13200

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 11:20am
Subject: Re: "ritual" [Victor]

 	
Dear Victor,
I'm not sure I understand what you mean...

Spiritually speaking, what is the difference between swimming and 
satipatthana? Between satipatthana and yoga?

Dan

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Hi Dan,
> 
> Regarding your first question on what are the characteristics of 
> right practice, I would like to ask it as: what is the path* 
leading 
> to the cessation of dukkha?
> 
> Regarding your second question "Is satipatthana a skill?"
> 
> As one of its definitions, the word "skill" means "a learned power 
of 
> doing something competently: a developed aptitude or ability"** 
The 
> word "satipatthana" is defined as "intent contemplation and 
> mindfulness, earnest thought, application of mindfulness"***
> 
> My answer is:
> Satipatthana is not a skill, but the skill in satipatthana is.
> 
> Likewise,
> Swimming itself is not a skill, but the skill of how to swim is.
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> *See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html
> **See http://www.webster.com/
> ***See http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/pali/
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > Victor:
> > > To add on what you have said, I would like to say that one can 
> read 
> > > all about swimming without knowing how to swim. Reading and 
> > studying 
> > > may help, but it really takes practice to learn the skill. 
> > 
> > You raise two important issues here. Certainly, the importance of 
> > practice is agreed on by all, and that there is a big distinction 
> > between swimming and reading about swimming (as there is between 
> > Dhamma and reading about Dhamma). The question is what are the 
> > characteristics of right practice. 
> > 
> > Is satipatthana a skill? 
> > 
> > Dan
	
13201

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 2:05pm
Subject: Re: "ritual" [Victor]

 	
Hi Dan,

Let's go back to your original question:
"Is satipatthana a skill?" 

My answer to you is:
No, Satipatthana is not a skill. However, the skill in satipatthana 
is.

If you are not sure what my answer means, let me know.

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> Dear Victor,
> I'm not sure I understand what you mean...
> 
> Spiritually speaking, what is the difference between swimming and 
> satipatthana? Between satipatthana and yoga?
> 
> Dan
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Hi Dan,
> > 
> > Regarding your first question on what are the characteristics of 
> > right practice, I would like to ask it as: what is the path* 
> leading 
> > to the cessation of dukkha?
> > 
> > Regarding your second question "Is satipatthana a skill?"
> > 
> > As one of its definitions, the word "skill" means "a learned 
power 
> of 
> > doing something competently: a developed aptitude or ability"** 
> The 
> > word "satipatthana" is defined as "intent contemplation and 
> > mindfulness, earnest thought, application of mindfulness"***
> > 
> > My answer is:
> > Satipatthana is not a skill, but the skill in satipatthana is.
> > 
> > Likewise,
> > Swimming itself is not a skill, but the skill of how to swim is.
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> > *See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn45-008.html
> > **See http://www.webster.com/
> > ***See http://dsal.uchicago.edu/dictionaries/pali/
> > 
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > > Victor:
> > > > To add on what you have said, I would like to say that one 
can 
> > read 
> > > > all about swimming without knowing how to swim. Reading and 
> > > studying 
> > > > may help, but it really takes practice to learn the skill. 
> > > 
> > > You raise two important issues here. Certainly, the importance 
of 
> > > practice is agreed on by all, and that there is a big 
distinction 
> > > between swimming and reading about swimming (as there is 
between 
> > > Dhamma and reading about Dhamma). The question is what are the 
> > > characteristics of right practice. 
> > > 
> > > Is satipatthana a skill? 
> > > 
> > > Dan
	
13202

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 4:20pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Iddhi: To Wynn, Sarah, Kom

 	
Hi all, regarding magical feats, while trying to find the answer to
another question I came across this description of piti (happiness) in
Vism IV, 94. As you know piti is the proximate cause of ekaggata (one
pointedness) and in the jhanas is brought on by vitakka and vicara
(applied thought and sustained thought). There are five degrees of
intensity of piti: minor, momentary, showering, uplifting, and
pervading. This isn't really a skill, but it definitely sounds like fun.

Larry
-----------------
Herein, minor happiness is only able to raise the hairs on the body.
Momentary happiness is like flashes of lightening at different moments.
Showering happiness breaks over the body again and again like waves on
the sea shore.

Uplifting happiness can be powerful enough to levitate the body and make
it spring up into the air. For this was what happened to the Elder
Maha-Tissa, resident at Punnavallika. He went to the shrine terrace on
the evening of the full moon day. Seeing the moonlight, he faced in the
direction of the Great Shrine [at Anuradhapura], thinking 'At this very
hour the four assemblies are worshipping at the Great Shrine!'. By means
of objects formerly seen [there] he aroused uplifting happiness with the
Enlightened One as object, and he rose into the air like a painted ball
bounced off a plastered floor and alighted on the terrace of the Great
Shrine....

So uplifting happiness can be powerful enough to levitate the body and
make it spring up into the air.

But when pervading (rapturous) happiness arises, the whole body is
completely pervaded, like a filled bladder, like a rock cavern invaded
by a huge inundation.

Now this fivefold happiness, when conceived and matured, perfects the
twofold tranquility, that is, bodily and mental tranquility. When
tranquility is conceived and matured, it perfects the twofold bliss,
that is, bodily and mental bliss. When bliss is conceived and matured,
it perfects the threefold concentration, that is, momentary
concentration, access concentration, and absorption concentration. <END
QUOTE>
	
13203

From: tikmok <kom@a...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 5:09pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Dear Howard,

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> 
> I think you make very important points here. We need be clearly 
aware 
> of the conceptual distinctions between the Brahma viharas and their 
near 
> enemies. Then, the other side of the coin is to have direct, clear 
> comprehension of exactly what is experienced at the time that one of 
the 
> Brahma viharas seems to be in force. I think it is very useful to be 
> particularly mindful on those occasions at which one of them seems to 
be in 
> effect with regard to a stranger, for that is a likely circumstance for us 
> not to be mistaken.

Thank you for reminding me that knowing the conceptual differences 
without knowing the actual differences ultimately doesn't improve my 
situation. I totally agree with you on this, with an addition. I see the 
direct comprehension as being on the same side of the coin of the 
conceptual study, being mutually supportive of one another. 

The direct, clear, and hopefully correct comprehension (by panna) 
cannot come about without hearing the teachings, and without 
understanding conceptually what the teachings are all about. There 
cannot be deepening appreciation of the teachings, without directly 
comprehending the realities that are arising now. The detailed 
teachings allow us to directly see how subtle kilesas are, and the more 
we directly see how subtle kilesas are, the more confidence we have in 
the teachings as well as the more conceptual understandings of the 
teachings. 

I think hearing about the dhammas (or thinking about them), and 
directly seeing the dhammas in daily life, go hand-in-hand. I think the 
mutual support of these 2 goes much deeper than some people 
recognize.

This, of course, doesn't mean that we should neglect developing kusala 
at all other levels!

kom
	
13204

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 5:30pm
Subject: kilesa

 	
Dear group, can someone enlighten me as to what are 'defilements
associated with agitation' and 'defilements associated with ignorance'
in the quote from Vism XXII 46 below? The defilements are greed, hate,
delusion, conceit, false view, uncertainty, torpor, agitation,
consciencelessness, and shamelessness.

thanks, Larry
--------------
At the time of developing the eight mundane attainments the serenity
power is in excess, while at the time of developing the contemplations
of impermanence, etc., the insight power is in excess. But at the noble
path moment they occur coupled together in the sense that neither one
exceeds the other. So there is coupling of the powers in the case of
each one of these four kinds of knowledge, according as it is said 'When
he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and from the
aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction, concentration, has
cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the defilements associated
with ignorance and from the aggregates, his insight in the sense of
contemplation has cessation as its domain. So serenity and insight have
a single nature in the sense of emergence, they are coupled together,
and neither exceeds the other. Hence it was said: He develops serenity
and insight coupled together in the sense of emergence'
	
13205

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 1:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
In a message dated 5/11/2002 5:33:14 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
LBIDD@w... writes:


> 'When
> he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and from the
> aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction, concentration, has
> cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the defilements associated
> with ignorance and from the aggregates, his insight in the sense of
> 

Hi Larry

Someone can probably give you a better answer, but in short...the defilements 
associated with agitation are any states that keep the mind from being 
concentrated. The defilements associated with ignorance are any states that 
keep the mind from attaining insight.

The answer is contained within the paragraph you cite but it is hard to 
decifer sometimes. That passage, from the Visuddhimagga, is a quote from the 
Patisambhidamagga. (I'm pretty sure.)

TG


	
13206

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 2:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi, Kom -

In a message dated 5/11/02 8:10:19 PM Eastern Daylight Time, kom@a... 
writes:


> Thank you for reminding me that knowing the conceptual differences 
> without knowing the actual differences ultimately doesn't improve my 
> situation. I totally agree with you on this, with an addition. I see the 
> direct comprehension as being on the same side of the coin of the 
> conceptual study, being mutually supportive of one another. 
> 
==============================
Actually, it is the two sides of the coin that support each other! 
I've never seen a one-sided coin!! ;-))

With two-sided (but not two-faced ;-) metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13207

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 7:50pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
Hi TG, 
you are correct. The quote in Visuddhimagga is from Patisambhidamagga
ii,98. I don't have this or even know what it is. What I was trying to
sort out is which defilements, of the 10, are associated with agitation
and which with ignorance. Also I was wondering if 'agitation' is
'uddhacca' (restlessness). I couldn't find the answer in Visuddhimagga.
Is there any indication in Patisambhidamagga?

Larry
--------------
'When he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and
from the aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction,
concentration, has cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the
defilements associated with ignorance and from the aggregates, his
insight in the sense of contemplation has cessation as its domain. So
serenity and insight have a single nature in the sense of emergence,
they are coupled together, and neither exceeds the other. Hence it was
said: He develops serenity and insight coupled together in the sense of
emergence'
	
13208

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 9:41pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Silabbataparamasa -- inner vs. outer?

 	
--- onco111 <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> 
> It is also a mistake to think that practicing and
> perfecting 
> meditation techniques will result in wisdom -- the
> fetter of [inner] 
> silabbataparamasa.
> 

No disagreement here, but ... :-)
Developing the tools that enable penetrating
insight does not guarantee wisdom, but a far greater
mistake is to dismiss these meditation practices as
too difficult for us to develop. The greatest mistake
is to believe that undeveloped wisdom could arise
without the assistance of developing these meditation
practices to a sufficient degree. 

-fk


	
13209

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 9:57pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] "ritual" [reply to Erik]

 	
--- onco111 <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
>
> I'm not sure what you mean when you say
> "breakthrough." [in my ashtanga yoga practice] Could
you 
> elaborate?
> 

Hi Dan, 
What I mean is that progress in yoga and spiritual
practice does not always show tangible incremental
signs of improvement on a daily basis. Months can pass
before progress is seen, but the crucial point is that
those months of seeming non-progress laid the
foundation for the "breakthrough". We must not cease
persistent practice if we do not get instant results.
There is no other way to create fertile conditions for
genuine insight to arise.

-fk



	
13210

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 10:05pm
Subject: 4 brahmavihara, 4 near enemies RE: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi Kom,
Do you know which suttas describe the 4 near
enemies? According to my recollection of what Jack
Kornfield's book said (i.e. 2 levels of
unverifiedness) :

near enemy of sympathetic joy (mudita) is jealousy,
near enemy of equanimity (upekkha) is
indifference/apathy

-fk

--- Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Christine,
> 
> I think the key to develop the 4-brahma vihara is to
> know
> their characteristics, and know how they are
> different from
> lobha, dosa, and moha. Without knowing this, when
> we think
> we are having metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha, it
> may
> just be wishful thinking out of our attachment to
> those
> qualities. Let me list the near enemies of the 4
> qualities,
> from memory (so please check, if you have the
> opportunities!)
> 
> Metta has lobha as its near enemy. It is easy to
> mistake
> lobha for metta. For example, when we treat
> somebody kindly
> who is dear to us, is that metta or lobha? Very
> difficult
> to tell.
> 
> Karuna has dosa as its near enemy. Without hearing
> the
> Buddha's teachings, some people mistake dosa
> (unhappiness
> for other people's misery) as karuna. When we see a
> thin,
> malnourished child, is the wish to do something for
> the
> child really driven by our need to drive away the
> unpleasant
> feeling (domanassa) or is it driven by karuna?
> 
> Mudita has lobha as its near enemy. When we see
> happiness
> of somebody dear to us, is that by attachment or by
> mudita?
> 
> Equanimity has ignorance as its near enemy. Some
> people
> mistake ignorance and its associated indifferent
> feeling as
> equanimity (often stated as upekkha). Equanimity is
> the
> quality of not falling into unwholesome states. 
> When we
> feel indifferent toward someone's plight, is that
> lack of
> metta (and lack of equanimity) or is there a
> knowledge that
> we cannot do anything for the person and that each
> person
> has kamma as their own?
> 
> We normally like to think good thing about ourselves
> (like
> we have metta, karuna, mudita, and equanmity,
> especially
> comparing to other people!), but without knowing
> these
> different qualities, then developing them to a high
> degree
> is impossible, and a lot of time, thinking that we
> actually
> have these qualities are just wishful thinking.
> 
> The thing is to develop kusala, and to discard
> akusala.
> What if we are in a situation that requires us to
> rebuke
> somebody to help others? My question would then be,
> is that
> rebuke done out of kusala or akusala? Rebuking
> somebody out
> of anger to help other people are akusala kamma, and
> one
> will certainly suffer the result of that akusala
> kamma, and
> enjoy the fruit out of the kusala intention for
> another. We
> need to be straight and true to the dhamma: if it is
> kusala,
> then it is kusala; if it is akusala, it is akusala. 
> Wishing
> it some way or another doesn't change the realities.
> 
> I reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. 
> The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick)
> 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the
> Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of
> recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda
> eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha
> couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his
> herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he
> did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with
> kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.
> 
> I believe the Buddha encouraged us to develop all
> levels of
> kusala (dana, sila, and bhavana) whenever an
> opportunity
> presents itself. He certainly didn't praise akusala
> or
> indifferent feeling (out of ignorance). But we also
> have to
> remember, all these qualities rise because of
> conditions.
> Without hearing the Buddha's teaching, they probably
> are
> conditioned by our own accumulations and the people
> with are
> associated with. However, with the Buddha's
> teachings, we
> can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing
> detailed
> teachings about these qualities and their enemies,
> by
> considering them in our daily lives, by knowing
> their
> benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by
> knowing
> them as they truly are: conditioned realities that
> fall away
> immediately that is neither self or ours.
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: christine_forsyth
> [mailto:cforsyth@v...]
> > Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:56 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6)
> >
> >
> > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> >
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for
> > me, accepting
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause
> > that aversion arises
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the
> > finger at a particular
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living
> > of our lives, and
> > while understanding that complex conditions
> > bring about suffering -
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether
> > it is ourselves, dear
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to
> > attempt to assist or
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are
> > being treated
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral
> > neutrality? Should we
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should
> > we just say 'It's
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings..
> > shows lack of
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much
> > dosa,mana, clinging, or not
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to
> > preserve silence,
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk
> > losing valued
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional
> > choice. And if I don't
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one
> > action instead of
> > another, the results of that action or non-action
> > are my kama-vipaka
> > eventually?
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in
> > need of protection,
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend
> Marin
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the
> > communists, and I didn't
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak
> > up because I wasn't a
> > Jew.
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I
> > didn't speak up because
> 
=== message truncated ===

13211

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 10:05pm
Subject: 4 brahmavihara, 4 near enemies RE: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi Kom,
Do you know which suttas describe the 4 near
enemies? According to my recollection of what Jack
Kornfield's book said (i.e. 2 levels of
unverifiedness) :

near enemy of sympathetic joy (mudita) is jealousy,
near enemy of equanimity (upekkha) is
indifference/apathy

-fk

--- Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Christine,
> 
> I think the key to develop the 4-brahma vihara is to
> know
> their characteristics, and know how they are
> different from
> lobha, dosa, and moha. Without knowing this, when
> we think
> we are having metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha, it
> may
> just be wishful thinking out of our attachment to
> those
> qualities. Let me list the near enemies of the 4
> qualities,
> from memory (so please check, if you have the
> opportunities!)
> 
> Metta has lobha as its near enemy. It is easy to
> mistake
> lobha for metta. For example, when we treat
> somebody kindly
> who is dear to us, is that metta or lobha? Very
> difficult
> to tell.
> 
> Karuna has dosa as its near enemy. Without hearing
> the
> Buddha's teachings, some people mistake dosa
> (unhappiness
> for other people's misery) as karuna. When we see a
> thin,
> malnourished child, is the wish to do something for
> the
> child really driven by our need to drive away the
> unpleasant
> feeling (domanassa) or is it driven by karuna?
> 
> Mudita has lobha as its near enemy. When we see
> happiness
> of somebody dear to us, is that by attachment or by
> mudita?
> 
> Equanimity has ignorance as its near enemy. Some
> people
> mistake ignorance and its associated indifferent
> feeling as
> equanimity (often stated as upekkha). Equanimity is
> the
> quality of not falling into unwholesome states. 
> When we
> feel indifferent toward someone's plight, is that
> lack of
> metta (and lack of equanimity) or is there a
> knowledge that
> we cannot do anything for the person and that each
> person
> has kamma as their own?
> 
> We normally like to think good thing about ourselves
> (like
> we have metta, karuna, mudita, and equanmity,
> especially
> comparing to other people!), but without knowing
> these
> different qualities, then developing them to a high
> degree
> is impossible, and a lot of time, thinking that we
> actually
> have these qualities are just wishful thinking.
> 
> The thing is to develop kusala, and to discard
> akusala.
> What if we are in a situation that requires us to
> rebuke
> somebody to help others? My question would then be,
> is that
> rebuke done out of kusala or akusala? Rebuking
> somebody out
> of anger to help other people are akusala kamma, and
> one
> will certainly suffer the result of that akusala
> kamma, and
> enjoy the fruit out of the kusala intention for
> another. We
> need to be straight and true to the dhamma: if it is
> kusala,
> then it is kusala; if it is akusala, it is akusala. 
> Wishing
> it some way or another doesn't change the realities.
> 
> I reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. 
> The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick)
> 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the
> Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of
> recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda
> eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha
> couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his
> herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he
> did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with
> kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.
> 
> I believe the Buddha encouraged us to develop all
> levels of
> kusala (dana, sila, and bhavana) whenever an
> opportunity
> presents itself. He certainly didn't praise akusala
> or
> indifferent feeling (out of ignorance). But we also
> have to
> remember, all these qualities rise because of
> conditions.
> Without hearing the Buddha's teaching, they probably
> are
> conditioned by our own accumulations and the people
> with are
> associated with. However, with the Buddha's
> teachings, we
> can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing
> detailed
> teachings about these qualities and their enemies,
> by
> considering them in our daily lives, by knowing
> their
> benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by
> knowing
> them as they truly are: conditioned realities that
> fall away
> immediately that is neither self or ours.
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: christine_forsyth
> [mailto:cforsyth@v...]
> > Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:56 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6)
> >
> >
> > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> >
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for
> > me, accepting
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause
> > that aversion arises
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the
> > finger at a particular
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living
> > of our lives, and
> > while understanding that complex conditions
> > bring about suffering -
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether
> > it is ourselves, dear
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to
> > attempt to assist or
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are
> > being treated
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral
> > neutrality? Should we
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should
> > we just say 'It's
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings..
> > shows lack of
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much
> > dosa,mana, clinging, or not
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to
> > preserve silence,
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk
> > losing valued
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional
> > choice. And if I don't
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one
> > action instead of
> > another, the results of that action or non-action
> > are my kama-vipaka
> > eventually?
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in
> > need of protection,
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend
> Marin
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the
> > communists, and I didn't
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak
> > up because I wasn't a
> > Jew.
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I
> > didn't speak up because
> 
=== message truncated ===


	

 	 

	
13212

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 10:06pm
Subject: 4 brahmaviharas, 4 near enemies RE: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi Kom,
Do you know which suttas describe the 4 near
enemies? According to my recollection of what Jack
Kornfield's book said (i.e. 2 levels of
unverifiedness) :

near enemy of sympathetic joy (mudita) is jealousy,
near enemy of equanimity (upekkha) is
indifference/apathy

-fk


--- Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Christine,
> 
> I think the key to develop the 4-brahma vihara is to
> know
> their characteristics, and know how they are
> different from
> lobha, dosa, and moha. Without knowing this, when
> we think
> we are having metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha, it
> may
> just be wishful thinking out of our attachment to
> those
> qualities. Let me list the near enemies of the 4
> qualities,
> from memory (so please check, if you have the
> opportunities!)
> 
> Metta has lobha as its near enemy. It is easy to
> mistake
> lobha for metta. For example, when we treat
> somebody kindly
> who is dear to us, is that metta or lobha? Very
> difficult
> to tell.
> 
> Karuna has dosa as its near enemy. Without hearing
> the
> Buddha's teachings, some people mistake dosa
> (unhappiness
> for other people's misery) as karuna. When we see a
> thin,
> malnourished child, is the wish to do something for
> the
> child really driven by our need to drive away the
> unpleasant
> feeling (domanassa) or is it driven by karuna?
> 
> Mudita has lobha as its near enemy. When we see
> happiness
> of somebody dear to us, is that by attachment or by
> mudita?
> 
> Equanimity has ignorance as its near enemy. Some
> people
> mistake ignorance and its associated indifferent
> feeling as
> equanimity (often stated as upekkha). Equanimity is
> the
> quality of not falling into unwholesome states. 
> When we
> feel indifferent toward someone's plight, is that
> lack of
> metta (and lack of equanimity) or is there a
> knowledge that
> we cannot do anything for the person and that each
> person
> has kamma as their own?
> 
> We normally like to think good thing about ourselves
> (like
> we have metta, karuna, mudita, and equanmity,
> especially
> comparing to other people!), but without knowing
> these
> different qualities, then developing them to a high
> degree
> is impossible, and a lot of time, thinking that we
> actually
> have these qualities are just wishful thinking.
> 
> The thing is to develop kusala, and to discard
> akusala.
> What if we are in a situation that requires us to
> rebuke
> somebody to help others? My question would then be,
> is that
> rebuke done out of kusala or akusala? Rebuking
> somebody out
> of anger to help other people are akusala kamma, and
> one
> will certainly suffer the result of that akusala
> kamma, and
> enjoy the fruit out of the kusala intention for
> another. We
> need to be straight and true to the dhamma: if it is
> kusala,
> then it is kusala; if it is akusala, it is akusala. 
> Wishing
> it some way or another doesn't change the realities.
> 
> I reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. 
> The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick)
> 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the
> Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of
> recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda
> eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha
> couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his
> herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he
> did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with
> kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.
> 
> I believe the Buddha encouraged us to develop all
> levels of
> kusala (dana, sila, and bhavana) whenever an
> opportunity
> presents itself. He certainly didn't praise akusala
> or
> indifferent feeling (out of ignorance). But we also
> have to
> remember, all these qualities rise because of
> conditions.
> Without hearing the Buddha's teaching, they probably
> are
> conditioned by our own accumulations and the people
> with are
> associated with. However, with the Buddha's
> teachings, we
> can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing
> detailed
> teachings about these qualities and their enemies,
> by
> considering them in our daily lives, by knowing
> their
> benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by
> knowing
> them as they truly are: conditioned realities that
> fall away
> immediately that is neither self or ours.
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: christine_forsyth
> [mailto:cforsyth@v...]
> > Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:56 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6)
> >
> >
> > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> >
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for
> > me, accepting
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause
> > that aversion arises
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the
> > finger at a particular
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living
> > of our lives, and
> > while understanding that complex conditions
> > bring about suffering -
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether
> > it is ourselves, dear
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to
> > attempt to assist or
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are
> > being treated
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral
> > neutrality? Should we
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should
> > we just say 'It's
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings..
> > shows lack of
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much
> > dosa,mana, clinging, or not
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to
> > preserve silence,
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk
> > losing valued
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional
> > choice. And if I don't
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one
> > action instead of
> > another, the results of that action or non-action
> > are my kama-vipaka
> > eventually?
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in
> > need of protection,
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend
> Marin
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the
> > communists, and I didn't
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak
> > up because I wasn't a
> > Jew.
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I
> > didn't speak up because
> 
=== message truncated ===


	
13213

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 6:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
Hi Larry

In the Manual of Abhidhamma (Abhidhammattha Sangaha) ignorance (delusion) and 
agitation (restlessness) are listed as "unwholesome universals" meaning that 
they accompany all unwholesome states. This, of course, would also mean 
that they accompany all defilements.

The Patisambhidhamma (Path of Discrimination) is making the point that -- 
insight is key in overcoming ignorance and concentration (serenity) is key in 
overcoming agitation. Also that insight and concentration (serenity) must be 
combined in order to emerge (break free) from defilements.

The Path of Discrimination (Patisambhidamagga) is one of the 15 books from 
the 5th Nikaya. The Visuddhimagga (Path of Purification) relies on it a lot.

TG


	
13214

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sat May 11, 2002 11:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Dear Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: 

> I think it is very useful to be 
> particularly mindful on those occasions at which one of them seems to be
> in 
> effect with regard to a stranger, for that is a likely circumstance for
> us 
> not to be mistaken.
.....
Speaking for myself, there is so much ignorance accumulated, that any
occasion or circumstance is one in which mental states are likely to be
mistaken. We tend to think in terms of an occasion or stretch of time or
action, but in reality the noble and far less noble states are changing
very rapidly and so at one moment there may be metta, the next attachment
and so on.
.....

Having said that, I sincerely hope you have no recurrence of the ‘episode’
that sent you to the ER and really appreciated your account of kindness
and compassion for the other patients. I’m quite sure you also helped
‘turn’ what might have been a difficult and unpleasant occasion for them
into a meaningful and happy one. They’re probably still talking about your
kindness;-)

The account was also an excellent example of how so often we think of a
particular ‘occasion’ or set of symptoms as being unpleasant (visit to ER
or unusual symptoms), but really the moments of vipaka (result of kamma)
through the sense doors are very brief and it’s the following unwholesome
mental states that are the real problem. Even the bodily experiences at
these times are not all unpleasant either as you’ve said.

Thank you, Howard, for sharing the fine examples of metta and compassion.
Who knows, but maybe, just maybe, these mental states had ‘cured’ the
problem by the time the drs started the tests;-))

Hoping you stay well and healthy,

Sarah
=====

> An example in this regard is what happened to me yesterday. I
> spent 
> yesterday afternoon through to 10 p.m. in the emergency room of a
> hospital. 
> (I had been experiencing frequent very odd, though, ironically, not 
> completely unpleasant, "episodes" yesterday which are quite difficult to
> 
> describe. Whatever it was, it was some sort of malfunction. All tests
> were 
> negative <snip>

	
13215

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:24am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 	
Christine, DaiWen

Christine, your post to Sarah raises aspects of dhamma that some people have
difficulty coming to terms with. And it reminded me of a recent post of DaiWen's
that I had meant to comment on.

Christine said:
> Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice. And if I don't 
> act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead of 
> another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-vipaka 
> eventually? 
> Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in need of protection, 
> speaking out about injustices, social action?

I agree that non-action can be as much an intentional choice as action. But as I
understand the teachings, the merits of any (non-) action are determined solely by
the quality of the accompanying mental state, and not to any extent by the
conventional outcome.

So is sympathetic action more likely to be kusala than non-action? I think each
person can only answer this by reference to their own experience. What may come
easily and naturally to one might be contrary to the nature of another. And for a
given person, much will depend on the kind of situation involved, anyway.

There is no inherent merit in one course rather than the other, since so much
depends on individual accumulations. In the end we all do what we are inclined to,
with what little kusala we can muster.

DaiWen's question raises similar issues:
> Given all this, I am not clear on what my role
> should be in terms of taking action or
> insisting on taking action against such an
> individual.

There is no 'right' or 'wrong' thing to be done here. You can only (non-) act as
you see best. At least you have the benefit of some understanding of kusala and
akusala, kamma and vipaka. You know that the ultimate merit of any (non-) action
you may take will depend on the degree of kusala with which it is performed, while
its results as far as the parties involved are concerned will depend in part on the
kamma of those parties. This knowledge may help shape a decision that is different
from what it might otherwise have been.

Jon


--- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> 
> Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for me, accepting 
> that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause that aversion arises 
> time and again,' is not blame or pointing the finger at a particular 
> individual. In actual everday hands-on living of our lives, and 
> while understanding that complex conditions bring about suffering - 
> are we to ignore people being wronged, whether it is ourselves, dear 
> ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to attempt to assist or 
> protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are being treated 
> unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral neutrality? Should we 
> speak out about perceived injustices, or should we just say 'It's 
> their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings.. shows lack of 
> advancement in the practice yet, too much dosa,mana, clinging, or not 
> enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to preserve silence, 
> than speak out and attract retribution, or risk losing valued 
> friendships....
> Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice. And if I don't 
> act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead of 
> another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-vipaka 
> eventually? 
> Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in need of protection, 
> speaking out about injustices, social action?
> Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend Marin 
> Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I didn't 
> speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a 
> Jew. 
> Then the came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because 
> I wasn't a trade unionist.
> Then they came for the Catholics, but I didn't speak up because I was 
> a protestant.
> Then they came for me, and by that time there was no one left to 
> speak for me." 
> Seemingly a dramatic quote of course, compared to an ordinary person 
> being treated unfairly in daily interactions, but it is talking about 
> the importance of making a stand against wrong. Small daily 
> happenings are miniature reflections of what happens on a larger 
> scale nationally and internationally. When the harm being done (as 
> in the categories above) is to a person who is a little different to 
> the majority, or to whom the majority seem to be either opposed or 
> indifferent, how easy it is to magnify their faults and minimise (or 
> be unable to hear or see clearly) the role of those others doing 
> wrong. How easy to look for the approval of the majority(more like 
> us), and feel validated.
> So what is a Buddhist to do, to live in the world correctly and 
> unselfishly, with loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and 
> equanimity regarding others? Watch our own mind states, and be aware 
> when dosa arises. Is that all? Does this mean ignoring the suffering 
> of others when it could be ameliorated or prevented? Extending or 
> pervading metta, but taking no action? What do the Teachings say?
> 
> metta,
> Christine


	
13216

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:27am
Subject: RE: [dsg] Satipatthana and concepts/realities

 	
Frank

--- frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> wrote: > Hi Jon,
> I appreciate the explanation, but ultimately my
> confusion with the mindfulnless sutta (MN 10) has to
> do with lack of distinction between foundation #4
> (mindfulness of "mind objects") and the other
> foundations. In other words, foundation #4 seems to
> overlap heavily with the other 3 foundations

You may well be right, Frank, when you say there is overlap. It seems this way to
me, too. However, I don’t have any textual references on this point**.

> even
> though contemplation of "mind-objects" implies a
> distinct technique worth its own catgeory. 

However, we differ on this point :-). I don’t see the 4 foundations of mindfulness
as 'distinct techniques', since the sutta is not about *techniques* of any kind, to
my understanding.

According to the commentary, the division into 4 is simply for the purpose of
analytical explanation. In the commentary to the beginning of the section on
breathing it says:

"Now the Blessed One, desirous of bringing about diverse kinds of attainments of
distinction in beings by the Discourse on the Arousing of Mindfulness, began to
teach the analytically explanatory portion [niddesavara] with the word "And how o
bhikkhus." 
He did that after *dividing into four the one mindfulness that is right* [ekameva
sammasatim] by way of the contemplation on the body, on feelings, on consciousness,
and on mental objects." 

The commentary also atthe end summarises the sutta by reference to the 21 objects of
satipatthana, and this of course ignores completely the classification into 4
foundations.

> Here's an example.
> Under contemplation of mind (3rd foundation):
> "He understands mind affected by lust as mind as mind
> affected by lust..."
> 
> Under contemplation of "mind-objeccts" (4th
> foundation) 5 hindrances section:
> "a monk understands, there is sensual desire in me; or
> ... there is no sensual desire in me."

One clear (to me) example of overlap is the inclusion of the 5 aggregates in the
section on 'dhammas (dhammanupasana). Since the 5 aggregates include all dhammas,
they include all the objects of satipatthana mentioned in the other 3 sections.

> Is there overlap/redundancy between 3rd and 4th
> foundation, or is there a distinct difference between
> those two methods of mindfulness?
> 
> To me, it seems like foundation #4 is just saying that
> any of the buddhist concepts/classifications that the
> buddha taught can be used as a framework or template
> to do the first 3 foundations of mindulness.
> Understood in this way, it makes sense to me. But if I
> treat the 4th foundation as a separate distinct
> method, as "mind-object" tends to imply, then I just
> become confounded because of so much overlap with the
> first 3 foundations. Jon, in your previous post you
> point out that the 4th foundation is a "real time"
> operation contemplating dhammas, but ALL FOUR
> foundations are real time, so again it is not
> something special to distinguish the 4th foundation.

I agree with this comment, Frank. I didn't mean to single out the 4th as being
special in this regard.

> Jon, I appreciate the time you took to explain some of
> the buddhist classifications that you use to interpret
> the 4th foundation, but to me, those classificaitons
> still do not separate the 4th foundation in such a way
> to make it very distinct, in the same way for example
> as mindfulness of form and mindfulness of feeling are
> very distinct.

The 4 foundations are distinct only as to their objects (not as to being techniques)
and even then there is a degree of overlap (to my understanding)

Jon

**PS I do recall seeing it suggested somewhere (Visuddhimagga ?) that any given
instance of satipatthana is 1 or other of the 4 foundations -- this could be read as
a implying that there is no overlap when properly understood.


	
13217

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Prompted/unprompted (was, ADL ch. 6 (18-23))

 	
Nina

Thanks very much for this information. Interesting that there are instances of
prompted dhammas where this is not an indication of weakness.

Jon

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote: > Dear Larry and Jon, I liked your
discussion on prompted and unprompted, and
> I could just add a detail I learnt from A. Sujin. Jhanacittas and lokuttara
> cittas are always reckoned as sasankharika, prompted. The reason: there have
> to be first maha-kusala cittas accompanied by pa~n~naa, which actually do
> the prompting. In Samatha pa~n~naa has to know exactly the conditions for
> being calm with the meditation subject, so that defilements are subdued. In
> Vipassana pa~n~naa has to understand clearly and thoroughly the dhamma at
> that moment as it is: impermanent, dukkha or anatta. I quote from Survey,
> Ch 20, Associated Dhammas:
> After explaining that only cittas of the sense-sphere are classified as
> prompted and unprompted, we read:
> < The cittas which are of a higher grade , namely, rupavacara cittas,
> arupavacara cittas, and lokuttara cittas, are not classified by way of
> asankharika and sasankharika. All of them are prompted, sasankharika. The
> reason for this is that they are dependent on the appropriate development as
> a necessary condition for their arising. In this context being sasankharika
> does not mean that they are weak such as in the case of kamavacara cittas
> which are prompted, sasankharika. Before rupavacara citta, arupavacara citta
> and lokuttara citta arise, there must each time be kamavacara citta
> accompanied by pa~n~naa.> end quote.
> Nina. 


	
13218

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:30am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 	
Howard

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> 
> In a message dated 5/5/02 9:22:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> jonoabb@y... writes:

> > I'm not sure in what sense you would see visible or audible data as being 
> > 'phantom' or 'a
> > shadow'. The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last for only a 
> > brief moment
> > doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their own capable of being 
> > discerned by
> > consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 'individual essence'). Do you 
> > see a necessary
> > contradiction in these 2 attributes (conditionality vs. own essence)?
> > 
> -------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> The problem I have here is with the adjectival phrase "of their own" 
> in the sentence "The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last for 
> only a brief moment doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their own 
> capable of being discerned by consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 
> 'individual essence')." Everything about these phenomena, including their 
> very existence, arises in total dependence on conditions, all of which are 
> equally empty of own-being. What arises in total dependence on other 
> conditions does not have own-being, and inasmuch as these other conditions 
> are equally without own-being, the emptiness is thoroughgoing.

I think you are saying:
(a) Phenomena arise in dependence on conditions
(b) Something that arises in dependence on something else cannot have own-being
(c) Accordingly, these phenomena could not have a distinct characteristic

I am with you on (a) and (b), but not on (c). In the Abhidhamma, the attribute of
'empty of self' is not seen as necessarily connoting 'lacking own (i.e., distinct)
characteristic'.

Jon


	
13219

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 	
Anders

I'm not sure that I have anything of substance to add to Dan's post(s), but I have
one or two comments on the Satipatthana Sutta itself.

--- anders_honore <anders.honore@g...> wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@y...,
Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > Rob E
> > C. Sitting vipassana
> > You refer to long periods (3 years) sitting in vipassana meditation 
> leading to obvious
> > changes in one's sense of self. Can you point to any instance in 
> the texts of the Buddha
> > recommending such a practice, or any mention at all of 'sitting 
> vipassana meditation'.
> 
> The Satipatthana Sutta:
> 
> "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, to 
> the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his 
> legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the 
> fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; 
> mindful he breathes out. "

It goes without saying, of course, that mindfulness can arise while one is sitting,
as in this passage from the sutta. The crucial question though is whether the
teachings recommend sitting *as a means to* the development of mindfulness.

In the passage you have quoted, the monk seems to be someone who is already adept at
mindfulness, since he is able to 'set mindfulness to the fore' and to maintain it
('always mindful') as he breathes. Note also that the mindfulness here is not yet
mindfulness related to *breathing* in particular -- that part of the sutta follows
after your passage.

Apart from that, however, there is the question of later passages in the same sutta.
If we read your passage as suggesting a *sitting practice* for mindfulness, then
how are we to read the follwing passages, also from the 'body' section:

"And further, O bhikkhus, when he is going, a bhikkhu understands: 'I am going';
when he is standing, he understands: 'I am standing'; when he is sitting, he
understands: 'I am sitting'; when he is lying down, he understands: 'I am lying
down'; or just as his body is disposed so he understands it. …
"And further, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu in walking, in standing (in a place), in sitting
(in some position), in sleeping, in waking, in speaking and in keeping silence, is a
person practising clear comprehension."

> And all the other foundations too.

To my reading of the sutta, the passage you have quoted refers to mindfulness of
breathing only, not to the other instances of mindfulness of the body and certainly
not to the other 3 'foundations'.

But the same question can be asked. Is the Buddha setting out a practice or
technique, or is he identifying the objects that mindfulness can take, without
limitation to the circumstances of their arising:

"Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust [or the other
kilesas], as with lust [etc.]; the consciousness without lust [etc.], as without
lust [etc.]; …"
[from the secion on citta/mind]
…
"How, O bhikkhus, does a bhikkhu live contemplating mental objects in the mental
objects of the five hindrances? 
"Here, O bhikkhus, when sensuality [or any of the other hindrances] is present, a
bhikkhu knows with understanding: 'I have sensuality [etc.],' or when sensuality
[etc.] is not present, he knows with understanding: 'I have no sensuality [etc.].' …
"
[from the section on dhammas/mind-objects]

I hope this makes some sense to you, Anders. I realise the sutta is open to more
than one interpretation, but I think it is worth careful and repeated study.

Jon

	
13220

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:43am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 	
Howard

I hope you don’t mind me coming in on this thread (since this is a topic we are
discussing in another thread).

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert -
> In a message dated 5/3/02 4:48:19 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
> > Dhammas like feeling and anger and greed and hardness are real -
> > unlike concepts such as human and man - but dhammas are impermanent. 
> > A dhamma cannot be changed into something other than what it is 
> > right now, but it lasts for an infinitely brief instant only, no 
> > matter we want it to stay or go. 
> > best wishes
> > robert
> > 
> > 
> ============================
> Yes, these dhammas exist, conditions exist - they are not imagined. 
> The question is what their mode of existence is. They are things-in-relation, 
> arising in dependence on other, similarly empty conditions, including 
> discernment (vi~n~nana). We tend to see them as separate and self-existing, 
> and that is avijja. 

I've pondered over this for some time, but remain puzzled about one or two of your
references. 

'Dhammas are things-in-relation'. What particular aspect do you have in mind here,
over and above the fact that dhammas are conditioned?

'We tend to see dhammas as separate'. I am not sure in what sense you mean this. 
Individual dhammas are said to be discrete, I believe, even when arising in
conjunction with other dhammas. Is it not more helpful to consider that we tend to
see wholes (concepts) and not the individual (i.e., separate) dhammas that are the
realities to which those concepts refer?

Jon

	
13221

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 3:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)[Kom]

 	
Dear Kom, and All,

Thank you for your post. Thought about it over the last couple of 
days and, no doubt, I'll continue to think about it. There is nothing 
in it that I could disagree with from a Dhamma point of view. Though 
I admit to having heavily researched 'other options'.:)
It seems that if I wished to find support for 'righteous anger' I 
shouldn't be a Theravadan....I should be a follower of 
Soka Gakkai International, as they are the only buddhists who don't 
strongly warn against it and, in fact, value it.
I have been reading an article called "The Divine Abidings - The Four 
Skillful Emotions Explained", which also discusses the point you 
made, that each of the divine abidings has a near enemy, which is a 
state which resembles the true abiding but misses it by being tinged 
with the defilements. And each also has a far enemy, which is its 
polar opposite and which cannot share the same mental continuum. 
http://www.baynet.net/~arcc/dhamma/divabid.html
and regarding 'righteous anger'...
"We should especially be on guard for the arising of "righteous" 
anger. Remember that ill-will is a poison and that you are only 
hurting yourself, karmically and spiritually, when you harbour a 
grudge for an imagined, or even a real, wrong." 

