tasting and so on. 
> 
> Howard, I haven’t really considered how frequently the Buddha discusses
> ‘citta’, using this terminology in the suttas. As others have suggested,
> I
> believe it is synonymous with ‘mano’ and ‘vi~n~nana’ which may be more
> commonly
> used, I’m not sure. I’d just like to finish with these translation notes
> by
> Gayan posted in the series of translations to Mike where the term citta
> is
> discussed in a sutta. 
> 
> I’ll just sign off first and hope I've helped rather than hindered or
> aggravated the proliferations;-))
> 
> Best wishes,
> 
> Sarah
> 
> (p.s. Rob Ep: I’ve just noticed this line which may be relevant to my
> post to
> you yesterday, I’m not sure :”when citta is dirty, the beings become
> dirty” -)
> *********************
> Extract from Gayan’s post (8896):
> 
> 2nd Gaddula sutta , khanda samyutta , S N
> 
> " dittham vo bhikkhave caranam naama cittanti evam bhante. 
> tampi kho bhikkhave caranam naama cittam citteneva cintitam tena pi kho
> bhikkhave
> caranena cittena cittanneca cittataram,
> tasmatiha bhikkhave abhikkhanam sakam cittam paccavekkhitabbam,
> diigharattam idam cittam samkilittham raagena , dosena , mohenati.
> citta samkileso bhikkhave satta samkilissamti cittavodana satta
> visujjhanti.
> naaham bhikkhave annam eka nikaayampi samanupassami evam cittam
> yathayidam
> bhikkhave
> tiracchanagataa paanaa te pi kho tiracchanagataa paanaa cittaneva
> cintitaa.
> tehipi kho bhikkhave tiracchanagatehi paanehi cittanneca cittataram. "
> 
> 
> monks , have you seen a 'drawing' called 'carana' ? ( citta -> citra (
> sanskrit ) )
> yes venerable sir.
> monks, even that 'carana' is thought by the citta ( mind )
> monks , ( so) the mind is more
> 'versatile/interesting/diverse...'(creatively, beautifully displayed)
> than
> that carana ( which is also thought by the mind )
> 
> [ carana is said to be a kind of beautiful animation graphics type of a
> thing existed those days ]
> 
> 
> monks every moment you should observe the mind.
> for a long period this mind has been subjected to the dirt of raaga,
> dosa,
> moha.
> when citta is dirty, the beings become dirty
> when the mind is cleaned, the beings become cleaned.
> 
> 
> monks I cant see a more versatile/diverse(creatively, beautifully
> displayed)
> category of beings than this animal category,
> monks even those animals are thought by the mind itself.
> this mind is more versatile than the animal kingdom,
> so monks you should observe it every moment.
> 
> 
> --------------------------------------------------
> 
> discussing above sutta, 
> when one enjoys a carana citta like above, the enjoyment comes because
> of
> raaga , dosa , moha.
> The carana is displayed in the mind and the end product is helped by the
> raaga, dosa, moha dirt that has been there in the mind for a long time.
> 
> Like a Movie,-> the same movie can be enjoyed by different persons with
> diffrent mind states.
> But the movie 'they' are seeing is different from eachother, because the
> movie created in the minds differ according to the person's mind state.(
> with diffrent intensities of raaga, dosa, moha )
> 
> <end quote from Gayan>
> ********************

	
10395

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Sarah

 	
Hi Sarah. : )

I enjoyed reading your message, and actually have made a bit of progress lately in
at least understanding the point of the commentary on 'luminous mind'. 

Nina's statement that the bhavanga cittas take place in between sense-door and
mind-door moments to maintain continuity was a new piece of info for me. I was
looking at the bhavangas as a separate process that only took place during the
sleep state or in unconsciousness or death.

The thesis that the whole thought or perceptual process is 'soiled' by the
defilements while the 'pure bhavanga' moments are obscured by ignorance, does make
a more understandable argument.

So I will be looking forward to seeing more of the commentary and Suan's comments
on these subjects.