I remember that recently 'elsewhere', we were talking about the 
surprising last line of the "Mulapariyaya Sutta - The Root Sequence"
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn001.html
>>"That is what the Blessed One said. Displeased, the monks did not 
delight in the Blessed One's words"<< 
I certainly understand how they felt....
It is hard to hear, and harder to accept, something that goes 
against how a person believes the world is, that is so much a part of 
a person, that they don't even know it is 'a belief', and not 'the 
way things are'..... things like that to 'fight injustice and evil, 
defend the poor and powerless' are always 'admirable' things to do. 
Social Work at the hospital is not going to feel quite the same after 
such a shaking up of certainty about motives.....it will be 
interesting observing myself over the next week or two. :-)

metta,
Christine

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Christine,
> 
> I think the key to develop the 4-brahma vihara is to know
> their characteristics, and know how they are different from
> lobha, dosa, and moha. Without knowing this, when we think
> we are having metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha, it may
> just be wishful thinking out of our attachment to those
> qualities. Let me list the near enemies of the 4 qualities,
> from memory (so please check, if you have the
> opportunities!)
> 
> Metta has lobha as its near enemy. It is easy to mistake
> lobha for metta. For example, when we treat somebody kindly
> who is dear to us, is that metta or lobha? Very difficult
> to tell.
> 
> Karuna has dosa as its near enemy. Without hearing the
> Buddha's teachings, some people mistake dosa (unhappiness
> for other people's misery) as karuna. When we see a thin,
> malnourished child, is the wish to do something for the
> child really driven by our need to drive away the unpleasant
> feeling (domanassa) or is it driven by karuna?
> 
> Mudita has lobha as its near enemy. When we see happiness
> of somebody dear to us, is that by attachment or by mudita?
> 
> Equanimity has ignorance as its near enemy. Some people
> mistake ignorance and its associated indifferent feeling as
> equanimity (often stated as upekkha). Equanimity is the
> quality of not falling into unwholesome states. When we
> feel indifferent toward someone's plight, is that lack of
> metta (and lack of equanimity) or is there a knowledge that
> we cannot do anything for the person and that each person
> has kamma as their own?
> 
> We normally like to think good thing about ourselves (like
> we have metta, karuna, mudita, and equanmity, especially
> comparing to other people!), but without knowing these
> different qualities, then developing them to a high degree
> is impossible, and a lot of time, thinking that we actually
> have these qualities are just wishful thinking.
> 
> The thing is to develop kusala, and to discard akusala.
> What if we are in a situation that requires us to rebuke
> somebody to help others? My question would then be, is that
> rebuke done out of kusala or akusala? Rebuking somebody out
> of anger to help other people are akusala kamma, and one
> will certainly suffer the result of that akusala kamma, and
> enjoy the fruit out of the kusala intention for another. We
> need to be straight and true to the dhamma: if it is kusala,
> then it is kusala; if it is akusala, it is akusala. Wishing
> it some way or another doesn't change the realities.
> 
> I reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick) 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.
> 
> I believe the Buddha encouraged us to develop all levels of
> kusala (dana, sila, and bhavana) whenever an opportunity
> presents itself. He certainly didn't praise akusala or
> indifferent feeling (out of ignorance). But we also have to
> remember, all these qualities rise because of conditions.
> Without hearing the Buddha's teaching, they probably are
> conditioned by our own accumulations and the people with are
> associated with. However, with the Buddha's teachings, we
> can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing detailed
> teachings about these qualities and their enemies, by
> considering them in our daily lives, by knowing their
> benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by knowing
> them as they truly are: conditioned realities that fall away
> immediately that is neither self or ours.
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...]
> > Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:56 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6)
> >
> >
> > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> >
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for
> > me, accepting
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause
> > that aversion arises
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the
> > finger at a particular
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living
> > of our lives, and
> > while understanding that complex conditions
> > bring about suffering -
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether
> > it is ourselves, dear
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to
> > attempt to assist or
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are
> > being treated
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral
> > neutrality? Should we
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should
> > we just say 'It's
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings..
> > shows lack of
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much
> > dosa,mana, clinging, or not
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to
> > preserve silence,
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk
> > losing valued
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional
> > choice. And if I don't
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one
> > action instead of
> > another, the results of that action or non-action
> > are my kama-vipaka
> > eventually?
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in
> > need of protection,
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend Marin
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the
> > communists, and I didn't
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak
> > up because I wasn't a
> > Jew.
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I
> > didn't speak up because
> > I wasn't a trade unionist.
> > Then they came for the Catholics, but I didn't
> > speak up because I was
> > a protestant.
> > Then they came for me, and by that time there was
> > no one left to
> > speak for me."
> > Seemingly a dramatic quote of course, compared to
> > an ordinary person
> > being treated unfairly in daily interactions, but
> > it is talking about
> > the importance of making a stand against wrong.
> > Small daily
> > happenings are miniature reflections of what
> > happens on a larger
> > scale nationally and internationally. When the
> > harm being done (as
> > in the categories above) is to a person who is a
> > little different to
> > the majority, or to whom the majority seem to be
> > either opposed or
> > indifferent, how easy it is to magnify their
> > faults and minimise (or
> > be unable to hear or see clearly) the role of
> > those others doing
> > wrong. How easy to look for the approval of the
> > majority(more like
> > us), and feel validated.
> > So what is a Buddhist to do, to live in the world
> > correctly and
> > unselfishly, with loving-kindness, compassion,
> > sympathetic joy, and
> > equanimity regarding others? Watch our own mind
> > states, and be aware
> > when dosa arises. Is that all? Does this mean
> > ignoring the suffering
> > of others when it could be ameliorated or
> > prevented? Extending or
> > pervading metta, but taking no action? What do
> > the Teachings say?
> >
> > metta,
> > Christine
> >
	
13222

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 4:29am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
---
Dear Kom.
This is very good post. I was especially interested in the piece:I 
reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick) 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.""
I haven't read this in English, did you get it in the Thai?
A similar thing happened withregard to the Buddha's attainment, As 
you know it took him 6years after he left the palce before finally 
reaching samasambuddha. This is not usual for a bodhisatta in the 
life they attain and most become Buddhas on the very day they leave 
laylife. The Buddha of this time spent most of the 6years caught up 
useless austerities. This was because in his last human life 
(vessantara), when he gave his children to the Brahmin, he had a few 
moments of aversion when he heard the Brahmin beating them as he 
went away. (I'm doing this from memory so might have a detail 
wrong). Fortunately he quickly conquered the defilement and was able 
to perfect the parami.
best wishes
robert

In dhammastudygroup@y..., Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> wrote:
> Dear Christine,
> 
> I think the key to develop the 4-brahma vihara is to know
> their characteristics, and know how they are different from
> lobha, dosa, and moha. Without knowing this, when we think
> we are having metta, karuna, mudita, and upekkha, it may
> just be wishful thinking out of our attachment to those
> qualities. Let me list the near enemies of the 4 qualities,
> from memory (so please check, if you have the
> opportunities!)
> 
> Metta has lobha as its near enemy. It is easy to mistake
> lobha for metta. For example, when we treat somebody kindly
> who is dear to us, is that metta or lobha? Very difficult
> to tell.
> 
> Karuna has dosa as its near enemy. Without hearing the
> Buddha's teachings, some people mistake dosa (unhappiness
> for other people's misery) as karuna. When we see a thin,
> malnourished child, is the wish to do something for the
> child really driven by our need to drive away the unpleasant
> feeling (domanassa) or is it driven by karuna?
> 
> Mudita has lobha as its near enemy. When we see happiness
> of somebody dear to us, is that by attachment or by mudita?
> 
> Equanimity has ignorance as its near enemy. Some people
> mistake ignorance and its associated indifferent feeling as
> equanimity (often stated as upekkha). Equanimity is the
> quality of not falling into unwholesome states. When we
> feel indifferent toward someone's plight, is that lack of
> metta (and lack of equanimity) or is there a knowledge that
> we cannot do anything for the person and that each person
> has kamma as their own?
> 
> We normally like to think good thing about ourselves (like
> we have metta, karuna, mudita, and equanmity, especially
> comparing to other people!), but without knowing these
> different qualities, then developing them to a high degree
> is impossible, and a lot of time, thinking that we actually
> have these qualities are just wishful thinking.
> 
> The thing is to develop kusala, and to discard akusala.
> What if we are in a situation that requires us to rebuke
> somebody to help others? My question would then be, is that
> rebuke done out of kusala or akusala? Rebuking somebody out
> of anger to help other people are akusala kamma, and one
> will certainly suffer the result of that akusala kamma, and
> enjoy the fruit out of the kusala intention for another. We
> need to be straight and true to the dhamma: if it is kusala,
> then it is kusala; if it is akusala, it is akusala. Wishing
> it some way or another doesn't change the realities.
> 
> I reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. The
> Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick) 3
> different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the Buddha that
> the water was unsuitable for drinking because of recent herd
> crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda eventually
> found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha couldn't get
> suitable water was said to be his chasing away his herd from
> unsuitable water in a previous live. Although he did this
> out of good intention, but akusala alternated with kusala,
> and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.
> 
> I believe the Buddha encouraged us to develop all levels of
> kusala (dana, sila, and bhavana) whenever an opportunity
> presents itself. He certainly didn't praise akusala or
> indifferent feeling (out of ignorance). But we also have to
> remember, all these qualities rise because of conditions.
> Without hearing the Buddha's teaching, they probably are
> conditioned by our own accumulations and the people with are
> associated with. However, with the Buddha's teachings, we
> can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing detailed
> teachings about these qualities and their enemies, by
> considering them in our daily lives, by knowing their
> benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by knowing
> them as they truly are: conditioned realities that fall away
> immediately that is neither self or ours.
> 
> kom
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: christine_forsyth [mailto:cforsyth@v...]
> > Sent: Friday, May 10, 2002 2:56 AM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6)
> >
> >
> > Dear Sarah, (Larry) and All,
> >
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for
> > me, accepting
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause
> > that aversion arises
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the
> > finger at a particular
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living
> > of our lives, and
> > while understanding that complex conditions
> > bring about suffering -
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether
> > it is ourselves, dear
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to
> > attempt to assist or
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are
> > being treated
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral
> > neutrality? Should we
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should
> > we just say 'It's
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings..
> > shows lack of
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much
> > dosa,mana, clinging, or not
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to
> > preserve silence,
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk
> > losing valued
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional
> > choice. And if I don't
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one
> > action instead of
> > another, the results of that action or non-action
> > are my kama-vipaka
> > eventually?
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in
> > need of protection,
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend Marin
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the
> > communists, and I didn't
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak
> > up because I wasn't a
> > Jew.
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I
> > didn't speak up because
> > I wasn't a trade unionist.
> > Then they came for the Catholics, but I didn't
> > speak up because I was
> > a protestant.
> > Then they came for me, and by that time there was
> > no one left to
> > speak for me."
> > Seemingly a dramatic quote of course, compared to
> > an ordinary person
> > being treated unfairly in daily interactions, but
> > it is talking about
> > the importance of making a stand against wrong.
> > Small daily
> > happenings are miniature reflections of what
> > happens on a larger
> > scale nationally and internationally. When the
> > harm being done (as
> > in the categories above) is to a person who is a
> > little different to
> > the majority, or to whom the majority seem to be
> > either opposed or
> > indifferent, how easy it is to magnify their
> > faults and minimise (or
> > be unable to hear or see clearly) the role of
> > those others doing
> > wrong. How easy to look for the approval of the
> > majority(more like
> > us), and feel validated.
> > So what is a Buddhist to do, to live in the world
> > correctly and
> > unselfishly, with loving-kindness, compassion,
> > sympathetic joy, and
> > equanimity regarding others? Watch our own mind
> > states, and be aware
> > when dosa arises. Is that all? Does this mean
> > ignoring the suffering
> > of others when it could be ameliorated or
> > prevented? Extending or
> > pervading metta, but taking no action? What do
> > the Teachings say?
> >
> > metta,
> > Christine
> >
	
13223

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
Hi, TG -

In a message dated 5/12/02 1:59:33 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
TGrand458@a... writes:


> The Patisambhidamagga (Path of Discrimination) is making the point that -- 
> insight is key in overcoming ignorance and concentration (serenity) is key 
> in 
> overcoming agitation. Also that insight and concentration (serenity) must 
> be 
> combined in order to emerge (break free) from defilements.
> 
> 
=================================
Could you please direct me to where this can be found (what pages or 
section) in this work. I have a copy of the Path of Discrimination, but I 
find it isn't the easiest work to read. 
BTW, I personally think that this is really more of a commentarial 
work than something that properly belongs in the sutta pitaka. (This is not 
to say that I think little of it. In fact, I very much like, for example, the 
fact that is discusses sabhava (own-being/self-nature) and, on my reading, 
denies it. But what I like in it or don't is irrelevant to whether or not it 
properly belongs in the sutta pitaka and whether or not it is actual word of 
the Buddha.)

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13224

From: wynn <wewynal@t...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Iddhi: To Wynn, Sarah, Kom

 	
Hi Suan,

Thank you for your reply. You certainly make it very clear now.

Thanks,
Wynn
	
13225

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:23am
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
op 10-05-2002 14:58 schreef Bodhi2500@a... op Bodhi2500@a...:

> (1)The perfection of giving,firstly,is to be practised by benefitting beings
> in many ways-by relinquishing ones happiness,belongings,body and life to
> others,by dispelling their fear and by instructing them in the dhamma.
> 
> (then we jump to the dispelling their fear section)
> 
> The Giving of fearlessness is the giving of protection to beings when they
> have become frightened on account of
> kings,thieves,fire,water,enemies,lions,tigers,other wild
> beasts,dragons,orges,demons,goblins etc.
> 
Dear Bodhi 2500, (sorry, I do not know your name), and all,
I am translating A. Sujin's book on the perfections, and was just about to
type what you quoted. I consider these days abhaya dana, the giving of
fearlessness, a lot. When there is this kind of dana, we have no grudges, we
forgive wrongs and have goodwill for the person who was unpleasant. A. Sujin
in her book stresses how all the perfections are connected and come into
play. I find it inspiring to see forgiving as a kind of dana. In Thai to
<give abhaya> is to forgive. (Maybe Kom can say more about this)
A. Sujin writes:

<There is another kind of dåna, generosity. Someone who develops the
perfections should consider the gift of fearlessness, or forgiving,
abhayadåna. If someone does not know that this is a perfection he will not
forgive someone else who has done him wrong. We should reflect on the gift
of fearlessness: if we do not forgive others how can we attain enlightenment
and eradicate defilements? This may be a condition for the gift of
fearlessness. This is a way of generosity higher than the giving of material
things, åmisa dåna. If we cannot forgive someone we do not like, we cannot
develop other kinds of kusala either with regard to this person. Even
material things that we could give such a person we are unable to give,
because we do not forgive him or we are still angry with him. For the same
reasons we cannot even give him the gift of Dhamma, Dhamma dåna, in helping
him with Dhamma discussion, or advise him as to what is useful in life and
what is not useful.
The gift of fearlessness or forgiving is the condition for the perfection of
morality, síla pårami, to develop; it is the condition for abstinence of
wrong action and speech we could commit towards someone we have not
forgiven. We should consider how our action and speech would be towards a
person we have not forgiven. Our conduct would not be as a friend and thus
kusala could not develop. How could we than cross over to the other shore,
namely, the eradication of defilements?
This shows us that our consideration of the nature of kusala in daily life
should be very refined. >

She then explains how essential panna is for the development of the
perfections. 
I had something happen to me. A family member I call X has done some
injustice to me, and although it was my duty to visit X, I thought, to what
use is my visit, I have so many other things to do, X will not appreciate
it. After deliberation with my husband I thought it was good to have metta
for X, to forgive X. So we see if there is dosa left we cannot even do other
kinds of kusala. My kusala is often sasankharika, induced or prompted.
Or it happens that I forgive, but aversion arises again. That means, not
enough accumulation of the perfections. Also patience is important. I like
the commentary to the Cariyapitaka: there should be an unpleasant person,
otherwise we cannot train in patience. This is like an example given once by
Eric, taken from the Mahayana tradition, that your enemy can be your
teacher. So, we should be glad when someone speaks harsh words to us, or
write harsh E mails to us. A. Sujin said in her book that some people appear
to be very patient and others do not. Those who are patient have trained
this virtue she said. She has an immense amount herself. Dan and Eric
discussed training, and as Dan said, no self who directs the training, but
there can be training in the perfections, in patience, and that can be a
real hard training! How much can we stand ? We have to think also of very
unimportant happenings in daily life, dropping something on the floor,
breaking a dish, hearing loud music, stumbling.
I had just written this and then there was small chaos in my kitchen,
dropping small frozen bits of patatoe on the kitchen floor while I was
frying in hot oil. Picking them up one by one. Just as well I had written
about patience in small things! Realities present themselves and we can
never know what will happen: reflection on patience or awareness of it as
only a kind of nama, cold presenting itself, or clinging to the fact of
remembering patience. They present themselves in a unsystematical way; I did
not select to remember patience, I did not select cold. How could we first
be aware of rupa, then of feeling, then of citta and then of dhamma? I do
not see anything systematical here.

It is especially panna that is the condition for training in the
perfections, because, as Kom said, you have to know the citta well, know the
good qualities and their near enemies. I cannot resist quoting the end of
his post I appreciate so much:

<However, with the Buddha's teachings, we
can develop them to the finest degree, by hearing detailed
teachings about these qualities and their enemies, by
considering them in our daily lives, by knowing their
benefits and the faults of their opposites, and by knowing
them as they truly are: conditioned realities that fall away
immediately that is neither self or ours.>

Now that I am in the mood of quoting, I also was particularly happy with
Sarah's post about encouragement to remember the brahma viharas when writing
E mails, and about situations where we are wronged or dear ones who are
wronged by others:

<However, when we are objecting and
finding ourselves and those we find dear’ so important, we forget about
metta, compassion and other noble qualities. We forget about conditions
both for the others’ words and actions and also we forget about kamma and
other factors which lead us (and our dear ones) to hear ,experience and
interpret as we do.>
I find that it helps to realize that the cittas which inspired harsh words
and the cittas which were unpleasant experiences have fallen away
immediately. Why holding on to it.
With appreciation of all the good posts that remind me to develop the
perfections,
Nina. 



	
13226

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 2:35am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi, Sarah -

Thanks for the kind wishes. I seem to be fine now. Evidently, what 
occurred was an interaction between grapefruit and, mainly, Lipitor, a 
cholesterol-controlling medication, as well as with several other medications 
I take. It turns out that grapefruit interacts badly with numerous common 
medications, a fact that would be good for people to know. I even found 
several web sites dealing with this topic, one of which is the following: 
http://www.powernetdesign.com/grapefruit Actually, I've been told by a 
pharmacist that people have died from grapefruit-medication interactions.
As you correctly point out, with regard to feelings of compassion etc, 
and other mind-state characteristics, most mind-moments, let alone their 
detailed characteristics, are missed by us. Our attention, our mindfulness 
and clear comprehension, is generally far too gross, not anywhere 
sufficiently microscopic, to see clearly the detailed moment-to-moment flux 
of mindstates, especially during "ordinary" (i.e. non-meditative) 
circumstances, and the best we can usually do is to get an overall sense of 
what predominates, along with an occasional focussing in on greater detail.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/12/02 2:46:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: 
> 
> > I think it is very useful to be 
> > particularly mindful on those occasions at which one of them seems to be
> > in 
> > effect with regard to a stranger, for that is a likely circumstance for
> > us 
> > not to be mistaken.
> .....
> Speaking for myself, there is so much ignorance accumulated, that any
> occasion or circumstance is one in which mental states are likely to be
> mistaken. We tend to think in terms of an occasion or stretch of time or
> action, but in reality the noble and far less noble states are changing
> very rapidly and so at one moment there may be metta, the next attachment
> and so on.
> .....
> 
> Having said that, I sincerely hope you have no recurrence of the ‘episode’
> that sent you to the ER and really appreciated your account of kindness
> and compassion for the other patients. I’m quite sure you also helped
> ‘turn’ what might have been a difficult and unpleasant occasion for them
> into a meaningful and happy one. They’re probably still talking about your
> kindness;-)
> 
> The account was also an excellent example of how so often we think of a
> particular ‘occasion’ or set of symptoms as being unpleasant (visit to ER
> or unusual symptoms), but really the moments of vipaka (result of kamma)
> through the sense doors are very brief and it’s the following unwholesome
> mental states that are the real problem. Even the bodily experiences at
> these times are not all unpleasant either as you’ve said.
> 
> Thank you, Howard, for sharing the fine examples of metta and compassion.
> Who knows, but maybe, just maybe, these mental states had ‘cured’ the
> problem by the time the drs started the tests;-))
> 
> Hoping you stay well and healthy,
> 
> Sarah
> =====
> 
> > An example in this regard is what happened to me yesterday. I
> > spent 
> > yesterday afternoon through to 10 p.m. in the emergency room of a
> > hospital. 
> > (I had been experiencing frequent very odd, though, ironically, not 
> > completely unpleasant, "episodes" yesterday which are quite difficult to
> > 
> > describe. Whatever it was, it was some sort of malfunction. All tests
> > were 
> > negative <snip>
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13227

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:53am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 	
Hi Jon, Anders and all,

I would like to share some thoughts regarding the practice of 
satipatthana.

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
[snip]
> > The Satipatthana Sutta:
> > 
> > "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, 
to 
> > the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding 
his 
> > legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to 
the 
> > fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes 
in; 
> > mindful he breathes out. "
> 
> It goes without saying, of course, that mindfulness can arise while 
one is sitting,
> as in this passage from the sutta. The crucial question though is 
whether the
> teachings recommend sitting *as a means to* the development of 
mindfulness.
> 


The teaching in Satipatthana Sutta describes how satipatthana is 
practiced; thus whether the teaching recommends sitting as a means to 
the development of mindfulness is subject to speculation. 

Having read that the Buddha said:

"There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, to 
the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his 
legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the 
fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; 
mindful he breathes out. "

the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a model 
that I would emulate. And this is how I learn how to establish 
mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
examples in the discourse and emulate them. It is a process 
of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.

Regards,
Victor
	
13228

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 7:12am
Subject: RE: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): dukkha Kiriya

 	
Dear Robert,

The piece, I believe, comes from the commentaries from
Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. The piece that you heard about
dukkha-kiriya is also interesting. Another story (related
one?) about why he had to do that for 6 years is because in
one life, when the bodhi-satta was associated with people
with the wrong view, he criticized a samma-sambuddha "the
balded sammana's dispensation is truly hard", and hence he
had to do dukkha-kiriya for 6 years before he reached the
attainment.

kkkkm

> -----Original Message-----
> From: robertkirkpatrick.rm
> [mailto:robertkirkpatrick@r...]
> Sent: Sunday, May 12, 2002 4:30 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)
>
>
> ---
> Dear Kom.
> This is very good post. I was especially
> interested in the piece:I
> reiterate the story from Maha-pari-nibbana sutta. The
> > Buddha asked V. Ananda for water (when he was sick) 3
> > different times, but V. Ananda mentioned to the
> Buddha that
> > the water was unsuitable for drinking because
> of recent herd
> > crossing. The Buddha insisted, and V. Ananda eventually
> > found suitable water. The fact that the Buddha
> couldn't get
> > suitable water was said to be his chasing away
> his herd from
> > unsuitable water in a previous live. Although
> he did this
> > out of good intention, but akusala alternated
> with kusala,
> > and the bad vipaka resulted from the akusala kamma.""
> I haven't read this in English, did you get it in
> the Thai?
> A similar thing happened withregard to the
> Buddha's attainment, As
> you know it took him 6years after he left the
> palce before finally
> reaching samasambuddha. This is not usual for a
> bodhisatta in the
> life they attain and most become Buddhas on the
> very day they leave
> laylife. The Buddha of this time spent most of
> the 6years caught up
> useless austerities. This was because in his last
> human life
> (vessantara), when he gave his children to the
> Brahmin, he had a few
> moments of aversion when he heard the Brahmin
> beating them as he
> went away. (I'm doing this from memory so might
> have a detail
> wrong). Fortunately he quickly conquered the
> defilement and was able
> to perfect the parami.
> best wishes
> robert
	
13229

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 3:36am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/12/02 5:38:43 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Jon -
> > 
> > In a message dated 5/5/02 9:22:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> > jonoabb@y... writes:
> 
> > > I'm not sure in what sense you would see visible or audible data as 
> being 
> > > 'phantom' or 'a
> > > shadow'. The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last for 
> only a 
> > > brief moment
> > > doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their own capable of 
> being 
> > > discerned by
> > > consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 'individual essence'). Do 
> you 
> > > see a necessary
> > > contradiction in these 2 attributes (conditionality vs. own essence)?
> > > 
> > -------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> > The problem I have here is with the adjectival phrase "of their 
> own" 
> > in the sentence "The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last 
> for 
> > only a brief moment doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their 
> own 
> > capable of being discerned by consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 
> > 'individual essence')." Everything about these phenomena, including their 
> 
> > very existence, arises in total dependence on conditions, all of which 
> are 
> > equally empty of own-being. What arises in total dependence on other 
> > conditions does not have own-being, and inasmuch as these other 
> conditions 
> > are equally without own-being, the emptiness is thoroughgoing.
> 
> I think you are saying:
> (a) Phenomena arise in dependence on conditions
> (b) Something that arises in dependence on something else cannot have 
> own-being
> (c) Accordingly, these phenomena could not have a distinct characteristic
> 
> I am with you on (a) and (b), but not on (c). In the Abhidhamma, the 
> attribute of
> 'empty of self' is not seen as necessarily connoting 'lacking own (i.e., 
> distinct)
> characteristic'.
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
================================
I wouldn't be with me on (c) either! ;-)) I would not say: 
"Accordingly, these phenomena could not have a distinct characteristic" It is 
not that they do not have distinct characteristics. They do. Phenomena do 
have characteristics. We recognize phenomena based on their characteristics. 
What is the case is that these characteristics are not *intrinsic*, not 
"owned", but arise in dependence on other empty conditions. The very 
phenomena, themselves, as existents, are not self-owned, but depend on their 
characteristics (in fact, cannot be separated from them), depend on being 
discerned, and arise, as by a conjurer's trick, from the confluence of other 
empty phenomena. 
I don't think we differ on the facts, Jon, but on how we think about 
them. We differ, I think, on our emphasis. There is also a difference, I 
think, in "flavor". My sense of things is that of a thoroughgoing 
impersonality and insubstantiality, without discrete, separate, independent, 
self-existence. 

With metta,
Howard



/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13230

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 3:41am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 	
Hi, Jon -

I just sent off a reply to another post of yours which, I think, will 
serve as a reply to this one as well. I'll leave this, for you to look at 
that other reply. The central question, as I see it, is the question of 
confounding discreteness in occurrence with independent existence, with 
self-existence.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/12/02 5:48:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> I hope you don’t mind me coming in on this thread (since this is a topic we 
> are
> discussing in another thread).
> 
> --- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Robert -
> > In a message dated 5/3/02 4:48:19 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> > robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
> > > Dhammas like feeling and anger and greed and hardness are real -
> > > unlike concepts such as human and man - but dhammas are impermanent. 
> > > A dhamma cannot be changed into something other than what it is 
> > > right now, but it lasts for an infinitely brief instant only, no 
> > > matter we want it to stay or go. 
> > > best wishes
> > > robert
> > > 
> > > 
> > ============================
> > Yes, these dhammas exist, conditions exist - they are not 
> imagined. 
> > The question is what their mode of existence is. They are 
> things-in-relation, 
> > arising in dependence on other, similarly empty conditions, including 
> > discernment (vi~n~nana). We tend to see them as separate and 
> self-existing, 
> > and that is avijja. 
> 
> I've pondered over this for some time, but remain puzzled about one or two 
> of your
> references. 
> 
> 'Dhammas are things-in-relation'. What particular aspect do you have in 
> mind here,
> over and above the fact that dhammas are conditioned?
> 
> 'We tend to see dhammas as separate'. I am not sure in what sense you mean 
> this. 
> Individual dhammas are said to be discrete, I believe, even when arising in
> conjunction with other dhammas. Is it not more helpful to consider that we 
> tend to
> see wholes (concepts) and not the individual (i.e., separate) dhammas that 
> are the
> realities to which those concepts refer?
> 
> Jon
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13231

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:49am
Subject: On the Realist Interpretation

 	
/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13232

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:50am
Subject: Re: On the Realist Interpretation

 	
Whoops! Hit the send button WAY too soon! ;-) I'll try again.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13233

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
In a message dated 5/12/2002 6:14:02 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:



> Could you please direct me to where this can be found (what pages or 
> section) in this work. I have a copy of the Path of Discrimination, but I 
> find it isn't the easiest work to read. 
> BTW, I personally think that this is really more of a commentarial 
> work than something that properly belongs in the sutta pitaka. (This is not 
> to say that I think little of it. In fact, I very much like, for example, 
> the 
> fact that is discusses sabhava (own-being/self-nature) and, on my reading, 
> denies it. But what I like in it or don't is irrelevant to whether or not 
> it 
> properly belongs in the sutta pitaka and whether or not it is actual word 
> of 
> the Buddha.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 



Hi Howard

In the "Path of Discrimination" the "Treatise on Coupling" Page 287 -- 295 
deals heavily with the issue of insight and serenity combining. 

I agree with your analysis of the Patisambhidamagga. I think of it as a 
hybrid between Sutta and Abhidhamma. It seems closer to Sutta based than 
Abhidhamma based, which may be why they put it in the 5th Nikaya.

This book is a marvel of insight analysis. Ven. Nanamoli died before it was 
"polished" and the one problem I have with the translation is his use of the 
word "idea" for dhamma. He was experimenting with it and I doubt he would 
have kept it in if he had been alive but that is 100% speculation. Anyway, I 
find if I substitute the word "state(s)" for his "idea(s)" the work makes 
much more sense 99% of the time.

This text requires full concentration throughout and takes several readings 
before its structure becomes more apparent and makes it an "easier read." 
Nevertheless, its like a nursery rhyme compared to the Dhammasangani or 
Patthana. LOL

TG


	
13234

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 7:15am
Subject: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, all - 

The following is in response to recent conversations on DSG, and it 
constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote out, but, I 
believe, never mailed:
In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in which a 
dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in effect, it is 
independent in the sense that those conditions which came together resulting 
in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer exist. 
Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and unconditionally.
Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes condition its 
cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions which caused 
it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the dhamma is a 
true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we have both 
substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same theory!
A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to indicate that 
a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional theory of the 
genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with basics of the 
Buddha's Dhamma.
Comments, anyone?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13235

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 7:46am
Subject: Re: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
In a message dated 5/12/2002 11:18:13 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:


> 
> 
> The following is in response to recent conversations on DSG, and it 
> constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote out, but, I 
> believe, never mailed:
> In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in which a 
> dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in effect, it 
> is 
> independent in the sense that those conditions which came together 
> resulting 
> in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer exist. 
> Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and unconditionally.
> Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes condition its 
> cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions which caused 
> it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the dhamma is a 
> true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we have both 
> substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same theory!
> A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to indicate 
> that 
> a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional theory of 
> the 
> genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with basics of the 
> Buddha's Dhamma.
> Comments, anyone?
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 

My comment is its bogus. Dhamma here meaning "living teachings of dhamma." 
The Buddha clearly states all sorts of reasons why Dhamma continues to become 
or does not continue to become. Its not magic. Its Dependent Arising.

TG

PS I hope I understood what you were talking about. LOL


	
13236

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 8:57am
Subject: Re: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, TG -

In a message dated 5/12/02 2:54:06 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
TGrand458@a... writes:


> My comment is its bogus. Dhamma here meaning "living teachings of dhamma." 
> 
> The Buddha clearly states all sorts of reasons why Dhamma continues to 
> become 
> or does not continue to become. Its not magic. Its Dependent Arising.
> 
> TG
> 
> PS I hope I understood what you were talking about. LOL
> 
========================
I'm not certain whether you understand me or not. Are we in agreement 
or disagreement on this?

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13237

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 3:58pm
Subject: Re: 4 brahmavihara, 4 near enemies RE: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Dear Frank (& Kom),

--- frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> wrote: > Hi Kom,
> Do you know which suttas describe the 4 near
> enemies? According to my recollection of what Jack
> Kornfield's book said (i.e. 2 levels of
> unverifiedness) :
> 
> near enemy of sympathetic joy (mudita) is jealousy,
> near enemy of equanimity (upekkha) is
> indifference/apathy
***** 

Let me add the following extract (which I posted ages ago) from the
Atthasalini below.

I understand that the near enemy of mudita (sympathetic joy) is “joy based
on the homelife” (Vis, 1X,100), i.e happiness connected with attachment.
The far enemy is dislike or aversion. In the Vis, it mentions “aversion
(boredom)”. The proximate cause for both mudita and jealousy is the same,
however and that is someone else’s good fortune.

With regard to upekkha (equanimity), the Atth below mentions delusion
accompanied by indifference as the near enemy. In the Vis (1X, 101) we
read that “equanimity has the equanimity of unknowing based on the home
life as its near enemy”.Below we read lusta and aversion are the far
enemies (“greed and resentment” in the Vis. translation). 
*****
QUOTE
> from the Atthasalini (PTS edition p.260):

..Each of them has two enemies, near and distant. To expand: of the Divine

State of love <metta> the near enemy is lust, because, like love, it sees 
merits. It is like a foe lurking near a man. Quickly it finds access. 
Hence love should be well protected from lust. Ill-will is its distant 
enemy. From its dissimilarity in nature it is like a man's foe dwelling in

a mountain fastness, etc. hence love should be cultivated secure from 
ill-will. It is impossible that one should cultivate love and at the same 
time get angry.

As to pity <karuna>, one who views visible objects, desirable, lovable, 
endearing, delightful, associated with craving, objects which have not
been 
obtained formerly as now past, ceased, changed, is filled with the sorrow 
called worldly. This, because it also contemplates adversity, is the near 
enemy of the Divine State of pity. From its dissimilarity in nature
cruelty 
is the distant enemy. Hence pity should be cultivated secure from cruelty.

It is impossible that one should cultivate pity and at the same time
strike 
with the hand etc.

As to sympathy (mudita), one who views visible objects, desirable, etc, is

filled with joy called wordly. This, because it also contemplates 
prosperity, is the near enemy of the Divine State of sympathy. From its 
dissimilarity in nature dislike is its distant enemy. Hence sympathy
should 
be cultivated secure from it. It is impossible that one should by 
sympathetic and at the same time be discontented with secluded monasteries

or with the higher moral states <adhikusaladhammesu>.

The fool who has seen a visible object and who is deluded, an average man 
who has not overcome the limits of his lower nature and result of former 
births, who does not see the evils of all conditioned things, is 
unacquainted with the teaching- this average man is filled with such 
indifference as is not able to transcend the visible object. Hence it is 
called worldly, and is mere delusion. Owing to its similarity in not 
considering faults and merits, it is the near enemy of the Divine State of

equanimity (upekkha>. From their dissimilarity in nature, both lust and 
aversion are its distant enemies. Hence equanimity should be cultivated 
secure from them. It is impossible that one should cultivate equanimity, 
and at the same time be enamoured with, or hurt another....

<End Quote>
*****

Thanks for encouraging me to check,

Sarah
====


	
13238

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:34pm
Subject: Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Dear Howard,
In theravada there is no possibilty of any dhamma , except nibbana, 
existing "alone and unconditionally.". Just one example: ALL dhammas 
(except nibbana) have arammana paccaya (object condition) as one of 
their present conditions.
best wishes
robert
--- --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, all - 
> 
> The following is in response to recent conversations on 
DSG, and it 
> constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote 
out, but, I 
> believe, never mailed:
> In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in 
which a 
> dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
effect, it is 
> independent in the sense that those conditions which came together 
resulting 
> in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
longer exist. 
> Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
unconditionally.
> Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
condition its 
> cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
which caused 
> it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the 
dhamma is a 
> true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we 
have both 
> substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same 
theory!
> A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to 
indicate that 
> a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional 
theory of the 
> genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with basics 
of the 
> Buddha's Dhamma.
> Comments, anyone?
> 
> With metta,
> Howard


13239

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:41pm
Subject: Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory correction.

 	
---
Sorry, I should have said that For instance all cittas have arammana 
paccaya as one of their present conditions.
In dhammastudygroup@y..., "robertkirkpatrick.rm" 
<robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
> Dear Howard,
> In theravada there is no possibilty of any dhamma , except 
nibbana, 
> existing "alone and unconditionally.". Just one example: ALL 
dhammas 
> (except nibbana) have arammana paccaya (object condition) as one 
of 
> their present conditions.
> best wishes
> robert
> --- --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, all - 
> > 
> > The following is in response to recent conversations on 
> DSG, and it 
> > constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote 
> out, but, I 
> > believe, never mailed:
> > In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in 
> which a 
> > dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
> effect, it is 
> > independent in the sense that those conditions which came 
together 
> resulting 
> > in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
> longer exist. 
> > Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
> unconditionally.
> > Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
> condition its 
> > cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
> which caused 
> > it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the 
> dhamma is a 
> > true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus 
we 
> have both 
> > substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same 
> theory!
> > A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to 
> indicate that 
> > a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional 
> theory of the 
> > genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with 
basics 
> of the 
> > Buddha's Dhamma.
> > Comments, anyone?
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard


13240

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:41pm
Subject: Re: "ritual" [reply to Frank]

 	
Dear Frank,

> What I mean is that progress in yoga and spiritual
> practice does not always show tangible incremental
> signs of improvement on a daily basis. Months can pass
> before progress is seen, but the crucial point is that
> those months of seeming non-progress laid the
> foundation for the "breakthrough". We must not cease
> persistent practice if we do not get instant results.
> There is no other way to create fertile conditions for
> genuine insight to arise.

When I first started practicing meditation with an intensive 2-week 
retreat, I saw a lot of what I called "progress" on a daily basis. I 
was delighted, even ecstatic at how wonderful it all was. When I 
discussed this with a monk as I was returning home, he told me that 
the delight with the calm and the special sensual experiences would 
fade shortly, and, of course, he was right.

After going back home, I found that nothing had really changed, 
despite the (mistaken) perception of great progress. I got into a 
pattern of intensive retreat (10 days to 4 weeks) once per year and 
daily maintenance practice (one to two hours per day) and kept it up 
for seven years. After that, I could no longer go on intensive 
retreats without failing in other responsibilities, but I kept up on 
the daily practice. The calm and the concentration and the witnessing 
of subtle sensations and the special experiences got more and more 
pronounced and profound feeling. So many things seemed like 
breakthroughs and progress! And yet, for the most part they weren't 
really. 

My ideas of breakthroughs and progress have changed in the years 
since. Come to think of it, I don't think much about "progress" at 
all anymore, and still less about "breakthroughs." If I compare 
myself now to myself when I first learned about Dhamma 14 years ago, 
I see a tremendous difference. How much of the "progress" is due to 
learning Dhamma and how much is due to simple maturing? Clearly, some 
is due to each, and for much of it, it is difficult to discern the 
cause. However, for some of it, it is clear that it was conditioned 
by Dhamma...

Breakthroughs -- If by "breakthough" you mean a single realization 
that significantly and noticeably changes they way you approach and 
live life, I can count on one hand the number of maturing 
breakthroughs in the past 14 years, and can count on one finger the 
number of Dhamma breakthroughs. In some sense, then, it is not 
difficult to tell just which part of the progress is Dhamma-related 
and which part is just due to standard maturing. 

Single moments of sharp insight -- when something becomes very clear 
for an instant (like a flash), and the mind immediately thereafter 
thinks: "Aha! So this is what those words really mean" or "Aha! There 
it was" -- certainly can have an impact and happen with far greater 
frequency than the kind of breakthrough discussed above (maybe even 
several times per year). You can remember these long after the fact, 
but in looking back, it is clear that any given insight like this 
does not have a significant, lasting effect. 

Single moments of softer insight -- when something becomes suddenly 
very clear over a short period of time as several dim flashes seem to 
illuminate the understanding, and the mind thinks: "O.K. I see that 
now" or "O.K. There it was" -- happen with much greater frequency 
(maybe even daily or several times a day). The moments are mildly 
disorienting. I can remember few specific instances of these, but I 
can see their effects accumulating.

Special experiences -- when something out of the ordinary happens in 
formal meditation when the mind is calm and the concentration sharp, 
and the mind thinks: "Cool! I'm making progress now" or "Cool! Things 
are going well now" or "I'm so glad I sat down to practice today" -- 
happen on occasion with daily formal practice and may happen 
frequently during intensive retreats. They seem to have some residual 
effects throughout the day or even for several days. The mind may 
seem calmer or lighter for some time, and there may well be an 
increased frequency and intensity of pleasant vedana. This can feel 
very nice. A common (and ditthi inducing) result of such a special 
experience "breakthrough" is increased lobha disguised as "progress." 

Case I. In my experience, the "special experiences" have been 
strongly and directly related to formal practice. These are certainly 
pleasant, but there is little (if any) connection with panya. 
However, there is a very strong, almost irresistable temptation to 
think that the special experiences are either insight, evidence of 
insight, or conducive to insight and to discount or ignore or even 
fail to see the lobha conditioned by these pleasant experiences. 

Case II. The single moments of sharp insight seem also to have been 
related directly related to the formal training. The concentration is 
sharpened to the extent that even subtle sensations appear very 
clear. A small insight appears in sharp relief and seems like a big 
insight. The mind reacts with strong lobha for these small insights 
that feel big. 

In both these cases, there is development of a preference for the 
conditions of quiet room, closed eyes, spine erect, concentration 
sharp -- lobha for special conditions, special experiences is 
unwittingly cultivated. So dangerous! The real working field for 
Dhamma is every moment, all types of conditions, every type of 
experience. When practice of Dhamma is confined to special places, 
special times, special conditions, special techniques, special 
experiences, we forget about studying the present moment because the 
concentration is not so sharp or because there are distractions or 
because we have to work on other obligations or sensual ingulgences 
("I'll think about Dhamma later...") 

Case III. The single moments of softer insight that occur with some 
frequency and whose effects are noticeably accumulated are not 
directly related to formal practice. In fact, they may even occur 
more frequently when the practice is not viewed as a technique to be 
done in such and such a place or in such and such a way, but rather, 
each moment is taken as an opportunity for practice. And it's not a 
matter of *A Practice*, per se, but, rather, just practice. No 
directing the mind to a particular object, but, instead, being aware 
of the characteristics of the mind that appears at this moment, as it 
arises and passes away, understanding the characteristics of mind as 
it arises and passes away. 

How? Well, when sati arises, this moment is understood as seeing, 
that moment as hearing, this mind with lobha, that mind with dosa, 
this dosa arising from craving, etc. Sati does not arise from anyone 
directing the mind to note any particular object or to look for any 
particular thing, but when dhammas arise with right view and sati, 
the characteristics are known and understood. They just arise and 
pass away, without being anyone, without being directed by anyone, 
without being conjured by anyone, without being owned by anyone. Mind 
with panya simply knows about dhammas and what to do with them and 
how to react to them without anyone needing to tell it about the 
dhammas and what to do with them and how to react to them. 

Dan
	

13241

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 6:57pm
Subject: Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
--Dear Howard,
This extract from the introduction of "Conditions" by Nina van 
gorkom probably answers some of your queries:

"Rúpas, physical phenomena, do not arise singly, but in groups, 
which can be produced by kamma, by citta, by heat or by nutrition . 
Thus we see that there is no reality which arises singly. Realities 
do not arise by their own power, they are dependant on other 
phenomena which make them arise. Moreover, there is not any reality 
which arises from a single cause, there is a concurrence of several 
conditions through which realities arise. ....If we understand that 
there is a multiplicity of conditions we will be less inclined to 
think that pain and pleasure can be controlled by a self. Or do we 
still think so? ...Nåma conditions rúpa and rúpa conditions nåma. We 
read in the Visuddhimagga (XVIII, 32) about the interdependence of 
nåma and rúpa:

... For just as when two sheaves of reeds are propped up one against 
the other, each one gives the other consolidating support, and when 
one falls the other falls, so too, in the five-constituent (five 
khandhas ) becoming, mentality-materiality occurs as an 
interdependent state, each of its components giving the other 
consolidating support, and when one falls owing to death, the other 
falls too. Hence the Ancients said:
The mental and material
Are twins and each supports the other;
When one breaks up they both break up
Through interconditionality.
......In being mindful of nåma and rúpa we will learn to distinguish 
their different characteristics, thus, we will not confuse nåma and 
rúpa, and we will also know them as conditioned realities, not 
self.""endquote
best wishes
robert 
- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, all - 
> 
> The following is in response to recent conversations on 
DSG, and it 
> constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote 
out, but, I 
> believe, never mailed:
> In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in 
which a 
> dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
effect, it is 
> independent in the sense that those conditions which came together 
resulting 
> in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
longer exist. 
> Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
unconditionally.
> Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
condition its 
> cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
which caused 
> it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the 
dhamma is a 
> true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we 
have both 
> substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same 
theory!
> A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to 
indicate that 
> a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional 
theory of the 
> genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with basics 
of the 
> Buddha's Dhamma.
> Comments, anyone?
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
	


13242

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 9:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] kilesa

 	
Hi TG,
Since we don't seem to have a definitive statement, I'm going to take a
stab at it and say this means lobha, dosa, mana (conceit), ditthi,
ahirika (shamelessness), and anottappa (consciencelessness) are cut off
by insight and moha, vicikiccha (doubt), thina (torpor), and uddhacca
(restlessness) are cut off by jhana.

Incidently, ditthi and vicikiccha are eliminated at stream entry. Dosa
is eliminated at non-returner state. Lobha, moha, mana, thina, uddhacca,
anottappa, and ahirika are eliminated at arahatship.

best wishes, Larry
-----------------
"At the time of developing the eight mundane attainments the serenity
power is in excess, while at the time of developing the contemplations
of impermanence, etc., the insight power is in excess. But at the noble
path moment they occur coupled together in the sense that neither one
exceeds the other. So there is coupling of the powers in the case of
each one of these four kinds of knowledge, according as it is said 'When
he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and from the
aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction, concentration, has
cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the defilements associated
with ignorance and from the aggregates, his insight in the sense of
contemplation has cessation as its domain. So serenity and insight have
a single nature in the sense of emergence, they are coupled together,
and neither exceeds the other. Hence it was said: He develops serenity
and insight coupled together in the sense of emergence.'"
Vism XXII, 46
	
13243

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 11:23pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 4 Ultimate Realities? (Sarah)

 	
Hi TG (& Howard),

--- TGrand458@a... wrote: > Hi Sarah.
> 
> I put the question mark back in the title. ;-) I understand your
> points and 
> I thank you for them.
> 
> I just wanted to comment on one point you made suggesting that seeing
> things 
> as phantoms would in essence be counter-productive. (I deleted the
> e-mail 
> accidentally.) I think you were pointing out that it is another concept
> to 
> get in the way of seeing things directly.
.....
I think I was just indicating that attempts to 'break down' elements or
see them as 'phantoms' or 'mirages' or 'plaintain trees' is not the same
of being aware of the characteristics or realities. This doesn't mean the
concepts are not useful for reminding us of the impermanence or
non-core/anatta nature. As you indicate below, the use of different
concepts can help decrease the attachment and wrong view that is so
ingrained.

Thanks for clarifying and apologies for anything that wasn't clear.< I
also mostly agreed with Howard's follow-on comments, except for "the
awareness of the emptiness of conceptual dhammas";-)>

Appreciating all your contributions

Sarah
======

> 
> I began this topic by quoting the Samyutta Nikaya and this is how the
> Buddha 
> recommended seeing "realities"...
> 
> Form -- should be seen as -- A Lump of Foam
> Feeling -- should be seen as -- A Bursting Bubble
> Perception -- should be seen as -- A Mirage
> Mental Formations -- should be seen as -- A Plaintain Tree (coreless)
> Consciousness -- should be seen as -- A Conjurors Trick
> 
> The way I see it, 'phantoms' fits in pretty well. Perhaps the Buddha
> saw 
> that certain concepts and even imaginations (based on principles of
> dependent 
> arising, impermanence, unsatisfactoriness, and no-self) could be used to
> help 
> free the mind from attachment.
> 
> Take care. TG


	
13244

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Sun May 12, 2002 11:49pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 	
Hi Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> Concepts are thoughts. Thoughts are mind objects. 
.....
Yes
.....
>What concepts 
> *refer* to, what they subsume, are frequently illusory, imagined, and
> not 
> existent at all. 
.....
yes
.....
>The concept of a red fire engine is a *thought*. 
.....
Yes
.....
>It
> exists - 
> just as hardness, anger, and smells exist.
.....
Thinking or Experiencing (of the concept or thought) exists. So does the
accompanying anger, pleasure and so on. However, I don't agree that 'the
red fire engine', 'the phantom', even the 'seeing' or 'hearing' as objects
of thinking exist. 

And so, only the thinking, anger, pleasure or other realities can be
objects of awareness. I know we have something of an ‘impasse’ here, but
both for this point and for some of the others you are raising in other
posts on characteristics, sabhava, self-nature, I’d like to add a quote:
.....
Quote from Sub Cy to Mulapariyaya Sutta, B.Bodhi p32:
*****
“They bear their own characteristics”: although there are no dhammas
devoid of their own characteristics <lakhana?>, this is still said for the
purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas endowed with their specific
natures <sabhava?> devoid of such attributions as that of a “being” etc. 
Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasureableness, and permanence,
etc, or nature (pakati), substance (dabba), soul (jiva), body etc, which
are mere misconstructions (parikappitaakaaramatta) due to craving and
views, or such entities as “sky-flowers” etc which are mere expressions of
conventional discourse (lokavohaaramatta), cannot be discovered as
ultimately real actualities (saccika.t.thaparamatthato), these dhammas
(i.e. those endowed with a specific nature) can. Tthese dhammas are
discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real
distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still, in
order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a
mere metaphorical device (upacaaramatta). Or else they are borne, they
are discerned, known, according to their specific nature, thus they are
dhammas (dhaariiyanti vaa yathaasabhaavato avadhaariyanti ~naayantii ti
dhammaa).
*****
Always good to hear your considerations,

Sarah
====


	
13245

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 0:06am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch.6 (1-6): indifferent (long)

 	
Hi again Howard,

--- upasaka@a... wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> Thanks for the kind wishes. I seem to be fine now. Evidently,
> what 
> occurred was an interaction between grapefruit and, mainly, Lipitor, 
<snip>
.....
Glad to hear you're OK now. One hears of grapefruit diets and grapefruit
pills, so I guess it's powerful stuff;-)
.....
> As you correctly point out, with regard to feelings of compassion
> etc, 
> and other mind-state characteristics, most mind-moments, let alone their
> 
> detailed characteristics, are missed by us. Our attention, our
> mindfulness 
> and clear comprehension, is generally far too gross, not anywhere 
> sufficiently microscopic, to see clearly the detailed moment-to-moment
> flux 
> of mindstates, especially during "ordinary" (i.e. non-meditative) 
> circumstances, and the best we can usually do is to get an overall sense
> of 
> what predominates, along with an occasional focussing in on greater
> detail.
.....
This is just what I understood from your post and for once we're in full
agreement <shock!>

Like you say, sometimes when giving or showing kindness or speaking out,
we can only have "an overall sense of what prdominates". Sometimes later,
like when I'm about to fall asleep, I find there may be further reflection
or reminders of some kusala (wholesome state)from the day and this can be
occasion for a little more kusala with calm, although again it's very
often (usually) quickly followed by attachment.

Thank you again for the kind examples and good reminders even whilst
waiting at a hospital.

Sarah
=====

	
13246

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 3:02am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 	
Hi Jon,

You are quite right about the difficulty in coming to terms with this 
aspect of dhamma. It is interesting that it is not a case of hearing 
and 'not' understanding....because I do, at least intellectually. 
Sometimes I feel as if there are two me's - a reasonable, rational 
one who drags a kicking and resisting one along. :-) 
Thanks for the common sense advice.

metta,
Christine
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Christine, DaiWen
> 
> Christine, your post to Sarah raises aspects of dhamma that some 
people have
> difficulty coming to terms with. And it reminded me of a recent 
post of DaiWen's
> that I had meant to comment on.
> 
> Christine said:
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice. And if I 
don't 
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead 
of 
> > another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-
vipaka 
> > eventually? 
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in need of 
protection, 
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> 
> I agree that non-action can be as much an intentional choice as 
action. But as I
> understand the teachings, the merits of any (non-) action are 
determined solely by
> the quality of the accompanying mental state, and not to any extent 
by the
> conventional outcome.
> 
> So is sympathetic action more likely to be kusala than non-action? 
I think each
> person can only answer this by reference to their own experience. 
What may come
> easily and naturally to one might be contrary to the nature of 
another. And for a
> given person, much will depend on the kind of situation involved, 
anyway.
> 
> There is no inherent merit in one course rather than the other, 
since so much
> depends on individual accumulations. In the end we all do what we 
are inclined to,
> with what little kusala we can muster.
> 
> DaiWen's question raises similar issues:
> > Given all this, I am not clear on what my role
> > should be in terms of taking action or
> > insisting on taking action against such an
> > individual.
> 
> There is no 'right' or 'wrong' thing to be done here. You can only 
(non-) act as
> you see best. At least you have the benefit of some understanding 
of kusala and
> akusala, kamma and vipaka. You know that the ultimate merit of any 
(non-) action
> you may take will depend on the degree of kusala with which it is 
performed, while
> its results as far as the parties involved are concerned will 
depend in part on the
> kamma of those parties. This knowledge may help shape a decision 
that is different
> from what it might otherwise have been.
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
> --- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: > Dear Sarah, (Larry) 
and All,
> > 
> > Interesting post, Sarah. The real question for me, accepting 
> > that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause that aversion 
arises 
> > time and again,' is not blame or pointing the finger at a 
particular 
> > individual. In actual everday hands-on living of our lives, and 
> > while understanding that complex conditions bring about 
suffering - 
> > are we to ignore people being wronged, whether it is ourselves, 
dear 
> > ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to attempt to assist 
or 
> > protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are being treated 
> > unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral neutrality? Should 
we 
> > speak out about perceived injustices, or should we just say 'It's 
> > their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings.. shows lack of 
> > advancement in the practice yet, too much dosa,mana, clinging, or 
not 
> > enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to preserve 
silence, 
> > than speak out and attract retribution, or risk losing valued 
> > friendships....
> > Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice. And if I 
don't 
> > act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead 
of 
> > another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-
vipaka 
> > eventually? 
> > Does Buddhism encourage protection of those in need of 
protection, 
> > speaking out about injustices, social action?
> > Does Buddhism have any equivalent of Reverend Marin 
> > Niemoellers "First They Came For"....
> > "In Germany, the Nazis first came for the communists, and I 
didn't 
> > speak up because I wasn't a communist.
> > Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I 
wasn't a 
> > Jew. 
> > Then the came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up 
because 
> > I wasn't a trade unionist.
> > Then they came for the Catholics, but I didn't speak up because I 
was 
> > a protestant.
> > Then they came for me, and by that time there was no one left to 
> > speak for me." 
> > Seemingly a dramatic quote of course, compared to an ordinary 
person 
> > being treated unfairly in daily interactions, but it is talking 
about 
> > the importance of making a stand against wrong. Small daily 
> > happenings are miniature reflections of what happens on a 
larger 
> > scale nationally and internationally. When the harm being done 
(as 
> > in the categories above) is to a person who is a little different 
to 
> > the majority, or to whom the majority seem to be either opposed 
or 
> > indifferent, how easy it is to magnify their faults and minimise 
(or 
> > be unable to hear or see clearly) the role of those others doing 
> > wrong. How easy to look for the approval of the majority(more 
like 
> > us), and feel validated.
> > So what is a Buddhist to do, to live in the world correctly and 
> > unselfishly, with loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, 
and 
> > equanimity regarding others? Watch our own mind states, and be 
aware 
> > when dosa arises. Is that all? Does this mean ignoring the 
suffering 
> > of others when it could be ameliorated or prevented? Extending or 
> > pervading metta, but taking no action? What do the Teachings say?
> > 
> > metta,
> > Christine
> 
> 
	
13247

From: jonoabb <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 6:36am
Subject: Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Howard

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi, all - 
> 
> The following is in response to recent conversations on 
DSG, and it 
> constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote 
out, but, I 
> believe, never mailed:

I'm not sure if you're suggesting that what follows is a view that 
you have seen expressed in this list, but it's a new one on me! It 
certainly doesn't represent the orthodox teaching, as I 
understand it -- but then I don't think you're saying it does?

Jon

> In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in 
which a 
> dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
effect, it is 
> independent in the sense that those conditions which came 
together resulting 
> in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
longer exist. 
> Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
unconditionally.
> Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
condition its 
> cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
which caused 
> it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the 
dhamma is a 
> true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we 
have both 
> substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very 
same theory!
> A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to 
indicate that 
> a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a 
conventional theory of the 
> genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with 
basics of the 
> Buddha's Dhamma.
> Comments, anyone?
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
	
13248

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 3:13am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, Jon -

In a message dated 5/13/02 9:44:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> Howard
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> > Hi, all - 
> > 
> > The following is in response to recent conversations on 
> DSG, and it 
> > constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote 
> out, but, I 
> > believe, never mailed:
> 
> I'm not sure if you're suggesting that what follows is a view that 
> you have seen expressed in this list, but it's a new one on me! It 
> certainly doesn't represent the orthodox teaching, as I 
> understand it -- but then I don't think you're saying it does?
> 
> Jon
==============================
It is certainly not the orthodox teaching. I also don't think that it 
has ever been a position explicitly adopted by anyone on this list, but I do 
think there is a tendency in that direction. It is because of such a tendency 
(and tendencies towards substantialism, eternalism, and annihilationism have 
haunted both Theravada and Mahayana from the very beginning) that I am wary 
of the translation of the term 'paramattha dhamma' as "reality". 

With metta,
Howard

> 
> > In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in 
> which a 
> > dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
> effect, it is 
> > independent in the sense that those conditions which came 
> together resulting 
> > in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
> longer exist. 
> > Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
> unconditionally.
> > Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
> condition its 
> > cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
> which caused 
> > it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the 
> dhamma is a 
> > true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we 
> have both 
> > substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very 
> same theory!
> > A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to 
> indicate that 
> > a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a 
> conventional theory of the 
> > genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with 
> basics of the 
> > Buddha's Dhamma.
> > Comments, anyone?
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13249

From: Sukin <sukin@k...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 9:36am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Dear Howard,
I am happy that you have not seen anyone on the list suggest that
paramattha dhammas exist independently of the conditions that brought
those dhammas into being, but that you only see the danger of a
tendency toward that kind of thinking.
I liked the way you formulated your question very much, it gave me a
better understanding of why you like to use the word "phantom" to
describe dhamma. And I think it very useful to counter the tendency
toward 'substantialism, eternalism, and annihilationism' as you have
expressed. I think if we remember that dhammas *are* their characterisctics,
and not something that have those characteristics, and also that they
are 'conditions' and not just something that have come into existence
because of other conditions, there can be a moving away from thinking
that they are independent entities.
Another thing - speculating here -, I also liked Dan's reminder about citta,
that it is not 'something' that experiences but is the act of
'experiencing'.
But I did not worry at that time about coming to a wrong understanding
of what cittas truly are as a consequence of an non critical use of the
word.
Why, because I felt(here is the speculation) that we learn about anything
from many different view points. The same phenomenon is viewed from
the perspective of their function, characteristic, manifestation, cause,
types, conditionality etc.,and also we view them from the perspective
of them being paramattha dhammas, ayatana, khandhas, dhatus. But more
importantly we are learning from people coming from different backgrounds,
each understanding the same word in different ways and expressing their
understandings to everyone to ponder and think. It wouldn't be very healthy
if everyone agreed on everything, that can be very dangerous, I think.
As long as we have not had direct experience of realities, wrong
understanding
can creep in anytime when the conditions are there. So for me I think its
very
important that I take part in or at least view these discussions regularly.
For
this I am very greatful to every member of this list. The members here not
only straighten out wrong intellectual view, but also greatly encourage the
direct experience of what these views point to.

By the way, thanks for your warning about grapefruit and certain
medications.
I don't think we have grapefruit here, but we got pomelo and its my
favourite
fruit and juice, and I also take Lipitor on days when I've had too much
cholesterol. I would have thought that I must have had the two together, but
maybe not. Or is there some difference in basic chemical constituent?!

Thanks again for your great posts.

Best wishes,
Sukin





----- Original Message -----
From: <upasaka@a...>
To: <dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com>
Sent: Monday, May 13, 2002 9:13 PM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory



13250

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 11:34am
Subject: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Howard
> > > In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period 
in 
> > which a 
> > > dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in 
> > effect, it is 
> > > independent in the sense that those conditions which came 
> > together resulting 
> > > in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no 
> > longer exist. 
> > > Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and 
> > unconditionally.
> > > Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes 
> > condition its 
> > > cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions 
> > which caused 
> > > it to arise are *already* nonexistent? 

Sounds like you are back to thinking about Zeno! 

Dan
	
13251

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 1:52pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
I pay homage to and take refuge in Buddha... Dhamma... Sangha.

It seems this was written in reference to the question "Who is the
builder of this house?" instead of "What supports this house?".

===

Dependent origination, this is quite different than "dependent
existence".

"While it exists, or is in effect, it is independent in the sense that
those conditions which came together resulting in the arising of this
dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer exist."

===

"While it exists..." - this existence is arising or ceasing, subject to
dependent origination, and as such the characteristic (through sanna) is
anicca. Not permanent, and no intrinsic nature.

"...it is independent in the sense that those conditions which came
together resulting in the arising of this dhamma..." - Independent?
These conditions are still causing/supporting its arising (s. dependent
origination). Dhamma comes from "that which supports". Like the
ridgepole. The house supported by the ridgepole. Without the ridgepole
the house would fall. This is house is "bound" by that which serves the
function of the "ridgepole".

"... have previously ceased, and no longer exist." If this were so, then
since the supports would be nonexistent ("dhr" meaning that which
supports), that which is supported by those supports would cease,
desist, fall away, dry up. However, if this dhamma is
arising/arisen/supported, it most certainly is supported (s.
citta/cetasika and dependent origination). There is a ridgepole there.
Those "which have previously ceased" have not ceased, at list in this
case.

===

"Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and unconditionally."

- again, the dhamma is arising, not existing independently. It's arising
is dependent on the conditions which support its arising (bubbles in a
stream). This house could not come to be without this ridgepole...

"Why, then, does the dhamma then cease?"

- The supports cease. (Sanna can be a large factor ;) ) It cannot be
arising any longer.

"What changes condition its cessation..."

- Again, the supports are removed, the ridgepole is broken. But it
should be noted that the process of the cessation is an observed quality
arising out of this dependent origination. This cessation that is a part
of anicca. Cessation isn't conditioned, only the arising is conditioned.
The process leading to cessation may be conditioned, but the cessation
is not conditioned. Conditioning is constructive, it gives birth.

"... as at the time it exits, those conditions which caused it to arise
are *already* nonexistent."

- This cannot be the case, because at the time it is arisen, with
support. Without it, it would cease, desist, fall away...

"Moreover, given that the dhamma is a true existent, its cessation is
then a true annihilation!"

- Again this dhamma is supported, and it may be supported right down to
"citta". So this dhamma is not eternal, not possessing an intrinsic
nature of its own, not permanent, subject to decay and loss.

With regard to this cessation of dhamma it would mean that the supports
would also have ceased.

" Thus we have both substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by
the very same theory!"

There is no substance that is without support, there is no annihilation
without substance.

This theory is thus unsupported.

Panatti.

-manji-

> -----Original Message-----
> From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...]
> Sent: Sunday, May 12, 2002 2:16 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com; dhamma-list@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory
> 
> Hi, all -
> 
> The following is in response to recent conversations on DSG,
and it
> constitutes a slight reworking of something I previously wrote out,
but, I
> believe, never mailed:
> In one reading of the Dhamma Theory, during the period in which
a
> dhamma exists, it is a true existent. While it exists, or is in
effect, it
> is
> independent in the sense that those conditions which came together
> resulting
> in the arising of this dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer
exist.
> Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and unconditionally.
> Why, then, does the dhamma then cease? What changes condition
its
> cessation, inasmuch as at the time it exists, those conditions which
> caused
> it to arise are *already* nonexistent? Moreover, given that the dhamma
is
> a
> true existent, its cessation is then a true annihilation! Thus we have
> both
> substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by the very same
theory!
> A discussion along the lines of the foregoing appears to
indicate
> that
> a realist understanding of the Dhamma Theory is a conventional theory
of
> the
> genus "pluralistic realism" which seems to be at odds with basics of
the
> Buddha's Dhamma.
> Comments, anyone?
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

	
13252

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 2:23pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory - Correction

 	
Correction: 

> -----Original Message-----
> From: manji [mailto:manji@s...]
> Sent: Monday, May 13, 2002 4:53 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: RE: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory
> 
> I pay homage to and take refuge in Buddha... Dhamma... Sangha.
> 
> It seems this was written in reference to the question "Who is the
> builder of this house?" instead of "What supports this house?".

It seems this was written in reference to the question "Who was the
builder of this house?" instead of "Who is the builder of this house?".
Also "What made this house instead of "What supports this house."

With regard to the pannatti,
There is (sanna?)... recollection... mental fabrication.

-manji-
	
13253

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 4:17pm
Subject: ADL ch. 8 (1)

 	
http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 8 (1)

AHETUKA CITTAS 

If we want to know ourselves we should not merely know the moments we
have akusala cittas or kusala cittas but other moments as well. When we
see something ugly, we dislike what we see. At the moment of dislike
there is akusala citta rooted in dosa (aversion). Before there is
dislike, however, there must be moments of merely seeing the object. At
these moments there are not yet akusala cittas, but cittas which are
without 'root' (in Pali: hetu). 

There are six cetasikas which are hetu or 'root'. Three of these hetus
are akusala; they are : lobha (attachment), dosa (aversion) and moha
(ignorance). Three hetus are sobhana (beautiful); they are: alobha
(greedlessness or generosity), adosa (non-hate or lovingkindness) and
amoha (panna or wisdom). The citta or cetasika which is accompanied by a
hetu is sahetuka. For example, dosa-mula-citta is sahetuka; moha and
dosa are the hetus which arise with dosa-mula-citta. 

Cittas without hetu are ahetuka cittas. There are many ahetuka cittas
arising in a day. Whenever we see, hear, smell, taste or receive
impressions through the body-sense, there are ahetuka cittas before
cittas with hetu (wholesome cittas or unwholesome cittas) arise. We are
inclined to pay attention only to the moments of like and dislike, but
we should know other moments as well; we should know ahetuka cittas. 

There are altogether eighteen types of ahetuka citta. Fifteen types of
ahetuka citta are vipakacittas and three types are kiriyacittas (cittas
which are 'inoperative', neither cause nor result). Seven of the ahetuka
vipakacittas are akusala vipakacittas (result of unwholesome deeds) and
eight of them are kusala 
vipakacittas (result of wholesome deeds). When an unpleasant object
impinges on the eye-sense, seeing-consciousness only experiences what
appears through the eyes; there is no dislike yet of the unpleasant
object. Seeing-consciousness is an ahetuka vipakacitta. Cittas which
dislike the object arise later on; these are seen. The citta which pays
attention to the shape and form of something and knows what it is, does
not experience an object through the eye-door but through the mind-door;
it has a different characteristic. When one uses the word 'seeing' one
usually means: paying attention to the shape and form of something and
knowing what it is, but there must also be a kind of citta which merely
sees visible object, and this citta does not know anything else. What we
see we can call 'visible object' or 'colour' ; what is meant is: what
appears through the eyes. When there is hearing, we can experience that
hearing has a characteristic which is different from seeing; the citta
which hears experiences sound through the ears. Only in experiencing the
different characteristics of realities over and over again, will we come
to know them as they are. People may think that there is a self which
can see and hear at the same time, but through which door can the self
be experienced? Taking realities for self is wrong view. 

Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and receiving impressions through the
body-sense do not arise without there being conditions for their
arising; they are the result of kamma. Eye-sense, ear-sense,
smelling-sense, tasting- sense and body-sense are rupas which are
produced by kamma as well; they are the corporeal result of kamma. Only
the mental result of kamma is called vipaka, and thus only citta and
cetasika (mental factors arising with the citta) can be vipaka. Rupa is
not vipaka. 

The Buddha taught that everything which arises must have conditions for
its arising. When we see something unpleasant there must be a condition
for it: it is the result of akusala kamma. Akusala vipaka cannot be the
result of kusala kamma. Seeing something pleasant is kusala vipaka; this
can only be the result of kusala kamma. The vipakacitta which arises
when there is an unpleasant or pleasant impression through one of the
five senses is ahetuka. At that moment there are no akusala hetus
(unwholesome roots) or sobhana hetus (beautiful roots) arising with the
citta.
	
13254

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 3:03pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, Sukin -

In a message dated 5/13/02 12:37:39 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
sukin@k... writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> I am happy that you have not seen anyone on the list suggest that
> paramattha dhammas exist independently of the conditions that brought
> those dhammas into being, but that you only see the danger of a
> tendency toward that kind of thinking.
> I liked the way you formulated your question very much, it gave me a
> better understanding of why you like to use the word "phantom" to
> describe dhamma.
> 
---------------------------------------
Howard:
Good. I'm pleased.
--------------------------------------
And I think it very useful to counter the tendency> 
> toward 'substantialism, eternalism, and annihilationism' as you have
> expressed. I think if we remember that dhammas *are* their 
> characterisctics,
> and not something that have those characteristics,
--------------------------------------
Howard:
Yes!! Excellent!!! This is exctly something I've been wanting to say. 
(No wonder I like it! ;-))
---------------------------------------
and also that they> 
> are 'conditions' and not just something that have come into existence
> because of other conditions, there can be a moving away from thinking
> that they are independent entities.
-------------------------------------
Howard:
I think this is wonderfully put. It matches my own thoughts on this 
matter exactly.
------------------------------------

> Another thing - speculating here -, I also liked Dan's reminder about citta,
> that it is not 'something' that experiences but is the act of
> 'experiencing'.
> 
--------------------------------------
Howard:
Again - something that I agree with and think is very important. 
Statements along the lines of "A citta is an intelligence" and "Cittas 
experience their object" are very misleading. A citta IS the experiencing of 
an object. It is an event.
---------------------------------------

> But I did not worry at that time about coming to a wrong understanding
> of what cittas truly are as a consequence of an non critical use of the
> word.
> Why, because I felt(here is the speculation) that we learn about anything
> from many different view points. The same phenomenon is viewed from
> the perspective of their function, characteristic, manifestation, cause,
> types, conditionality etc.,and also we view them from the perspective
> of them being paramattha dhammas, ayatana, khandhas, dhatus. But more
> importantly we are learning from people coming from different backgrounds,
> each understanding the same word in different ways and expressing their
> understandings to everyone to ponder and think. It wouldn't be very healthy
> if everyone agreed on everything, that can be very dangerous, I think.
> As long as we have not had direct experience of realities, wrong
> understanding
> can creep in anytime when the conditions are there. So for me I think its
> very
> important that I take part in or at least view these discussions regularly.
> For
> this I am very greatful to every member of this list. The members here not
> only straighten out wrong intellectual view, but also greatly encourage the
> direct experience of what these views point to.
> 
> By the way, thanks for your warning about grapefruit and certain
> medications.
> I don't think we have grapefruit here, but we got pomelo and its my
> favourite
> fruit and juice, and I also take Lipitor on days when I've had too much
> cholesterol. I would have thought that I must have had the two together, 
> but
> maybe not. Or is there some difference in basic chemical constituent?!
> 
> Thanks again for your great posts.
> 
> Best wishes,
> Sukin
> 
===========================
Thank you, Sukin, for your very friendly and enjoyable reply.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13255

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 5:35pm
Subject: Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Hi Everybody

In the Visuddhimagga, there are a few occasions when Buddhaghosa brings up 
opinions of contemporary monks/scholars that don't accord with Dhamma from 
his point of view. He then refutes their position/beliefs. The "burden of 
proof" that Buddhaghosa uses to refute or accept whether or not something is 
dhamma is this... It must be supported by the Suttas. He asks them to 
"recite a Sutta" to prove the validity of their point. If it can't be 
supported by a Sutta, their point is considered invalid. We'd have to look 
hard to find someone more "Abhidhamma friendly" than Buddhaghosa, yet it 
seems clear he does not consider the Abhidhamma the historic teachings of the 
Buddha and not credible enough to use as an absolute authority.

This would seem to indicate (at least from Buddhaghosa's point of view) that 
Abhidhamma is based on Suttas and that the Suttas are not the "spoon 
feedings" from Abhidhamma.

With this in mind, it might be good to consider whether or not the Buddha, in 
the Suttas, ever taught or recommended to see dhammas as -- ultimate 
realities with their own characteristics. I can't recall any such instance.

TG




	
13256

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 9:42pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] RE: Dosa and Renunciation (Some Clarification)

 	
Dear Manji,

--- manji <manji@s...> wrote
> 
> Nibbana is un-conditioned, therefore not dependent. Since it is not
> dependent and un-conditioned it cannot rise and fall.
.....
I agree with your neat statement and have enjoyed reading your other
comments, including the recent ones on conditions.
.....
Some time ago when you were discussing renunciation (nekkhama), you quoted
the following and I particularly appreciated the reminder:

"In the train to Bodhgaya Bhante Dhammadhara read to us the
"Silavimamsa-Jãtaka" (no. 330). It is said that a hawk seized a piece of
meat and was pecked at by other birds who also wanted it, until he let
go of it. Then another bird seized it who was harassed in his turn until
he let go of it, and then the same happened to other birds who seized
that piece of meat. Whoever let go of it was left in peace. The
Bodhisatta said:

"These desires of ours are like pieces of meat. To those that grasp at
them is sorrow, and to those that let go is peace.

=========
You also gave some interesting quotes and reflections on nekkhama
(renunciation) and reminded me of its true meaning and how it can only be
developed with the wisdom which sees the unsatisfactory nature of the
objects of clinging:

From Manji’s earlier post:
*****
M:Another from the text by Nina Van Gorkom, a quote from...

=========
"...We read in the commentary to the Cariyapitaka [1] the following
definition of renunciation:

"Renunciation has the characteristic of departing from sense pleasures
and existence; its function is to verify the unsatisfactoriness they
involve; its manifestation is the withdrawal from them; a sense of
spiritual urgency is its proximate cause.
=========

>From Cula-sihanada Sutta:

9. "Bhikkhus, there are these four kinds of clinging. What four?
Clinging to sensual pleasures, clinging to views, clinging to rules and
observances, and clinging to a doctrine of self.”

M:This process of liberation, there are the ten thousand joys and ten
thousand sorrows, great moments of pleasant feeling and happiness may
arise abundantly. Knowing these moments as they truly are. So perhaps
there is "without attachment" not because there "is an abundance of
pleasant feeling, so no need to go scrounging for pleasant feeling" and
not because there "is an an absence of pleasant feeling, it is not worth
suffering about", but because ultimately there is just "without
attachment" and knowing of the dhamma.

There is nekkhamma. <end quote>
*****
I understand you to be saying that as wisdom and nekkhama develop, there
is more and more detachment from feelings and other realities. Hence, the
meaning of nekkhamma (applying equally to laypeople as well as monks) as
given in the Nyantiloka dictionary:
*****
QUOTE
nekkhamma: 'freedom from sensual lust', renunciation. Though apparently
from nir + Ö kram, 'to go forth (into the homeless state of a monk)', this
term is in the Páli texts nevertheless used as if it were derived from
káma, lust, and always as an antonym to káma. It is one of the perfections
(s. páramí). N. sankappa, thought free from lust, or thought of
renunciation, is one of the 3 kinds of right thought (sammá-sankappa), the
2nd link of the Noble Eightfold Path (s. magga, 2), its antonym being
kámasankappa, lustful thought.
*****

I’d also like to add a (rather long)quote from ‘Cetasikas’ by Nina on
nekkhama which youmay find helpful if you haven’t read it. 

Thanks for all your reminders, Manji.

Sarah
======
QUOTE
>We read in the "Discourse on the Twofold Thought" (Middle Length sayings
I, 19) that the Buddha, while he was still a Bodhisatta, considered both
akusala vitakka and kusala vitakka. We read that when the thought of
sense-pleasures arose, he comprehended thus: 

... "This thought of sense-pleasures has arisen in me. but it conduces to
self-hurt and it conduces to the hurt of others and it conduces to the
hurt of both, it is destructive of intuitive wisdom, associated with
distress, not conducive to nibbana." But while I was reflecting, "It
conduces to self-hurt", it subsided: and while I was reflecting, ''It
conduces to the hurt of others", it subsided: and while I was reflecting.
"It is destructive of intuitive wisdom, it is associated with distress, it
is not conducive to nibbana", it subsided. So I, monks, kept on getting
rid of the thought of sense-pleasures as it constantly arose, I kept on
driving it out, I kept on making an end of it... "
The same is said about the thought of malevolence and the thought of
harming. We then read: 

....Monks, according to whatever a monk ponders and reflects on much, his
mind in consequence gets a bias that way. Monks, if a monk ponder and
reflect much on thought of sense-pleasures he ejects thought of
renunciation; if he makes much of the thought of sense-pleasures, his mind
inclines to the thought of sense-pleasures. Monks, if a monk ponder and
reflect much on the thought of malevolence... he ejects the thought of
non-malevolence.., his mind inclines to the thought of malevolence. Monks,
if a monk ponder and reflect much on the thought of harming, he ejects the
thought of non-harming; if he makes much of the thought of harming, his
mind inclines to the thought of harming...
It is useful to know on what we reflect most of the time. We have a bias
towards akusala, since we have accumulated so much akusala. We are more
inclined to unwholesome thoughts and therefore it is difficult to have
wholesome thoughts. When there is a pleasant object the thought of
sense-pleasures arises almost immediately. When there is an unpleasant
object there is bound to be a thought of annoyance or malice, or there can
even be a thought of harming. when someone else receives praise and
honour, we may be inclined to jealousy and then there is akusala vitakka
accompanying the dosa-mula-citta with jealousy. It is difficult to
cultivate kusala vitakka but the Buddha showed that it can be done.
Further on in the sutta we read about three kinds of kusala vitakka which
are the opposites of the three kinds of akusala vitakka. They are : 

the thought of renunciation (nekkhamma) 
the thought of non-malevolence (avyapada) 
the thought of non-harming (avihimsa)
The bodhisatta realized that these lead neither to self-hurt, nor to the
hurt of others, nor to the hurt of both, but that they are for "growth in
intuitive wisdom", that they are "not associated with distress",
"conducive to nibbana ". We read about kusala vitakka:  

....Monks, if a monk ponder and reflect much on the thought of
renunciation he ejects the thought of sense-pleasures: if he makes much of
the thought of renunciation, his mind inclines to the thought of
renunciation. Monks, if a monk ponder and reflect much on the thought of
non-malevolence he ejects the thought of malevolence... Monks, if a monk
ponder and reflect much on the thought of non-harming, he ejects the
thought of harming; if he makes much of the thought of non-harming his
mind inclines to the thought of non-harming...
One may wonder whether nekkhamma, renunciation, is the same as retirement
from worldly life and whether it therefore pertains in particular to
monks. Although a monk's life should be a life of contentment with little,
he may not be cultivating nekkhamma. Whoever has not eradicated attachment
to sense objects has stiff conditions for "thought of sense-pleasures", no
matter whether he is a monk or a layman, When a monk receives delicious
almsfood, is attachment not likely to arise? 

     There are many degrees of nekkhamma and not only monks should
cultivate it, but laypeople as well. Actually, all kusala dhamma are
nekkhamma (1 Vibhanga, Book of Analysis, 3, Analysis of the Elements,
182.), when we perform dana, observe sila or apply ourselves to mental
development, we are at such moments not absorbed in sense-pleasures, there
is renunciation. We can experience that when there is loving kindness or
compassion we do not think of ourselves; thus, there is a degree of
detachment. If we see the disadvantages of being selfish, of thinking of
our own pleasure and comfort, there are more conditions for being
attentive to others, Detachment from the concept of self is still a higher
degree of renunciation which can be achieved through the development of
right understanding of realities. Both monks and laypeople should
cultivate this kind of renunciation, when the concept of self has been
eradicated, stinginess has been eradicated as well, and thus, there are
more conditions for generosity. Moreover, sila will be purer, there will
be no more conditions for transgressing the five precepts.  <end quote>
**************************************************************
  


	
13257

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Mon May 13, 2002 10:52pm
Subject: Re: Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Dear TG,
Certainly there were wrong teachings that Buddhaghosa refuted based 
on sutta, but I haven't seen any of his writings that indicate 
that "he does not consider the Abhidhamma the historic teachings of 
the 
> Buddha". In the Atthasalini Buddhaghosa (expositor p16-17) it 
notes that the buddha in the 4th
week 
after his enlightenment he contemplated the Dhammasangani (ist 
section of abhidhamma) "and while he contemplated the
Dhammasangani 
his body did not emit rays; .. but when it came to the great
book 
(the Patthana of the Abhidhamma) he began to contemplate the 24 
conditions..his omniscience found its opportunity therein.."
I have visted the site in Bodhgaya and it is marked by a marble 
tablet about 20 meters from the site where he sat under the
Bodhi 
tree.
Leaving aside whether the Buddha ever taught anything about 
paramattha dhammas such as the khandas (aggregates) the ayatanas 
and the dhatus (elements) is there now any experience of colour, an 
element, or sound? Is any feeling arising or are these elements 
imaginations like people and cars?
best wishes
robert
- In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> Hi Everybody
> 
> In the Visuddhimagga, there are a few occasions when Buddhaghosa 
brings up 
> opinions of contemporary monks/scholars that don't accord with 
Dhamma from 
> his point of view. He then refutes their position/beliefs. 
The "burden of 
> proof" that Buddhaghosa uses to refute or accept whether or not 
something is 
> dhamma is this... It must be supported by the Suttas. He asks 
them to 
> "recite a Sutta" to prove the validity of their point. If it can't 
be 
> supported by a Sutta, their point is considered invalid. We'd 
have to look 
> hard to find someone more "Abhidhamma friendly" than Buddhaghosa, 
yet it 
> seems clear he does not consider the Abhidhamma the historic 
teachings of the 
> Buddha and not credible enough to use as an absolute authority.
> 
> This would seem to indicate (at least from Buddhaghosa's point of 
view) that 
> Abhidhamma is based on Suttas and that the Suttas are not 
the "spoon 
> feedings" from Abhidhamma.
> 
> With this in mind, it might be good to consider whether or not the 
Buddha, in 
> the Suttas, ever taught or recommended to see dhammas as -- 
ultimate 
> realities with their own characteristics. I can't recall any such 
instance.
> 
> TG


13258

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 4:36am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (1)

 	
> Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and receiving
> impressions through the
> body-sense do not arise without there being
> conditions for their
> arising; they are the result of kamma. 

Two questions:
1) for a non-arahant, isn't just about every
volitional action kamma?
2) for an arahant, if they do not generate kamma, then
what are the conditions for their sense impressions?

> 
> The Buddha taught that everything which arises must
> have conditions for
> its arising. When we see something unpleasant there
> must be a condition
> for it: it is the result of akusala kamma. 

Everything that arises must have a condition, but it
seems to be over reaching to say that akusala kamma is
the cause of all unpleasant experience. Examples:

1) example 1: I used to not like the vegetable kale.
Then I liked it. Sometimes, I still don't like it.
Whether it is a pleasant or unpleasant experience
seems to be more of a function of my body's need for
those nutrients. When it needs those nutrients, the
bitterness tastes good. When it doesn't, it tasts bad.
Doesn't seem to have anything to do with kusala or
akusala.

2) example 2: Growing up as a kid, Star Wars (the
movie) was like a religious revelation, a highly
pleasant experience. Now, depending on my frame of
mind, I can react with:
a) nostalgic appreciation of the child who can be
amused and tricked by special effects and simple
storyline based on mythological archetypes.
b) indifference to the whole Star Wars
empire/phenomenon
c) revulsion and aversion towards George Lucas for
defiling the sanctity of Star Wars with Phantom Menace
and disillusioning all the (former) children who once
cherished it. 

What type of unpleasant experience I have when exposed
to Star Wars can vary so much it seems odd to simply
attribute it to akusala kamma. 

-fk


	
13259

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 5:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Dear TG,

I’ll just add a few comments to the last past of your post in which you
raise some good points:

--- TGrand458@a... wrote: > 
> With this in mind, it might be good to consider whether or not the
> Buddha, in 
> the Suttas, ever taught or recommended to see dhammas as -- ultimate 
> realities with their own characteristics. I can't recall any such
> instance.
.....
I would suggest that often supposedly simple phrases in suttas are
overlooked and without the explanation of the commentaries or abhidhamma
are simply misunderstood as we’ve often discussed here.

I have the Mulapariyaya Sutta out, simply because I ‘ve been intending to
use it to reply to another post for a few days.

In the very first paragraph, we read the Buddha as saying “I will teach
you, bhikkhus, the exposition of the root of all things.”
(sabbadhammamuulapariyaaya)

What do “all things” refer to?

We read in the commentary, and sub-commentary notes provided by B.Bodhi
about the various meanings of ‘all’ in the suttas. Here it refers to ‘the
all of personality (sakkaayasabba)’, i.e. the 5 khandhas which are of
course the paramattha dhammas. 

We read further about the various meanings of dhamma (here translated as
‘things’) in the suttas:

“Cy. The word “dhamma” is found used in the following senses: the
scriptures (pariyatti), the (Four Noble) Truths (sacca), concentration
(samaadhi), wisdom (pa~n~na), nature (pakati), things endowed with a
specific nature (sabhava), emptiness (su~n~nataa), merit (pu~n~na), a
disciplinary offense (aapatti), the knowable (~neyya) etc.”

The commentary continues with reference to this particular sutta and the
use of “all things” (sabbadhamma) here:

“here the word occurs in the sense of things endowed with a specific
nature. This is the word-meaning: “They bear their own characteristics,
thus they are dhammas” (attano lakkha.na”m dhaarentii ti dhammaa”.

This commentary explanation is followed by the one I quoted very recently
for Howard (requoted at end of post) which makes it clear that 1) all
dhammas have characteristics, 2)these dhammas (i.e.5 khandhas) have
sabhava, 3) dhammas are anatta, 4) concepts are not “real actualities”
whereas those with sabhava are, 5) dhammas cannot be separated or
distinguished from their characteristics (lakkhana), 6) they can only be
known by ‘their specific nature” (yathaasabhaavato) or characteristics.

I appreciate that some people prefer to exclude the commentary
elaborations from their study of the Tipitaka. For myself, the extra
details are invaluable and indeed have been recited with the Tipitaka, as
I understand, by the arahants from very early times.

Finally, with regard to the use of ‘ultimate realities’ in the suttas, I’d
like to requote from a post of Robert Eddison’s sometime ago (before you
joined DSG I think):

QUOTE
“Are you perhaps referring to paramattha sacca (truth in the highest
sense)?
If so, I would agree that this term is absent in the Suttas, though I
would
suggest that the notion is present. That is to say, the idea that
something
may be true conventionally but not ultimately is inferrable from the
Suttas, even though it is expressed in different terms.

What the Commentaries call conventional truth (sammuti-sacca), the Suttas
call 'worldly consensus' (lokasamañña), 'worldly language' (lokanirutti),
'worldly usage' (lokavohaara), or 'worldly convention' (lokapaññatti).

What the Commentaries call truth in the highest sense (paramattha-sacca)
is
indicated in several ways in the Suttas, but most unambiguously when the
Buddha prefaces a statement with "In truth and reality..." (saccato
thetato).

E.g.

"....since in truth and reality there obtains neither self nor what
belongs
to self...."
(Alagadduupama Sutta )

"In truth and reality, here and now the Tathaagata is not to be found
[i.e.
in the khandhas, apart from the khandhas etc.]."
(Yamaka Sutta)” <end quote>
*****
Whether we say that ‘hardness has the characteristic / nature of
impermanence’ or ‘hardness is impermanent’, ‘hardness has the
characteristic of being experienced’, or ‘hardness is rupa’ and so on is
not in itself of great importance, as I see It. What is important is the
development of awareness and understanding which knows the hardness as it
is when it appears. 

As Dan, Howard and others discussed on the ‘citta thread’, the words have
some significance, but inevitably wrong views will interpret what is heard
as signifying a self if so inclined. Hence, as Christine pointed out, even
the group of Bhikkhus listening to the Buddha, himself, reciting the
Mulapariyaya Sutta, were unable to fully appreciate its meaning. "But
those bhikkhus did not delight in the word of the Exalted One". 

As the extra commentary notes make clear, this was due to their
accumulation of mana (conceit). It’s really a wonderful reminder for me of
the danger of mana and how this and the other kilesa (defilements) can
make it so very hard for us to listen sometimes to the Teachings, even--
as Christine again reminded us-- if intellectually they are heard and
understood.
.....
Let me finish with a quote from the Sutta which goes to the heart of the
Teachings (if rightly understood):

“ A bhikkhu who is a learner, bhikkhus, who has not attained his heart’s
ideal but is still yearning for the supreme security from bondage - he
directly knows earth as earth. Having directly known earth as earth, let
him not conceive (himself as) earth; let him not conceive (himself) in
earth; let him not conceive (himself apart) from earth; let him not
conceive ‘earth is mine’; let him not delight in earth. What is the
reason ? In order that he may fully understand it, I declare.

He directly knows water as water ........” and so on <end quote>.
*****

I hope there is something useful here and I’ll be glad to hear any further
comments.

Sarah
=====

Quote from Sub Cy to Mulapariyaya Sutta, B.Bodhi p32:
*****
“They bear their own characteristics”: although there are no dhammas
devoid of their own characteristics <lakhana?>, this is still said for the
purpose of showing that these are mere dhammas endowed with their specific
natures <sabhava?> devoid of such attributions as that of a “being” etc. 
Whereas such entities as self, beauty, pleasureableness, and permanence,
etc, or nature (pakati), substance (dabba), soul (jiva), body etc, which
are mere misconstructions (parikappitaakaaramatta) due to craving and
views, or such entities as “sky-flowers” etc which are mere expressions of
conventional discourse (lokavohaaramatta), cannot be discovered as
ultimately real actualities (saccika.t.thaparamatthato), these dhammas
(i.e. those endowed with a specific nature) can. Tthese dhammas are
discovered as ultimately real actualities. And though there is no real
distinction (between these dhammas and their characteristics), still, in
order to facilitate understanding, the exposition makes a distinction as a
mere metaphorical device (upacaaramatta). Or else they are borne, they
are discerned, known, according to their specific nature, thus they are
dhammas (dhaariiyanti vaa yathaasabhaavato avadhaariyanti ~naayantii ti
dhammaa).
*****



	
13260

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 6:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
Dear Nina and Stigan (alias Bodhi 2500),

Thank you very much for the references and comments and also for your
daily life examples, Nina.

I found the connection between the 'giving of fearlessness', forgiveness
and dana very interesting and helpful. 

>This is a way of generosity higher than the giving of
> material
> things, åmisa dåna.

This is a very useful reminder for me as there are many opportunities in a
day when we hold small or petty grudges. 

I look forward to reading your translation of K.Sujin' s 'Perfections'.

> <There is another kind of dåna, generosity. Someone who develops the
> perfections should consider the gift of fearlessness, or forgiving,
> abhayadåna. If someone does not know that this is a perfection he will
> not
> forgive someone else who has done him wrong. We should reflect on the
> gift
> of fearlessness: if we do not forgive others how can we attain
> enlightenment
> and eradicate defilements?

Thank you both,

Sarah
=====




	
13261

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 2:52am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, Dan -

In a message dated 5/13/02 2:35:21 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> Sounds like you are back to thinking about Zeno! 
> 
> 
=======================
Interestingly (maybe to some! ;-), I have seen at least one article 
relating Zeno to Nagarjuna.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13262

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 3:11am
Subject: Re: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
Hi, Manji -

I agree that the theory is invalid. It only has the appearance of 
validity, I believe, due to our error in thinking about paramattha dhammas as 
entities. There is only one point of your reply below that I want to 
question. You write: 
******************************************************************
"...it is independent in the sense that those conditions which came
together resulting in the arising of this dhamma..." - Independent?
These conditions are still causing/supporting its arising (s. dependent
origination). Dhamma comes from "that which supports". Like the
ridgepole. The house supported by the ridgepole. Without the ridgepole
the house would fall. This is house is "bound" by that which serves the
function of the "ridgepole".