Nice to talk to you too! : )

Robert

=============

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > Well, I have at least done a *bit* of homework, and went and read the
> > translations
> > of the 'luminous mind' commentary that Nina was working on. I appreciate
> > those
> > being there, they are quite clear in what they say.
> 
> I’m very impressed;-)
> ===================
> 
> > Although I understand the parent-child analogy, I can't see the comparison. 
> > The
> > bhavanga-cittas have no responsibility to the defiled cittas in question. 
> > They
> > have no relationship to them at all. Though they are 'pure' and the waking
> > cittas
> > are 'defiled' that is as far as the good parent/bad child analogy goes. 
> > There is
> > no real soiling of the reputation of the bhavanga cittas via the soiling of
> > the
> > waking cittas. It has no effect on the bhavanga cittas at all. To whom
> > would the
> > reputation be ruined, or who would hold the bhavanga cittas responsible for
> > not
> > 'preventing' the defiling of the waking cittas? It seems to me to be an
> > analogy
> > that doesn't apply to the reality of these cittas. 
> 
> As Nina said, I think we have to be careful not to take the analogy too far.
> Having said that, I find it very interesting too.
> 
> As I understand, just as the bad child may spoil the reputation of the parent
> due to a lack of comprehension (by society) of where the fault really lies and
> confusing parent and child together, perhaps we can say that the kilesa give
> the entire mind states or process of phenomena a bad reputation through
> ignorance of the real state of affairs.
> 
> In our ignorance, we notice someone’s anger and think they are an ‘angry
> person’. There is no comprehension that dosa just arises in a few javana
> cittas. With no understanding of ‘pure’ bhavanga cittas between processes, they
> are all sullied by those cittas with dosa. 
> 
> It doesn’t seem convoluted to me, but then I just accept the commentary
> interpretation and don’t try to analyse too much. The commentary makes it clear
> that the kilesa that defile the mind are arising in the later javana process,
> so there’s no idea of pure and impure cittas together or of vipaka and javana
> cittas together (none of which would make any sense).
> 
> Like you, I'm very interested to read the sub-commentary and translation in due
> course too.
> 
> When we read the Buddha’s descritptions of realities in fine detail in the
> Abhidhamma and sometimes in the Suttas, it is a description rather than a
> prescription as Jon and Dan pointed out before. Accumulations vary so much and
> so there is no rule at all as to which realities will become known at any given
> time. Bhavanga cittas may be known by someone’s panna and not another’s. It
> doesn’t matter at all. 
> 
> > The Buddha's statement is quite simple and clear. The explanation that
> > attributes
> > this to the bhavanga cittas is convoluted. I would think there would have to
> > be
> > some logical extrapolation from the Buddha's original words for the
> > commentary's
> > viewpoint to be understood. 
> 
> For many years (read decades) I used to just ‘switch off’ when I heard about
> bhavanga cittas....Like you say, it just seemed too convoluted. In the last
> year, I’ve been hearing explanations and considering in ways that are very
> helpful for me at this time. Again, there’s no rule, but since you asked or
> suggested another interpretation, the topic has come up... 
> 
> Often I use an alarm-clock to wake up and probably because I’ve been talking
> with Ken O about sleep and bhavangas, I’ve been noticing how as soon as the
> alarm rings, the worlds of eye-door, ear-door, mind-door with lots of lobha,
> dosa and panatti are so apparent within seconds. Occasionally there’s a little
> awareness, but usually there is just the grasping, aversion, the stories and
> the ignorance instantly.
> 
> Always fun talking to you, Rob,
> 
> Sarah
>

	
10396

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:32pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Concept

 	
Dear Sarah,
Thanks for your note!
If you could define micha/ditthi for me I would be much appreciative!