"... have previously ceased, and no longer exist." If this were so, then
since the supports would be nonexistent ("dhr" meaning that which
supports), that which is supported by those supports would cease,
desist, fall away, dry up. However, if this dhamma is
arising/arisen/supported, it most certainly is supported (s.
citta/cetasika and dependent origination). There is a ridgepole there.
Those "which have previously ceased" have not ceased, at list in this
case.
**********************************************************
Actually, I believe that it *is* so that the conditions which led to 
the arising of a paramattha dhamma have already ceased by the time that 
paramattha dhamma has arisen. It is just a matter of simple phenomena, 
uncompounded conditions, arising and passing away, and in the process, 
serving as condition for the lawful arising of another paramattha dhamma. The 
notion that dhammas continue, perhaps in some latent form, exhibiting "causal 
power", was a Sarvastivadin notion, a substantialist one, and one which is 
not, so far as I know, accepted by Theravada.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/13/02 4:56:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
manji@s... writes:


> 
> I pay homage to and take refuge in Buddha... Dhamma... Sangha.
> 
> It seems this was written in reference to the question "Who is the
> builder of this house?" instead of "What supports this house?".
> 
> ===
> 
> Dependent origination, this is quite different than "dependent
> existence".
> 
> "While it exists, or is in effect, it is independent in the sense that
> those conditions which came together resulting in the arising of this
> dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer exist."
> 
> ===
> 
> "While it exists..." - this existence is arising or ceasing, subject to
> dependent origination, and as such the characteristic (through sanna) is
> anicca. Not permanent, and no intrinsic nature.
> 
> "...it is independent in the sense that those conditions which came
> together resulting in the arising of this dhamma..." - Independent?
> These conditions are still causing/supporting its arising (s. dependent
> origination). Dhamma comes from "that which supports". Like the
> ridgepole. The house supported by the ridgepole. Without the ridgepole
> the house would fall. This is house is "bound" by that which serves the
> function of the "ridgepole".
> 
> "... have previously ceased, and no longer exist." If this were so, then
> since the supports would be nonexistent ("dhr" meaning that which
> supports), that which is supported by those supports would cease,
> desist, fall away, dry up. However, if this dhamma is
> arising/arisen/supported, it most certainly is supported (s.
> citta/cetasika and dependent origination). There is a ridgepole there.
> Those "which have previously ceased" have not ceased, at list in this
> case.
> 
> ===
> 
> "Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and unconditionally."
> 
> - again, the dhamma is arising, not existing independently. It's arising
> is dependent on the conditions which support its arising (bubbles in a
> stream). This house could not come to be without this ridgepole...
> 
> "Why, then, does the dhamma then cease?"
> 
> - The supports cease. (Sanna can be a large factor ;) ) It cannot be
> arising any longer.
> 
> "What changes condition its cessation..."
> 
> - Again, the supports are removed, the ridgepole is broken. But it
> should be noted that the process of the cessation is an observed quality
> arising out of this dependent origination. This cessation that is a part
> of anicca. Cessation isn't conditioned, only the arising is conditioned.
> The process leading to cessation may be conditioned, but the cessation
> is not conditioned. Conditioning is constructive, it gives birth.
> 
> "... as at the time it exits, those conditions which caused it to arise
> are *already* nonexistent."
> 
> - This cannot be the case, because at the time it is arisen, with
> support. Without it, it would cease, desist, fall away...
> 
> "Moreover, given that the dhamma is a true existent, its cessation is
> then a true annihilation!"
> 
> - Again this dhamma is supported, and it may be supported right down to
> "citta". So this dhamma is not eternal, not possessing an intrinsic
> nature of its own, not permanent, subject to decay and loss.
> 
> With regard to this cessation of dhamma it would mean that the supports
> would also have ceased.
> 
> " Thus we have both substantialism and annihilationism countenanced by
> the very same theory!"
> 
> There is no substance that is without support, there is no annihilation
> without substance.
> 
> This theory is thus unsupported.
> 
> Panatti.
> 
> -manji-
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13263

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 7:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 	
Rob E

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
...
> > An interesting observation -- 'ultimate reality', yet like a bubble or a lump of
> > foam. 
> > Well, I suppose it's an example of looking at the same thing from different
> > perspectives.
> > They are 'ultimate' in the sense of being the underlying phenomena of what we
> > take for
> > people and things, yet they also have no intrinsic merit.
> > 
> > Both aspects need to be understood.
> > 
> > Jon
> 
> Which makes Howard's and others' case that the word 'ultimate' is misleading and
> incorrect. It constantly needs to be re-explained and qualified, because it
> implies something other than what it means. Ultimate in common parlance means the
> height of something much more than it means the final particle that cannot be
> broken down.

Actually, similar comments could be made about many other terms used in the dhamma,
including no doubt some that you take for granted but that would be a problem for
someone less familiar with the dhamma than yourself. Think of wholesome/skilful
(for kusala), memory (for sanna), consciousness (for citta/vinnana), concentration
(for samadhi), tranquillity (for samatha) mentality-materiality (for nama-rupa) and
so on. None of these terms as used in the teachings bears a meaning even remotely
close to its everyday meaning.

> In math, which is Howard's area, I think there are terms that describe this kind
> of thing more generically, numbers that can't be broken down any further,
> equations that cannot be divided down to a lesser amount on either side. The
> least common denominator which unites equivalent mathematical terms.
> 
> For myself, I would propose 'primary realities' or even 'basic realities', but
> primary accomplishes what you would want, it establishes them as indivisible and
> 'first and foremost' without the baggage of 'ultimate'.

And others have a real problem with 'realties'!

Actually, this reminds me of a discussion on this very subject with Ken O not so
long ago (during one of your lurk modes), where we came to a somewhat similar
conclusion on the term 'basic'. I also like Rob K's 'fundamental'. 

But as a translation of the term used in the texts ('paramattha'), I don’t think any
of these various terms is appropriate (that doesn’t mean I have any objection to
their use).

> Now I may be paranoid, but it does seem like the term 'paramatha', if it is indeed
> 'ultimate' betrays a kind of idealization of these fleeting actualities, and
> perhaps is a way in which the idea of entity creeps back into Abhidhamma. Terms
> have a 'flavor' of meaning, and 'paramatha' seems to have precisely the wrong one.
> Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think I recall the prefix 'para' as having a sense
> of something like 'great'. Is this not so?

The choice of the term 'paramattha' (from 'parama' + 'attha') to describe the
fundamental dhammas, and its English translation as 'ultimate realities', is
explained in A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, notes to Ch. I #2 as follows:

"Ultimate realities are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic nature
(sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of existence,
the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of
experience. Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves the
final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of
experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived from
‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing."

The fact that some particular terminology may seem to have connotations that we find
unfortunate should not be allowed to detract us from the task of trying to
understand the primary/basic/fundamental/ultimate realities/phenomena that are being
referred to and which are capable of being the object of awareness and understanding
of the level of satipatthana/vipassana. Otherwise we are in danger of missing the
whole point!

Jon


	
13264

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 10:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.

 	
op 12-05-2002 02:42 schreef TGrand458@a... op TGrand458@a...:

> In a message dated 5/11/2002 5:33:14 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
> LBIDD@w... writes:
> 
>> 'When
>> he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and from the
>> aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction, concentration, has
>> cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the defilements associated
>> with ignorance and from the aggregates, his insight in the sense of
TGrand:
> 
> Someone can probably give you a better answer, but in short...the defilements
> associated with agitation are any states that keep the mind from being
> concentrated. The defilements associated with ignorance are any states that
> keep the mind from attaining insight.

Dear Larry, T G and Num,

First of all Uddhacca, this can be translated as agitation, restlessness,
excitement, it does not matter. So long as we understand that it keeps one
from kusala. (See my Cetasikas).
Now going to the Patisambidhamagga, English p. 291, using Larry's quote:
--------------
At the time of developing the eight mundane attainments the serenity
power is in excess, while at the time of developing the contemplations
of impermanence, etc., the insight power is in excess. But at the noble
path moment they occur coupled together in the sense that neither one
exceeds the other. So there is coupling of the powers in the case of
each one of these four kinds of knowledge, according as it is said 'When
he emerges from the defilements associated with agitation, and from the
aggregates, his mental unification, non-distraction, concentration, has
cessation as its domain. When he emerges from the defilements associated
with ignorance and from the aggregates, his insight in the sense of
contemplation has cessation as its domain. So serenity and insight have
a single nature in the sense of emergence, they are coupled together,
and neither exceeds the other. Hence it was said: He develops serenity
and insight coupled together in the sense of emergence'

N: Vis quotes from the Yugana katha, about coupling. I have the Co in Thai
which is very long, and I can only make a few notes. It is explained that
cessation, nirodha, is nibbana. Thus here lokuttara citta is referred to.

As to uddhacca, uddhacca dhammas are the defilements of vipassana in this
context. These arise after the three beginning stages of insight have
arisen: illumination, etc. See also in the text p. 295, the verse. Uddhacca
is a hindrance and conditions tanha, mana and ditthi. The Co explains about
the balancing of samatha and vipassana. If samatha exceeds vipassana, there
would be laziness. If vipassana exceeds samatha one would be distracted.
They should be balanced. Samatha and vipassana can be coupled at the moment
of magga-citta because they are coupled in vipassana that is vutthana
gamini, leading to emergence (meaning enlightenment. N.)
More about uddhacca: when overcome by the defilements of vipassana, when he
thinks of obhasa, illumination, he is distracted, does not realize
impermanence, dukkha and anatta.

I just chose a few passages. Num who is now packing and moving to Thailand,
will study the Patisambiddha with A. Sujin, his aunt and others. It will be
greatly appreciated if he can share with us what he learns, we can form a
Patisambidha Magga corner, perhaps?
I agree with T.G that some words can be substituted, but if we know the Pali
we do not have to stumble over this. In the back, in the English list we
also find the Pali. Idea: can be state or dhamma. Actuality: the four noble
Truths. Choice: substitute patience, khanti. And so on.
Best wishes, from Nina. 


	
13265

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 7:39am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Hi, TG -

In a message dated 5/14/02 12:38:05 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
TGrand458@a... writes:


> Hi Everybody
> 
> In the Visuddhimagga, there are a few occasions when Buddhaghosa brings up 
> opinions of contemporary monks/scholars that don't accord with Dhamma from 
> his point of view. He then refutes their position/beliefs. The "burden of 
> 
> proof" that Buddhaghosa uses to refute or accept whether or not something 
> is 
> dhamma is this... It must be supported by the Suttas. He asks them to 
> "recite a Sutta" to prove the validity of their point. If it can't be 
> supported by a Sutta, their point is considered invalid. We'd have to look 
> 
> hard to find someone more "Abhidhamma friendly" than Buddhaghosa, yet it 
> seems clear he does not consider the Abhidhamma the historic teachings of 
> the 
> Buddha and not credible enough to use as an absolute authority.
> 
> This would seem to indicate (at least from Buddhaghosa's point of view) 
> that 
> Abhidhamma is based on Suttas and that the Suttas are not the "spoon 
> feedings" from Abhidhamma.
> 
> With this in mind, it might be good to consider whether or not the Buddha, 
> in 
> the Suttas, ever taught or recommended to see dhammas as -- ultimate 
> realities with their own characteristics. I can't recall any such 
> instance.
> 
> TG
> 
=========================
Well, of course, I am very "friendly" towards what is expressed here. 
I would just add a clarification (from my perspective). With regard to 
paramattha dhammas not bring "ultimate realities with their own 
characteristics", I agree, but would like to emphasize to following two 
points: (1) The term 'simple (or basic or fundamental) phenomena' (as opposed 
to mentally compounded ones) I see as preferable to that of 'ultimate 
realities', and (2) It is not that paramattha dhammas don't have 
characteristics - they do (conventionally speaking), but they should not be 
thought of as "their own". In fact, there is no entity to own the 
characteristics, there are just those characteristics, arising together, 
briefly, in dependence on other conditions.


With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13266

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 2:21pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory

 	
With light, much like yellow being dependent on red and green. Red may
arise, but without green there is no yellow. Red may arise again, but
this time arise with green, so that yellow is arisen, dependently arisen
on red and green. Again, red may arise, and green may arise, now yellow
is arisen, dependently arisen on red and green.

Now red may fall away, cease, and desist. Yellow, will too fall away,
cease, and desist.

It isn't that the dhammas continue, they arise again, this is what I
mean by "still causing". Without the ridgepole, the house is broken. The
ridge pole, however, can it be arisen without the house? So this can be
understood in the same sense as the colors.

Without this dependent origination, there can be no unbinding of it.
There is no knot, no unbinding of it, without a rope.

-manji-

> -----Original Message-----
> From: upasaka@a... [mailto:upasaka@a...]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 10:12 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] On the Realist Interpretation of the Dhamma Theory
> 
> Hi, Manji -
> 
> I agree that the theory is invalid. It only has the appearance
of
> validity, I believe, due to our error in thinking about paramattha
dhammas
> as
> entities. There is only one point of your reply below that I want to
> question. You write:
> ******************************************************************
> "...it is independent in the sense that those conditions which came
> together resulting in the arising of this dhamma..." - Independent?
> These conditions are still causing/supporting its arising (s.
dependent
> origination). Dhamma comes from "that which supports". Like the
> ridgepole. The house supported by the ridgepole. Without the ridgepole
> the house would fall. This is house is "bound" by that which serves
the
> function of the "ridgepole".
> 
> "... have previously ceased, and no longer exist." If this were so,
then
> since the supports would be nonexistent ("dhr" meaning that which
> supports), that which is supported by those supports would cease,
> desist, fall away, dry up. However, if this dhamma is
> arising/arisen/supported, it most certainly is supported (s.
> citta/cetasika and dependent origination). There is a ridgepole there.
> Those "which have previously ceased" have not ceased, at list in this
> case.
> **********************************************************
> Actually, I believe that it *is* so that the conditions which
led
> to
> the arising of a paramattha dhamma have already ceased by the time
that
> paramattha dhamma has arisen. It is just a matter of simple phenomena,
> uncompounded conditions, arising and passing away, and in the process,
> serving as condition for the lawful arising of another paramattha
dhamma.
> The
> notion that dhammas continue, perhaps in some latent form, exhibiting
> "causal
> power", was a Sarvastivadin notion, a substantialist one, and one
which is
> not, so far as I know, accepted by Theravada.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> In a message dated 5/13/02 4:56:08 PM Eastern Daylight Time,
> manji@s... writes:
> 
> 
> >
> > I pay homage to and take refuge in Buddha... Dhamma... Sangha.
> >
> > It seems this was written in reference to the question "Who is the
> > builder of this house?" instead of "What supports this house?".
> >
> > ===
> >
> > Dependent origination, this is quite different than "dependent
> > existence".
> >
> > "While it exists, or is in effect, it is independent in the sense
that
> > those conditions which came together resulting in the arising of
this
> > dhamma have previously ceased, and no longer exist."
> >
> > ===
> >
> > "While it exists..." - this existence is arising or ceasing, subject
to
> > dependent origination, and as such the characteristic (through
sanna) is
> > anicca. Not permanent, and no intrinsic nature.
> >
> > "...it is independent in the sense that those conditions which came
> > together resulting in the arising of this dhamma..." - Independent?
> > These conditions are still causing/supporting its arising (s.
dependent
> > origination). Dhamma comes from "that which supports". Like the
> > ridgepole. The house supported by the ridgepole. Without the
ridgepole
> > the house would fall. This is house is "bound" by that which serves
the
> > function of the "ridgepole".
> >
> > "... have previously ceased, and no longer exist." If this were so,
then
> > since the supports would be nonexistent ("dhr" meaning that which
> > supports), that which is supported by those supports would cease,
> > desist, fall away, dry up. However, if this dhamma is
> > arising/arisen/supported, it most certainly is supported (s.
> > citta/cetasika and dependent origination). There is a ridgepole
there.
> > Those "which have previously ceased" have not ceased, at list in
this
> > case.
> >
> > ===
> >
> > "Thus, while the dhamma exists, it does so alone and
unconditionally."
> >
> > - again, the dhamma is arising, not existing independently. It's
arising
> > is dependent on the conditions which support its arising (bubbles in
a
> > stream). This house could not come to be without this ridgepole...
> >
> > "Why, then, does the dhamma then cease?"
> >
> > - The supports cease. (Sanna can be a large factor ;) ) It cannot be
> > arising any longer.
> >
> > "What changes condition its cessation..."
> >
> > - Again, the supports are removed, the ridgepole is broken. But it
> > should be noted that the process of the cessation is an observed
quality
> > arising out of this dependent origination. This cessation that is a
part
> > of anicca. Cessation isn't conditioned, only the arising is
conditioned.
> > The process leading to cessation may be conditioned, but the
cessation
> > is not conditioned. Conditioning is constructive, it gives birth.
> >
> > "... as at the time it exits, those conditions which caused it to
arise
> > are *already* nonexistent."
> >
> > - This cannot be the case, because at the time it is arisen, with
> > support. Without it, it would cease, desist, fall away...
> >
> > "Moreover, given that the dhamma is a true existent, its cessation
is
> > then a true annihilation!"
> >
> > - Again this dhamma is supported, and it may be supported right down
to
> > "citta". So this dhamma is not eternal, not possessing an intrinsic
> > nature of its own, not permanent, subject to decay and loss.
> >
> > With regard to this cessation of dhamma it would mean that the
supports
> > would also have ceased.
> >
> > " Thus we have both substantialism and annihilationism countenanced
by
> > the very same theory!"
> >
> > There is no substance that is without support, there is no
annihilation
> > without substance.
> >
> > This theory is thus unsupported.
> >
> > Panatti.
> >
> > -manji-

	
13267

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 3:17pm
Subject: Nekkhamma (Was: RE: [dsg] RE: Dosa and Renunciation)

 	
Hi Sarah,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Sarah [mailto:sarahdhhk@y...]
> Sent: Tuesday, May 14, 2002 12:42 AM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] RE: Dosa and Renunciation (Some Clarification)

< snip snip >

> I understand you to be saying that as wisdom and nekkhama develop,
there
> is more and more detachment from feelings and other realities. Hence,
the
> meaning of nekkhamma (applying equally to laypeople as well as monks)
as
> given in the Nyantiloka dictionary:
> *****
> QUOTE
> nekkhamma: 'freedom from sensual lust', renunciation. Though
apparently
> from nir + Ö kram, 'to go forth (into the homeless state of a monk)',
this
> term is in the Páli texts nevertheless used as if it were derived from
> káma, lust, and always as an antonym to káma. It is one of the
perfections
> (s. páramí). N. sankappa, thought free from lust, or thought of
> renunciation, is one of the 3 kinds of right thought (sammá-sankappa),
the
> 2nd link of the Noble Eightfold Path (s. magga, 2), its antonym being
> kámasankappa, lustful thought.
> *****

There have been the equivalent of three replies to this thread (rather
lengty to include suttas). None came to a fruition, except the present
one. Currently reading the Mahadukkhakkhanda Sutta as well as the
Latukikopama Sutta presently.

There most certainly is that which serves the function of the process of
which has arisen when conceptualizing the process of which you refer,
however this mental object of process is merely a bubble in the stream,
a mental fabrication from recollection, from sanna.

Aren't all characteristics and mental formations, when viewed, nothing
more than mental fabrications of sanna?

Hehe, prajna paramita strikes again :) and with that, sanna too.

;)

So in a nekkhamma sense, with reference to the Mahadukkhakkhanda Sutta:

Without craving the gratification of sensual pleasures.
Without craving the gratification of material objects.
Without craving the gratification of feeling.

And in a jhana sense...

Without gratification of sensual pleasures. (first, second and third
jhana)
Without gratification of feeling. (fourth jhana)

Majjhima Nikaya - Latukikopama Sutta: 66 (Bhikkhu Nanamoli and Bhikkhu
Bodhi transl.)

20. "Here, Udayin, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from
unwholesome states, a bhikkhu enters upon and abides in the first
jhana... With the stilling of applied and sustained thought, he enters
upon and abides in the second jhana... With the fading away as well of
rapture... he enters upon and abides in the third jhana... With the
abandoning of pleasure and pain... he enters upon and abides in the
fourth jhana...
21. "This is called the bliss of renunciation, the bliss of seclusion,
the bliss of peace, the bliss of enlightenment. I say of this kind of
pleasure that it should be persued, that it should be developed, that it
should be cultivated, that it should not be feared.

So on to 29.

29. "Here, Udayin, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain... a bhikkhu
enters upon and abides in the fourth jhana... That surmounts it. But
that too, I say is not enough. Abandon it, I say; surmount it, I say.
And what surmounts it?

So on to the arupa-jhana. And such is the short lived life of this
pannati.

metta-
manji
	
13268

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 4:15pm
Subject: question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
What does "Buddha nature" mean?
	
13269

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 4:34pm
Subject: ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
http://www.abhidhamma.org/abhid.html

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 8 (2)

The ahetuka vipakacitta which sees an unpleasant or a pleasant object
through the eyes is seeing-consciousness, in Pali: cakkhu-vinnana
(cakkhu means eye).  

The ahetuka vipakacitta which hears an unpleasant or a pleasant object
through the ears is hearing-consciousness, in Pali: sota-vinnana (sota
means ear).  

The ahetuka vipakacitta which smells an unpleasant or a pleasant object
through 
the nose is smelling-consciousness, in Pali: ghana-vinnana (ghana means
nose).  
The ahetuka vipakacitta which experiences an unpleasant or a pleasant
taste through the tongue is tasting-consciousness, in Pali:
jivha-vinnana (jivha means 
tongue).  

The ahetuka vipakacitta which experiences an unpleasant or a pleasant
object through the body-sense is body-consciousness, in Pali:
kaya-vinnana (kaya means body) .  

There are two kinds of ahetuka vipaka experiencing an object through
each of the five doors: one is akusala vipaka and one is kusala vipaka.
Thus there are five pairs of ahetuka vipakacittas which arise depending
on the five sense-doors. There are also other kinds of ahetuka
vipakacitta which will be dealt with later on. The ten ahetuka
vipakacittas which are the 'five pairs are called in
Pali:         dvi-panca-vinnana (two times five
vinnana). They are:  

1. Cakkhu-vinnana (seeing-consciousness):  akusala vipaka, accompanied
by upekkha (indifferent feeling); kusala vipaka, accompanied by
upekkha  
 
2. Sota-vinnana (hearing-consciousness):  akusala vipaka, accompanied
by upekkha; kusala vipaka, accompanied by upekkha  

3. Ghana-vinnana (smelling-consciousness): akusala vipaka, accompanied
by upekkha; kusala vipaka, accompanied by upekkha  

4. Jivha-vinnana (tasting-consciousness):  akusala vipaka, accompanied
by upekkha; kusala vipaka, accompanied by upekkha  

5. Kaya-vinnana (body-consciousness):  
akusala vipaka, accompanied by dukkha vedana (bodily painful
feeling);  kusala vipaka, accompanied by sukha vedana  
(bodily pleasant feeling) 

The ahetuka vipakacittas which see, hear, smell and taste are invariably
accompanied by upekkha (indifferent feeling), no matter whether they are
akusala vipaka or kusala vipaka. The citta which dislikes the object may
arise afterwards. This citta is sahetuka (with hetus or roots) and it is
accompanied by  unpleasant feeling. Or the citta which likes the
object may arise; this citta which is also sahetuka may be accompanied
by pleasant feeling or by indifferent feeling. We are inclined to think
that the dvi-panca-vinnanas can occur at the same time as like or
dislike of the object, but this is not so. Different cittas arise at
different moments and the feelings which accompany the cittas are
different too; none of these realities should be taken for self.
	
13270

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 0:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Hi, Dan -

In a message dated 5/14/02 7:22:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> What does "Buddha nature" mean? 
> 
> 
========================
Better just ask the other guys, Dan! ;-)) I *think* it may just be the 
capacity/potentiality beings have for enlightenment. (It's an okay idea, I 
think, so long as one doesn't reify it into some sort of "power" or 
"potency", so long as it only means that should X and Y happen, so will Z 
happen (just a conditionality).

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 



13271

From: <Bodhi2500@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 1:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
Thank-you for your replies, they are very helpful.

As well as forgiveness would abhayadaana also include "giving protection to 
beings when they have become frightened on account of fire,water,lions tigers 
and other wild beasts?" ie. In a bush fire where animals are being burnt, the 
"saving" them from the fire. Or when someone is being attacked by "wild 
animals" and you have the means to protect them? Would these cases be 
concidered Abhayadaana?

I also look forward to reading the translation of K.Sujin' s 'Perfections'

Metta
S


	
13272

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 5:26pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Dan wrote: What does "Buddha nature" mean?

Hi Dan, I'll bite. I think this question could also be phrased "what
does 'buddha' mean?" To me it means sati; more inscrutably, it could
mean nibbana.

Larry
	
13273

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 5:39pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.

 	
Hi Nina, thanks for this interesting piece of research. I think the next
book I get is going to be the Samyutta Nikaya but I would be very
interested in any discussions you and Num and TG would have on
Patisambhidamagga, particularly with input from A Sujin. When is Num
going to be settled? I had a medical question that relates to rootless
body feeling.

Larry
	
13274

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 6:17pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (1)

 	
--- 
Dear Frank,
When we try to think about kamma and vipaka (result of kamma) it can 
get confusing. But by studying the actual paramattha dhammas - they 
are happening now- it becomes clearer.
Nina van Gorkom writes in ADL: "Cittas can be classified by way of 
jati' (literally means 'birth' or 'nature'). There are four jatis: 
akusala, kusala, vipaka, kiriya. 
It is important to know which jati a citta is. We cannot develop 
wholesomeness in our life if we take akusala for kusala or if we take 
akusala for vipaka. For instance, when we hear unpleasant words, the 
moment of experiencing the sound (hearing-consciousness) is akusala 
vipaka, the result of an unwholesome deed we performed ourselves. But 
the aversion which may arise very shortly afterwards is not vipaka, 
but it arises with akusala citta.""
In your examples below the aversion you felt was not vipaka - result 
of kamma - it was akusala jati, a different type of citta.
Now you are in Hawaii, maybe the overall impression is pleasant, but 
only by studying the actual moments can there be any understanding 
into what is really happening. At the beach there may be many 
pleasant feelings through the bodysense, quickly followed by 
attachment of some level, but there may also be moments when it is 
just a little too hot and the feeling through the bodysense is 
unpleasant (vipaka-result of akusala kamma in this case). In the 
latter case you might not even notice it and any aversion in the 
javana phase might be so slight as to be unnoticeable. All thse 
different impressions and reactions are arising and falling away so 
fast; and if we continue to live in the world of concepts we can 
never know this truth, we may think about impermanence, and that can 
make us calmer but it cannot uproot our delusions. 
You might go swimming and cool off, the thinking may be with much 
pleasant feeling "how nice it is here" associated with lobha; but 
too, there might be brief moments when the water is too cold, or salt 
gets in your eyes,. Any aversion to these moments is not the result 
of kamma but the actual experience through the bodysense is.
best wishes
robert

In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> wrote:
> 
> > Seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and receiving
> > impressions through the
> > body-sense do not arise without there being
> > conditions for their
> > arising; they are the result of kamma. 
> 
> Two questions:
> 1) for a non-arahant, isn't just about every
> volitional action kamma?
> 2) for an arahant, if they do not generate kamma, then
> what are the conditions for their sense impressions?
> 
> > 
> > The Buddha taught that everything which arises must
> > have conditions for
> > its arising. When we see something unpleasant there
> > must be a condition
> > for it: it is the result of akusala kamma. 
> 
> Everything that arises must have a condition, but it
> seems to be over reaching to say that akusala kamma is
> the cause of all unpleasant experience. Examples:
> 
> 1) example 1: I used to not like the vegetable kale.
> Then I liked it. Sometimes, I still don't like it.
> Whether it is a pleasant or unpleasant experience
> seems to be more of a function of my body's need for
> those nutrients. When it needs those nutrients, the
> bitterness tastes good. When it doesn't, it tasts bad.
> Doesn't seem to have anything to do with kusala or
> akusala.
> 
> 2) example 2: Growing up as a kid, Star Wars (the
> movie) was like a religious revelation, a highly
> pleasant experience. Now, depending on my frame of
> mind, I can react with:
> a) nostalgic appreciation of the child who can be
> amused and tricked by special effects and simple
> storyline based on mythological archetypes.
> b) indifference to the whole Star Wars
> empire/phenomenon
> c) revulsion and aversion towards George Lucas for
> defiling the sanctity of Star Wars with Phantom Menace
> and disillusioning all the (former) children who once
> cherished it. 
> 
> What type of unpleasant experience I have when exposed
> to Star Wars can vary so much it seems odd to simply
> attribute it to akusala kamma. 
> 
> -fk
> 
> 
	
13275

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 8:45pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
Dear group,
Just a note of clarification regarding akusala vipaka citta. This citta
gets its name, 'akusala', based on its cause, an akusala citta rooted in
lobha/dosa/moha. The vipaka itself is without any akusala/kusala
quality. Hence its designation 'rootless' (ahetuka). Akusala citta
rooted in lobha/dosa/moha (always?) causes a rootless citta. Rootless
cittas cause nothing but may be a contributory condition for another
citta rooted in lobha/dosa/moha or alobha/adosa/amoha, which, inturn,
must (?) cause another vipaka.

An akusala citta will only cause an akusala vipaka simply because that
is how vipaka is named. Sight, sound, smell, taste vipaka will have a
neutral feeling. Body sense vipaka will be pleasant or unpleasant
feeling. It is impossible (?) for anyone but the Buddha to tell whether
a vipaka citta is kusala or akusala. Both kusala and akusala _rootless_
vipaka cittas have the same qualities. There is also a class of kusala
vipaka citta _with_ roots. This has kusala qualities but because it is
vipaka, it cannot cause another citta. 

It can be seen very easily in satipatthana that whatever sight, sound,
taste, smell, or body feeling may arise, it is value neutral. Like and
dislike are lobha and dosa. They may arise in response to the vipaka and
will, in turn, produce another vipaka. We can't really see this kamma
process unfolding. We can recognize cause, and we can recognize effect.
But we cannot put the two together. We have to take the Buddha's word
for it.

Unpleasant body feeling is not necessarily akusala vipaka. Kusala citta
can cause unpleasant body feeling.

Corrections joyously welcomed.

yours in the way, Larry

question: Is kamma unstopable once the cause has arisen?

L.
	
13276

From: azita gill <gazita2002@y...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 9:15pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
--- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear group,
> Just a note of clarification regarding akusala
> vipaka citta. This citta
> gets its name, 'akusala', based on its cause, an
> akusala citta rooted in
> lobha/dosa/moha. The vipaka itself is without any
> akusala/kusala
> quality. Hence its designation 'rootless' (ahetuka).
> Akusala citta
> rooted in lobha/dosa/moha (always?) causes a
> rootless citta. Rootless
> cittas cause nothing but may be a contributory
> condition for another
> citta rooted in lobha/dosa/moha or
> alobha/adosa/amoha, which, inturn,
> must (?) cause another vipaka.
> 
> An akusala citta will only cause an akusala vipaka
> simply because that
> is how vipaka is named. Sight, sound, smell, taste
> vipaka will have a
> neutral feeling. Body sense vipaka will be pleasant
> or unpleasant
> feeling. It is impossible (?) for anyone but the
> Buddha to tell whether
> a vipaka citta is kusala or akusala. Both kusala and
> akusala _rootless_
> vipaka cittas have the same qualities. There is also
> a class of kusala
> vipaka citta _with_ roots. This has kusala qualities
> but because it is
> vipaka, it cannot cause another citta. 
> 
> It can be seen very easily in satipatthana that
> whatever sight, sound,
> taste, smell, or body feeling may arise, it is value
> neutral. Like and
> dislike are lobha and dosa. They may arise in
> response to the vipaka and
> will, in turn, produce another vipaka. We can't
> really see this kamma
> process unfolding. We can recognize cause, and we
> can recognize effect.
> But we cannot put the two together. We have to take
> the Buddha's word
> for it.
> 
> Unpleasant body feeling is not necessarily akusala
> vipaka. Kusala citta
> can cause unpleasant body feeling.
> 
> Corrections joyously welcomed.
> 
> yours in the way, Larry
> 
> question: Is kamma unstopable once the cause has
> arisen?
> 
> L. 
> 
> dear Larry, I query that last comment about
"unpleasant body feeling ------cause unpleasant body
feeling" . I can't see how kusala citta can cause
something unpleasant. Can you elaborate please? 

> regarding your question about kamma - I think
it is unstopable - unless you become an arahat - but
you can't do this if the kamma is really heavy, such
as killing mum or dad, harming a Buddha, etc.
> Azita,
> May all beings be happy,

	
13277

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 5:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
In a message dated 5/14/2002 11:45:16 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:


> (1) The term 'simple (or basic or fundamental) phenomena' (as opposed 
> to mentally compounded ones) I see as preferable to that of 'ultimate 
> realities', and (2) It is not that paramattha dhammas don't have 
> characteristics - they do (conventionally speaking), but they should not be 
> thought of as "their own". In fact, there is no entity to own the 
> characteristics, there are just those characteristics, arising together, 
> briefly, in dependence on other conditions.
> 
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 

I agree completely Howard. The term I came up with previously was "primary 
states" but the term "fundamental phenomena" is pretty darn much the same 
thing.

But your second point is even more important. And I'll add this...

There are characteristics, but nothing has its own characteristic. 
Characteristics are not non-existent, nor are they existent. Characteristics 
are systematically and continuosly altering into something else. 

TG


	
13278

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 10:22pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
Dear Nina and Bodhi2500,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...]
>
> > (1)The perfection of giving,firstly,is to be
> practised by benefitting beings
> > in many ways-by relinquishing ones
> happiness,belongings,body and life to
> > others,by dispelling their fear and by
> instructing them in the dhamma.
> >
> > (then we jump to the dispelling their fear section)
> >
> > The Giving of fearlessness is the giving of
> protection to beings when they
> > have become frightened on account of
> > kings,thieves,fire,water,enemies,lions,tigers,other wild
> > beasts,dragons,orges,demons,goblins etc.
> >
> Dear Bodhi 2500, (sorry, I do not know your
> name), and all,
> I am translating A. Sujin's book on the
> perfections, and was just about to
> type what you quoted. I consider these days
> abhaya dana, the giving of
> fearlessness, a lot. When there is this kind of
> dana, we have no grudges, we
> forgive wrongs and have goodwill for the person
> who was unpleasant. A. Sujin
> in her book stresses how all the perfections are
> connected and come into
> play. I find it inspiring to see forgiving as a
> kind of dana. In Thai to
> <give abhaya> is to forgive. (Maybe Kom can say
> more about this)
> A. Sujin writes:
>
> <There is another kind of dåna, generosity.
> Someone who develops the
> perfections should consider the gift of
> fearlessness, or forgiving,
> abhayadåna. If someone does not know that this is
> a perfection he will not
> forgive someone else who has done him wrong. We
> should reflect on the gift
> of fearlessness: if we do not forgive others how
> can we attain enlightenment
> and eradicate defilements? This may be a
> condition for the gift of
> fearlessness. This is a way of generosity higher

Bhaya in Thai means generally means danger (drawbacks,
penalties, disadvantages), i.e., danger from kings, thieves,
fire, water, enemies, lions, tigers, other wild beasts,
dragons, orges, demons, goblins etc. Abhaya is its
opposite, however, in the Thai language it is mostly used to
mean forgiveness. Giving a person abhaya, in Thai, usually
means forgiving the person: this doesn't have to be outward.
The beautiful part is you can forgive a person without other
people (including the subject) knowing that this "gift" has
already occured.

When I hear K. Sujin on tape, I understood that this means
strictly forgiving. However, looking at the description
now, it seems to be more than forgiving. When we help other
people from dangers, be it through directly helping, or
counseling, it also seems like it is also abhaya dana. The
gift of the dhamma is obviously the most elavated type of
abhaya dhamma. We help other people in reaching the true
abhaya, nibbana.

kom
	
13279

From: <Bodhi2500@a...> 
Date: Tue May 14, 2002 6:56pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
Thank-you Nina,Sarah and Kom for your replies.

Metta 
S


In a message dated 15/05/02 15:26:30 E. Australia Standard Time, 
kom@a... writes:


> Dear Nina and Bodhi2500,
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: Nina van Gorkom [mailto:nilo@e...]
> >
> > > (1)The perfection of giving,firstly,is to be
> > practised by benefitting beings
> > > in many ways-by relinquishing ones
> > happiness,belongings,body and life to
> > > others,by dispelling their fear and by
> > instructing them in the dhamma.
> > >
> > > (then we jump to the dispelling their fear section)
> > >
> > > The Giving of fearlessness is the giving of
> > protection to beings when they
> > > have become frightened on account of
> > > kings,thieves,fire,water,enemies,lions,tigers,other wild
> > > beasts,dragons,orges,demons,goblins etc.
> > >
> > Dear Bodhi 2500, (sorry, I do not know your
> > name), and all,
> > I am translating A. Sujin's book on the
> > perfections, and was just about to
> > type what you quoted. I consider these days
> > abhaya dana, the giving of
> > fearlessness, a lot. When there is this kind of
> > dana, we have no grudges, we
> > forgive wrongs and have goodwill for the person
> > who was unpleasant. A. Sujin
> > in her book stresses how all the perfections are
> > connected and come into
> > play. I find it inspiring to see forgiving as a
> > kind of dana. In Thai to
> > <give abhaya> is to forgive. (Maybe Kom can say
> > more about this)
> > A. Sujin writes:
> >
> > <There is another kind of dåna, generosity.
> > Someone who develops the
> > perfections should consider the gift of
> > fearlessness, or forgiving,
> > abhayadåna. If someone does not know that this is
> > a perfection he will not
> > forgive someone else who has done him wrong. We
> > should reflect on the gift
> > of fearlessness: if we do not forgive others how
> > can we attain enlightenment
> > and eradicate defilements? This may be a
> > condition for the gift of
> > fearlessness. This is a way of generosity higher
> 
> Bhaya in Thai means generally means danger (drawbacks,
> penalties, disadvantages), i.e., danger from kings, thieves,
> fire, water, enemies, lions, tigers, other wild beasts,
> dragons, orges, demons, goblins etc. Abhaya is its
> opposite, however, in the Thai language it is mostly used to
> mean forgiveness. Giving a person abhaya, in Thai, usually
> means forgiving the person: this doesn't have to be outward.
> The beautiful part is you can forgive a person without other
> people (including the subject) knowing that this "gift" has
> already occured.
> 
> When I hear K. Sujin on tape, I understood that this means
> strictly forgiving. However, looking at the description
> now, it seems to be more than forgiving. When we help other
> people from dangers, be it through directly helping, or
> counseling, it also seems like it is also abhaya dana. The
> gift of the dhamma is obviously the most elavated type of
> abhaya dhamma. We help other people in reaching the true
> abhaya, nibbana.
> 
> kom
> 



	
13280

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 0:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [reply to Frank]

 	
Dear Dan,

Of course I’ve really enjoyed all your recent contributions and as I said
before, it’s always a refreshing ‘shake-up’ when you and Erik are around
with your distinct, eloquent and colourful styles. Many (read: most) will
not agree with the ‘ritual’ posts --and that isn’t why they were
written--. but I personally think you make some very helpful points and I
particularly liked this final paragraph, which I read a few times.

> How? Well, when sati arises, this moment is understood as seeing, 
> that moment as hearing, this mind with lobha, that mind with dosa, 
> this dosa arising from craving, etc. Sati does not arise from anyone 
> directing the mind to note any particular object or to look for any 
> particular thing, but when dhammas arise with right view and sati, 
> the characteristics are known and understood. They just arise and 
> pass away, without being anyone, without being directed by anyone, 
> without being conjured by anyone, without being owned by anyone. Mind 
> with panya simply knows about dhammas and what to do with them and 
> how to react to them without anyone needing to tell it about the 
> dhammas and what to do with them and how to react to them. 
.....

Of course some --but not me-- might object to the ‘mind and panya knows’
in the way others -- again not me-- object to ‘seeing (or citta) sees’;-))

Thank you and Erik also for sharing so much of your *own* experience with
us too.

Hope Lisa and the boys appreciate not having the timer going off every 5
minutes during meals, playtime, domestic chores or visits to restaurants.
(Actually, as Frank may appreciate, we use 5 minute timers for
1st-thing-in-the-morning- yoga poses, so they have their uses;-) 

Sarah
======


	
13281

From: Kenneth Ong <ashkenn@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 0:23am
Subject: RE: [dsg] attachment to concept

 	
Kom

> I disagree with you on this point (until I change my mind,
> obviously!). It is one of those things that I think we can
> say the Buddha definitely said either (but not both):
> 1) Concept can be an object of satipatthana
> 2) Concept cannot be an object of satipatthana.
> 
> I think the difference is so substantial that there would be
> no ambiguity / different meanings in the 3 tipitakas. Also,
> it would make sense to have an interpretation of the
> teachings that are consistent across all the 3 tipitakas,
> not just suttanta or abhidhamma, and as far as I know, the
> position that a concept cannot be an object of satipatthana
> is the most consistent explanation among the 3 tipitakas,
> the commentaries, and Visuddhimagga. Of course, not knowing
> all the texts (or even a good part of the text), I will read
> on...

k: In the first place, in the sutta, there is no mention that concepts
can not be objects of satipatthana. the position that concepts cannot be
objects of satipatthana is in Abhidhamma and not in Sutta. I have not
seen in what Buddha said that only paramattha are objects of satipatthana.
Hence where is the inconsistency. Does Abhidhamma rejects concepts as
objects in Satipatthana and on what basis is the objection derive from? 
Is it just because concepts are not paramathas? Then we got to ask, where
does objects derived from?



> 
> Also, I think your point on the teaching being easiest (from
> the beginning of satipatthana sutta) is not consistent with
> what I know. Each person are pre-inclined to different sets
> of dhammas. We hear in the commentaries that the Buddha:
> 

k: I think I did not express myself clearly, I was saying that
Satipatthana starts from the observable to the more subtle level.

> > Another big issue abt control/no control
> > recently, if we read the
> > definition of right effort in the suttas, it
> > indicates there is control.
> > But we stick our concept of Abhidhamma then there
> > is no control. There is
> > control but the control does not mean there is a
> > need to "cling" to a self
> > for control. If there is no control, why would
> > Buddha seek enlightment to
> > get out of the birth-death cycle, isn't it this
> > intention (to get out of
> > the birth cycle) attached to a desire. Buddha
> > knows that we need a goal
> > to relieve ourselve, isn't the goal of Abhidhamma
> > is enlightment. So isn't
> > it fits into our mental image of going to nirvana
> > that let us eventually
> > condition us to practise satipatthana. These are
> > my train of thought, may
> > sound confusing though.
> 
> Again, as far as I know, given the complexities of
> conditions that cause the dhamma to arise, no control
> (dhamma arises only because of conditions, and not a single
> agent causing the dhamma to arise) is the best explanation
> of the Buddha teachings. This theory doesn't support random
> arising: if there are no (or not enough) conditions for a
> dhamma to arise, then it cannot arise. If there is, then it
> must arise. This is regardless of the intention of the
> person (since intention is not the *only* dhamma that
> conditions).

k: I did not said that there is a self that controls. We all know there
is no self that controls but there is a cetasikas (cetana) that control or
you prefer the word condition our actions. This cetasikas is the
controlling factor in our decisions, whether to perform a kusala or
akusala actions. To say that is no control is extremist. Take for
example, while we are driving, if we are able to brake to stop an accident
from happening, are we going to brake or not (vice aside other factors
like wet road). Definitely there is no self that is controlling but there
is a cetasikas that controls our actions. If there is no control, we will
not be reading suttas or Abhidhamma in the first place. 

k: For your kind comments please.


kind regards
Ken O




	
13282

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 1:08am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [reply to Frank]

 	
Thanks, Sarah.

--> Dan: How? Well, when sati arises, this moment is understood as 
seeing, that moment as hearing, this mind with lobha, that mind with 
dosa, this dosa arising from craving, etc. Sati does not arise from 
anyone directing the mind to note any particular object or to look 
for any particular thing, but when dhammas arise with right view and 
sati, the characteristics are known and understood. They just arise 
and pass away, without being anyone, without being directed by 
anyone, without being conjured by anyone, without being owned by 
anyone. Mind with panya simply knows about dhammas and what to do 
with them and how to react to them without anyone needing to tell it 
about the dhammas and what to do with them and how to react to them. 

--> Sarah: Of course some --but not me-- might object to the `mind 
and panya knows' in the way others -- again not me-- object 
to `seeing (or citta) sees';-))

** Touché! You caught me! 

Seriously, that metaphorical construction always gives me pause 
because it powerfully evokes a "thing" that is doing the doing. 
Equally powerfully it evokes the "no control" aspect of anatta, which 
is exactly why it is used in this context. The "no control" aspect is 
interesting and useful in some contexts, but it is not the same thing 
as anatta, and I don't think it's quite right. The similes 
about 'mind with panya knows' and such are merely metaphorical, such 
as using "I" and "we." However, they sound less metaphorical, and 
it's tempting to substitute them for doctrine in a technical context, 
and I do want to be on guard against that! 

Thanks again, Sarah.

Dan
	
13283

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 2:13am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 	
Dear Christine,

I have both your posts to Kom and myself here which I’d like to insperse
with a few more comments (but nothing new;-)). Apologies for making it a
rather long post.

--- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: 

> I admit to having heavily researched 'other options'.:)
> It seems that if I wished to find support for 'righteous anger' I 
> shouldn't be a Theravadan....I should be a follower of 
> Soka Gakkai International, as they are the only buddhists who don't 
> strongly warn against it and, in fact, value it.
.....
I’m sure by now you have researched most Buddhist groups and I hope we
don’t lose you to Soka Gakkai or any other ‘righteous anger’ group;-)
.....
> http://www.baynet.net/~arcc/dhamma/divabid.html
> and regarding 'righteous anger'...
> "We should especially be on guard for the arising of "righteous" 
> anger. Remember that ill-will is a poison and that you are only 
> hurting yourself, karmically and spiritually, when you harbour a 
> grudge for an imagined, or even a real, wrong."
.....
Thank you for this helpful quote. It’s a good reminder that from a dhamma
point of view, it makes no difference whether the grudge is for an
‘imagined’ or ‘real’ wrong. In other words, the problem is the anger, the
state of mind, rather than the supposed cause. At this time there is no
forgiveness (abhaya dana) as Stigan and Nina were discussing. I’m sure the
ideas of the giving of fearlessness, protection and forgiveness being
connected in this way will be as novel to you as to me.
.....
> I remember that recently 'elsewhere', we were talking about the 
> surprising last line of the "Mulapariyaya Sutta - The Root Sequence"
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn001.html
> >>"That is what the Blessed One said. Displeased, the monks did not 
> delight in the Blessed One's words"<< 
> I certainly understand how they felt....
> It is hard to hear, and harder to accept, something that goes 
> against how a person believes the world is, that is so much a part of 
> a person, that they don't even know it is 'a belief', and not 'the 
> way things are'..... things like that to 'fight injustice and evil, 
> defend the poor and powerless' are always 'admirable' things to do. 
> Social Work at the hospital is not going to feel quite the same after 
> such a shaking up of certainty about motives.....it will be 
> interesting observing myself over the next week or two. :-)
.....
Yes, the dhamma really goes against the stream or the conventional way of
looking at the world. Like you said elsewhere, sometimes it makes plenty
of logical sense, but there can still be plenty of resistance and clinging
to deep-held beliefs.
.....
>The real question for me, accepting 
> that 'our accumulation of dosa is the real cause that aversion arises 
> time and again,' is not blame or pointing the finger at a particular 
> individual. In actual everday hands-on living of our lives, and 
> while understanding that complex conditions bring about suffering - 
> are we to ignore people being wronged, whether it is ourselves, dear 
> ones, or even perfect strangers? Are we not to attempt to assist or 
> protect (in a non-violent way) those we feel are being treated 
> unfairly and suffering? Is there total moral neutrality? Should we 
> speak out about perceived injustices, or should we just say 'It's 
> their fruits of kamma' or 'Uh-huh hurt feelings.. shows lack of 
> advancement in the practice yet, too much dosa,mana, clinging, or not 
> enough <choose label>' ? Often, it is easier to preserve silence, 
> than speak out and attract retribution, or risk losing valued 
> friendships....
> Non-action, like action, is an intentional choice. And if I don't 
> act, when I could have acted, or if I choose one action instead of 
> another, the results of that action or non-action are my kama-vipaka 
> eventually? 
.....
Like Jon said, there isn’t any rule and how any of us will behave at any
given time will depend on many different conditions. We’re used to judging
the value of these by the particular action or outer appearance, but as we
know, the Teachings are referring to the understanding of mental states
which change rapidly. Of course we can speak out about perceived
injustices with good intentions and wise speech, just as we can with the
opposite. So it’s not a matter of not speaking out, if that is our
inclination, but of developing more understanding while speaking out (or
keeping silent).
.....
<snip>
> the importance of making a stand against wrong. Small daily 
> happenings are miniature reflections of what happens on a larger 
> scale nationally and internationally. When the harm being done (as 
> in the categories above) is to a person who is a little different to 
> the majority, or to whom the majority seem to be either opposed or 
> indifferent, how easy it is to magnify their faults and minimise (or 
> be unable to hear or see clearly) the role of those others doing 
> wrong. How easy to look for the approval of the majority(more like 
> us), and feel validated.
.....
For me, having also been rather political in my youth and worked a lot in
community and social work settings, I’d say it’s very easy to make a stand
with plenty of feeling (mostly unwholesome) which it’s very easy indeed to
justify. It rather scares me to think of the lack of kindness or
forgiveness there often is for the so-called perpetrators who act out of
their accumulated defilements too. The test, I believe, is not how the
other acts but how much understanding and kindness there is when we ‘step
in’ or perform our duties or do what we consider 'right' .
.....
> So what is a Buddhist to do, to live in the world correctly and 
> unselfishly, with loving-kindness, compassion, sympathetic joy, and 
> equanimity regarding others? Watch our own mind states, and be aware 
> when dosa arises. Is that all? Does this mean ignoring the suffering 
> of others when it could be ameliorated or prevented? Extending or 
> pervading metta, but taking no action? What do the Teachings say?
.....
Firstly, I’d say that we have to be very realistic and honest with
ourselves. Of course we’re not going to live like arahants and if we try
to do so by imitation, it’s wrong and shows more clinging. Appreciating
the suffering of others and doing what we can to help n any way with metta
and compassion is always skilful and to be encouraged. The realism and
honesty lies in not kidding ourselves that it’s all pure and noble when
inevitably it isn’t and not to think that the particular action or
non-action is the criterion of this.

Btw, thanks for encouraging me to look more carefully at BB’s intro and
the commentary notes to the Mulapariyaya sutta discussing why the monks
were not pleased by the discourse:
***
“Having heard this sutta taught for the purpose of shattering their
conceit, those bhikkhus thought: “The theorist, he says, perceives earth.
The learner, the arahat, and the Tathagata directly know it. What is
this? How is this? previously we could quickly understand whatever the
Exalted One said. But now we cannot make head or tail out of this
‘exposition of the root’. Oh, the Buddhas are immeasurable and
unfathomable!” Thus they became humble, like snakes with drawn fangs, and
went respectfully to attend upon the Buddha and listen to the Dhamma.”
***
We also read about how the Bodhisattva had to help them to reduce their
pride in a previous life. How many lives have we also ‘resisted’ hearing
the truth because of mana and wrong views?

“..humble like snakes with drawn fangs’....interesting;-)

Any points you raise are always useful for me too, Chris

metta,
Sarah
===== 


	
13284

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 3:37am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Deciding how best to act

 	
> > I remember that recently 'elsewhere', we were talking about the 
> > surprising last line of the "Mulapariyaya Sutta - The Root 
Sequence"
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn001.html
> > >>"That is what the Blessed One said. Displeased, the monks did 
not 
> > delight in the Blessed One's words"<< 

I wonder if they "did not delight" because the whole sutta was about 
those bhikkhus who go astray delighting in various concepts. It would 
be strange to read a rousing account of how the bhikkhus listening 
then delighted in Buddha's words (concepts).
	
13285

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 5:14am
Subject: RE: [dsg] satipatthana

 	
Rob E

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: 
> Dear Jon,
> I guess what this particular issue comes down to is whether the Buddha is saying
> to contemplate these characteristics of realities, or whether to contemplate
> specific namas and rupas in a given category, and just, as you say, indicating the
> areas within which the specific instances can be found.

I'm not quite clear on the distinction you are making here, Rob, so I'll just say
that I take him to be indicating the contemplation of any presently arising
phenomena.

> I also agree, and think it is an important point, that concepts as such can be
> pointing towards other concepts or be pointing towards realities, and that
> concepts that point to realities have a very special usefulness, even though they
> themselves do not have a real object. They are the only guide we have to direct
> us towards real objects, other than direct discernment itself.
> 
> If the Sutta says "...takes hold of the aggregate of...", it is reasonable to say
> that the Buddha is saying to take an arising example of the aggregate as an object
> of discernment and see it for what it is. I'm just not sure from the language of
> the Sutta whether he is saying that or not.

Here are some further passages from the sutta that it might be useful to consider in
that light:

"Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust [or with hate
or with ignorance], as with lust [or hate or ignorance]; the consciousness without
lust [etc.], as without lust [etc.]; …"
"Here, O bhikkhus, when sensuality [or any of the other of the 5 hindrances] is
present, a bhikkhu knows with understanding: 'I have sensuality [or whichever of the
5 hindrances],' or when sensuality [etc.] is not present, he knows with
understanding: 'I have no sensuality [etc.].'"

The commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta explains 'present' in the passage just
above as "existing by way of occurrence, practice or repeated happening", and 'not
present' as "not existing, by way of non-occurrence or because of rejection from the
mind by way of reflection or concentration".

It then explains the terms "by way of occurrence" and "existing" as follows:
"Since there is no state of yoking together of the good and the bad moral qualities
similar to the yoking of two bulls to a cart, -- since the good and the bad do not
exist together -- from the absence of sensuality at the time of seeing one's mind
through knowledge it is said: 'by way of occurrence'. At the moment of seeing wisely
the occurrence of sense-desire there is no sense-desire as good and bad states of
mind cannot exist together 
"Existing means: When it is found in one's own mental flux."

Some people really doubt whether there can be awareness of presently arising
('existing') akusala states. Here it clearly assumes there can be, and explains
that the akusala state and the moment of wisely seeing it are in reality 2 separate
mind moments.

I hope you find something here to reflect on.

Jon


	
13286

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 5:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (1)

 	
Hi Robert,
--- "robertkirkpatrick.rm"
<robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
> For instance, when we hear
> unpleasant words, the 
> moment of experiencing the sound
> (hearing-consciousness) is akusala 
> vipaka, the result of an unwholesome deed we
> performed ourselves.
This still makes no sense to me. According to your
explanation, my examples are not the result of akusala
vipaka, but simply akusala cittas. How is it different
in your example? Hearing concsiousness is merely
hearing consciousness, and the experience of
"unpleasant words" must necessarily be following
akusala cittas then, and not the "hearing
consciousness" that is akusala vipaka.

At the beach there [...] there may also be
> moments when it is 
> just a little too hot and the feeling through the
> bodysense is 
> unpleasant (vipaka-result of akusala kamma in this
> case). 

Again I am baffled by this explanation. I would tend
to believe the cause of the hot feeling is sitting in
the sun too long, not vipaka-result of akusala kamma. 

-fk


	
13287

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 5:34am
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
--- onco111 <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> What does "Buddha nature" mean? 

Hi Dan,
What aspect or perspective are you trying to probe?
I'm guessing you already know the standard
definitions, and there's a specific angle you're
looking for.

-fk


	
13288

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 6:10am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [reply to Frank]

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > Seriously, that metaphorical construction always gives me pause 
> because it powerfully evokes a "thing" that is doing the doing. 
> Equally powerfully it evokes the "no control" aspect of anatta, 
which 
> is exactly why it is used in this context. The "no control" aspect 
is 
> interesting and useful in some contexts, but it is not the same 
thing 
> as anatta, and I don't think it's quite right. > 
> Dan
-------------------
Dear Dan,
Pleased to see you realise that one reason to write in this way is 
that it stresses on anatta - that there is no self doing anything 
but that different dhammas are performing whatever function is 
appropriate. It is like the Visuddhimagga says (xvii312)"The absence 
of interestedness on the part of ignorance, such as 'Formations
[sankhara] must be made to occur by me, or on the part of 
formations, such as 'vinnana must be made to ocur by us'. One who 
sees this rightly abandons self view by understanding the absence of 
a maker".
We are persistently fooled into thinking that there is a self who 
decides and directs. It helps us see that there is really no self 
when the commentaries further define any dhamma by means of lakkhana 
(characteristic), rasa (function), paccupatthana (the way it 
presents itself) and its padatthana (proximate cause). Bodhi in CMA 
(p. 29) gives the example of citta: "Its characteristic is the 
knowing of an object. Its function is to be a forerunner of the 
mental factors in that it presides over them, and is always 
accompanied by them.Its manisfestation is as a continuity of 
processes.Its proximate cause is nama and rupa because consciousness 
cannot arise in the absence of mental and material factors."
Just as an aside on what 'knowing' means the visuddhimagga 
(xiv4 ) "consciousness knows the objects as blue or yellow, and it 
brings about penetration of its characteristics, but it cannot bring 
about, by endeavouring, the manisfestation of the path. 
Understanding (panna) knows the object in the way stated, and it 
brings about by endeavouring, the manifestation of the path." This 
perhaps ties up with your excellent series on silabataparamasa; as 
you indicated this is actually an aspect of wrong view, it is not 
the action per se that is the clinging to rule and ritual but the 
wrong view that feels one is somehow controlling and directing the 
various khandas. In the quote from the visuddhimagga we see that 
citta(without panna) can know the characteristic of dhammas, it can 
perceive subtle feelings colours, sounds, hardness, heat - but if 
panna is not present nothing is gained, one may be developing 
silabataparamasa.

I was also interested in your comment that "The "no control" aspect 
is 
> interesting and useful in some contexts, but it is not the same 
thing 
> as anatta, and I don't think it's quite right"".
I think everyone sees different aspects of the teaching so for me 
the no-control aspect seems a crucial aspect of anatta.
"Those same five aggregates are anatta because of the words 'what is 
painful is no self' Why? Because there is no exercising power over 
them. The mode of insusceptibilty to having power exercised over 
them is the characteristic of anatta" Yam dukkham tam anatta"ti pana 
vacanato tadeva khandhapañcakam anatta. Kasma? Avasavattanato; 
avasavattanakaro anattalakkhanam (sammohavinodani p60( dispeller of 
delusion). it continues:
"that is why the impermanent, the painful and the not-self are one 
thing and the characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self are 
another . For that which consists of the five aggregates, the twevle 
bases, the eigthteen elements is all impermanent, painful and no-
self; the modes of alteration of the kind aforesaid are the 
characteristics of impermanence, pain and no-self.""
.
best wishes
robert
	
13289

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 6:27am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (1)

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> wrote:
> Hi Robert,
> --- "robertkirkpatrick.rm"
> <robertkirkpatrick@r...> wrote:
> > For instance, when we hear
> > unpleasant words, the 
> > moment of experiencing the sound
> > (hearing-consciousness) is akusala 
> > vipaka, the result of an unwholesome deed we
> > performed ourselves.
> This still makes no sense to me. According to your
> explanation, my examples are not the result of akusala
> vipaka, but simply akusala cittas. How is it different
> in your example? Hearing concsiousness is merely
> hearing consciousness, and the experience of
> "unpleasant words" must necessarily be following
> akusala cittas then, and not the "hearing
> consciousness" that is akusala vipaka.
_____________

Dear Frank,
By learning to study the different jatis it can be known whether 
akusala citta follows the vipaka. The moment of hearing the sound 
when someone is speaking angrily is very brief - and so quickly 
after that the javana process, seven moments, happens - but there is 
no rule that akusala citta must arise. There could instead be 
patience, or there could be direct insight into sound or hearing. 
The jatis are so different.


> 
> At the beach there [...] there may also be
> > moments when it is 
> > just a little too hot and the feeling through the
> > bodysense is 
> > unpleasant (vipaka-result of akusala kamma in this
> > case). 
> 
> Again I am baffled by this explanation. I would tend
> to believe the cause of the hot feeling is sitting in
> the sun too long, not vipaka-result of akusala kamma. 
> --------

Everyone is so different. In a group of people the temperature might 
be good for one, not for another. I like the aircon. on low but my 
friends like it on high.
Vipaka citta is by definition caused by kamma; but, as I have 
mentioned in the past, no citta arises through only one condition 
and vipaka needs other conditions to act as support for the kamma to 
produce its result.
best wishes
robert

> -fk
> 
> 
	
13290

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 3:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Hi again, Dan -

Just one further point about the Mahayana term 'Buddha nature' that 
I'd like to emphasize. I think it is a notion which, like 'paramattha dhamma' 
for the Theravadins, is like a snake that must be held properly lest it bite 
the holder. It is very easy, I believe, for this term to take on 
substantialist overtones resulting in wrong view. In fact, I believe that 
such statements as "We are already enlightened", which are seen from time to 
time in Zen, flow from an erroneous grasping of the notion of 'Buddha 
nature', though, not being a "Zen man", I may be missing the meaning for the 
words (as one "misses the forest for the trees").

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/14/02 8:00:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... 
writes:


> Hi, Dan -
> 
> In a message dated 5/14/02 7:22:02 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> dalthorp@o... writes:
> 
> 
> > What does "Buddha nature" mean? 
> > 
> > 
> ========================
> Better just ask the other guys, Dan! ;-)) I *think* it may just be 
> the 
> capacity/potentiality beings have for enlightenment. (It's an okay idea, I 
> think, so long as one doesn't reify it into some sort of "power" or 
> "potency", so long as it only means that should X and Y happen, so will Z 
> happen (just a conditionality).
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13291

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 4:40am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Hi, TG -

In a message dated 5/15/02 12:30:44 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
TGrand458@a... writes:


> 
> I agree completely Howard. The term I came up with previously was "primary 
> 
> states" but the term "fundamental phenomena" is pretty darn much the same 
> thing.
> 
> But your second point is even more important. And I'll add this...
> 
> There are characteristics, but nothing has its own characteristic. 
> Characteristics are not non-existent, nor are they existent. 
> Characteristics 
> are systematically and continuosly altering into something else. 
> 
> TG
> 
=============================
Hmm. I do have some reservations about your final sentence. It's not 
clear to me exactly what you mean. I don't, for example, see hardness as 
"becoming" softness. What I see is that while there was hardness, now there 
is softness. Conditions cease and others arise, all being nothing 
in-and-of-themselves, merely empty phenomena rolling on. I think that while a 
discrete/momentary view of dhammas can be a form of substantialism 
["momentary reality view"], so can a continuity/transformational view be 
["continous reality view"].

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13292

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 8:50am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> > There are characteristics, but nothing has its own 
characteristic. 
> Characteristics are not non-existent, nor are they existent. 
Characteristics 
> are systematically and continuosly altering into something else. 
> 
> TG
> 
____________
Dear TG,
I don't think any dhamma can change into something else. This might 
be of interest: Visuddhimagga (xvii313) "the defining of the 
individual characteristics of ignorance etc. is called the method of 
diversity. One who sees this rightly abandons the eternity view by 
seeing the arising of each new state."
best wishes
robert
	
13293

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 9:04am
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
---
Dear Larry, 
a good summary for the most part. 
Related to azita's query: "It is impossible (?) for anyone but the
> Buddha to tell whether
> a vipaka citta is kusala or akusala"
Most of the the time it is hard to know whether the sense door 
experience is from akusala or kusala. However, there are only 2 
possibilties and so we can sometimes be fairly sure that say hearing 
is akusala vipaka (hearing someone speaking out of anger); or a 
painful experience through the bodysense (akusala vipaka); seeing a 
piece of shit (akusala vipaka); smelling a foul smell(akusala 
vipaka), tasting something rotten (akusala vipaka).
What we definitely cannot know is the past kamma that conditioned 
those particular moments; that knowledge is the domain of the 
Buddha's.
best wishes
robert

In dhammastudygroup@y..., azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote:
> --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear group,
> > Just a note of clarification regarding akusala
> > vipaka citta. This citta
> > gets its name, 'akusala', based on its cause, an
> > akusala citta rooted in
> > lobha/dosa/moha. The vipaka itself is without any
> > akusala/kusala
> > quality. Hence its designation 'rootless' (ahetuka).
> > Akusala citta
> > rooted in lobha/dosa/moha (always?) causes a
> > rootless citta. Rootless
> > cittas cause nothing but may be a contributory
> > condition for another
> > citta rooted in lobha/dosa/moha or
> > alobha/adosa/amoha, which, inturn,
> > must (?) cause another vipaka.
> > 
> > An akusala citta will only cause an akusala vipaka
> > simply because that
> > is how vipaka is named. Sight, sound, smell, taste
> > vipaka will have a
> > neutral feeling. Body sense vipaka will be pleasant
> > or unpleasant
> > feeling. It is impossible (?) for anyone but the
> > Buddha to tell whether
> > a vipaka citta is kusala or akusala. Both kusala and
> > akusala _rootless_
> > vipaka cittas have the same qualities. There is also
> > a class of kusala
> > vipaka citta _with_ roots. This has kusala qualities
> > but because it is
> > vipaka, it cannot cause another citta. 
> > 
> > It can be seen very easily in satipatthana that
> > whatever sight, sound,
> > taste, smell, or body feeling may arise, it is value
> > neutral. Like and
> > dislike are lobha and dosa. They may arise in
> > response to the vipaka and
> > will, in turn, produce another vipaka. We can't
> > really see this kamma
> > process unfolding. We can recognize cause, and we
> > can recognize effect.
> > But we cannot put the two together. We have to take
> > the Buddha's word
> > for it.
> > 
> > Unpleasant body feeling is not necessarily akusala
> > vipaka. Kusala citta
> > can cause unpleasant body feeling.
> > 
> > Corrections joyously welcomed.
> > 
> > yours in the way, Larry
> > 
> > question: Is kamma unstopable once the cause has
> > arisen?
> > 
> > L. 
> > 
> > dear Larry, I query that last comment about
> "unpleasant body feeling ------cause unpleasant body
> feeling" . I can't see how kusala citta can cause
> something unpleasant. Can you elaborate please? 
> 
> > regarding your question about kamma - I think
> it is unstopable - unless you become an arahat - but
> you can't do this if the kamma is really heavy, such
> as killing mum or dad, harming a Buddha, etc.
> > Azita,
> > May all beings be happy,
> > > 
> > 
	
13294

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 5:44am
Subject: A Couple More Thoughts Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Hi again, TG (and Robert) -

Let me add a couple more thoughts with regard to this momentariness - 
continuity dichotomy. It strikes me as a false choice. With regard to the 
momentariness view, it seems to me that when we assume that there is an 
instant at which a condition ceases, we are extrapolating from our ordinary 
macroscopic view of the world. If there were such an instant of cessation, we 
would have to ask which of the following is true at that instant: (1) The 
condition holds, (2) The condition does not hold, (3) The condition both 
holds and does not hold, and (4) The condition neither holds nor does not 
hold. An examination of these shows that they are all untenable. At the same 
time, the continuity (or transformational) view is, as discussed before, also 
faulty. So, what can be truly said? Merely, I think, that there is no evident 
"instant of cessation", nor is there a continuous deformation, but simply 
that a condition used to hold, but no longer holds, that being all that it 
means to say that it ceased. It simply did not remain. To say that a 
condition is anicca/impermanent is merely to say that it is not permanent, it 
is not lasting.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13295

From: Kom Tukovinit <kom@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 0:12pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] attachment to concept

 	
Dear Ken O,

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Kenneth Ong [mailto:ashkenn@y...]
>
>
> Kom
>
> k: In the first place, in the sutta, there is no mention that concepts
> can not be objects of satipatthana. the position that concepts cannot be
> objects of satipatthana is in Abhidhamma and not in Sutta. I have not
> seen in what Buddha said that only paramattha are objects of satipatthana.
> Hence where is the inconsistency. Does Abhidhamma rejects concepts as
> objects in Satipatthana and on what basis is the objection derive from?
> Is it just because concepts are not paramathas? Then we got to ask, where
> does objects derived from?

You are right to say that the sutta doesn't appear to explicitly say that
concepts cannot be objects of satipatthana. I will give you a list of
reasons why saying that only "paramatha" dhammas are objects of satipatthana
*may* be a plausible explanation:

1) If something is not even there, then it cannot have impermanence or
falling-away as its characteristics

2) Howard coined "concepts" as "mental constructs." Without the repetition
of the mind door processes, mental constructs cannot be experienced. All
paramatha characteristics are experienced relatively immediately after the
brief existence of the object. There are definitely differences when we
consider "feelings", as compared to "freedom": what's the difference? One
has its conditioned characteristics that can be directly experienced, where
the other we have to think a little to understand what it means. One may
have a hard time explaining to a person from another culture the concept of
freedom, but I am sure one has less problem explaining feelings.

3) A good portion of the teachings in the sutta mention the 5 kandhas, 12
ayatanas, and 18 dhatus, all explained in the commentaries and the
abhidhamma as being paramatha realities.

4) There are 84,000 headings in the tipitakas. Over 40,000 are in the
abhidhamma. Unless you don't believe in the authenticity of the abhidhamma,
then you have to consider why even doubling the volume by extremely
intricate and detailed explanation of the "realities" if about half is
already enough to allow all beings to understand the essence of the
teachings.

5) Of course, we shouldn't stick to book knowledge and our own belief of
what the teachings mean. There are realities arising now. What are the
differences between experiencing the 5 kandhas and concepts?

> > Again, as far as I know, given the complexities of
> > conditions that cause the dhamma to arise, no control
> > (dhamma arises only because of conditions, and not a single
> > agent causing the dhamma to arise) is the best explanation
> > of the Buddha teachings. This theory doesn't support random
> > arising: if there are no (or not enough) conditions for a
> > dhamma to arise, then it cannot arise. If there is, then it
> > must arise. This is regardless of the intention of the
> > person (since intention is not the *only* dhamma that
> > conditions).
>
> k: I did not said that there is a self that controls. We all know there
> is no self that controls but there is a cetasikas (cetana) that control or
> you prefer the word condition our actions. This cetasikas is the
> controlling factor in our decisions, whether to perform a kusala or
> akusala actions. To say that is no control is extremist. Take for
> example, while we are driving, if we are able to brake to stop an accident
> from happening, are we going to brake or not (vice aside other factors
> like wet road). Definitely there is no self that is controlling but there
> is a cetasikas that controls our actions. If there is no control, we will
> not be reading suttas or Abhidhamma in the first place.
>

Can we will (or cetana) all the angers (that most people don't like) away?

When you say "we all know" there is no self, I interpret this to be that we
understand conceptually that there is no self. Despite this understanding,
the wrong views of self/mine/me are extremely subtle. It is everywhere.
Even when we think we understand, we are still yet searching for the self
that we desperately hold on to. My view (conceptual) is that each of the
dhamma in quetions are *all* conditioned. You wouldn't be reading or
writing to me if the conditions are not perfect that this happens. Plenty
of people subscribe, and then leave, DSG. Why did they leave? They don't
have the will to persevere through this sort of discussion? Or is it just
that they have no accumulations, both past and present, to endure this sort
of discussion?

By reading the above statments, "you" have already subtly changed due to new
accumulations. The kamma that has caused the reading of this right/wrong
explanation has already given its results (in seeing, etc.). The
accumulations in the past are pushing you to continue reading instead of
just hitting the delete key (or hitting the delete key instead of just
reading!). The considerations of the dicussions (be in kusala/aksuala) are
already being accumulated that surely will condition future similar dhamma
to arise when the time comes. There are no single agent that directs.
There is only dhamma that will cause vipaka (and other kind of dhammas) in
the future (kusala/akusala), vipakas tha are results of the past, and all
those functional cittas that are occuring, passing away, all without anyone
noticing them.

kom
	
13296

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 1:47pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
I don't know the standard, basic definitions. That's why I'm asking. A 
friend of mine recently went on a Rinzai retreat and came back with 
all sorts of words I don't understand at all. Just looking for some 
help on what the words mean and what kinds of contexts they are used 
in.

Dan

> > What does "Buddha nature" mean? 
> 
> Hi Dan,
> What aspect or perspective are you trying to probe?
> I'm guessing you already know the standard
> definitions, and there's a specific angle you're
> looking for.
> 
> -fk
> 
> 
	
13297

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 2:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Thanks, Howard. I'm trying to look at this without being bitten, i.e. 
without thinking, "Hmmm... It all sounds like substantialist heresy 
to me, ya' dang ignurnt infidel!" 

Should I try to concentrate on noting: "Thinking; thinking; dosa; 
dosa..." if the above line of thought takes root? 

WWMD (What Would Mahasi Do?)

Dan

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., upasaka@a... wrote:
> Hi again, Dan -
> 
> Just one further point about the Mahayana term 'Buddha 
nature' that 
> I'd like to emphasize. I think it is a notion which, like 
'paramattha dhamma' 
> for the Theravadins, is like a snake that must be held properly lest 
it bite 
> the holder. It is very easy, I believe, for this term to take on 
> substantialist overtones resulting in wrong view. In fact, I believe 
that 
> such statements as "We are already enlightened", which are seen from 
time to 
> time in Zen, flow from an erroneous grasping of the notion of 
'Buddha 
> nature', though, not being a "Zen man", I may be missing the meaning 
for the 
> words (as one "misses the forest for the trees").
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> In a message dated 5/14/02 8:00:59 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
upasaka@a... 
> writes:


13298

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 2:58pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Thanks, Larry. Howard also mentioned that "Buddha nature" could be 
something like panya (which is somewhat like a suped up sati [Well, 
not exactly! Hmmm... come to think of it, not even close. But 
doesn't Rinzai teach us to try not to think? What's that all about 
anyway? Guess it could be related to the etymology of the word 
"Zen" (Japanese) < chan (Chinese) < dhyana (Sanskrit) = jhana 
(Pali)]. Is buddha nature the second jhana and beyond? Or is it the 
jhana that takes characteristics as object [paramattha dhammas] rather 
than "objects" as object [kasina]). 

You are right about "buddha nature" = "nibbana" as inscrutable -- 
leastwise to me anyway.

Dan

> Hi Dan, I'll bite. I think this question could also be phrased 
"what
> does 'buddha' mean?" To me it means sati; more inscrutably, it could
> mean nibbana.
> 
> Larry
	
13299

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 4:14pm
Subject: ADL ch. 8 (3)

 	
http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 8 (3)

The feeling arising with the body-consciousness which experiences an
impression through the body-sense cannot be indifferent; it arises
either with bodily painful feeling or with bodily pleasant feeling. When
an unpleasant bodily impression is experienced the feeling which
accompanies the body-consciousness is dukkha-vedana (bodily painful
feeling). When a pleasant bodily impression is experienced the feeling
which accompanies the body-consciousness is sukha-vedana (bodily
pleasant feeling). Bodily unpleasant feeling and bodily pleasant feeling
are nama which can arise only with the body-consciousness which
experiences an object through the body-sense. Both bodily feeling and
mental feeling are nama, but they arise because of different conditions
and at different moments. For example, we may have bodily pleasant
feeling when we are in comfortable surroundings, but in spite of that,
we may still be worried and also have moments of mental unpleasant
feeling; these feelings arise at different moments. Bodily pleasant
feeling is the result of kusala kamma. The mental unpleasant feeling
which arises when we are unhappy is conditioned by our accumulation of
dosa (aversion); it is akusala. 

The whole day there are impressions received through the body-sense,
which is a kind of rupa. Bodily impressions can be received all over the
body and thus the door of the body-sense can be at any place of the
body. Whenever we touch hard or soft objects, when cold or heat contacts
the body, and when we move, bend or stretch, there are unpleasant or
pleasant impressions received through the body-sense. One may wonder
whether at each moment there is a bodily impression, bodily pleasant or
bodily unpleasant feeling arises. One may notice the coarse bodily
feelings, but not the subtle bodily feelings. For example, when
something is a little too hard, too cold or too hot, there is
dukkha-vedana (bodily painful feeling) arising with the body
consciousness which experiences the object through the body-sense. One
may not notice the subtle bodily feelings if one has not learned to be
aware of realities. 

The arahat, when he experiences an unpleasant impression or a pleasant
impression through the body-sense, only has bodily unpleasant feeling or
bodily pleasant feeling arising with the body-consciousness. He has no
akusala cittas or kusala cittas after the vipakacitta; he has
kiriyacittas ('inoperative' cittas). The deeds which the arahat performs
are neither kusala nor akusala. So he will not be born again. We read in
the 'Kindred Sayings' (IV, Salayatana-vagga, Kindred Sayings about
Feeling, Book I, par.6) that the Buddha said to the monks: 

'The untaught manyfolk, monks, feels feeling that is pleasant, feeling
that is painful and feeling that is neutral. The well-taught Ariyan
disciple, monks, feels the same three feelings. ' 

Now herein, monks, what is the distinction, what is the specific
feature, what is the difference between the well-taught Ariyan disciple
and the untaught manyfolk?' 

'For us, lord, things are rooted in the Exalted One....' 

'The untaught manyfolk, monks, being touched by feeling that is painful,
weeps and wails, cries 
aloud, knocks the breast, falls into utter bewilderment. For he feels a
twofold feeling, bodily and mental ... Touched by that painful feeling
he feels repugnance for it. Feeling that repugnance for the painful
feeling, the lurking tendency to repugnance fastens on him. Touched by
the painful feeling, he delights in pleasant feeling. Why so? The
untaught manyfolk, monks, knows of no refuge from painful feeling save
sensual pleasure. Delighting in that sensual pleasure, the lurking
tendency to sensual pleasure fastens on him....' 

Is this not real life? Touched by painful feeling, we delight in
pleasant feeling; we believe that pleasant feeling is real happiness. we
do not see life as it really is: dukkha. We wish to close our eyes to
sickness, old age and death, to 'lamentation and despair', to the
impermanence of all conditioned realities. We expect happiness in life
and when we have to suffer we think that pleasant feeling might cure us
of suffering and we cling to it. In the Buddha's teaching of the
'Dependent Origination' it is said that feeling conditions craving. Not
only pleasant feeling and indifferent feeling condition craving, also
painful feeling conditions craving, since one wishes to be liberated
from painful feeling. Furthermore we read in the sutta: 

'....If he feels feeling that is pleasant, he feels it as one in
bondage. If he feels feeling that is painful, he feels it as one in
bondage. If he feels feeling that is neutral, he feels it as one in
bondage. This untaught manyfolk, monks, is called 'in bondage to birth,
death, sorrow and grief, woe, lamentation and despair. He is in bondage
to dukkha. So I declare. 

But, monks, the well-taught Ariyan disciple, when touched by painful
feeling, weeps not, wails not, cries not aloud, knocks not the breast,
falls not into utter bewilderment. He feels but one feeling, the bodily,
not the mental... If he feels a feeling that is pleasant, he feels it as
one freed from bondage. If he feels a feeling that is painful, he feels
it as one that is freed from bondage. If he feels a neutral feeling, he
feels it as one that is freed from bondage. This well-taught Ariyan 
disciple, monks, is called 'freed from the bondage of birth, old age,
from sorrow and grief, from woe, lamentation and despair, freed from the
bondage of dukkha.' So I declare....'
	
13300

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 1:28pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
In a message dated 05/15/2002 8:41:43 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
upasaka@a... writes:

<< Hmm. I do have some reservations about your final sentence. It's not 
clear to me exactly what you mean. I don't, for example, see hardness as 
"becoming" softness. What I see is that while there was hardness, now there 
is softness. Conditions cease and others arise, all being nothing 
in-and-of-themselves, merely empty phenomena rolling on. I think that while 
a 
discrete/momentary view of dhammas can be a form of substantialism 
["momentary reality view"], so can a continuity/transformational view be 
["continous reality view"].

With metta,
Howard >>

Interesting points Robert and Howard. I will continue to think about it. 
However, my current understanding is that phenomena are "positionally 
moved/altered" by contact with other phenomena. This positional 
movement/alteration is impermanence. 

<>

There was hardness, now there is softness? Why? There must be a cause.

<<Conditions cease and others arise, all being nothing 
in-and-of-themselves, merely empty phenomena rolling on.>>

This first part of this statement will not accord to the law of dependent 
origination as I understand it...
This being, that is
With the arising of this, that arises
This not being, that is not
With the ceasing of this, that ceases.

<>

I do believe primary states are real. However, due to Dependent Arising, 
they are impermanent, sorrowful (to become attached to), and no-self. I do 
see it as a chain of causal alteration. So If the last part of this 
statement infers that "continuity/transformational view" is akin to "self 
view", I'd be on the opposite end of that opinion.

But its all good stuff to think about. 

Take care. TG
	

13301

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 1:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
In a message dated 05/15/2002 8:51:42 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:

<< -- In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> > There are characteristics, but nothing has its own 
characteristic. 
> Characteristics are not non-existent, nor are they existent. 
Characteristics 
> are systematically and continuosly altering into something else. 
> 
> TG
> 
____________
Dear TG,
I don't think any dhamma can change into something else. This might 
be of interest: Visuddhimagga (xvii313) "the defining of the 
individual characteristics of ignorance etc. is called the method of 
diversity. One who sees this rightly abandons the eternity view by 
seeing the arising of each new state."
best wishes
robert
>>

Hi Robert
The key phrase here I think is "...systematically and continuously altering 
into something else." They change because they are part of a "system" of 
dependent arising. States do not arise or cease by themselves. They are 
conditioned by the "conglomeration of forces impacting them." They arise and 
cease due to forces. The states "themselves" are the forces and the common 
denominator might be considered the Four Great Elements. The Four Great 
Elements is the dynamic engine that propells conditionality along IMO. The 
Four Great Elements are completely selfless and dependent (on each other) as 
well.

I'm afraid I haven't heard the last of this. LOL TG
	

 	
	
	


13302

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 6:06pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
Dear Azita,

You are correct. Painful body vipaka citta is akusala vipaka and
pleasant body feeling vipaka is kusala vipaka. I just assumed that body
was the same as eye, ear, nose and tongue regardless of the
pleasant/unpleasant feeling. There is no difference between kusala and
akusala vipaka eye, ear, nose, and tongue. It should also be pointed out
that painful body vipaka is rootless, as is pleasant body vipaka. This
rootless quality is what I would call a neutral value, i.e., neither
kusala nor akusala, even though there is kusala or akusala cause. So the
painful or pleasant body feeling is neither wholesome nor unwholesome.
Basically it doesn't matter what the cause was. I guess there are no
evil consequences to evil cittas. This is a very surprising way to
regard kamma. So I don't quite know what to make of it. I think I'll
have to put this one on the shelf and let it sit for awhile.

Below is a quote from "A Comprehensive Manual Of Abhidhamma" that bears
on this issue.

Larry

CMA ch. 1, guide to #8
Unwholesome-resultant conscousness (akusalavipakacittani): The first
category of rootless consciousness comprises the seven types of
consciousness that result from unwholesome kamma. These types of
consciousness are not themselves unwholesome but kammically
indeterminate (abyakata). The word "unwholesome" (akusala) here means
that they are resultants produced by unwholesome kamma; the word
qualifies, not these states of consciousness themselves, but the kamma
from which they are born.
	
13303

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 6:31pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
Hi Robert,

I think we need more info on how kamma works. I don't see how kamma
leads to dukkha. Paticcasamupadda is not kamma. Correct?

Larry
	
13304

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 7:13pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., LBIDD@w... wrote:
> Hi Robert,
> 
> I think we need more info on how kamma works. I don't see how kamma
> leads to dukkha. Paticcasamupadda is not kamma. Correct?
> 
> Larry
_____
Dear Larry,
The paticcasamuppada includes kamma(cause) and vipaka(result):
An aspect of the Paticcasamuppada is 
the three rounds : kamma-vatta(action),
vipaka-vatta(result) and kilesa-vatta (defilements ). These three 
cover all 12 links of the Paticcasamuppada.
Kilesa vatta consists of avijja(ignorance), tanha(desire), and 
upadana (grasping).
Kamma vatta consists of sankhara (formations)and kamma-bhava.
Vipaka vatta connsists of vinnana (consciousness), nama-rupa, 
salayatana (six bases), phassa (contact), vedana(feeling), jati 
(birth), upapatti-bhava, jara-marana (decay and death).

The actual moments of experience
through the doorways (seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling) 
are vipaka (result) but because of defilement(kilesa) 
arises kamma. These rounds are all spinning now,
continually, as they always have in samsara. 
The three rounds are all conditioned and closely related. 
Someone sees an expensive car: that is the concept. 
What actually happens is visible object conditions seeing
consciousness (vipaka). Because kilesa (avijja and lobha)the root 
cause are not eliminated they may condition kamma (such as working 
extra hard to get money - or maybe even stealing the car). In the 
future
that kamma will bring a suitable result (vipaka vatta)... and so the 
round goes
on and on...But no self anywhere.

Of course the example above is just to give a broad idea. In fact 
kilesa vatta and kamma vatta can be considered to be occuring also in 
the same moment - it depends in what ways we are considering it. That 
is why paticcasamupadda is so deep and hard to understand. 

Your comments in an earlier post - where you thought that there was 
no evil result- are not quite right. Every vipaka citta is result of 
kamma. And that result is because of 
kusala or akusala kamma done in the near or distant past.
Akusala kamma by its nature can only condition vipaka which is 
anittham, amanapam, akanatum (unpleasant, undesired, disagreeable) 
and kusala kamma can only produce result (vipaka) which is the 
agreeable.
This letter has some more info:
http://www.escribe.com/religion/dhammastudygroup/m8010.html

best wishes
robert
	
13305

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 7:23pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
--- >>- In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> > There are characteristics, but nothing has its own 
> characteristic. 
> > Characteristics are not non-existent, nor are they existent. 
> Characteristics 
> > are systematically and continuosly altering into something 
else. 
> > TG ____________
> Dear TG,
> I don't think any dhamma can change into something else. This 
might 
> be of interest: Visuddhimagga (xvii313) "the defining of the 
> individual characteristics of ignorance etc. is called the method 
of 
> diversity. One who sees this rightly abandons the eternity view by 
> seeing the arising of each new state."

> robert
> >>
>________________ 
> Hi Robert
> The key phrase here I think is "...systematically and continuously 
altering 
> into something else." They change because they are part of 
a "system" of 
> dependent arising. States do not arise or cease by themselves. 
They are 
> conditioned by the "conglomeration of forces impacting them." They 
arise and 
> cease due to forces. The states "themselves" are the forces and 
the common 
> denominator might be considered the Four Great Elements. The Four 
Great 
> Elements is the dynamic engine that propells conditionality along 
IMO. The 
> Four Great Elements are completely selfless and dependent (on each 
other) as 
> well.
> I'm afraid I haven't heard the last of this. LOL TG
_____
Dear TG,
No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the powerhouse of 
paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in 
limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha (ignorance 
and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
You might be interested in this earlier conversation with Howard that 
relates to Paticcasamuppada.
, 
> robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
>> I think it is hard to accept -but nevertheless true - that there 
is 
> > nothing at all in this samsara that does not vanish . What is 
more it 
> > vanishes as soon as it appears, faster than we could imagine. 
> > However, because phenomena including 'knowing' (citta,vinnnana, 
mano 
> > consciousness)are immediately replaced with no gap between it 
seems 
> > that the knowing does not fall away. Citta is the chief in 
knowing .
> > 
> > 
> =========================
> Howard: Just one point: Under the assumption that there are, 
indeed, no gaps, 
> there is a *sense* in which it could be validly said that the 
function of 
> consciousness is continuous - changing, but continuous. For what 
would 
> 'continuous' mean other than there being no gaps? (Just a point.)
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
________> 
Ha ha. Yes in that sense consciousness is continuous. But it is 
always a different consciousness, formed by different , although 
sometimes similar, conditions. The Buddha compared consciousness to 
fire: the fire that burned dependent on sticks, the one that burned 
dependent on dried dung, the one that burned dependent on oil,..
Different fires but still having the same characteristic of fire; in 
the same way he said seeing-consciousness is different from hearing 
consciosness is different from smelling .....But still all having the 
same charactersitic of knowing. It is because of continuity and 
because the different consciousness's have the same general nature 
that we take it as lasting and 'mine'. The Visuddhimagga(XV3) "The 
characteristic of impermanence does not become apparent because when 
rise and fall are not given attention it is concealed by 
continuity"..However when continuity is disrupted by discerning rise 
and fall the characterisitic of impermanence becomes apparent in its 
true nature"
kind regards
robert
	
13306

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 7:27pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Dan,

Being in the Japanese and Chinese martial arts, and as Buddhist, Ch'an
(Zen) is considered a transmission outside of orthodox methods.
Penetrating dhamma with meditative calm and lightening quick lightness,
pliancy, wieldiness and proficiency of dhamma. All arising with wisdom,
so on to non-delusion. Sound familiar? Sobhana Cetasika :)

Some background information on the very beginning of Ch'an/Zen, from
/The Gateless Gate/. ( http://www.ibiblio.org/zen/cgi-bin/koan-index.pl
)

======================
Buddha Twirls a Flower

When Buddha was in Grdhrakuta mountain he turned a flower in his fingers
and held in before his listeners. Every one was silent. Only
Maha-Kashapa smiled at this revelation, although he tried to control the
lines of his face. 
Buddha said: `I have the eye of the true teaching, the heart of Nirvana,
the true aspect of non-form, and the ineffable stride of Dharma. It is
not expressed by words, but especially transmitted beyond teaching. This
teaching I have given to Maha-Kashapa.'

Mumon's Comment: Golden-faced Guatama thought he could cheat anyone. He
made the good listeners as bad, and sold dog meat under the sign of
mutton. And he himself thought it was wonderful. What if all the
audience had laughed together? How could he have transmitted the
teaching? And again, if Maha-Kashapa had not smiled, how could he have
transmitted the teaching? If he says that realization can be
transmitted, he is like the city slicker that cheats the country dub,
and if he says it cannot be transmitted, why does he approve of
Maha-Kashapa? 

/At the turning of a flower/
/His diguise was exposed./
/No one is heaven or earth can surpass/
/Maha-Kashapa's wrinkled face./
=====================

A common test and practice of students in zen is a koan, a case in which
the mind is readily engaged, much like that of any daily living event.
Koans come from a root word which refers to a signpost that was located
in a center of a town that had a rule or law posted.

Therefore koans, are much the same, a universal rule or law is
presented, but in actuality it is merely a case of concepts which link
up to the dhammas which they represent.

The mind, when taking this image, is conditioned to relive the dhammas
in the image. Basically concepts, much like abhi-dhamma, point to the
realities. There is such intense concentration developed that that
sanna/chanda bring up the real dhamma from a mere concept, this is
abhi-dhamma power also. The words are "right-up-to" the dhamma.

"Like a finger pointing to the moon."

This mere linking up with the dhamma is not enough; sati must arise at
every moment. This then results in wisdom arising, and thus like
lightening there is penetrating the essence of the koan.

Remember I said koans can be a test, the teacher may receive a response
to the koan from the student. This response can be tied up and bound in
kamma, doubt, and much akusala or the response can be mostly vipaka. So
the student may have a spontaneous answer, but there is one more test,
does the response arise with wisdom. To penetrate a koan, there must
both be spontaneity and wisdom arising with a response.

It seems, from experience that ch'an/zen transmission carries direct
perception of dhammas. At the beginning, perhaps not for what they
really are, but it sets the seas into motion, like a stone thrown into
still water, instead of getting bogged down and freezing the dhamma
(into concepts) with ignorance, attachment and aversion. Then after
experiencing this directly, there can a solid foundation from which the
eightfold path arises.

This might ring of esoteric branches of Buddhism, in Japan, these
schools are considered Mikkyo. Where there is emphasis on tantra and
wisdom of kamma, and specifically the process of "thought - word -
deed".

Well, perhaps this helped,
You wouldn't stand and sit at the road sign that said "Chicago 35
miles". You'd keep moving. No freezing dhamma. ;) So this leads to
Dzogchen, hehehe.

Bye bye.

-manji-

> -----Original Message-----
> From: onco111 [mailto:dalthorp@o...]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 4:47 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders
> 
> I don't know the standard, basic definitions. That's why I'm asking. A
> friend of mine recently went on a Rinzai retreat and came back with
> all sorts of words I don't understand at all. Just looking for some
> help on what the words mean and what kinds of contexts they are used
> in.
> 
> Dan
> 
> > > What does "Buddha nature" mean?
> >
> > Hi Dan,
> > What aspect or perspective are you trying to probe?
> > I'm guessing you already know the standard
> > definitions, and there's a specific angle you're
> > looking for.
> >
> > -fk

	
13307

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 3:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
In a message dated 5/15/2002 7:23:54 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:


> Dear TG,
> No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
> The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the powerhouse of 
> paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in 
> limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
> The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha (ignorance 
> and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
> 




	
13308

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 3:49pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhaghosa's "Burden of Proof"

 	
Ignore that last LOL Pulled the trigger to fast. ;)


	
13309

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 4:48pm
Subject: 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising

 	
In a message dated 5/15/2002 7:23:54 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:


> Dear TG,
> No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
> The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the powerhouse of 
> paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in 
> limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
> The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha (ignorance 
> and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
> You might be interested in this earlier conversation with Howard that 
> relates to Paticcasamuppada.


Hi Robert. 
Yes, this is the 12 fold chain of Dependent Arising that explains the arising 
and ceasing of sentient beings. However, the "principle" of Dependent 
Arising applies to all conditioned things, animate or inanimate. And that's 
what I was referring to previously. The "principle" being...

This being, that is
With the arising of this, that arises
This not being, that is not
With the ceasing of this, that ceases.

This will probabIy provoke more controversy but I believe mentality is an 
outgrowth of the 4 Great Elements...certainly a unique and complex outgrowth, 
yet I believe it is physical laws and positional movement that result in the 
energies we call mentality. Just as when the 4 Great Elements come together 
to generate nuclear fusion (a star)...and although the vast majority of space 
is not filled with stars, yet when the right conditions arise, a star arises: 
so too, under the appropriate causal conditions, mentality will arise. The 
"star system"generates electromagnetic radiation, the "mind system" generates 
mental states. Both are illuminating in "their own" unique way due to the 
causal forces that lead to those outgrowths. (Of course mind and body are 
interrelated/inter-generating but I'm not trying to get that technical.)

The 4 Great Elements are dynamic forces that diversify into various 
formations due to the "principle" of Dependent Arising. I think its 
important to spend a good deal of time considering what the 4 Great Elements 
really do. I think there is a tendency to think they are relatively easy to 
understand. They may be one of the hardest things to understand.

Anyway, something to think about unless its summarily rejected. ;-)

Take care and keep happy. TG


	
13310

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 5:18pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising

 	
Hi, TG -

In a message dated 5/15/02 11:51:09 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
TGrand458@a... writes:


> 
> In a message dated 5/15/2002 7:23:54 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dear TG,
> > No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
> > The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the powerhouse of 
> > paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in 
> > limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
> > The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha (ignorance 
> > and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
> > You might be interested in this earlier conversation with Howard that 
> > relates to Paticcasamuppada.
> 
> 
> Hi Robert. 
> Yes, this is the 12 fold chain of Dependent Arising that explains the 
> arising 
> and ceasing of sentient beings. However, the "principle" of Dependent 
> Arising applies to all conditioned things, animate or inanimate. And 
> that's 
> what I was referring to previously. The "principle" being...
> 
> This being, that is
> With the arising of this, that arises
> This not being, that is not
> With the ceasing of this, that ceases.
> 
> This will probabIy provoke more controversy but I believe mentality is an 
> outgrowth of the 4 Great Elements...certainly a unique and complex 
> outgrowth, 
> yet I believe it is physical laws and positional movement that result in 
> the 
> energies we call mentality. Just as when the 4 Great Elements come 
> together 
> to generate nuclear fusion (a star)...and although the vast majority of 
> space 
> is not filled with stars, yet when the right conditions arise, a star 
> arises: 
> so too, under the appropriate causal conditions, mentality will arise. The 
> 
> "star system"generates electromagnetic radiation, the "mind system" 
> generates 
> mental states. Both are illuminating in "their own" unique way due to the 
> causal forces that lead to those outgrowths. (Of course mind and body are 
> interrelated/inter-generating but I'm not trying to get that technical.)
> 
---------------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Well, I don't know about controversy, but, just for the record, since 
we do agree on much, let me just mention that this is not one of them! ;-))
---------------------------------------------------------

> 
> The 4 Great Elements are dynamic forces that diversify into various 
> formations due to the "principle" of Dependent Arising. I think its 
> important to spend a good deal of time considering what the 4 Great 
> Elements 
> really do. I think there is a tendency to think they are relatively easy 
> to 
> understand. They may be one of the hardest things to understand.
> 
> Anyway, something to think about unless its summarily rejected. ;-)
> 
> Take care and keep happy. TG
> 
> 
============================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13311

From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 10:59pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.

 	
Hi Larry,

I would certainly encourage anyone to put SN on top of the list (I like
BB's translation best, esp, as it has some extra commentary notes at the
back and the Wisdom pub. I have, is beautifully presented.

I'll be interested to join the PSM (patisambhidamagga) corner too.If
anyone wishes to get a copy, it is published by PTS as 'The Path of
Discrimination'. It's a good idea Nina and TG gave to add a few notes at
the back with the help at the glossary (a kind of reverse engineering) so
as to u'stand what some of the translations are referring to. I hope
Howard joins in too, just to make sure we don't get too 'cosy';-)

Num moves to Bkk in early June after a few days with Kom and the Bay Area
discussion group....(Kom or Num, pls give us a report!). He suggests Nina
has 'divine eyes' as she knows rightly he's packing and I suggest Num and
Kom have a few special powers as they seem to have already read PSM,
Survey and Cetasikas by a telephone fast scan method;-)

I expect he may get back to you on the medical rootless bodily feeling
after the removal co have been at the w'end and he only has his suitcase
to worry about.

Anyway, I have to get ready myself for class and then the w'end in Bkk 
(Wesak in HK) leaving early tomorrow. Meanwhile I also hear SE QLD DSG is
having its first informal meeting;-) (hope to hear about it, Azita and
Chris)

Sarah
======

--- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Nina, thanks for this interesting piece
of research. I think the next
> book I get is going to be the Samyutta Nikaya 
>but I would be very
> interested in any discussions you and Num and TG would have on
> Patisambhidamagga, particularly with input from A Sujin. When is Num
> going to be settled? I had a medical question that relates to rootless
> body feeling.
> 
> Larry

	
13312

From: Jaran Jainhuknan <jjn@b...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 2:22am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 918

 	
Hi Sarah:

What is SE QLD?

Thanks,
jaran
> Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 13:59:55 +0800 (CST)
> From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...>
> Subject: Re: Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.
>
> Anyway, I have to get ready myself for class and then the w'end
in Bkk
> (Wesak in HK) leaving early tomorrow. Meanwhile I also hear SE
QLD DSG is
> having its first informal meeting;-) (hope to hear about it,
Azita and
> Chris)
>
> Sarah
	
13313

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 2:58am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Digest Number 918

 	
Hi Jaran,

SE QLD means 'South East Queensland'. Azita is down from Cairns on 
holiday in Maleny - a couple of hours drive north of Brisbane. She 
and I (plus SarahF) are meeting for Dhamma discussions overlunch on 
Sunday, which I am very much looking forward to. :-)

metta,
Christine

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "Jaran Jainhuknan" <jjn@b...> wrote:
> Hi Sarah:
> 
> What is SE QLD?
> 
> Thanks,
> jaran
> > Date: Thu, 16 May 2002 13:59:55 +0800 (CST)
> > From: Sarah <sarahdhhk@y...>
> > Subject: Re: Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.
> >
> > Anyway, I have to get ready myself for class and then the w'end
> in Bkk
> > (Wesak in HK) leaving early tomorrow. Meanwhile I also hear SE
> QLD DSG is
> > having its first informal meeting;-) (hope to hear about it,
> Azita and
> > Chris)
> >
> > Sarah
	
13314

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 3:38am
Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders

 	
Thanks, Manji. ...definitely something to chew on. Thanks. This is 
exactly the sort of thing I was looking for. More comments later...

Dan

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "manji" <manji@s...> wrote:
> Dan,
> 
> Being in the Japanese and Chinese martial arts, and as Buddhist, 
Ch'an
> (Zen) is considered a transmission outside of orthodox methods.
> Penetrating dhamma with meditative calm and lightening quick 
lightness,
> pliancy, wieldiness and proficiency of dhamma. All arising with 
wisdom,
> so on to non-delusion. Sound familiar? Sobhana Cetasika :)
> 
> Some background information on the very beginning of Ch'an/Zen, from
> /The Gateless Gate/. ( http://www.ibiblio.org/zen/cgi-bin/koan-
index.pl
> )
> 
> ======================
> Buddha Twirls a Flower
> 
> When Buddha was in Grdhrakuta mountain he turned a flower in his 
fingers
> and held in before his listeners. Every one was silent. Only
> Maha-Kashapa smiled at this revelation, although he tried to 
control the
> lines of his face. 
> Buddha said: `I have the eye of the true teaching, the heart of 
Nirvana,
> the true aspect of non-form, and the ineffable stride of Dharma. It 
is
> not expressed by words, but especially transmitted beyond teaching. 
This
> teaching I have given to Maha-Kashapa.'
> 
> Mumon's Comment: Golden-faced Guatama thought he could cheat 
anyone. He
> made the good listeners as bad, and sold dog meat under the sign of
> mutton. And he himself thought it was wonderful. What if all the
> audience had laughed together? How could he have transmitted the
> teaching? And again, if Maha-Kashapa had not smiled, how could he 
have
> transmitted the teaching? If he says that realization can be
> transmitted, he is like the city slicker that cheats the country 
dub,
> and if he says it cannot be transmitted, why does he approve of
> Maha-Kashapa? 
> 
> /At the turning of a flower/
> /His diguise was exposed./
> /No one is heaven or earth can surpass/
> /Maha-Kashapa's wrinkled face./
> =====================
> 
> A common test and practice of students in zen is a koan, a case in 
which
> the mind is readily engaged, much like that of any daily living 
event.
> Koans come from a root word which refers to a signpost that was 
located
> in a center of a town that had a rule or law posted.
> 
> Therefore koans, are much the same, a universal rule or law is
> presented, but in actuality it is merely a case of concepts which 
link
> up to the dhammas which they represent.
> 
> The mind, when taking this image, is conditioned to relive the 
dhammas
> in the image. Basically concepts, much like abhi-dhamma, point to 
the
> realities. There is such intense concentration developed that that
> sanna/chanda bring up the real dhamma from a mere concept, this is
> abhi-dhamma power also. The words are "right-up-to" the dhamma.
> 
> "Like a finger pointing to the moon."
> 
> This mere linking up with the dhamma is not enough; sati must arise 
at
> every moment. This then results in wisdom arising, and thus like
> lightening there is penetrating the essence of the koan.
> 
> Remember I said koans can be a test, the teacher may receive a 
response
> to the koan from the student. This response can be tied up and 
bound in
> kamma, doubt, and much akusala or the response can be mostly 
vipaka. So
> the student may have a spontaneous answer, but there is one more 
test,
> does the response arise with wisdom. To penetrate a koan, there must
> both be spontaneity and wisdom arising with a response.
> 
> It seems, from experience that ch'an/zen transmission carries direct
> perception of dhammas. At the beginning, perhaps not for what they
> really are, but it sets the seas into motion, like a stone thrown 
into
> still water, instead of getting bogged down and freezing the dhamma
> (into concepts) with ignorance, attachment and aversion. Then after
> experiencing this directly, there can a solid foundation from which 
the
> eightfold path arises.
> 
> This might ring of esoteric branches of Buddhism, in Japan, these
> schools are considered Mikkyo. Where there is emphasis on tantra and
> wisdom of kamma, and specifically the process of "thought - word -
> deed".
> 
> Well, perhaps this helped,
> You wouldn't stand and sit at the road sign that said "Chicago 35
> miles". You'd keep moving. No freezing dhamma. ;) So this leads to
> Dzogchen, hehehe.
> 
> Bye bye.
> 
> -manji-
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: onco111 [mailto:dalthorp@o...]
> > Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 4:47 PM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> > Subject: Re: [dsg] question for Howard, Erik, and Anders
> > 
> > I don't know the standard, basic definitions. That's why I'm 
asking. A
> > friend of mine recently went on a Rinzai retreat and came back 
with
> > all sorts of words I don't understand at all. Just looking for 
some
> > help on what the words mean and what kinds of contexts they are 
used
> > in.
> > 
> > Dan
> > 
> > > > What does "Buddha nature" mean?
> > >
> > > Hi Dan,
> > > What aspect or perspective are you trying to probe?
> > > I'm guessing you already know the standard
> > > definitions, and there's a specific angle you're
> > > looking for.
> > >
> > > -fk

	
13315

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Wed May 15, 2002 11:51pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Patisambhidamagga, Larry, TG and Num.

 	
Hi, Sarah (and Larry, TG, num, and all) -

I would also be very interested in joining an extended online study of 
the PSM, provided that we take it slowly, step by step, and with gentle 
explanation of Pali terms introduced in the discussion (for Pali-challenged 
folks such as me).

With metta,
Howard 

In a message dated 5/16/02 2:01:03 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
sarahdhhk@y... writes:


> Hi Larry,
> 
> I would certainly encourage anyone to put SN on top of the list (I like
> BB's translation best, esp, as it has some extra commentary notes at the
> back and the Wisdom pub. I have, is beautifully presented.
> 
> I'll be interested to join the PSM (patisambhidamagga) corner too.If
> anyone wishes to get a copy, it is published by PTS as 'The Path of
> Discrimination'. It's a good idea Nina and TG gave to add a few notes at
> the back with the help at the glossary (a kind of reverse engineering) so
> as to u'stand what some of the translations are referring to. I hope
> Howard joins in too, just to make sure we don't get too 'cosy';-)
> 
> Num moves to Bkk in early June after a few days with Kom and the Bay Area
> discussion group....(Kom or Num, pls give us a report!). He suggests Nina
> has 'divine eyes' as she knows rightly he's packing and I suggest Num and
> Kom have a few special powers as they seem to have already read PSM,
> Survey and Cetasikas by a telephone fast scan method;-)
> 
> I expect he may get back to you on the medical rootless bodily feeling
> after the removal co have been at the w'end and he only has his suitcase
> to worry about.
> 
> Anyway, I have to get ready myself for class and then the w'end in Bkk 
> (Wesak in HK) leaving early tomorrow. Meanwhile I also hear SE QLD DSG is
> having its first informal meeting;-) (hope to hear about it, Azita and
> Chris)
> 
> Sarah
> ======
> 
> --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Hi Nina, thanks for this interesting piece
> of research. I think the next
> > book I get is going to be the Samyutta Nikaya 
> >but I would be very
> > interested in any discussions you and Num and TG would have on
> > Patisambhidamagga, particularly with input from A Sujin. When is Num
> > going to be settled? I had a medical question that relates to rootless
> > body feeling.
> > 
> > Larry

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13316

From: robertkirkpatrick.rm <robertkirkpatrick@r...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 5:22am
Subject: Re: 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising

 	
--- 
Dear TG,
Glad you brought up these ideas as a discussion forum should be a 
place where we show our thinking and help each other understand 
further aspects. 
Your views seem somewhat materialistic and possibly influenced by 
scientific ideas about nature and the world. This is fine, of 
course, but not, I believe, what the Buddha taught.

I don't think we can really apply Paticcasamuppada to inanimate 
objects. Consider the twelve links: avijja(ignorance), tanha
(desire), upadana (grasping)sankhara (formations) kamma-bhava.
vinnana (consciousness), nama-rupa, 
salayatana (six bases), phassa (contact), vedana(feeling), jati 
(birth), upapatti-bhava, jara-marana (decay and death).
Inanimate objects are void of any avijja(ignorance), 
tanha(desire), upadana (grasping)sankhara (formations) kamma-bhava.
vinnana (consciousness), phassa (contact), vedana(feeling).
best wishes
robert
In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 5/15/2002 7:23:54 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dear TG,
> > No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
> > The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the 
powerhouse of 
> > paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in 
> > limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
> > The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha 
(ignorance 
> > and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
> > You might be interested in this earlier conversation with Howard 
that 
> > relates to Paticcasamuppada.
> 
> 
> Hi Robert. 
> Yes, this is the 12 fold chain of Dependent Arising that explains 
the arising 
> and ceasing of sentient beings. However, the "principle" of 
Dependent 
> Arising applies to all conditioned things, animate or inanimate. 
And that's 
> what I was referring to previously. The "principle" being...
> 
> This being, that is
> With the arising of this, that arises
> This not being, that is not
> With the ceasing of this, that ceases.
> 
> This will probabIy provoke more controversy but I believe 
mentality is an 
> outgrowth of the 4 Great Elements...certainly a unique and complex 
outgrowth, 
> yet I believe it is physical laws and positional movement that 
result in the 
> energies we call mentality. Just as when the 4 Great Elements 
come together 
> to generate nuclear fusion (a star)...and although the vast 
majority of space 
> is not filled with stars, yet when the right conditions arise, a 
star arises: 
> so too, under the appropriate causal conditions, mentality will 
arise. The 
> "star system"generates electromagnetic radiation, the "mind 
system" generates 
> mental states. Both are illuminating in "their own" unique way 
due to the 
> causal forces that lead to those outgrowths. (Of course mind and 
body are 
> interrelated/inter-generating but I'm not trying to get that 
technical.)
> 
> The 4 Great Elements are dynamic forces that diversify into 
various 
> formations due to the "principle" of Dependent Arising. I think 
its 
> important to spend a good deal of time considering what the 4 
Great Elements 
> really do. I think there is a tendency to think they are 
relatively easy to 
> understand. They may be one of the hardest things to understand.
> 
> Anyway, something to think about unless its summarily rejected. ;-
)
> 
> Take care and keep happy. TG

13317

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 2:10am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising

 	
Hi, Robert (and TG) -

In a message dated 5/16/02 8:23:45 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:


> I don't think we can really apply Paticcasamuppada to inanimate 
> objects. Consider the twelve links: avijja(ignorance), tanha
> (desire), upadana (grasping)sankhara (formations) kamma-bhava.
> vinnana (consciousness), nama-rupa, 
> salayatana (six bases), phassa (contact), vedana(feeling), jati 
> (birth), upapatti-bhava, jara-marana (decay and death).
> Inanimate objects are void of any avijja(ignorance), 
> tanha(desire), upadana (grasping)sankhara (formations) kamma-bhava.
> vinnana (consciousness), phassa (contact), vedana(feeling).
> 
===========================
I think that TG wasn't referring to the 12-linked, specific 
application of dependent arising pertaining to the arising of suffering, but 
rather to the general formulation of conditionality somewhat along the lines 
of "When this is, that is; when this arises, that arises". 
I do agree, however, that TG's formulation appears to be 
materialistic, whereas my view of the Dhamma considers it to be an instance 
of the genus "phenomenalism", being experientially oriented, with rupas not 
being independent material entities and events, but rather existing/occurring 
*as* elements of sentient experience of the material sort. So, for example, 
from this perspective, there is no hardness other than as a possible element 
of experience. Thus, when we say that "The table is hard", all that this 
actually means, from this phenomenalist perspective, is that should that 
complex pattern of experiential events that we usually describe as "touching 
the table" occur, then there will arise the experience of hardness. So, I'm 
talking here about conditionality as regards the arising of "experiential 
events of rupic type", rather than as regards allegedly existing external 
material objects.
Phenomenalism in general, except in its most radical form, the form to 
which I actually subscribe ;-), doesn't presume that there is no realm of 
independent physicality underlying material experience, but only that such a 
realm is, in principle, at best inferable, and not directly knowable (since 
all that we can actually know is experience, itself), and hence, 
pragmatically, can be ignored. With regard to this, I provide the following 
quotation:
**********************************
The central idea of phenomenalism is well put in this passage from Poincare 
(with a dash of positivism) (1914, p. 14):[A] reality completely independent 
of the mind which conceives it, sees or feels it, is an impossibility. A 
world as exterior as that, even if it existed, would for us be forever 
inaccessible. But what we call objective reality is, in the last analysis, 
what is common to many thinking beings, and could be common to us all; this 
common part, we shall see, can only be the harmony expressed by mathematical 
laws. It is this harmony then which is the sole objective reality, the only 
truth we can obtain. 

Poincare, H. (1914) The value of science. New York: Dover, 1958. 
****************************

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 



	
13318

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 6:44am
Subject: RE: [dsg] 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising

 	
TG,

I would suggest /Abhidhamma in Daily life/, pgs. 13-14, along with
/Concepts and Realities/.

==========

There is "Dependent Origination" as a concept/principle, "Dependent
Origination" as experienced.

In the first case, as a concept, there is "Dependent Origination of
Suffering". Perhaps this will clarify what it applies to.

The 12 Links of Dependent Origination generally are taken for the
Dependent Origination of Suffering, thus presenting the wheel of life,
and of samsara. 

The four great elements may be taken as concept/principle or the four
great elements may be taken as experienced. When taking them as
experienced (as any dhamma) there may be sana recollecting this "rupa"
as "earth". This gives rise to mental formations. The mind may
immediately advert its concentration and consciousness onto this mental
formation, and thus it is easy to take this recollection as real
"earth", which is not the case. This recollection may not be a word, it
could be any mental formation arising from experiencing "hardness".

An important note on the meaning of this whole mess: these
/characteristics/ of the four great elements are thus labled "earth",
thus labled "water", thus labled "fire" and thus labled "wind". This
labeling is done by nothing more than sanna (marking/recollection). With
regard to "dependent origination", you may see that the mental
formations of the four great elements are dependently originated.

... therefore, experiencing the characteristics of the four great
elements, conditions a solid understanding of what the four great
elements actually are, experiencing hardness there is recollection -
"this is earth", experiencing cohesion there is recollection - this is
"water" etc. Then after much experiencing this dhamma sanna arising with
wisdom recollects... this is "not-self" anatta.

Again though, mental formations. Stay steadfast without taking concepts
for what is real, sanna will mark realities and recollections will
occur, but do not take these recollections as reality. Keep steadfast on
the dhamma.

Take care,
manji

> -----Original Message-----
> From: TGrand458@a... [mailto:TGrand458@a...]
> Sent: Wednesday, May 15, 2002 11:49 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [dsg] 4 Great Elements and Dependent Arising
> 
> In a message dated 5/15/2002 7:23:54 PM Pacific Daylight Time,
> robertkirkpatrick@r... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dear TG,
> > No, I'm afraid you haven't ;).
> > The four great elements are rupa and are not at all the powerhouse
of
> > paticcasamuppada. They do condition each other and nama -but in
> > limited ways (see Conditions, Nina van Gokom).
> > The dynamic engine of paticcasamuppada is avijja and tanha
(ignorance
> > and craving)and these are nama (mentality) not rupa.
> > You might be interested in this earlier conversation with Howard
that
> > relates to Paticcasamuppada.
> 
> 
> Hi Robert.
> Yes, this is the 12 fold chain of Dependent Arising that explains the
> arising
> and ceasing of sentient beings. However, the "principle" of Dependent
> Arising applies to all conditioned things, animate or inanimate. And
> that's
> what I was referring to previously. The "principle" being...
> 
> This being, that is
> With the arising of this, that arises
> This not being, that is not
> With the ceasing of this, that ceases.
> 
> This will probabIy provoke more controversy but I believe mentality is
an
> outgrowth of the 4 Great Elements...certainly a unique and complex
> outgrowth,
> yet I believe it is physical laws and positional movement that result
in
> the
> energies we call mentality. Just as when the 4 Great Elements come
> together
> to generate nuclear fusion (a star)...and although the vast majority
of
> space
> is not filled with stars, yet when the right conditions arise, a star
> arises:
> so too, under the appropriate causal conditions, mentality will arise.
> The
> "star system"generates electromagnetic radiation, the "mind system"
> generates
> mental states. Both are illuminating in "their own" unique way due to
the
> causal forces that lead to those outgrowths. (Of course mind and body
are
> interrelated/inter-generating but I'm not trying to get that
technical.)
> 
> The 4 Great Elements are dynamic forces that diversify into various
> formations due to the "principle" of Dependent Arising. I think its
> important to spend a good deal of time considering what the 4 Great
> Elements
> really do. I think there is a tendency to think they are relatively
easy
> to
> understand. They may be one of the hardest things to understand.
> 
> Anyway, something to think about unless its summarily rejected. ;-)
> 
> Take care and keep happy. TG

	
13319

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 10:00am
Subject: Rite and rituals

 	
Dear Dan, I really liked your account of your personal experiences with
regard to meditation. Very sincere. I could not help laughing when I read
the dialogue with Sarah about citta with panna which knows, <it> knows.
Cittas perform different functions, kicca. Seeing-consciousness performs the
function of seeing, receiving-consciousness performs the function of
receiving the object. They all perform different functions, but just for a
moment, and then they fall away. When insight has not been developed to
different stages, of course, no matter what we read about citta, we may
cling to a self. A self who controls. But it is helpful to realize this.
Best wishes, Nina.
	
13320

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 10:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] giving protection, abhaya dana

 	
op 15-05-2002 07:22 schreef Kom Tukovinit op kom@a...:

> 
> Bhaya in Thai means generally means danger (drawbacks,
> penalties, disadvantages), i.e., danger from kings, thieves,
> fire, water, enemies, lions, tigers, other wild beasts,
> dragons, orges, demons, goblins etc. Abhaya is its
> opposite, however, in the Thai language it is mostly used to
> mean forgiveness. Giving a person abhaya, in Thai, usually
> means forgiving the person: this doesn't have to be outward.
> The beautiful part is you can forgive a person without other
> people (including the subject) knowing that this "gift" has
> already occured.
> 
> When I hear K. Sujin on tape, I understood that this means
> strictly forgiving. However, looking at the description
> now, it seems to be more than forgiving. When we help other
> people from dangers, be it through directly helping, or
> counseling, it also seems like it is also abhaya dana. The
> gift of the dhamma is obviously the most elavated type of
> abhaya dhamma. We help other people in reaching the true
> abhaya, nibbana.

Dear Kom and Stigan,
I like Kom's post, especially the end. I looked up bhaya in the Pali dict,
it can mean fear and the objects that cause fear. The abstaining from
akusala kamma is included in Maha-dana and this can help us to see the
aspect of giving freedom from danger or fear. See Gradual Sayings, Book of
the Eights, Ch IV, § 9 (transl by Ven. Nyanaponika, Wheel 238-240: Outcomes
of Merit) : 
<Herein, monks, a noble disciple gives up the taking of life and abstains
from it. By abstaining from the taking of life, the noble disciple gives to
immeasurable beings freedom from fear, gives to them freedom from hostility,
and freedom from oppression. By giving to immeasurable beings freedom from
fear, freedom from hostility, and freedom from oppression, he himself will
enjoy immeasurable freedom from fear, freedom from hostility, and freedom
from oppression...>
The same is said about the abstaining from the other akusala kamma patha.
Thus, compassion and metta can also be considered as giving.
I listened to the tape and it was said that when we are angry, we give hate,
we may even harm others. But when we forgive we do not think about someone
else's wrongs anymore, we give him freedom from harm, goodwill.
Nina.
	
13321

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 2:20pm
Subject: Re: Rite and rituals

 	
--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> Dear Dan, I really liked your account of your personal experiences 
with
> regard to meditation. Very sincere. I could not help laughing when 
I read
> the dialogue with Sarah about citta with panna which knows, <it> 
knows.
> Cittas perform different functions, kicca. Seeing-consciousness 
performs the
> function of seeing, receiving-consciousness performs the function of
> receiving the object. They all perform different functions, but 
just for a
> moment, and then they fall away. When insight has not been 
developed to
> different stages, of course, no matter what we read about citta, we 
may
> cling to a self. A self who controls. But it is helpful to realize 
this.
> Best wishes, Nina.

Nina and all,

It is not self that one clings to. If one clings, it is the 
aggregate, which is not self, that one clings to. 

I would also like to share this link with the group.
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-052.html

Regards,
Victor
	
13322

From: manji <manji@s...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 2:29pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals :)

 	
Who is clinging? ;)

-manji-

> -----Original Message-----
> From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...]
> Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 5:21 PM
> To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com
> Subject: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> > Dear Dan, I really liked your account of your personal experiences
> with
> > regard to meditation. Very sincere. I could not help laughing when
> I read
> > the dialogue with Sarah about citta with panna which knows, <it>
> knows.
> > Cittas perform different functions, kicca. Seeing-consciousness
> performs the
> > function of seeing, receiving-consciousness performs the function of
> > receiving the object. They all perform different functions, but
> just for a
> > moment, and then they fall away. When insight has not been
> developed to
> > different stages, of course, no matter what we read about citta, we
> may
> > cling to a self. A self who controls. But it is helpful to realize
> this.
> > Best wishes, Nina.
> 
> Nina and all,
> 
> It is not self that one clings to. If one clings, it is the
> aggregate, which is not self, that one clings to.
> 
> I would also like to share this link with the group.
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-052.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor

	
13323

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 3:30pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals :)

 	
Manji,

Thanks for the question. I should be more careful using "one 
clings." 

Regards,
Victor

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "manji" <manji@s...> wrote:
> Who is clinging? ;)
> 
> -manji-
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: yuzhonghao [mailto:victoryu@s...]
> > Sent: Thursday, May 16, 2002 5:21 PM
> > To: dhammastudygroup@y...
> > Subject: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> > > Dear Dan, I really liked your account of your personal 
experiences
> > with
> > > regard to meditation. Very sincere. I could not help laughing 
when
> > I read
> > > the dialogue with Sarah about citta with panna which knows, <it>
> > knows.
> > > Cittas perform different functions, kicca. Seeing-consciousness
> > performs the
> > > function of seeing, receiving-consciousness performs the 
function of
> > > receiving the object. They all perform different functions, but
> > just for a
> > > moment, and then they fall away. When insight has not been
> > developed to
> > > different stages, of course, no matter what we read about 
citta, we
> > may
> > > cling to a self. A self who controls. But it is helpful to 
realize
> > this.
> > > Best wishes, Nina.
> > 
> > Nina and all,
> > 
> > It is not self that one clings to. If one clings, it is the
> > aggregate, which is not self, that one clings to.
> > 
> > I would also like to share this link with the group.
> > http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn12-052.html
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor


13324

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 4:27pm
Subject: ADL ch. 8 (4)

 	
http://www.budsas.org/ebud/nina-abhidhamma/nina-abhi-00.htm

Abhidhamma In Daily Life
Chapter 8 (4)

Feelings arise because of conditions and fall away again. They are
impermanent 
and they should not be taken for self. We read in the 'Kindred Savings'
(lV Salayatana-vagga, Kindred Sayings on Sense, Third Fifty, par. 130,
Haliddaka): 

Once the venerable Kaccana the Great was staying among the folk of
Avanti, at Osprey's Haunt, on a sheer mountain crag. Then the
housefather Haliddakani came to the venerable Kaccana the Great. Seated
at one side he said this: 

'lt has been said by the Exalted One, sir, "Owing to diversity in
elements arises diversity of contact. Owing to diversity of contact
arises diversity of feeling." Pray, sir, how far is this so?' 

'Herein, housefather, seeing a pleasant object with the eye, a monk, at
the thought "This is such and such," comes to know of eye-consciousness
that is pleasant to experience. Owing to contact that is pleasant to
experience arises pleasant feeling. 

When with the eye he sees an object that is displeasing, a monk, at the
thought "This is such and such," comes to know of eye-consciousness that
is unpleasant to experience. Owing to contact that is unpleasant to
experience arises unpleasant feeling. 

When with the eye he sees an object that is of indifferent effect, a
monk, at the thought "This is such and such," comes to know of
consciousness that is neutral. Owing to contact that is neutral to
experience arises feeling that is neutral. 

So also, housefather, hearing a sound with the ear, smelling a scent
with the nose, tasting a savour with the tongue, contacting a tangible
with the body, cognizing a pleasing mind-state with the mind... a
mind-state that is displeasing... a mind-state that is indifferent in
effect.... 

Thus, housefather, owing to diversity in elements arises diversity of
contact. Owing to diversity of contact arises diversity of feeling.' 

If we are mindful of realities which appear through the different
doorways we will know from experience many different namas and rupas; we
will know different types of citta and different kinds of feeling. We
will know that all these realities are only conditioned elements and not
self. We will know from experience that there are not only cittas
accompanied by lobha, dosa and moha, and cittas accompanied by wholesome
roots, but also cittas which are ahetuka, cittas without roots. One may
not find it interesting to know more about seeing, hearing and the other
realities appearing through the different doorways. However, in order to
see things as they are, it is essential to know that the citta which,
for example, experiences sound, has a characteristic which is different
from the citta which likes or dislikes the sound and that these cittas
arise because of different conditions. What the Buddha taught can be
proved by being mindful of realities. 

Questions 
1. Which are the six hetus (roots)? 
2. When there is seeing it may be kusala vipaka or akusala vipaka. Are
there hetus accompanying seeing-consciousness?
	


	
13326

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 4:29pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] make friends with other nudists

 	
That's "BUDDHIST", not "NUDIST"!!!

In a message dated 5/16/02 10:35:43 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
billvety@y... writes:


> 
> Hi, there,
> 
> I have a great website to recommend for nudists only. Over there you 
> can 
> make friends with fellow nudists in your area or around the world. It 
> is 
> free and no porn. Check it out.
> 
> http://www.nudistfriendfinder.com
> 
> Gene
> 



	
13327

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 5:43pm
Subject: Mentality derived from the 4 Great Elements

 	
Enjoying your comments, thanks...

The Patisambhidamagga states that "...the eye..., ear..., nose..., tongue..., 
body..., and mind are derived from the 4 Great Elements." Chapter 15 -- 
Defining Internally (The Path of Discrimination pg. 76 -- 77)

I would like to also note that the Four Great Nikayas are loaded with 
"material examples" that illustrate various principles and often mental 
principles. I'm sure most of you are familiar with the various "agriculture 
analogies" of soil, water, earth; that represent fields of experience and 
mental interactions. Or the rubbing together of two sticks to generate heat 
and the separation of those sticks, which leads to cooling; to illustrate 
causality...

"Just as if from the adjusted friction of two sticks, heat is born, a spark 
is brought forth, but from the separation and withdrawing of just those two 
sticks, the heat which was consequent [on friction], that ceases, that is 
quenched…" Samyutta Nikaya (PTS, Kindred Sayings, vol. 2, pg. 67)

The Buddha said that... "delight and lust should be seen as like the water 
element." Samyutta Nikaya... (Connected Discourses of the Buddha, vol. 1, 
pg. 891)

What does the water element do? In general it holds/pulls things together 
and intensifies phenomena. So delight and lust (or craving) should be seen 
operating like this apparently. If this is a materialistic view of the 
dhamma...I'm guilty. :-)

TG


	
13328

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Thu May 16, 2002 11:43pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 	
Hi Larry and Azita,

Relating to Larry's question "Is kamma unstopable once the cause has
arisen?"
You may be interested in a part of an article I am reading 
called "Anattanisamsa - A concise Description of the Advantages 
Arising Out of The Realisation of Anatta by The Venerable Mahahthera 
Ledi Sayaday, Agga Maha Pandita, D. Litt.
http://web.ukonline.co.uk/buddhism/ledi002.htm

Interesting about kusala kamma...

metta,
Christine

"How Past Kammas Become Inoperative."

"How the infinite numbers of past kammas became inoperative the 
moment sakkaya ditthi is extinguished may be illustrated as follows: 

In a string of beads where an infinite number of beads are strung 
together by a strong silk thread, if one bead is pulled all the other 
beads follow or accompany the one that is pulled. But if the silk 
thread is removed, pulling one of the beads does not disturb the 
other beads because there is no longer any attachment between them. 

A being who possesses sakkaya ditthi harbours a strong attachment for 
the series of khandhas during past existences and past world-cycles 
by transforming them into "I". Thinking "In past existences and in 
past world-cycles I have been on many occasions a human being, a deva 
or a brahma." he acquires the thread that is sakkaya ditthi. It is 
thus that the infinite number of past akusala kammas committed in 
past existences and past world-cycles, and which have not as yet 
produced resultants, accompany that being wherever he may be reborn. 
These past akusala kammas resemble beads that are strung and bound 
together by a strong thread. 

Beings who clearly perceive the anatta characteristic, however, and 
who have rid themselves of sakkaya ditthi. perceive that the rupa and 
namakkhandhas which arise and disappear even in the short course of 
one sitting as separate phenomena and not as a bonded continuum. The 
concept of "my atta" which is like the thread, is no longer present. 
Their khandhas appear to them like the string of beads from which the 
thread has been removed. They clearly perceive that the akusala 
kammas which they had committed in the past are not 'persons', 
or 'beings' or 'I', or 'my kammas', and that they are which arise and 
disappear in an instant. That is why these past akusala kammas 
disappear entirely as soon as sakkaya ditthi disappears. 

Here, it is to be observed that only the akusala kammas disappear. 
Past kusala kammas do not disappear through the mere disappearance of 
sakkaya ditthi. It is only when the stage of the arahatta magga is 
reached, and when tanha is completely eradicated, do kusala kammas 
also totally disappear." 

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote:
> --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear group,
> > Just a note of clarification regarding akusala
> > vipaka citta. This citta
> > gets its name, 'akusala', based on its cause, an
> > akusala citta rooted in
> > lobha/dosa/moha. The vipaka itself is without any
> > akusala/kusala
> > quality. Hence its designation 'rootless' (ahetuka).
> > Akusala citta
> > rooted in lobha/dosa/moha (always?) causes a
> > rootless citta. Rootless
> > cittas cause nothing but may be a contributory
> > condition for another
> > citta rooted in lobha/dosa/moha or
> > alobha/adosa/amoha, which, inturn,
> > must (?) cause another vipaka.
> > 
> > An akusala citta will only cause an akusala vipaka
> > simply because that
> > is how vipaka is named. Sight, sound, smell, taste
> > vipaka will have a
> > neutral feeling. Body sense vipaka will be pleasant
> > or unpleasant
> > feeling. It is impossible (?) for anyone but the
> > Buddha to tell whether
> > a vipaka citta is kusala or akusala. Both kusala and
> > akusala _rootless_
> > vipaka cittas have the same qualities. There is also
> > a class of kusala
> > vipaka citta _with_ roots. This has kusala qualities
> > but because it is
> > vipaka, it cannot cause another citta. 
> > 
> > It can be seen very easily in satipatthana that
> > whatever sight, sound,
> > taste, smell, or body feeling may arise, it is value
> > neutral. Like and
> > dislike are lobha and dosa. They may arise in
> > response to the vipaka and
> > will, in turn, produce another vipaka. We can't
> > really see this kamma
> > process unfolding. We can recognize cause, and we
> > can recognize effect.
> > But we cannot put the two together. We have to take
> > the Buddha's word
> > for it.
> > 
> > Unpleasant body feeling is not necessarily akusala
> > vipaka. Kusala citta
> > can cause unpleasant body feeling.
> > 
> > Corrections joyously welcomed.
> > 
> > yours in the way, Larry
> > 
> > question: Is kamma unstopable once the cause has
> > arisen?
> > 
> > L. 
> > 
> > dear Larry, I query that last comment about
> "unpleasant body feeling ------cause unpleasant body
> feeling" . I can't see how kusala citta can cause
> something unpleasant. Can you elaborate please? 
> 
> > regarding your question about kamma - I think
> it is unstopable - unless you become an arahat - but
> you can't do this if the kamma is really heavy, such
> as killing mum or dad, harming a Buddha, etc.
> > Azita,
> > May all beings be happy,
	
13329

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 1:19am
Subject: Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Dear Nina,
I could not help laughing either. Sarah is really great, isn't she. 

Yes, craving for a "self" is a powerful drive. But, really, that self 
we crave is nothing more than a concept, not really existent at all. 

Dan

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> Dear Dan, I really liked your account of your personal experiences 
with
> regard to meditation. Very sincere. I could not help laughing when 
I read
> the dialogue with Sarah about citta with panna which knows, <it> 
knows.
> Cittas perform different functions, kicca. Seeing-consciousness 
performs the
> function of seeing, receiving-consciousness performs the function of
> receiving the object. They all perform different functions, but 
just for a
> moment, and then they fall away. When insight has not been 
developed to
> different stages, of course, no matter what we read about citta, we 
may
> cling to a self. A self who controls. But it is helpful to realize 
this.
> Best wishes, Nina.
	
13330

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 2:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities? - Jon and Nina

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob E
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> > --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> ...
> > > An interesting observation -- 'ultimate reality', yet like a bubble or a
> lump of
> > > foam. 
> > > Well, I suppose it's an example of looking at the same thing from different
> > > perspectives.
> > > They are 'ultimate' in the sense of being the underlying phenomena of what
> we
> > > take for
> > > people and things, yet they also have no intrinsic merit.
> > > 
> > > Both aspects need to be understood.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > Which makes Howard's and others' case that the word 'ultimate' is misleading
> and
> > incorrect. It constantly needs to be re-explained and qualified, because it
> > implies something other than what it means. Ultimate in common parlance means
> the
> > height of something much more than it means the final particle that cannot be
> > broken down.
> 
> Actually, similar comments could be made about many other terms used in the
> dhamma,
> including no doubt some that you take for granted but that would be a problem
> for
> someone less familiar with the dhamma than yourself. Think of wholesome/skilful
> (for kusala), memory (for sanna), consciousness (for citta/vinnana),
> concentration
> (for samadhi), tranquillity (for samatha) mentality-materiality (for nama-rupa)
> and
> so on. None of these terms as used in the teachings bears a meaning even
> remotely
> close to its everyday meaning.
> 
> > In math, which is Howard's area, I think there are terms that describe this
> kind
> > of thing more generically, numbers that can't be broken down any further,
> > equations that cannot be divided down to a lesser amount on either side. The
> > least common denominator which unites equivalent mathematical terms.
> > 
> > For myself, I would propose 'primary realities' or even 'basic realities', but
> > primary accomplishes what you would want, it establishes them as indivisible
> and
> > 'first and foremost' without the baggage of 'ultimate'.
> 
> And others have a real problem with 'realties'!
> 
> Actually, this reminds me of a discussion on this very subject with Ken O not so
> long ago (during one of your lurk modes), where we came to a somewhat similar
> conclusion on the term 'basic'. I also like Rob K's 'fundamental'. 
> 
> But as a translation of the term used in the texts ('paramattha'), I don’t think
> any
> of these various terms is appropriate (that doesn’t mean I have any objection to
> their use).
> 
> > Now I may be paranoid, but it does seem like the term 'paramatha', if it is
> indeed
> > 'ultimate' betrays a kind of idealization of these fleeting actualities, and
> > perhaps is a way in which the idea of entity creeps back into Abhidhamma. 
> Terms
> > have a 'flavor' of meaning, and 'paramatha' seems to have precisely the wrong
> one.
> > Correct me if I'm wrong, but I think I recall the prefix 'para' as having a
> sense
> > of something like 'great'. Is this not so?
> 
> The choice of the term 'paramattha' (from 'parama' + 'attha') to describe the
> fundamental dhammas, and its English translation as 'ultimate realities', is
> explained in A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, notes to Ch. I #2 as follows:
> 
> "Ultimate realities are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic
> nature
> (sabhaava). These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of
> existence,
> the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of
> experience. Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves
> the
> final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of
> experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived
> from
> ‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing."
> 
> The fact that some particular terminology may seem to have connotations that we
> find
> unfortunate should not be allowed to detract us from the task of trying to
> understand the primary/basic/fundamental/ultimate realities/phenomena that are
> being
> referred to and which are capable of being the object of awareness and
> understanding
> of the level of satipatthana/vipassana. Otherwise we are in danger of missing
> the
> whole point!
> 
> Jon

True, Jon, if something merely has a coincidental implication that has nothing to
do with its material content, then it should be dismissed, and we should get back
to the analysis of the reality it points to. However, if there is an inherent
problem in the analysis itself, that should be looked into, not ignored.

The quote from Abhidhamma in Daily Life troubles me, and not coincidentally. 
Since this is Nina's book, I invite Nina to comment, and I apologize in advance
for taking a tough view towards this quote. I don't want to misinterpret what she
says through ignorance, but this is what troubles me:

"Ultimate realities are things that exist by reason of their own intrinsic
> nature
> (sabhaava). 

Buddha says to regard all things as dreamlike and unreal. How can anything in
manifestation thus be regarded as self-existent? I see this as establishing a
string of objective monads. Even if they are only in the moment, they are
constantly and eternally being replaced by other monads, equally real and
irreducible. To establish anything as real is to establish entities, the opposite
of the universal anatta that Buddha teaches. Buddha didn't teach that some things
were real entities and others have anatta. Anatta-ness is universal. There is
nothing that can be established as ultimately self-existent, or this is broken,
and there is something actual to cling to, in this case the string of momentary
namas and rupas, which is made substantial via its 'ultimately real' constituent
parts. This is again why the flavor of 'ultimate' bothers me, not because it has
an accidental implication, but because it has a purposeful one, which is intrinsic
to what it is signifying. This is also borne out by the next sentence in your
quote.

These are the dhammas: the final, irreducible components of
> existence,

Why should there be any components of existence that are final and irreducible? 
This again is a form of monadic thought. If all is empty of self and
substantiality, constantly shifting and impossible to hold onto, wherefore do
these 'real' components of 'reality' show up? They create an objective existence
that can be successfully clung to.

And the next phrase troubles me more.

> the ultimate entities which result from a correctly performed analysis of
> experience. 

ultimate entities! I thought the whole point of Buddhism is that are *no*
entities, period. Instead, this analysis has reduced the idea of entity to a more
fleeting level, but re-established it there. We all live and die. There is
nothing unique in saying that there is a self or object that is impermanent. The
idea in Buddhism as I understand it is to see that this impermanence and lack of
entity is *radical*, that it destroys the notion that there is any core experience
at which consciousness might rest. But this establishes a place for consciousness
to abide. If consciousness can abide on a real object, it can constitute a real
self, in my opinion. If there is a real object for consciousness that is
objectively viable, then there is the possibility for consciousness to constitute
a real self.

Such existents admit of no further reduction, but are themselves
> the
> final terms of analysis, the true constituents of the complex manifold of
> experience. Hence the word ‘paramattha’ is applied to them, which is derived
> from
> ‘parama’ = ultimate, highest, final, and ‘attha’ = reality, thing."

My understanding of Buddha's message is that there is no ultimate reality to
*anything* in experience. That is the only way in which clinging and self are
dissolved as false concepts. Setting up a realm of experience that is ultimate
and real, and in which actual entities are established takes the sting out of the
emptiness of experience, since it is not total, and gives the false construct of
self something to cling to, a 'real stream of experience' which is eternal and
viable, not subject to anatta. I believe it defeats the the idea of thoroughly
and completely disenfranchising consciousness from the notion that there is
*anything* that may be salvaged in this life by a separate being, and that all
concepts of self are false.

Again, Nina, I apologize if I have mangled your words or intentions in the process
of trying to sort this out.

Best,
Robert Ep.


13331

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 3:56am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
> Pleased to see you realise that one reason to write in this way is 
> that it stresses on anatta - that there is no self doing anything 
> but that different dhammas are performing whatever function is 
> appropriate. 

No, it stresses the "no control" anatta, which is an important aspect 
to be sure and one that Westerners have a particularly difficult time 
understanding and accepting. Others have taught "no control" as well, 
including Christians, fatalists, et al. What is unique to Buddhism is 
that it teaches not only "no control", but also anatta AND how the 
delusion of atta arises AND how the delusion of atta is rooted out. 

In the metaphorical "citta cognizes", the aspect of "no control" is 
clearly emphasized, but there is unquestionably a substantialist 
undertone. This is a good thing to think about. 

> We are persistently fooled into thinking that there is a self who 
> decides and directs. It helps us see that there is really no self 
> when the commentaries further define any dhamma by means of lakkhana 
> (characteristic), rasa (function), paccupatthana (the way it 
> presents itself) and its padatthana (proximate cause). 

Again, "function" is an odd word. In English it has both teleological 
and substantialist connotations, both of which are unwelcome. No word 
is perfect, but it is helpful to consider questions like this.

More comments as time permits...
Thanks, Robert.

Dan
	

 	 

	
13332

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 5:00am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Supportive spiritual practices (was, what is extreme? ...)

 	
Rob Ep

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Jon,
> For me personally, I tend to judge practices by their effects rather than by their
> designation. I tend to see Buddhist thought as the clearest expression of the
> true human condition, but do see other philosophies as having a place on the
> continuum of the spiritual life of our species.

I'm sure I've asked this before, but I don't recall having had a response. When you
say you judge practices by their effects, does that mean effects in terms of the
dhamma and, if so, what effects found in the teachings would you be referring to?

I suppose my question could also be put in this way: to evaluate anything in tersm
of the dhamma, don't we need to see if it conforms to the teachings? After all, a
practice that does not conform to the teachings could not bring the same result as
practice conforming to the teachings (or do we differ here).

> As regards yoga, I think that it has positive effects, and that it is a practice
> that can create conditions for the development of peacefulness, concentration,
> perceptual clarity, the ability to observe thoughts and calm emotions. While I
> appreciate the possibility you have mentioned several times that such practices
> can give 'false readings' through suppressing akusala without eradicating it, or
> create pleasant feelings with attachment that are not really kusala but seem to be
> [see, I do pay attention at times], I think the overall effect of yoga is
> positive.

To say that the overall effect of yoga is positive doesn't mean much unless you aer
saying that by doing yoga you are achieving something that can be achieved no other
way. And I don't think you are saying that. Actually, I would think there are any
number of other 'practices' that could be substituted for yoga in what you write
here and which would bring (to one person or another) the same 'result'. This to me
indicates that it is not the 'practice' itself but some other factor (eg, the
person's approach to the practice) that is the operative factor.

Just my thoughts

Jon

> To me, the overall state of the body and mind, including the condition of the
> nervous system, and the psychic energy channels which correspond to what an
> acupuncurist would talk about, all have an influence on how capable someone is to
> view realities clearly as they arise, and distinguish thought from object, concept
> from thought, etc., all the things that denote mindfulness and the development of
> wisdom.
> 
> I do not think that yoga by itself can take a person to an understanding of anatta
> and anicca, but I do think that yoga has a lot to teach about the changing nature
> of phenomena, control, dissatisfaction, all of which are confronted every time
> someone works through a pose. In other words, I think it is a positive
> conditioning agent and a powerful aid on the path. Like any corrolary medicine,
> it can take one in the wrong direction if used incorrectly.
> 
> When the friend/teacher I mentioned did his Vipassana retreats, he was used to
> doing a little yoga inbetween sittings. This was generally discouraged at the
> retreat center, but they decided in his case to approve it, because the way that
> he used the yoga was to deal with his body in a way that promoted discernment. He
> had some medical conditions that the yoga handled to some extent.
> 
> Anyway, if one has Buddhist principles and path in mind, and uses yoga as a
> corrolary agent, I think its preparation of the body and mind can be very helpful.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ==========================
> 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > Rob E
> > 
> > I note your impassioned (and articulate) arguments in favour of 'supportive
> > spiritual practices' from outside the teachings (for example, yoga) in the
> > development of the understanding that is the heart of the teachings.
> > 
> > Just to clarify where you stand on this issue, would you say that the view
> > that, 'There is no connection between the practice of yoga and the development
> > of insight' is in accordance with, or is contrary to, the teachings as you
> > understand them.
> > 
> > I ask this not to be picky or anything like that, but to draw out a point ;-).
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > hi.
> > > I am one of those strange people who think that supportive spiritual
> > > practices do
> > > increase one's spiritual state. That is one of the reasons I keep arguing in
> > > favor of meditation, and I would also argue in favor of yoga. To me, the
> > > path
> > > involves understanding Dhamma, everyday discernment and skillful practices
> > > that
> > > increase one's Right Energy, Right View, etc. When the mind is cleared of
> > > obscuring concepts in meditation, or the body made more relaxed and the
> > > nerves
> > > cleared out through yoga, to me these create conducive conditions for
> > > understanding and insight.
> > > 
> > > I have never been able to put the Dhamma in a box where there is one right
> > > interpretation and one right practice. Has my knowledge of Hindu Advaita
> > > Vedanta
> > > or Zen or Tibetan Dzogchen been inconsequential to my understanding of
> > > Dhamma? To
> > > me, having a cross-reference of enlightened knowledge is a great asset which
> > > serves as an underlying commentary to rightly understand teachings. 
> > > 
> > > The fact that the 'modern' father of Yoga, Patanjali, wrote of an Eight-fold
> > > Path 
> > > [Ashtanga], does not seem totally coincidental to me with the Buddha's Noble
> > > Eightfold Path. One who has a sense of history will see that there are often
> > > more
> > > than coincidences in these sorts of synchronies. Sometimes they mean
> > > something,
> > > sometimes they don't. But I don't personally find it helpful to see
> > > Theravadan
> > > Buddhism, or Abhidhamma in particular, or whatever one adopts as one's main
> > > approach to Realization, as an isolated study, an island in the middle of a
> > > sea of
> > > inconsequential things that are all thoroughly 'other'. I personally like a
> > > synergistic approach, as I believe that there is a dialectic in the history
> > > of
> > > thought, philosophy and even enlightenment, which comes up in different forms
> > > throughout history.
> > > 
> > > The idea that there is a fixed 'Buddhism' which is the only right one, and
> > > that it
> > > is not developed but either found as a whole or lost as a static whole, does
> > > not
> > > seem right to me. Rather, it seems to me that the principles of Buddhism are
> > > the
> > > core that doesn't change, but that the outer form does change, and not only
> > > changed after the Buddha's parinibbana, but even during the Buddha's
> > > lifetime, as
> > > he spoke to different groups, and to my mind, probably became more skillful
> > > and
> > > precise at expressing the Dhamma throughout his long career. To see the
> > > Buddha as
> > > a static entity who was 'perfect' and thus fixed in stone from the moment of
> > > his
> > > Enlightenment, to me also turns the Buddha into a Godhead, and takes away the
> > > practical skillful development which he himself always praised, and which all
> > > Buddhist teachers have partaken of throughout their careers. 
> > > 
> > > So for me, the ultimate state of Realization may be a very definite
> > > experience and
> > > may not be variable, the principles of Buddhism may be unique, particularly
> > > Buddha's teaching of Anatta, but the evolution of Buddhism and many of its
> > > elements are not only shared by various forms of Buddhist practice, but even
> > > have
> > > elements in common with other traditions, and which may shed light on the
> > > true
> > > nature of the Dhamma.
> > > 
> > > I know this is not a popular standpoint, but I thought I would take the
> > > occasion
> > > to speak my mind. Of course I will go back to the Dhamma, and attempt to be
> > > in
> > > the presence of its true meaning, but I will not erase my sense that the
> > > world is
> > > in a state of spiritual evolution, and that it is something that all of us
> > > share
> > > in various forms.
> > > 
> > > If Frank *had* meant that his yoga had an influence on his spiritual opening
> > > or
> > > understanding of Buddhism, I personally would accept it as a good and
> > > worthwhile
> > > possibility. I don't want to be dogmatic about Buddhism, and assume that
> > > anything
> > > that isn't expressly from the official version of Buddhism as we imperfectly
> > > understand it at this time, is the only area from which to draw valuable
> > > experiences along the path.
> > > 
> > > Take Care,
> > > Robert Ep.

	
13333

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 5:14am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration & FSM

 	
Christine

You suggest finding out whether:

> any of those who teach us to study the realities [have] NEVER done any 
> formal meditation?

Putting aside the tricky question of what kind of formal meditation you
are referring to, I think that any answer could only cover the limited
span of a single lifetime and so would not really 'prove' anything!

Jon

--- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: > Dear Anders, Jon,
Dan, Eric and All,
> 
> As you say Eric, this topic has been discussed (or at least alluded 
> to) many times on this and other lists. One thing I don't recall 
> being discussed is whether the Formal Meditation and the Dhamma Study 
> could be a consecutive, but distinctly separate, occurrences in 
> someone's lifetime. That those who think FM is unnecessary, don't 
> realise that their previous involvment actually WAS necessary, and 
> they are getting by on a previously learned skill?
> There are many people whom I admire and learn from. Some do Formal 
> Meditation (sitting, standing, walking, eating ), and go to Retreats 
> etc., some combine FM and Dhamma Study, some Study and practice 
> mindfullness. 
> Those who do FM feel that it is essential according to the 
> Teachings, and that Dhamma Study is not sufficient even with 
> mindfullness. Those who practice the latter seem to feel FM is 
> harmless, perhaps soothing, but not necessary, according to the 
> Teachings. It is very confusing when coming upon this difference of 
> opinion, especially when many of us gained our first introduction to 
> Buddhism during Dhamma talks after group meditation.
> 
> I only have a vague knowledge of some list members involvment with FM 
> or Study, but wonder if there is anyone who has NEVER done FM in the 
> past, however long ago, and who obtains satisfying results from 
> Dhamma study and mindfulness only? (For instance, Sarah has told 
> us of her FM practice years ago, and that she doesn't find it a 
> necessary practice now.) Just an idle thought, - could it be that 
> one can get to a 'sufficient' level that is accessible for progress 
> on the Path.... just like riding a bike, you never lose the skill? 
> Have any of those who teach us to study the realities NEVER done any 
> formal meditation?
> 
> metta,
> Christine
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "rikpa21" <rikpa21@y...> wrote:
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > > Hi Anders,
> > > Interesting exchange with Jon. I hope you don't mind my butting 
> in 
> > > briefly...
> > > 
> > > Jon: Can you point to any instance in the texts of the Buddha 
> > > recommending such a practice, or any mention at all of 'sitting 
> > > vipassana meditation'.
> > > 
> > > Anders: The Satipatthana Sutta: "There is the case where a monk --
> 
> > > having gone to the wilderness, to the shade of a tree, or to an 
> > empty 
> > > building -- sits down folding his legs crosswise, holding his 
> body 
> > > erect and setting mindfulness to the fore [lit: the front of the 
> > > chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; mindful he breathes out. "
> > > 
> > > And all the other foundations too.
> > > 
> > > -----------------
> > > Yes, I think we all agree that one case in which mindfulness can 
> > be 
> > > established is when a monk sits cross-legged under a tree with 
> > body 
> > > erect. But is this a recommendation of sitting in order to 
> > establish 
> > > mindfulness or is it just part of a list of activities in which 
> > > mindfulness can be established? 
> > 
> > Hi Dan & Anders (Anders, thank you for your recent spate of posts 
> > reminding us of the importance of discarding views).
> > 
> > Dan, I think this topic's been covered in some detail before here, 
> > but that never means it isn't worth covering again.
> > 
> > Just looking at my own experience, the entire message of what the 
> > Buddha was teaching would have been lost on me, because without 
> > sitting meditation none of the factors said to lead to the stated 
> > aim of the Dhamma have arisen without this most basic of practices, 
> > expounded in all versions of the Satipatthana Sutta as well as the 
> > Anapanasati Sutta.
> <<<<snip>>>>
> 

	
13334

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 5:19am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Kamma In Color: To Jon

 	
Suan

Thanks very much for this. I have since tracked down a translation of the
sutta by Vens Nanamoli and Bodhi in NDB (Numerical Discourses of the
Buddha), where the same gloss from the commentary is made. 

Jon

--- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> 
> Dear Jon
> 
> How are you?
> 
> You wrote:
> 
> "I am guessing that the 4th kind of kamma refers to moments of 
> mundane or supramundane path consciousness (this being the only kind 
> of kamma that does not conduce to further rebirth in samsara)."
> 
> Your guess was very close because Commentary on Samkhitta Suttam, on 
> which Vitthaara Suttam was an elaboration, settled on supramundane 
> path consciousness.
> 
> Thank you for your interest in my new commentary on Vitthaara Suttam. 
> As soon as I finish writing it, I will post it to this list. Won't be 
> long.
> 
> With regards,
> 
> Suan 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > 
> > 
> > 
> > Suan
> > 
> > Many thanks for your translation of this interesting sutta. 
> > 
> > I could be wrong, but I am guessing that the 4th kind of kamma 
> refers to moments of
> > mundane or supramundane path consciousness (this being the only 
> kind of kamma that
> > does not conduce to further rebirth in samsara).
> > 
> > I look forward to reading your commentary in due course.
> > 
> > Jon
> > 
> > --- abhidhammika <abhidhammika@y...> wrote: > 
> > 
> > > Vitthaara Suttam, from which the following translation was made, 
> can 
> > > be found in Section 233, Kammavaggo, Catukkanipaata, 
> Anguttaranikaayo 
> > > on Chatthasangayana CD-ROM version 3 produced by Vipassana 
> Research 
> > > Institute. Those who use Roman edition should see page 230 in 
> Volume 
> > > 2 of that edition.
> > > 
> > > 
> > > VITTHAARA SUTTAM ON FOUR GROUPS OF KAMMA
> > > 
> > > Vitthaara Suttam On Four Groups Of Kamma 
> > > 
> > > Translated By Suan Lu Zaw
> > > 
> > > Monks, four actions have been declared by me by having personally 
> > > realized them with extraordinary wisdom. What are the four? 
> Monks, 
> > > there is dark action having dark result. Monks, there is white 
> action 
> > > having white result. Monks, there is dark and white action having 
> > > dark and white result. Minks, there is un-dark and un-white 
> action 
> > > having un-dark and un-white result, which takes place for 
> depletion 
> > > of actions.
> > > 
> > > Monks, what is dark action having dark result? Here, monks, some 
> > > carry out physical action with anger, verbal action with anger, 
> and 
> > > mental action with anger. Having carried out physical action with 
> > > anger, having carried out verbal action with anger, and having 
> > > carried out mental action with anger, he is reborn in the harsh 
> > > world. Being reborn in the harsh world, harsh contacts touch him. 
> > > Being touched by harsh contacts, he experiences the really 
> miserable 
> > > harsh feelings like those beings in hell do. Monks, this is 
> called 
> > > dark action having dark result.
> > > 
> > > Monks, what is white action having white result? Here, monks, 
> some 
> > > carry out physical action with dis-anger, verbal action with dis-
> > > anger, and mental action with dis-anger. Having carried out 
> physical 
> > > action with dis-anger, having carried out verbal action with dis-
> > > anger, and having carried out mental action with dis-anger, he is 
> > > reborn in the gentle world. Being reborn in the gentle world, 
> gentle 
> > > contacts touch him. Being touched by gentle contacts, he 
> experiences 
> > > the really pleasant gentle feelings like Subhakinha Brahma gods 
> do. 
> > > Monks, this is called white action having white result.
> > > 
> > > Monks, what is dark and white action having dark and white 
> result? 
> > > Here, monks, some carry out physical action with anger as well as 
> > > with dis-anger, verbal action with anger as well as with dis-
> anger, 
> > > and mental action with anger as well as with dis-anger. Having 
> > > carried out physical action with anger as well as with dis-anger, 
> > > having carried out verbal action with anger as well as with dis-
> > > anger, and having carried out mental action with anger as well as 
> > > with dis-anger, he is reborn in the harsh and gentle world. Being 
> > > reborn in the harsh and gentle world, harsh as well as gentle 
> > > contacts touch him. Being touched by harsh as well as gentle 
> > > contacts, he experiences the mixed feelings of pleasure and 
> misery 
> > > like human beings, some sensuous gods and some mansion-owning 
> halfway 
> > > beings do. Monks, this is called dark and white action having 
> dark 
> > > and white result.
> > > 
> > > Monks, what is un-dark and un-white action having un-dark and un-
> > > white result, which takes place for depletion of actions? Here, 
> > > monks, such activation as to eradicate dark action having dark 
> > > result, such activation as to eradicate white action having white 
> > > result, and such activation as to eradicate dark and white action 
> > > having dark and white result, this activation is called un-dark 
> and 
> > > un-white action having un-dark and un-white result, which takes 
> place 
> > > for depletion of actions. Monks, these four actions have been 
> > > declared by me by having personally realized them with 
> extraordinary 
> > > wisdom. 
> > > 
> > > 
> > > NOTES ON KEY TERMS 
> > > 
> > > The phrase "with anger" is a translation of the Pali 
> > > compound "sabyaapajjam" which was defined as "sadosam" in the 
> Pali 
> > > commentary. Sadosam = sa + dosam.
> > > Doso is defined as anger in Pali Text Society's Pali – English 
> > > Dictionary, see page 332.
> > > 
> > > The phrase "with dis-anger" is a translation of the Pali 
> > > word "abyaapajjam". The opposite of the Pali term "doso" 
> is "adoso". 
> > > Dis-anger is the literal translation of "adoso". Abyaapajjo is 
> > > described as a synonym of adoso in Section 33, Dhammasanganii. 
> Hence, 
> > > I translated abyaapajjam as with dis-anger in order to contrast 
> it 
> > > with anger in Paragraph Two of the Vitthaara Suttam. 
> > > 
> > > In Section 397, Siilakkhandha Pali, Diighanikaayo, we 
> find "bhikkhu 
> > > averam abyaapajjam mettacittam bhaaveti. Without enmity, and with 
> dis-
> > > anger, the monk develops the loving mind". 
> > > 
> > > Thus, dis-anger is a technical term to convey love or loving 
> kindness 
> > > as one of its meanings. It does not refer to the mere absence of 
> > > anger as when our minds are with greed.
> > > 
> > > Un-dark is a translation of the word "akanha, not dark". Here, un-
> > > darkness does not refer to other colors such as whiteness. It 
> means 
> > > counteracting the very color of darkness. Un-dark means anti-
> dark. 
> > > 
> > > Thus, un-dark action would counteract the dark actions and their 
> dark 
> > > results. 
> > > 
> > > Un-white is a translation of the word "asukka, not white". Here, 
> too, 
> > > un-whiteness does not refer to darkness or other colors. It means 
> > > counteracting the very color of whiteness. Un-white means anti-
> white. 
> > > 
> > > Thus, un-white action would counteract the white actions and 
> their 
> > > white results. 

	
13335

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 1:42am
Subject: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Hi, Dan (and Nina) -

In a message dated 5/17/02 4:20:46 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> Dear Nina,
> I could not help laughing either. Sarah is really great, isn't she. 
> 
> Yes, craving for a "self" is a powerful drive. But, really, that self 
> we crave is nothing more than a concept, not really existent at all. 
> 
> Dan
> 
==========================
In reading what you wrote here, Dan, it occurred to me how to clarify 
the presentation of my ideas on concepts. When you write "But, really, that 
self we crave is nothing more than a concept, not really existent at all.", I 
see this as perfectly good, clear, and correct conventional expression, just 
as you intended. But, to me, if it is taken *literally*, then it is off the 
mark. I think that when we say that something "is mere concept", what we 
actually mean is not that this alleged thing exists and is nothing more than 
being of the category "concept", but, rather, the following:
(1) There is a concept, a mental construct, an idea mentally formed 
from elementary experiences (paramattha dhammas), but (2) There is no 
actually observable referent of this concept. 
So, when we say that the "self we crave is nothing more than a 
concept, not really existent at all", what we really mean is that, while the 
concept / idea of 'self' exists, there is no self, no *referent* of the 
concept of 'self'. For some concepts, there exist referents, but for others 
there are none. When a concept of 'X' has no referent we *say* that "X is 
mere concept", but this referring to an "X which is mere concept" is just a 
manner of speaking. There really is no X that is imagined, because there is 
no X at all! There *is* no such thing. Even when we say "It is just 
imagined", the use of the pronoun 'it' already *suggests* to our mind an 
existent - an "imagined" existent! ;-)) We fall victim to the very form of 
our speech! The very use of a name (noun phrase or pronomial phrase), 
suggests the existence of an object. Ironically, for example, the very use of 
the term 'Merely imagined self', for example, suggests the existence of some 
"thing" which *is* a merely imagined self. The very form of our language 
pushes reification on us! 
I hope this clarifies the point I have so poorly been trying to make 
for so long on the list. ;-))

With metta,
Howard


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13336

From: Jaran Jainhuknan <jjn@b...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 5:56am
Subject: Re: [dsg] SE QLD

 	
Chistine:
Good to hear from you. Thanks for the explanation. Have fun. Looking
forward to your account of the lunch-on.
Good day,
jaran

Hi Jaran,

SE QLD means 'South East Queensland'. Azita is down from Cairns on
holiday in Maleny - a couple of hours drive north of Brisbane. She
and I (plus SarahF) are meeting for Dhamma discussions overlunch on
Sunday, which I am very much looking forward to. :-)

metta,
Christine
	
13337

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 8:49am
Subject: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Hi Howard,
Just a few quick comments:
> mark. I think that when we say that something "is mere concept", 
what we 
> actually mean is not that this alleged thing exists and is nothing 
more than 
> being of the category "concept", but, rather, the following:
> (1) There is a concept, a mental construct, an idea mentally 
formed 
> from elementary experiences (paramattha dhammas), but (2) There is 
no 
> actually observable referent of this concept. 
> So, when we say that the "self we crave is nothing more than 
a 
> concept, not really existent at all", what we really mean is that, 
while the 
> concept / idea of 'self' exists, there is no self, no *referent* of 
the 
> concept of 'self'. 

Aren't views of "self" just misinterpretations of the five aggregates? 
E.g. thinking some combination of the aggregates is a "self" and 
then mistakenly attributing "self"-ish characteristics (commonly 
"eternalist" notions) to that referent via concept.

More as time allows...

Thanks for the interesting comments.

Dan
	
13338

From: frank kuan <fcckuan@y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 10:32am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [reply to Frank]

 	
On the topic of "progress" and "breakthroughs":

Hi Dan,
Thanks for sharing such a detailed account of your
insights and meditation experience. 
Even what you call "standard" progress, I see that
as dhamma progress, as a result of constant
application of "right effort". I do agree that our
notion of progress can be very deceiving, since what
requires much conditioning can be deconditioned. 
However, I believe it is important to monitor our
"progress" without clinging to it, so we can evaluate
whether we're moving in the right direction. For
example, my worldy interactions are a constant acid
test of how well my dhamma understanding is
progressing. How do I react to bad traffic ? Long
lines at the grocery store? Pain of illness? Being
unjustly accused by friends or non-friends? How much
clinging to my self, my possessessions, my lifestyle?
What do I eat, how much is due to satisfying need for
nutrition versus delight? How much sensory stimulation
I chase after, even things of educational nature like
inter-religious study rationalized as education but
also a clinging for mental stimulation? 
The list goes on and on. Everyday there are
millions of moments that we can see if our dhamma
practice is bearing favorable results or whether we
need to adjust our practice accordingly. Is
non-clinging increasing or decreasing? Anger...Lust...
Increasing or Decreasing?

-fk


	
13339

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 11:44am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Supportive spiritual practices (was, what is extreme? ...)

 	
--- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > Dear Jon,
> > For me personally, I tend to judge practices by their effects rather than by
> their
> > designation. I tend to see Buddhist thought as the clearest expression of the
> > true human condition, but do see other philosophies as having a place on the
> > continuum of the spiritual life of our species.
> 
> I'm sure I've asked this before, but I don't recall having had a response. When
> you
> say you judge practices by their effects, does that mean effects in terms of the
> dhamma and, if so, what effects found in the teachings would you be referring
> to?

Well, the preliminary problem in answering that is that 'in terms of the dhamma'
is subject to the individual's evaluation. You can say that anything that creates
kusala effects is in line with the dhamma, or you can say that only those things
which are explicitly mentioned in the suttas are in line with the dhamma, or you
could say that those things which lead us to the dhamma by hook or by crook are in
line with the dhamma, because we all come to the dhamma by various combinations of
conditions and actions.

So I would agree with you, but I would not presuppose that one could say bluntly
'this is in line with the dhamma and this is not', although I'm sure in some cases
one would think they could. But when you think about it, ultimately, you could
say 'well if you murder someone that is definitely not in line with the dhamma,
and that will lead you in the opposite direction'. But I suppose it is possible,
like the woman who had two horrific deaths in her family and wandered into the
Buddha's camp demented, and thereby reached arahat status, that someone could kill
someone, suffer horrible remorse to the point that they realized that all things
are empty, unsatisfying, etc., and turn to the Path. So in that sense it is hard
to know what is in line with the dhamma, ultimately.

In the case of yoga, I would say it leads towards flexibility, concentration,
discernment, etc. These in themselves -- are they in line with the dhamma or not?
I would say yes, but obviously if one just settles for those qualities and
doesn't move forward into the eightfold path, then it would turn out to not be in
line with the dhamma. So it depends on how these qualities are employed. I still
think that in conjunction with Buddhist practice, yoga can be beneficial and
helpful, at least for some people. Sarah, who practices yoga, says that she
doesn't consider it part of her Buddhist orientation [correct me if I'm wrong,
Sarah] but it is just 'something that she does' because she has the propensity for
it and she likes it. I guess I could say the same, that I would do it even if it
were not explicitly moving me forward, just because it seems pleasant and helpful
to me. But I still think that the qualities it engenders are in the direction of
the path. Again, to me, they are part of the necessary but not sufficient
category. One can do something that is useful and helpful and in the right
direction, and not go far enough.

> I suppose my question could also be put in this way: to evaluate anything in
> tersm
> of the dhamma, don't we need to see if it conforms to the teachings? After all,
> a
> practice that does not conform to the teachings could not bring the same result
> as
> practice conforming to the teachings (or do we differ here).

I think there is some difference of opinion as to what the teachings are, and yes,
I think that something that will have the correct results of the teachings should
be in line with the teachings. But again, do the practices have to be explicitly
mentioned to be in line with the teachings? What if they are not forbidden and
not encouraged? Can one decide for oneself, based on the principles of the
teachings, whether something accords with them or not?

For instance, we have some conflict here about whether Buddha's teachings are
prescriptive or descriptive. It can't really be proven one way or the other,
although i think most Theravadan practitioners would say they are prescriptive,
and most Abhidhamma practitioners would say they are descriptive. Am I wrong that
there is a difference of opinion here, which is not resolved by appealing directly
to the suttas?

> > As regards yoga, I think that it has positive effects, and that it is a
> practice
> > that can create conditions for the development of peacefulness, concentration,
> > perceptual clarity, the ability to observe thoughts and calm emotions. While
> I
> > appreciate the possibility you have mentioned several times that such
> practices
> > can give 'false readings' through suppressing akusala without eradicating it,
> or
> > create pleasant feelings with attachment that are not really kusala but seem
> to be
> > [see, I do pay attention at times], I think the overall effect of yoga is
> > positive.
> 
> To say that the overall effect of yoga is positive doesn't mean much unless you
> aer
> saying that by doing yoga you are achieving something that can be achieved no
> other
> way. 

I disagree with this proposition. An apple and an orange both have nutrition and
have some of the same vitamins, same health benefits. Does the fact that the
orange has these qualities disqualify the beneficial effects of the apple? Why
does something have to be exclusive to be beneficial? Yoga has beneficial
effects. So do many other things. They are all good, and one can take their
choice of what to do based on their predilection. Is yoga better or worse than
tai chi? Apples and oranges, both good in their own way.

And I don't think you are saying that. Actually, I would think there are
> any
> number of other 'practices' that could be substituted for yoga in what you write
> here and which would bring (to one person or another) the same 'result'. This
> to me
> indicates that it is not the 'practice' itself but some other factor (eg, the
> person's approach to the practice) that is the operative factor.

The approach is important too, but practices, like all causes, have their
beneficial or non-beneficial effects as well.

Best,
Robert Ep.

===================


> Just my thoughts
> 
> Jon
> 
> > To me, the overall state of the body and mind, including the condition of the
> > nervous system, and the psychic energy channels which correspond to what an
> > acupuncurist would talk about, all have an influence on how capable someone is
> to
> > view realities clearly as they arise, and distinguish thought from object,
> concept
> > from thought, etc., all the things that denote mindfulness and the development
> of
> > wisdom.
> > 
> > I do not think that yoga by itself can take a person to an understanding of
> anatta
> > and anicca, but I do think that yoga has a lot to teach about the changing
> nature
> > of phenomena, control, dissatisfaction, all of which are confronted every time
> > someone works through a pose. In other words, I think it is a positive
> > conditioning agent and a powerful aid on the path. Like any corrolary
> medicine,
> > it can take one in the wrong direction if used incorrectly.
> > 
> > When the friend/teacher I mentioned did his Vipassana retreats, he was used to
> > doing a little yoga inbetween sittings. This was generally discouraged at the
> > retreat center, but they decided in his case to approve it, because the way
> that
> > he used the yoga was to deal with his body in a way that promoted discernment.
> He
> > had some medical conditions that the yoga handled to some extent.
> > 
> > Anyway, if one has Buddhist principles and path in mind, and uses yoga as a
> > corrolary agent, I think its preparation of the body and mind can be very
> helpful.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ==========================
> > 
> > --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> > > Rob E
> > > 
> > > I note your impassioned (and articulate) arguments in favour of 'supportive
> > > spiritual practices' from outside the teachings (for example, yoga) in the
> > > development of the understanding that is the heart of the teachings.
> > > 
> > > Just to clarify where you stand on this issue, would you say that the view
> > > that, 'There is no connection between the practice of yoga and the
> development
> > > of insight' is in accordance with, or is contrary to, the teachings as you
> > > understand them.
> > > 
> > > I ask this not to be picky or anything like that, but to draw out a point
> ;-).
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > > 
> > > --- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > hi.


	
13340

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 8:02am
Subject: Re: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Di, Dan -

In a message dated 5/17/02 11:50:42 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> Just a few quick comments:
> > mark. I think that when we say that something "is mere concept", 
> what we 
> > actually mean is not that this alleged thing exists and is nothing 
> more than 
> > being of the category "concept", but, rather, the following:
> > (1) There is a concept, a mental construct, an idea mentally 
> formed 
> > from elementary experiences (paramattha dhammas), but (2) There is 
> no 
> > actually observable referent of this concept. 
> > So, when we say that the "self we crave is nothing more than 
> a 
> > concept, not really existent at all", what we really mean is that, 
> while the 
> > concept / idea of 'self' exists, there is no self, no *referent* of 
> the 
> > concept of 'self'. 
> 
> Aren't views of "self" just misinterpretations of the five aggregates? 
> E.g. thinking some combination of the aggregates is a "self" and 
> then mistakenly attributing "self"-ish characteristics (commonly 
> "eternalist" notions) to that referent via concept.
---------------------------------------------------
Howard:
Yes, for the most part. But also, there is the idea of something 
*other* than an of the khandas which allegedly underlies them, or is 
associated with them, or even is viewed as being a reality that is 
erroneously associated with them. The Hindu Atman/Brahman seems to be 
simultaneously all of these!
---------------------------------------------------

> 
> More as time allows...
> 
> Thanks for the interesting comments.
> 
> Dan
> 
==========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13341

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 9:39am
Subject: Re: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
In a message dated 5/17/02 4:04:40 PM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... 
writes:


> Di, Dan -
> =======================
Make that "Hi, Dan"!!! ;-))

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13342

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 9:44am
Subject: Re: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Hi again, Dan -

In a message dated 5/17/02 4:04:40 PM Eastern Daylight Time, upasaka@a... 
writes:


> ---------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
> Yes, for the most part. But also, there is the idea of something 
> *other* than an of the khandas which allegedly underlies them, or is 
> associated with them, or even is viewed as being a reality that is 
> erroneously associated with them. The Hindu Atman/Brahman seems to be 
> simultaneously all of these!
> 
=======================
This was a *really* sloppily typed post of mine! To make sense of the 
above, please replace 'an' by 'any' in the 2nd sentence of the quoted 
material. Sorry.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13343

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 1:50pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
Dan and Robert,

Each and every aggregate is not self. It does not mean that there is 
no self doing anything. It does not mean that there is a self doing 
anything. It does not mean "no control." It simply means each and 
every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my 
self."

The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is not 
to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > Pleased to see you realise that one reason to write in this way 
is 
> > that it stresses on anatta - that there is no self doing anything 
> > but that different dhammas are performing whatever function is 
> > appropriate. 
> 
> No, it stresses the "no control" anatta, which is an important 
aspect 
> to be sure and one that Westerners have a particularly difficult 
time 
> understanding and accepting. Others have taught "no control" as 
well, 
> including Christians, fatalists, et al. What is unique to Buddhism 
is 
> that it teaches not only "no control", but also anatta AND how the 
> delusion of atta arises AND how the delusion of atta is rooted out. 
> 
> In the metaphorical "citta cognizes", the aspect of "no control" is 
> clearly emphasized, but there is unquestionably a substantialist 
> undertone. This is a good thing to think about. 
> 
> > We are persistently fooled into thinking that there is a self 
who 
> > decides and directs. It helps us see that there is really no self 
> > when the commentaries further define any dhamma by means of 
lakkhana 
> > (characteristic), rasa (function), paccupatthana (the way it 
> > presents itself) and its padatthana (proximate cause). 
> 
> Again, "function" is an odd word. In English it has both 
teleological 
> and substantialist connotations, both of which are unwelcome. No 
word 
> is perfect, but it is helpful to consider questions like this.
> 
> More comments as time permits...
> Thanks, Robert.
> 
> Dan
	
13344

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 2:04pm
Subject: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Howard, you wrote:

> Yes, for the most part. But also, there is the idea of 
something 
> *other* than an of the khandas which allegedly underlies them, or is 
> associated with them, or even is viewed as being a reality that is 
> erroneously associated with them. The Hindu Atman/Brahman seems to 
be 
> simultaneously all of these!

Yes. I forget that. Thanks.
	
13345

From: onco111 <dalthorp@o...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 2:18pm
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
Hi Victor,
The other day my 6 year old son Matt invented some creature that lived 
in his world. He told me that it might descend upon my head and suck 
out my soul.

"But I don't have a soul," I said.
"Yes you do. Everyone has a soul," he replied.
"What is that 'soul'?"
"It is the wanting things."
"The 'wanting things'? What's that called?"
"Craving."
Then he changed the subject.

The 'no control' aspect is doesn't really mean 'no control,' but, 
rather, that there is no one to do any controlling. Our normal way of 
thinking about 'control' is to have someone doing it. In fact, when we 
try to think about how to control, it is so very difficult to not have 
consciousness rooted in self-view that the 'no control' framework 
really does have utility, even though it does not fully strike the 
mark.

Dan


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> Dan and Robert,
> 
> Each and every aggregate is not self. It does not mean that there 
is 
> no self doing anything. It does not mean that there is a self doing 
> anything. It does not mean "no control." It simply means each and 
> every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not 
my 
> self."
> 
> The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is 
not 
> to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> > > Pleased to see you realise that one reason to write in this way 
> is 
> > > that it stresses on anatta - that there is no self doing 
anything 
> > > but that different dhammas are performing whatever function is 
> > > appropriate. 
> > 
> > No, it stresses the "no control" anatta, which is an important 
> aspect 
> > to be sure and one that Westerners have a particularly difficult 
> time 
> > understanding and accepting. Others have taught "no control" as 
> well, 
> > including Christians, fatalists, et al. What is unique to Buddhism 
> is 
> > that it teaches not only "no control", but also anatta AND how the 
> > delusion of atta arises AND how the delusion of atta is rooted 
out. 
> > 
> > In the metaphorical "citta cognizes", the aspect of "no control" 
is 
> > clearly emphasized, but there is unquestionably a substantialist 
> > undertone. This is a good thing to think about. 
> > 
> > > We are persistently fooled into thinking that there is a self 
> who 
> > > decides and directs. It helps us see that there is really no 
self 
> > > when the commentaries further define any dhamma by means of 
> lakkhana 
> > > (characteristic), rasa (function), paccupatthana (the way it 
> > > presents itself) and its padatthana (proximate cause). 
> > 
> > Again, "function" is an odd word. In English it has both 
> teleological 
> > and substantialist connotations, both of which are unwelcome. No 
> word 
> > is perfect, but it is helpful to consider questions like this.
> > 
> > More comments as time permits...
> > Thanks, Robert.
> > 
> > Dan
	
13346

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 3:00pm
Subject: Once More with Feeling (on Concepts) Re: [dsg] Re: Rite and rituals

 	
Hi Howard and all,

I would like to make some comments to your message....

> In reading what you wrote here, Dan, it occurred to me how 
to clarify 
> the presentation of my ideas on concepts. When you write "But, 
really, that 
> self we crave is nothing more than a concept, not really existent 
at all.", I 
> see this as perfectly good, clear, and correct conventional 
expression, just 
> as you intended. But, to me, if it is taken *literally*, then it is 
off the 
> mark. I think that when we say that something "is mere concept", 
what we 
> actually mean is not that this alleged thing exists and is nothing 
more than 
> being of the category "concept", but, rather, the following:
> (1) There is a concept, a mental construct, an idea mentally 
formed 
> from elementary experiences (paramattha dhammas), but (2) There is 
no 
> actually observable referent of this concept. 

Howard, we are basically in agreement here: (1) Concepts are verbal 
fabrications, constructed, compounded.



The concept of human being is a concept. It is not human being. The 
concept of tree is a concept. It is not tree.

Any concept is impermanent(not because it rises and falls very fast), 
unsatisfactory, not self.



> So, when we say that the "self we crave is nothing more than 
a 
> concept, not really existent at all", what we really mean is that, 
while the 
> concept / idea of 'self' exists, there is no self, no *referent* of 
the 
> concept of 'self'. 



The concept of self is a concept. It is not self. Regarding the 
statement "there is no self", 
see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
(The view "there is no self" is to be abandoned, given up, although 
it might not be easy.)


Regards,
Victor
	
13347

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 3:31pm
Subject: Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
Hi Dan,

Please tell Matt that this "wanting thing" is to be seen as it 
actually is with right discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I 
am not. This is not my self."

I would also like to share this verse with you and the group:

159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
self-control. 

http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:
> Hi Victor,
> The other day my 6 year old son Matt invented some creature that 
lived 
> in his world. He told me that it might descend upon my head and 
suck 
> out my soul.
> 
> "But I don't have a soul," I said.
> "Yes you do. Everyone has a soul," he replied.
> "What is that 'soul'?"
> "It is the wanting things."
> "The 'wanting things'? What's that called?"
> "Craving."
> Then he changed the subject.
> 
> The 'no control' aspect is doesn't really mean 'no control,' but, 
> rather, that there is no one to do any controlling. Our normal way 
of 
> thinking about 'control' is to have someone doing it. In fact, when 
we 
> try to think about how to control, it is so very difficult to not 
have 
> consciousness rooted in self-view that the 'no control' framework 
> really does have utility, even though it does not fully strike the 
> mark.
> 
> Dan
> 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "yuzhonghao" <victoryu@s...> wrote:
> > Dan and Robert,
> > 
> > Each and every aggregate is not self. It does not mean that 
there 
> is 
> > no self doing anything. It does not mean that there is a self 
doing 
> > anything. It does not mean "no control." It simply means each 
and 
> > every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is 
not 
> my 
> > self."
> > 
> > The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is 
> not 
> > to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> > 
> > --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., "onco111" <dalthorp@o...> wrote:

	
13348

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 11:49am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
Hi, Dan -

In a message dated 5/17/02 5:20:37 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
dalthorp@o... writes:


> Hi Victor,
> The other day my 6 year old son Matt invented some creature that lived 
> in his world. He told me that it might descend upon my head and suck 
> out my soul.
> 
> "But I don't have a soul," I said.
> "Yes you do. Everyone has a soul," he replied.
> "What is that 'soul'?"
> "It is the wanting things."
> "The 'wanting things'? What's that called?"
> "Craving."
> Then he changed the subject.
> 
> The 'no control' aspect is doesn't really mean 'no control,' but, 
> rather, that there is no one to do any controlling. Our normal way of 
> thinking about 'control' is to have someone doing it. In fact, when we 
> try to think about how to control, it is so very difficult to not have 
> consciousness rooted in self-view that the 'no control' framework 
> really does have utility, even though it does not fully strike the 
> mark.
> 
> Dan
> 
============================
Dan, you write some excellent posts. Are you sure your son isn't 
ghost-writing your material?!!! ;-))
Wow - he's something!!