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=========

--- Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> wrote:
> Dear Rob Ep,
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Sarah,
> > It's getting a little clearer, I hope.
> 
> Good!
> > 
> > A concept can be the object of a citta, but a concept is never a nama.
> 
> Right!
> 
> > A concept of the Universe is not a citta, because the 'Universe' is not a
> > real
> > object, but a conceptual, imaginary one. 
> 
> Mmmm, yes the Universe is a concept and and the “Universe’ is not a real
> object. Even if it were a concept of a real object, it would not be a citta.
> The reason that neither a concept or a rupa is ever a citta is because a citta
> is a reality which experiences an object which concepts and rupas don’t do.
> 
> > But the citta that thinks about the concept of the Universe can have that
> > concept
> > as its 'unreal' object. Is this correct?
> 
> Yes, spot on! (Cittas in the mind-door process only).
> 
> > A citta that recognizes a concept as a concept, an unreal object, occurs with
> > sati
> > and perhaps with panna, 
> 
> Mmmmmm, sati arises with all kusala (wholesome) cittas and panna with any
> related to bhavana (mental development). So if there is wise reflection about
> concepts, like now hopefully, this reflection will be accompanied by sati and
> panna. However, as Jon wrote in a post yesterday, if it is sati of
> satipatthana, accompanied by panna, the object can only be a reality and never
> a concept. So there is no ‘knowing’ a concept, because a concept doesn’t exist
> except in our imagination. Sati and panna know that at these moments the
> reality is thinking which can be understood precisely.
> 
> >but a citta that mistakes a concept for a reality --
> > that
> > thinks the 'Universe' is a real object, not a concept -- occurs with moha,
> > and is
> > a 'deluded' citta. Is this correct?
> 
> Certainly there is moha at these moments. When there is the ‘deluded’ citta
> which wrongly takes concept for reality, there is also (micha) ditthi at these
> moments. This is why we can consider ditthi as the most ‘dangerous’ cetasika
> (to quote K.Sujin) and the first one that has to be eradicated.
> 
> I think you’re getting ‘very warm’ indeed,
> 
> Speak soon,
> Sarah
> ==========

	
10397

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:36pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: luminous mind: To Robert Epstein And Like-minded Dhamma Friends

 	
Hi Suan

Don't worry abt others critising abt the commentaries. If commentaries
could not atest the criticism, then the value of the commentaries will
diminish greatly. 

Even if others critise the commentaries with ill intentions, then it is 
their aksuala kamma and not ours :).

What will happen, will happen :) so why worry what its beyond our control.


Kind regards
Ken O

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Suan,
> I both understand your reluctance to have the commentaries criticized,
> and also
> thank you for your willingness to do so for the education of those who
> are
> sincerely interested. I happen to fall into both categories, as I
> sometimes may
> debate points in the commentaries, while still sincerely desiring to
> learn. 
> 
> I am sensitive to the feelings of those who take the commentaries as
> part of the
> Canon, and perhaps this type of debate is not always appropriate. If
> there are
> points that should not be argued, I would be happy to just listen and
> learn in
> those cases and not bring up doubts on the list. 
> 
> In any case, I greatly appreciate your sub-commentaries and any parts of
> the
> actual commentaries that you share with us.
> 
> Thanks,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ================================
> 
> --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > Dear Robert (And Like-minded Friends)
> > 
> > How are you?
> > 
> > Thank you for your request.
> > 
> > Tiikaa on the luminous mind is very good for those who do not mind 
> > reading serous technical explanations, together with Pali grammatical 
> > discussions. 
> > 
> > As you might be aware of some dhamma friends criticizing commentaries 
> > on Pali Suttas, I am sincerely reluctant to translate and post them 
> > for general readers.
> > 
> > For those of us who have to read Pali texts for professional reasons, 
> > commentaries (Atthakathas) and Subcommentaries (Tiikaa) are the only 
> > reliable sources for all the academic needs. 
> > 
> > You will soon find that Tiikaa author had even explained all the Pali 
> > particles in details which can guide us in choosing the right syntax 
> > when we translate the Buddha's original Pali statements. 
> > 
> > Well, now, you and like-minded friends show appreciation and request 
> > for such texts, I will try my best to translate and post the Tiikaa 
> > on luminous mind on-list.
> > 
> > Won't be long!
> > 
> > With best wishes,
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > http://www.bodhiology.org
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote:
> 

	
10398

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed Dec 26, 2001 11:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: subcommentary Pali

 	
Hi Nina, Kom and (Suan)

On the point of moving the translation of subco to other forum, I find it
highly objectational bc mainly both these forums are very restricted
forums. No public could join.

I used to be able to access to palistudy a few months ago but I did not
join it bc I thought I find my time available for pali study is limited. 
when i try to access it recently, I find it under close doors. to me this
is a great waste to the spread of pali words that are critical to the
success of Theravada traditions. even though I respect privacy of groups
but reserving it to certain groups of pple is to me not to the beneficial
of sharing the dhamma.