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13349

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 11:59am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
Hi again, Dan -

Talking about unusual things said by children, your writing what your 
brilliant six-year old said reminded of something my older son said to us 
when he was 3 to 4 years old. We were riding in the car, and he casually said 
"I used to be an Indian" (meaning a Native American). My wife and I smiled to 
each other (how cute we thought he was), and we played along, saying "Oh, 
yes? When were you an Indian?". "Before I was born" was the reply!

With metta,
Howard
	
13350

From: christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 4:23pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration & FSM

 	
Hi Jon,

aarrghhh! Trumped by the old 'beginningless time' answer again! 
But you are quite right, of course. :-)

metta,
Christine

--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Christine
> 
> You suggest finding out whether:
> 
> > any of those who teach us to study the realities [have] NEVER 
done any 
> > formal meditation?
> 
> Putting aside the tricky question of what kind of formal meditation 
you
> are referring to, I think that any answer could only cover the 
limited
> span of a single lifetime and so would not really 'prove' anything!
> 
> Jon
> 
> --- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: > Dear Anders, Jon,
> Dan, Eric and All,
> > 
> > As you say Eric, this topic has been discussed (or at least 
alluded 
> > to) many times on this and other lists. One thing I don't recall 
> > being discussed is whether the Formal Meditation and the Dhamma 
Study 
> > could be a consecutive, but distinctly separate, occurrences in 
> > someone's lifetime. That those who think FM is unnecessary, don't 
> > realise that their previous involvment actually WAS necessary, 
and 
> > they are getting by on a previously learned skill?
> > There are many people whom I admire and learn from. Some do 
Formal 
> > Meditation (sitting, standing, walking, eating ), and go to 
Retreats 
> > etc., some combine FM and Dhamma Study, some Study and practice 
> > mindfullness. 
> > Those who do FM feel that it is essential according to the 
> > Teachings, and that Dhamma Study is not sufficient even with 
> > mindfullness. Those who practice the latter seem to feel FM is 
> > harmless, perhaps soothing, but not necessary, according to the 
> > Teachings. It is very confusing when coming upon this difference 
of 
> > opinion, especially when many of us gained our first introduction 
to 
> > Buddhism during Dhamma talks after group meditation.
> > 
> > I only have a vague knowledge of some list members involvment 
with FM 
> > or Study, but wonder if there is anyone who has NEVER done FM in 
the 
> > past, however long ago, and who obtains satisfying results from 
> > Dhamma study and mindfulness only? (For instance, Sarah has 
told 
> > us of her FM practice years ago, and that she doesn't find it a 
> > necessary practice now.) Just an idle thought, - could it be 
that 
> > one can get to a 'sufficient' level that is accessible for 
progress 
> > on the Path.... just like riding a bike, you never lose the 
skill? 
> > Have any of those who teach us to study the realities NEVER done 
any 
> > formal meditation?
> > 
> > metta,
> > Christine
	
13351

From: <TGrand458@a...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 1:48pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
In a message dated 5/17/2002 2:18:12 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
victoryu@s... writes:


> Dan and Robert,
> 
> Each and every aggregate is not self. It does not mean that there is 
> no self doing anything. It does not mean that there is a self doing 
> anything. It does not mean "no control." It simply means each and 
> every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is not my 
> self."
> 
> The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is not 
> to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 

There is no-self, and there is no control. Both Self and control are a 
delusion and both delusions are "self view."

Things arise and cease due to conditions. We might think its "our" idea to 
study Buddhism. Not without the condition of the Buddha's teaching it isn't. 
We might think its "our" idea to take a trip to Paris. Not without the 
condition of the travel industry, not without the European continent, not 
without financial resources, or the job that provides them, or the people who 
created the job, or the ancestors of those people, or our ancestors, or with 
the heat from the sun, or without the gravity from mass, or without oxygen, 
or without the elements generated by supernova, or without a particular 
interest that makes Paris interesting, or without the conditions that 
contacted that interest, or without a government that allows that freedom, 
etc., etc., uncountable times over.

There is pushing and pulling of causal forces, there is an illusion of self 
control, but ultimately there is no self control.

How then can an effort be made to practice dhamma? Because of the causality 
of education. Plus uncountable supporting (conditional) phenomena.

TG


	
13352

From: <LBIDD@w...> 
Date: Fri May 17, 2002 9:54pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita

 	
Hi Christine, interesting article. I am far from understanding how kamma
works, but I think anatta can be partially glimpsed just by finding
rootless cittas. It seems obvious that akusala roots are at the heart of
all self grasping. That is to say, akusala roots are what is most
commonly taken as 'self'. And this 'self' appropriates vipaka as soon as
it arises, so the vipaka becomes the attribute of the akusala citta.
Seeing vipaka for what it is (rootless) is to see that it is not self.
Somehow this translates into seeing that the sahetuka citta is also not
self. It's sort of infectious.

The main thing is to identify the object of one's feelings. See that the
object is itself without feeling. See that the feeling is lobha, dosa,
or moha. Voila! What was self is no longer self. Abhidhamma for the
untaught manyfolk :-)

Larry
	
13353

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 4:21am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 	
Victor

--- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: 
> Hi Jon, Anders and all,
> 
> I would like to share some thoughts regarding the practice of 
> satipatthana.
...
> The teaching in Satipatthana Sutta describes how satipatthana is 
> practiced; thus whether the teaching recommends sitting as a means to 
> the development of mindfulness is subject to speculation. 
> 
> Having read that the Buddha said:
> 
> "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, to 
> the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his 
> legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the 
> fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; 
> mindful he breathes out. "
> 
> the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a model 
> that I would emulate. And this is how I learn how to establish 
> mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
> examples in the discourse and emulate them. It is a process 
> of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.

I'm not sure about the approach of 'emulating' the monks mentioned in the
discourses. Is it not better to seek to understand the essence of the
Buddha's words? In any event, it is surely not possible to emulate the
wisdom of another (many of those monks were ready for enlightenment on
hearing the Buddha's teaching).

How about "learning by understanding and applying"?

Just my thoughts.

Jon 

	
13354

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 4:50am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Is kamma unstoppable? (was, ADL ch. 8 (2)Larry/Azita)

 	
Christine

It is I think well established that kamma can become 'inoperative' )ahosi)
under certain circumstances, but I would like to question something in the
explanation given below.

The statement that:
> ... past akusala kammas 
> disappear entirely as soon as sakkaya ditthi disappears. 
is not supported by the texts as far as I am aware. I believe there are
numerous instances in the suttas of arahants (including the Buddha)
receiving the fruits of akusala kamma.

On the subject of kamma generally, see the useful entry in Nyanatiloka's
'Buddhist Dictionary'. I have pasted below 2 extracts relevant to this
thread (ahosi-kamma and destructive/supplanting kamma)

Jon

A. Ahosi-kamma
"With regard to the time of the taking place of the karma-result (vipáka),
one distinguishes, as mentioned above, 3 kinds of karma:
1. karma ripening during the life-time;
2. karma ripening in the next birth;
3. karma ripening in later births.
The first two kinds of karma may be without karma-result (vipáka), if the
circumstances required for the taking place of the karma-result are
missing, or if, through the preponderance of counteractive karma and their
being too weak, they are unable to produce any result. *In this case they
are called ahosi-kamma, lit. 'karma that has been', in other words,
ineffectual karma*.
The third type of karma, however, which bears fruit in later lives, will,
whenever and wherever there is an opportunity, be productive of
karma-result. Before its result has ripened, it will never become
ineffective as long as the life-process is kept going by craving and
ignorance.

B. Destructive/supplanting kamma
With regard to their functions one distinguishes:
1. regenerative (or productive) karma,
2. supportive (or consolidating) karma,
3. counteractive (suppressive or frustrating) karma,
4. destructive (or supplanting) karma.
(1) produces the 5 groups of existence (corporeality, feeling, perception,
mental formations, consciousness) at rebirth as well as during
life-continuity.
(2) does not produce karma-results but is only able to maintain the
already produced karma-results.
(3) counteracts or suppresses the karma-results.
(4) *destroys the influence of a weaker karma* and effects only its own
result.







--- christine_forsyth <cforsyth@v...> wrote: > Hi Larry and
Azita,
> 
> Relating to Larry's question "Is kamma unstopable once the cause has
> arisen?"
> You may be interested in a part of an article I am reading 
> called "Anattanisamsa - A concise Description of the Advantages 
> Arising Out of The Realisation of Anatta by The Venerable Mahahthera 
> Ledi Sayaday, Agga Maha Pandita, D. Litt.
> http://web.ukonline.co.uk/buddhism/ledi002.htm
> 
> Interesting about kusala kamma...
> 
> metta,
> Christine
> 
> "How Past Kammas Become Inoperative."
> 
> "How the infinite numbers of past kammas became inoperative the 
> moment sakkaya ditthi is extinguished may be illustrated as follows: 
> 
> In a string of beads where an infinite number of beads are strung 
> together by a strong silk thread, if one bead is pulled all the other 
> beads follow or accompany the one that is pulled. But if the silk 
> thread is removed, pulling one of the beads does not disturb the 
> other beads because there is no longer any attachment between them. 
> 
> A being who possesses sakkaya ditthi harbours a strong attachment for 
> the series of khandhas during past existences and past world-cycles 
> by transforming them into "I". Thinking "In past existences and in 
> past world-cycles I have been on many occasions a human being, a deva 
> or a brahma." he acquires the thread that is sakkaya ditthi. It is 
> thus that the infinite number of past akusala kammas committed in 
> past existences and past world-cycles, and which have not as yet 
> produced resultants, accompany that being wherever he may be reborn. 
> These past akusala kammas resemble beads that are strung and bound 
> together by a strong thread. 
> 
> Beings who clearly perceive the anatta characteristic, however, and 
> who have rid themselves of sakkaya ditthi. perceive that the rupa and 
> namakkhandhas which arise and disappear even in the short course of 
> one sitting as separate phenomena and not as a bonded continuum. The 
> concept of "my atta" which is like the thread, is no longer present. 
> Their khandhas appear to them like the string of beads from which the 
> thread has been removed. They clearly perceive that the akusala 
> kammas which they had committed in the past are not 'persons', 
> or 'beings' or 'I', or 'my kammas', and that they are which arise and 
> disappear in an instant. That is why these past akusala kammas 
> disappear entirely as soon as sakkaya ditthi disappears. 
> 
> Here, it is to be observed that only the akusala kammas disappear. 
> Past kusala kammas do not disappear through the mere disappearance of 
> sakkaya ditthi. It is only when the stage of the arahatta magga is 
> reached, and when tanha is completely eradicated, do kusala kammas 
> also totally disappear." 
> 
> --- In dhammastudygroup@y..., azita gill <gazita2002@y...> wrote:
> > --- LBIDD@w... wrote: > Dear group,

	
13355

From: Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 5:03am
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities? - Jon and Nina

 	
Rob Ep

Just a very quick note to say that the extracts in my earlier post are not
from Nina's ADL but from CMA, the translatin of the Abhidhamattha Sangaha.


More later, as i am out of time on this hotel computer.

Jon

--- Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> wrote: > 
> --- Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:


> The quote from Abhidhamma in Daily Life troubles me, and not
> coincidentally. 
> Since this is Nina's book, I invite Nina to comment, and I apologize in
> advance
> for taking a tough view towards this quote. I don't want to
> misinterpret what she
> says through ignorance, but this is what troubles me:
> 
> "Ultimate realities are things that exist by reason of their own
> intrinsic
> > nature
> > (sabhaava). 
> 


	
13356

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 5:48am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 	
Jon,

Regarding "learning by understanding and applying", what about it?

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., Jonothan Abbott <jonoabb@y...> wrote:
> Victor
> 
> --- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: 
> > Hi Jon, Anders and all,
> > 
> > I would like to share some thoughts regarding the practice of 
> > satipatthana.
> ...
> > The teaching in Satipatthana Sutta describes how satipatthana is 
> > practiced; thus whether the teaching recommends sitting as a 
means to 
> > the development of mindfulness is subject to speculation. 
> > 
> > Having read that the Buddha said:
> > 
> > "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, 
to 
> > the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding 
his 
> > legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to 
the 
> > fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes 
in; 
> > mindful he breathes out. "
> > 
> > the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a model 
> > that I would emulate. And this is how I learn how to establish 
> > mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
> > examples in the discourse and emulate them. It is a process 
> > of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.
> 
> I'm not sure about the approach of 'emulating' the monks mentioned 
in the
> discourses. Is it not better to seek to understand the essence of 
the
> Buddha's words? In any event, it is surely not possible to emulate 
the
> wisdom of another (many of those monks were ready for enlightenment 
on
> hearing the Buddha's teaching).
> 
> How about "learning by understanding and applying"?
> 
> Just my thoughts.
> 
> Jon
	
13357

From: yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 5:54am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 	
TG,

For the statement "there is no self",
see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this 
verse with you:

159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
self-control.

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html

Regards,
Victor


--- In dhammastudygroup@y..., TGrand458@a... wrote:
> In a message dated 5/17/2002 2:18:12 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> victoryu@s... writes:
> 
> 
> > Dan and Robert,
> > 
> > Each and every aggregate is not self. It does not mean that 
there is 
> > no self doing anything. It does not mean that there is a self 
doing 
> > anything. It does not mean "no control." It simply means each 
and 
> > every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> > discernment thus: "This is not mine. This I am not. This is 
not my 
> > self."
> > 
> > The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is 
not 
> > to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> 
> There is no-self, and there is no control. Both Self and control 
are a 
> delusion and both delusions are "self view."
> 
> Things arise and cease due to conditions. We might think its "our" 
idea to 
> study Buddhism. Not without the condition of the Buddha's teaching 
it isn't. 
> We might think its "our" idea to take a trip to Paris. Not 
without the 
> condition of the travel industry, not without the European 
continent, not 
> without financial resources, or the job that provides them, or the 
people who 
> created the job, or the ancestors of those people, or our 
ancestors, or with 
> the heat from the sun, or without the gravity from mass, or without 
oxygen, 
> or without the elements generated by supernova, or without a 
particular 
> interest that makes Paris interesting, or without the conditions 
that 
> contacted that interest, or without a government that allows that 
freedom, 
> etc., etc., uncountable times over.
> 
> There is pushing and pulling of causal forces, there is an illusion 
of self 
> control, but ultimately there is no self control.
> 
> How then can an effort be made to practice dhamma? Because of the 
causality 
> of education. Plus uncountable supporting (conditional) phenomena.
> 
> TG
	
13358

From: <upasaka@a...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 3:23am
Subject: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 	
Hi, Jon (and all) -

In a message dated 5/18/02 7:23:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
jonoabb@y... writes:


> 
> Victor
> 
> --- yuzhonghao <victoryu@s...> wrote: 
> > Hi Jon, Anders and all,
> > 
> > I would like to share some thoughts regarding the practice of 
> > satipatthana.
> ...
> > The teaching in Satipatthana Sutta describes how satipatthana is 
> > practiced; thus whether the teaching recommends sitting as a means to 
> > the development of mindfulness is subject to speculation. 
> > 
> > Having read that the Buddha said:
> > 
> > "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, to 
> > the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his 
> > legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the 
> > fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; 
> > mindful he breathes out. "
> > 
> > the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a model 
> > that I would emulate. And this is how I learn how to establish 
> > mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
> > examples in the discourse and emulate them. It is a process 
> > of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.
> 
> I'm not sure about the approach of 'emulating' the monks mentioned in the
> discourses. Is it not better to seek to understand the essence of the
> Buddha's words? In any event, it is surely not possible to emulate the
> wisdom of another (many of those monks were ready for enlightenment on
> hearing the Buddha's teaching).
> 
> How about "learning by understanding and applying"?
> 
> Just my thoughts.
> 
> Jon 
> 
====================================
I found a not-too-long sutta which I think is interesting in a couple 
ways. The sutta is the following:

***********************

Samyutta Nikaya XLVII.40



Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta



Analysis of the Frames of Reference

Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
For free distribution only.

"I will teach you the frames of reference, their development, and the path of 
practice leading to their development. Listen & pay close attention. I will 
speak. 

"Now, what are the frames of reference? There is the case where a monk 
remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- 
putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. He remains 
focused on feelings in & of themselves... mind in & of itself... mental 
qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside 
greed & distress with reference to the world. "This is called the frames of 
reference.

"And what is the development of the frames of reference? There is the case 
where a monk remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to 
the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to 
the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away 
with regard to the body -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & 
distress with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon 
of origination with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon of 
passing away with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon of 
origination & passing away with regard to feelings -- ardent, alert, & 
mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. "He 
remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, 
remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, 
remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard 
to the mind -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress 
with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon of 
origination with regard to mental qualities, remains focused on the 
phenomenon of passing away with regard to mental qualities, remains focused 
on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to mental 
qualities -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with 
reference to the world. "This is called the development of the frames of 
reference.

"And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve, right 
speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, 
right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the development 
of the frames of reference." Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 <A HREF="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html">
http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html</A>
*******************************
The first section after the three introductory sentences defines what 
"the frames of reference" (often called "the setting up of mindfulness") is, 
namely the case where the practitioner remains directly focussed on the 
various elements of experience "ardent, alert, & mindul - putting aside greed 
& distress with reference to the world." We might note here that the activity 
has two aspects: (1) the ardent, alert, and mindful focussing, and (2) the 
putting aside of (what the translator gives as) "greed & distress with 
reference to the world," this latter suggesting a state of equanimity. 
The second section deals with the (further?) development of this, 
consisting of focussing on the aspects of origination and of cessation of 
these phenomena. This would engender the clear seeing of anicca and anatta, 
leading to disenchantment.
Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the path of 
practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically the 
noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes satipatthana 
more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather than 
as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this reading, 
that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating in 
satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation).

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./ (From the Diamond Sutra) 




	
13359

From: Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 7:43am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 	
op 17-05-2002 11:03 schreef Robert Epstein op epsteinrob@Y...:

>> The choice of the term 'paramattha' (from 'parama' + 'attha') to describe the
>> fundamental dhammas, and its English translation as 'ultimate realities', is
>> explained in A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, notes to Ch. I #2 as
>> follows:

Hallo Rob Ep, I always enjoy it to hear from you. You did not mangle my
words, because you mistook Jon's quotes of the notes to the Manual of Abh,
which is the Abhidhammatta Sangaha, for my book Abhidhamma in Daily Life.
Now what is quoted there is the explanation, as far as I understand, by Ven.
Bodhi himself, and I find that he uses terms that are complicated to me
personally, although he formulates very well. Am I glad I do not have to
explain all those terms :-).
But I see you are somewhat struggling with the term ultimate realities,
paramattha dhammas. Now I am going to repeat what others and I said before:
it is not so important what term we use so long as we understand the
difference between concepts and realities, we can also call dhammas, and
that by considering this just now. When someone talks to you, are there not
different moments: hearing just sound, and thinking of words and their
meaning? Touching hardness and knowing there is a table? If we try to reason
too much we really get lost, I believe. You may like A. Sujin's book on line
(Robert K's web) Realities and Concepts.

I wonder if it could be helpful if I quote something from my Preserving the
Teachings although you may have seen this before:

<Paramattha dhammas have each their own characteristic which is unalterable.
Seeing has its own characteristic that cannot be changed, no matter how we
name it. We can call it by another name, but seeing is always seeing, its
characteristic cannot be changed. Seeing experiences what is visible, colour
or visible object. Visible object has its own characteristic and when it
appears it can be directly experienced without having to name it. Anger is a
type of nåma that has its own characteristic which cannot be changed. Anger
is always anger, no matter how we name it. Hardness is a kind of rúpa that
can be directly experienced through the bodysense, no matter how we name it.
When we touch a cup or a chair we know their different meanings in
conventional sense: we drink from a cup and we sit on a chair. However, when
we touch them hardness may appear. We can verify that hardness is only an
element, a kind of rúpa that has the characteristic of hardness, to be
experienced through the bodysense, no matter it is hardness of a cup, a
chair or a hand. We can directly experience it without thinking of it,
without naming it. It is important to learn the difference between
paramattha dhammas and concepts. Right understanding developed through
satipatthåna has as object paramattha dhammas, not concepts. Concepts are
not real in the ultimate or fundamental sense, they are objects of thinking.
When we see people walking, we cling immediately to shape and form, to a
conglomeration of things, to a concept of a whole. In reality seeing sees
just visible object, no people. Thinking thinks of the concept of people who
are walking; thinking is a paramattha dhamma, it is nåma, but the concept it
thinks of is not a paramattha dhamma. Thinking is conditioned by seeing.
Acharn Sujin asked us: ³Can there be people without visible object?²
When we are reading we are immediately absorbed in the story we read and we
have different feelings about it, we feel happy or sad. At such moments we
live in the world of concepts and ideas that are real merely in conventional
sense. When we are reading, different cittas experience different objects.
The citta that sees experiences only colour or visible object which impinges
on the eyesense. Other types of cittas think of the meaning of the letters
and of the whole story. Acharn Sujin reminded us that in real life we are
also as it were ³reading². We are looking at lines and shapes and we define
these as this or that person.
We should not try to avoid thinking of concepts of people and things, but we
can learn the difference between paramattha dhammas and concepts. .....
.....Studying dhamma, reality, is studying with mindfulness of what appears
at this very moment. The purpose of our study should be understanding of our
life at this moment.
This is a new approach to life, to the world. We are used to being
infatuated with the world of people and all the things around us without
understanding what is really there: nåma and rúpa that arise because of
their appropriate conditions and then fall away immediately. When we
perceive people there are in reality different moments of citta: seeing is
different from thinking of the meaning of what we see. When we perceive a
person or a thing, we pay attention to a mental image of a whole, and we are
absorbed in all the details of what is seen. This happens during all our
activities in daily life when we, for example, add sugar and milk to our
coffee, use knife and fork when we are eating, when we are reading or
walking. A mental image of a whole is not a reality, a dhamma, it is a
concept, paññatti. The word concept, in Påli paññatti, has different
meanings: it is a name or term that conveys a meaning as well as the idea it
makes known. Thus, it makes known and also, it is what has been made known.
Names can denote persons or things that are not realities, or they can
denote realities, such as different nåmas and rúpas. When we have a notion
of a ³whole², such as a person or thing, we are thinking of an idea, a
concept, not a reality, not a nåma or rúpa.>

Monday I am off for a three day hike,
best wishes from Nina. 



	
13360

From: Robert Epstein <epsteinrob@Y...> 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 11:01am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 	
Hi Nina,
Thank you so much for your answer and quote, and for your clarification that I had
my books mixed up! Now I can debate freely <phew> and only worry about whether I
am misapprehending the Dharma.

I think you are right that whether we talk about paramatha dhammas or just
dhammas, the important thing is what is actually occurring in the moment, free
from concepts. But my problem with calling the momentary manifestations of the
khandas 'realities' is greater than that, because my question is: Are these
momentary manifestations actually 'real'? What is their status? Is it correct to
think of them as 'real'? Howard in his signature and others at other times have
quoted Buddha saying that we should regard this life as an illusion, a fleeting
dream, not substantial, but a kind of trick of the mind. Do we call the events
that arise in a dream 'realities'? It seems contradictory to me. If the purpose
of the path is to awaken from the dream of samsara, the illusion that we are
separate individuated beings with internal entities, and that what we perceive is
filtered through the operations of the mind, I would agree that it is a highly
important thing to be able to distinguish between what we are really experiencing
in the moment, and to be able to tell whether it is a concept or a perceived
reality.

But to stop there and to say that the experience of 'hardness', 'sadness', or
other momentary experiences are 'real', and that they are the final reality, seems
to me to rob us of the understanding that these too are *unreal*, that they are
momentary manifestations of perception or thought, dependent on human
consciousness for their appearance. There seems to be an empiricist idea in
calling dhammas 'realities', that things exist in the world apart from human
apprehension. The fact that we perceive 'hardness' or 'sadness' does not mean
that they are real, it only proves that these things occur in the mind, without
which we perceive nothing. 

I believe Buddha asked us to suspend any judgment about whether there is a 'real
world' outside of us or not, and to regard our experience as the experience of the
kandhas. Are the kandhas actual structures that exist in a real world? I think
that to draw the conclusion that they are is to say that we live in an objective
universe which is actual and substantial. And this would then be a substantialist
view which leads to real object and entity.

It is hard for me to imagine the sensation of 'hardness' being real, without it
somehow implying a 'real object' that is hard. 'Hardness' cannot float about or
exist by itself, there is no 'hardness' that stands on its own and makes an
impression on a person. Hardness is a quality of something that is hard. The
point in seeing 'hardness' as more real than 'wood' and 'wood' as a concept is to
demonstrate that we do not experience things except through their qualities. But
it does not take away from the presumption that underlies 'hardness' as a reality,
that there is indeed something that is hard, even though we can only perceive it
one quality at a time. If we say the 'hardness' is 'real', rather than merely an
experience of the perceiving organ, then we assert by implication that the 'wood'
is also real, and that that which is made of wood is also real, even though we
admit that we cannot perceive it all at once, but only one rupa at a time.

So that leaves me with the question, are objects real according to Buddha? Do we
live in an empirically objective universe, apprehended imperfectly by us as
perceiving subjects? Can we ever assume that there is a world of 'realities'
either within or beyond our own mental and perceptual functions, which are
thoroughly caused by the interaction of the kandhas? 

The objects and thoughts that we perceive through the cittas are in every case
productions of mental processes, through mental or sensory doors. To me it is
very uncertain that anything that we apprehend in these ways can be called
'realities'. I would prefer to think of them as 'manfestations', 'arisings', or
'creations of perceptual/mental processes'. I just don't see how we can assume
anything that is a 'reality' beyond the mind itself, from which all our
experiences arise.

I think it makes a difference which way we look at this, as to what there is to
awaken from. Do we awaken to a world that is still intact with real objects to
apprehend, which to me has a kind of security to it. After all, even when we
awaken, the world will still be here, only seen more perfectly in each moment. 

Or, do we awaken to a world in which all our realities are seen as productions of
mind, and that in fact none of it has final reality? In which our familiar
objects as well as ourselves are seen to be illusory through and through, like the
dream that Buddha refers to in several places? To me, this is a much more radical
awakening, and one that truly threatens the sense of self. No-self, no permanent
object, no security, nothing to hold onto. And no room for any kind of self or
entity to reside.

Best,
Robert Ep.

=======================================

--- Nina van Gorkom <nilo@e...> wrote:
> op 17-05-2002 11:03 schreef Robert Epstein op epsteinrob@Y...:
> 
> >> The choice of the term 'paramattha' (from 'parama' + 'attha') to describe the
> >> fundamental dhammas, and its English translation as 'ultimate realities', is
> >> explained in A Comprehensive Manual of Abhidhamma, notes to Ch. I #2 as
> >> follows:
> 
> Hallo Rob Ep, I always enjoy it to hear from you. You did not mangle my
> words, because you mistook Jon's quotes of the notes to the Manual of Abh,
> which is the Abhidhammatta Sangaha, for my book Abhidhamma in Daily Life.
> Now what is quoted there is the explanation, as far as I understand, by Ven.
> Bodhi himself, and I find that he uses terms that are complicated to me
> personally, although he formulates very well. Am I glad I do not have to
> explain all those terms :-).
> But I see you are somewhat struggling with the term ultimate realities,
> paramattha dhammas. Now I am going to repeat what others and I said before:
> it is not so important what term we use so long as we understand the
> difference between concepts and realities, we can also call dhammas, and
> that by considering this just now. When someone talks to you, are there not
> different moments: hearing just sound, and thinking of words and their
> meaning? Touching hardness and knowing there is a table? If we try to reason
> too much we really get lost, I believe. You may like A. Sujin's book on line
> (Robert K's web) Realities and Concepts.
> 
> I wonder if it could be helpful if I quote something from my Preserving the
> Teachings although you may have seen this before:
> 
> <Paramattha dhammas have each their own characteristic which is unalterable.
> Seeing has its own characteristic that cannot be changed, no matter how we
> name it. We can call it by another name, but seeing is always seeing, its
> characteristic cannot be changed. Seeing experiences what is visible, colour
> or visible object. Visible object has its own characteristic and when it
> appears it can be directly experienced without having to name it. Anger is a
> type of nåma that has its own characteristic which cannot be changed. Anger
> is always anger, no matter how we name it. Hardness is a kind of rúpa that
> can be directly experienced through the bodysense, no matter how we name it.
> When we touch a cup or a chair we know their different meanings in
> conventional sense: we drink from a cup and we sit on a chair. However, when
> we touch them hardness may appear. We can verify that hardness is only an
> element, a kind of rúpa that has the characteristic of hardness, to be
> experienced through the bodysense, no matter it is hardness of a cup, a
> chair or a hand. We can directly experience it without thinking of it,
> without naming it. It is important to learn the difference between
> paramattha dhammas and concepts. Right understanding developed through
> satipatthåna has as object paramattha dhammas, not concepts. Concepts are
> not real in the ultimate or fundamental sense, they are objects of thinking.
> When we see people walking, we cling immediately to shape and form, to a
> conglomeration of things, to a concept of a whole. In reality seeing sees
> just visible object, no people. Thinking thinks of the concept of people who
> are walking; thinking is a paramattha dhamma, it is nåma, but the concept it
> thinks of is not a paramattha dhamma. Thinking is conditioned by seeing.
> Acharn Sujin asked us: ³Can there be people without visible object?²
> When we are reading we are immediately absorbed in the story we read and we
> have different feelings about it, we feel happy or sad. At such moments we
> live in the world of concepts and ideas that are real merely in conventional
> sense. When we are reading, different cittas experience different objects.
> The citta that sees experiences only colour or visible object which impinges
> on the eyesense. Other types of cittas think of the meaning of the letters
> and of the whole story. Acharn Sujin reminded us that in real life we are
> also as it were ³reading². We are looking at lines and shapes and we define
> these as this or that person.
> We should not try to avoid thinking of concepts of people and things, but we
> can learn the difference between paramattha dhammas and concepts. .....
> .....Studying dhamma, reality, is studying with mindfulness of what appears
> at this very moment. The purpose of our study should be understanding of our
> life at this moment.
> This is a new approach to life, to the world. We are used to being
> infatuated with the world of people and all the things around us without
> understanding what is really there: nåma and rúpa that arise because of
> their appropriate conditions and then fall away immediately. When we
> perceive people there are in reality different moments of citta: seeing is
> different from thinking of the meaning of what we see. When we perceive a
> person or a thing, we pay attention to a mental image of a whole, and we are
> absorbed in all the details of what is seen. This happens during all our
> activities in daily life when we, for example, add sugar and milk to our
> coffee, use knife and fork when we are eating, when we are reading or
> walking. A mental image of a whole is not a reality, a dhamma, it is a
> concept, paññatti. The word concept, in Påli paññatti, has different
> meanings: it is a name or term that conveys a meaning as well as the idea it
> makes known. Thus, it makes known and also, it is what has been made known.
> Names can denote persons or things that are not realities, or they can
> denote realities, such as different nåmas and rúpas. When we have a notion
> of a ³whole², such as a person or thing, we are thinking of an idea, a
> concept, not a reality, not a nåma or rúpa.>
> 
> Monday I am off for a three day hike,
> best wishes from Nina. 


 

 
13361 From: Howard 
Date: Sat May 18, 2002 10:47pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Robert (and Nina) -

       The position you take here, Rob, seems to go a bit beyond mine. 
Something which is like a "star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of 
lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream" has a 
mirage-like quality, but it is not absolutely nothing. Dhammas exist, but in 
a middle-way, dependent, and not self-supporting manner (despite the root mean
ing of 'dhamma'). The question is exactly what does one mean by a "reality". 
I do NOT see hardness as having to be hardness of "something". There are just 
the characteristics and functionalities, but no "things" that possess them, 
except conventionally (that is: only in a manner of speaking). The 
characteristics are real in the sense of being elements of experience, but 
are unreal in the sense of not being self-existent. This is my take on the 
matter. My fear is that the constant reference to "realities" tends towards a 
substantialist perspective.

With metta,
Howard

In a message dated 5/18/02 2:02:50 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> Hi Nina,
> Thank you so much for your answer and quote, and for your clarification 
> that I had
> my books mixed up!  Now I can debate freely <phew> and only worry about 
> whether I
> am misapprehending the Dharma.
> 
> I think you are right that whether we talk about paramatha dhammas or just
> dhammas, the important thing is what is actually occurring in the moment, 
> free
> from concepts.  But my problem with calling the momentary manifestations of 
> the
> khandas 'realities' is greater than that, because my question is:  Are 
> these
> momentary manifestations actually 'real'?  What is their status?  Is it 
> correct to
> think of them as 'real'?  Howard in his signature and others at other times 
> have
> quoted Buddha saying that we should regard this life as an illusion, a 
> fleeting
> dream, not substantial, but a kind of trick of the mind.  Do we call the 
> events
> that arise in a dream 'realities'?  It seems contradictory to me.  If the 
> purpose
> of the path is to awaken from the dream of samsara, the illusion that we 
> are
> separate individuated beings with internal entities, and that what we 
> perceive is
> filtered through the operations of the mind, I would agree that it is a 
> highly
> important thing to be able to distinguish between what we are really 
> experiencing
> in the moment, and to be able to tell whether it is a concept or a 
> perceived
> reality.
> 
> But to stop there and to say that the experience of 'hardness', 'sadness', 
> or
> other momentary experiences are 'real', and that they are the final 
> reality, seems
> to me to rob us of the understanding that these too are *unreal*, that they 
> are
> momentary manifestations of perception or thought, dependent on human
> consciousness for their appearance.  There seems to be an empiricist idea 
> in
> calling dhammas 'realities', that things exist in the world apart from 
> human
> apprehension.  The fact that we perceive 'hardness' or 'sadness' does not 
> mean
> that they are real, it only proves that these things occur in the mind, 
> without
> which we perceive nothing.  
> 
> I believe Buddha asked us to suspend any judgment about whether there is a 
> 'real
> world' outside of us or not, and to regard our experience as the experience 
> of the
> kandhas.  Are the kandhas actual structures that exist in a real world?  I 
> think
> that to draw the conclusion that they are is to say that we live in an 
> objective
> universe which is actual and substantial.  And this would then be a 
> substantialist
> view which leads to real object and entity.
> 
> It is hard for me to imagine the sensation of 'hardness' being real, 
> without it
> somehow implying a 'real object' that is hard.  'Hardness' cannot float 
> about or
> exist by itself, there is no 'hardness' that stands on its own and makes an
> impression on a person.  Hardness is a quality of something that is hard.  
> The
> point in seeing 'hardness' as more real than 'wood' and 'wood' as a concept 
> is to
> demonstrate that we do not experience things except through their 
> qualities.  But
> it does not take away from the presumption that underlies 'hardness' as a 
> reality,
> that there is indeed something that is hard, even though we can only 
> perceive it
> one quality at a time.  If we say the 'hardness' is 'real', rather than 
> merely an
> experience of the perceiving organ, then we assert by implication that the 
> 'wood'
> is also real, and that that which is made of wood is also real, even though 
> we
> admit that we cannot perceive it all at once, but only one rupa at a time.
> 
> So that leaves me with the question, are objects real according to Buddha?  
> Do we
> live in an empirically objective universe, apprehended imperfectly by us as
> perceiving subjects?  Can we ever assume that there is a world of 
> 'realities'
> either within or beyond our own mental and perceptual functions, which are
> thoroughly caused by the interaction of the kandhas?    
> 
> The objects and thoughts that we perceive through the cittas are in every 
> case
> productions of mental processes, through mental or sensory doors.  To me it 
> is
> very uncertain that anything that we apprehend in these ways can be called
> 'realities'.  I would prefer to think of them as 'manfestations', 
> 'arisings', or
> 'creations of perceptual/mental processes'.  I just don't see how we can 
> assume
> anything that is a 'reality' beyond the mind itself, from which all our
> experiences arise.
> 
> I think it makes a difference which way we look at this, as to what there 
> is to
> awaken from.  Do we awaken to a world that is still intact with real 
> objects to
> apprehend, which to me has a kind of security to it.  After all, even when 
> we
> awaken, the world will still be here, only seen more perfectly in each 
> moment.  
> 
> Or, do we awaken to a world in which all our realities are seen as 
> productions of
> mind, and that in fact none of it has final reality?  In which our familiar
> objects as well as ourselves are seen to be illusory through and through, 
> like the
> dream that Buddha refers to in several places?  To me, this is a much more 
> radical
> awakening, and one that truly threatens the sense of self.  No-self, no 
> permanent
> object, no security, nothing to hold onto.  And no room for any kind of 
> self or
> entity to reside.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13362 From: TG 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 1:45am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  In a message dated 5/18/2002 5:54:55 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
Victor writes:


> TG,
> 
> For the statement "there is no self",
> see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this 
> verse with you:
> 
> 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
> others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
> self-control.
> 
> See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 

Hi Victor

Here I believe is the "conventional view" of self control.  Someone still 
encumbered with self view can still benefit from not acting in unskilful 
ways, i.e., killing, stealing, lying, etc.

By understanding that the "self-control" referred to in the above quote is 
simply described 5 conditioned aggregates and conditional volitional 
responses; the advice can be considered education (teaching) that is forging 
the CONDITIONS so that a mind can understand that certain acts (conditions) 
lead to suffering, while other acts (conditions) lead to non-suffering.  

Its all a matter of cause and effect.  The 5 aggregates of clinging cannot 
usurp power over mere cause and effect with a "self" that does not exist.

TG



 
13365 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 11:17am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi Howard,
Thanks for your note!  I basically agree, and am equally worried about the
substantialist potentiality of 'realities'.  However, I think we have to confront
these sayings of the Buddha in order to understand whether the world is be
realized or awakened from.  yes, a dream has an actual existence as dream, just as
concept does actually exist as concept.  Both have in common that their referents
do not actually exist outside the dream or concept.  So the question which I am
trying to face, and bring out is:  do the 'realities' of 'hardness' which comes
through a sense-door or a 'thought' which comes through a 'mind-door' have any
substantial existence outside of the mind which apprehends them?  This does not
mean they do not take place, it is asking where and on what basis they take place.
 If Buddha says that this life is like a dream and should be regarded as an
illusion, a magic trick, or whatever, all of these metaphors point in the same
direction: that our reality is seeming, not substantial.  To say that there is a
world of 'actual realities' hiding behind our delusions is indeed substantialist. 
I don't see how to avoid it.  When we are dreaming the details of such dream can
be clearly felt and reacted to, just as in our own lives.  I think Buddha was
helping us not just to discern, but by discerning, to awaken.  When we awake from
a dream, we can still go over many of the details, but we know they are not
substantial, even though they did indeed occur, as you assert.  But we shouldn't
cling to them, either in their present or their 'authentic' state when seen as
dreamlike occurrences in the mind.

When Buddhaghosa states that the namas and rupas are the 'irreduceible final
entities' of experience, that seems pretty far in the other direction to me.  How
about you?

best,
Robert Ep.

==========================

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Robert (and Nina) -
> 
>        The position you take here, Rob, seems to go a bit beyond mine. 
> Something which is like a "star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of 
> lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream" has a 
> mirage-like quality, but it is not absolutely nothing. Dhammas exist, but in 
> a middle-way, dependent, and not self-supporting manner (despite the root mean
> ing of 'dhamma'). The question is exactly what does one mean by a "reality". 
> I do NOT see hardness as having to be hardness of "something". There are just 
> the characteristics and functionalities, but no "things" that possess them, 
> except conventionally (that is: only in a manner of speaking). The 
> characteristics are real in the sense of being elements of experience, but 
> are unreal in the sense of not being self-existent. This is my take on the 
> matter. My fear is that the constant reference to "realities" tends towards a 
> substantialist perspective.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> In a message dated 5/18/02 2:02:50 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > Hi Nina,
> > Thank you so much for your answer and quote, and for your clarification 
> > that I had
> > my books mixed up!  Now I can debate freely <phew> and only worry about 
> > whether I
> > am misapprehending the Dharma.
> > 
> > I think you are right that whether we talk about paramatha dhammas or just
> > dhammas, the important thing is what is actually occurring in the moment, 
> > free
> > from concepts.  But my problem with calling the momentary manifestations of 
> > the
> > khandas 'realities' is greater than that, because my question is:  Are 
> > these
> > momentary manifestations actually 'real'?  What is their status?  Is it 
> > correct to
> > think of them as 'real'?  Howard in his signature and others at other times 
> > have
> > quoted Buddha saying that we should regard this life as an illusion, a 
> > fleeting
> > dream, not substantial, but a kind of trick of the mind.  Do we call the 
> > events
> > that arise in a dream 'realities'?  It seems contradictory to me.  If the 
> > purpose
> > of the path is to awaken from the dream of samsara, the illusion that we 
> > are
> > separate individuated beings with internal entities, and that what we 
> > perceive is
> > filtered through the operations of the mind, I would agree that it is a 
> > highly
> > important thing to be able to distinguish between what we are really 
> > experiencing
> > in the moment, and to be able to tell whether it is a concept or a 
> > perceived
> > reality.
> > 
> > But to stop there and to say that the experience of 'hardness', 'sadness', 
> > or
> > other momentary experiences are 'real', and that they are the final 
> > reality, seems
> > to me to rob us of the understanding that these too are *unreal*, that they 
> > are
> > momentary manifestations of perception or thought, dependent on human
> > consciousness for their appearance.  There seems to be an empiricist idea 
> > in
> > calling dhammas 'realities', that things exist in the world apart from 
> > human
> > apprehension.  The fact that we perceive 'hardness' or 'sadness' does not 
> > mean
> > that they are real, it only proves that these things occur in the mind, 
> > without
> > which we perceive nothing.  
> > 
> > I believe Buddha asked us to suspend any judgment about whether there is a 
> > 'real
> > world' outside of us or not, and to regard our experience as the experience 
> > of the
> > kandhas.  Are the kandhas actual structures that exist in a real world?  I 
> > think
> > that to draw the conclusion that they are is to say that we live in an 
> > objective
> > universe which is actual and substantial.  And this would then be a 
> > substantialist
> > view which leads to real object and entity.
> > 
> > It is hard for me to imagine the sensation of 'hardness' being real, 
> > without it
> > somehow implying a 'real object' that is hard.  'Hardness' cannot float 
> > about or
> > exist by itself, there is no 'hardness' that stands on its own and makes an
> > impression on a person.  Hardness is a quality of something that is hard.  
> > The
> > point in seeing 'hardness' as more real than 'wood' and 'wood' as a concept 
> > is to
> > demonstrate that we do not experience things except through their 
> > qualities.  But
> > it does not take away from the presumption that underlies 'hardness' as a 
> > reality,
> > that there is indeed something that is hard, even though we can only 
> > perceive it
> > one quality at a time.  If we say the 'hardness' is 'real', rather than 
> > merely an
> > experience of the perceiving organ, then we assert by implication that the 
> > 'wood'
> > is also real, and that that which is made of wood is also real, even though 
> > we
> > admit that we cannot perceive it all at once, but only one rupa at a time.
> > 
> > So that leaves me with the question, are objects real according to Buddha?  
> > Do we
> > live in an empirically objective universe, apprehended imperfectly by us as
> > perceiving subjects?  Can we ever assume that there is a world of 
> > 'realities'
> > either within or beyond our own mental and perceptual functions, which are
> > thoroughly caused by the interaction of the kandhas?    
> > 
> > The objects and thoughts that we perceive through the cittas are in every 
> > case
> > productions of mental processes, through mental or sensory doors.  To me it 
> > is
> > very uncertain that anything that we apprehend in these ways can be called
> > 'realities'.  I would prefer to think of them as 'manfestations', 
> > 'arisings', or
> > 'creations of perceptual/mental processes'.  I just don't see how we can 
> > assume
> > anything that is a 'reality' beyond the mind itself, from which all our
> > experiences arise.
> > 
> > I think it makes a difference which way we look at this, as to what there 
> > is to
> > awaken from.  Do we awaken to a world that is still intact with real 
> > objects to
> > apprehend, which to me has a kind of security to it.  After all, even when 
> > we
> > awaken, the world will still be here, only seen more perfectly in each 
> > moment.  
> > 
> > Or, do we awaken to a world in which all our realities are seen as 
> > productions of
> > mind, and that in fact none of it has final reality?  In which our familiar
> > objects as well as ourselves are seen to be illusory through and through, 
> > like the
> > dream that Buddha refers to in several places?  To me, this is a much more 
> > radical
> > awakening, and one that truly threatens the sense of self.  No-self, no 
> > permanent
> > object, no security, nothing to hold onto.  And no room for any kind of 
> > self or
> > entity to reside.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.



 
13366 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 9:13am
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 5/18/02 11:18:34 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> Hi Howard,