Kind regards
Ken O

> Dear Suan,
> It is so kind of you to offer to translate the subco, and I like Kom's
> suggestion of moving this to another forum, to your convenience either
> to
> Abh or to palistudy. Even if you could translate only the difficult
> words
> and constructions of the subco, now and then just a few terms, it would
> be
> of great help so that I can continue working on it. I would not like to
> cause trouble so that you work late at night.
> With many thanks, best wishes from Nina. 

	
10399

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Thu Dec 27, 2001 0:20am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Parinibbana Subcommentary (Part Two) To Robert Epstein

 	
Hi Robert

I think my water analogy is wrong. I have mixed up bhavanga cittas with
other type of cittas. I find that the the parent and child analogy of
bhavanga cittas by the commentaries are not adequate to explain the
meaning of bhavanga cittas. 

To me I equate defiled as vibrations. the bhavanga cittas are vibrated by
sensory objects through causes and conditions (defilements) even though
their objects are not sensory ones. Such vibrations (or disturbances)
includes kusala and akusala, as long as there is vibrations hurling at
bhavanga cittas, it is meant to be defiled.

We could not at one hand saying that is it only being defiled by just
aksuala bc it leave a loop hole "what happen if it is being disturbed by
kusala". To me it should be viewed that whatever vibrates bhavanga cittas
are defilements since bhavanga cittas are by nature luminious in this
context.

When it is not being vibrated, it is considered luminious. 

I believe that you have understand that bhavanga cittas are also used for
sense proccess and in between sense process. I think I have a problem,
how come there is citta that is beyond our six senses.

And that also remind me of dreaming. I believe there are latent tendecies
in bhavanga cittas also and such tendecies are manifested mostly affected
by lobha mula tendecies. When at times we seem to be very awake at
dreaming (half awake and half dreaming) the mind door sense process are
awake but not strong enough to be truly really awake. At that time of
such weak mind door sense process, there is an ability to see, hear and
taste and also memory. Such weak mind door sense process only, there is a
possiblity of reasoning or perceptions in our dream. Just guessing, he he
:) for the fun of it.


Kind regards
Ken O


--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Hi Kenneth.
> I guess we can get someone else to chime in again on this, but my
> understanding is
> that the bhavanga cittas never make any contact with sense objects and
> thus are
> never defiled. They only get 'turned on' in deep sleep, unconsciousness
> or death
> to ensure the continuity during the 'blank periods' when the conscious
> mind and
> sensory phenomena are absent. So when there is sense object impinging
> on a citta,
> it is never bhavanga citta, it is always the 'waking' citta. When
> bhavanga citta
> awakens, there is never any object there. Bhavanga citta only has as
> its object
> the last object before the previous death, and it never varies, so there
> is no
> chance of any defilement.
> 
> If the above is true, by this logic, I cannot see how the bhavanga citta
> can be
> the one referred to in the statement: 'Mind is luminous, but is defiled
> by
> incoming defilements'. It would be quite impossible.
> 
> And in fact, the commentaries seems to assume as I do that the bhavanga
> cittas
> cannot be directly defiled. That is why they employ the 'parent and
> child'
> analogy, which says that the waking cittas, which are defiled, ruin the
> reputation
> of the parents, the bhavanga cittas, even though the bhavanga cittas are
> never
> themselves defiled. So in a sense the Buddha could be saying that the
> bhavanga
> cittas are defiled by the other cittas, even though they themselves are
> actually
> *not* defiled. With respect, this seems to be stretching the meaning of
> the
> Buddha's very simple declarative statement quite a bit, in my opinion. 
> 
> I look forward to reading a greater part of the commentary on this
> subject, if
> Suan takes on the time-consuming task of translating it, and I hope it
> will
> clarify the above.
> 
> Until then, I think it is interesting to note the different 'streams' of
> cittas
> that are taking place on different levels in the human structure, as it
> is
> constructed from moment to moment by a series of changing conditions and
> events. 
> There are the subconsious cittas, the bhavanga cittas; the conscious
> ones, which
> perceive namas and rupas, and the supra-mundane cittas, which discern
> the reality
> of arising namas and rupas and some of which are capable of perceiving
> Nibbana. 
> But as I understand it, it is still the case that only one of these
> cittas appears
> at a time. It is an interesting picture of reality.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ============
> 
> --- Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> wrote: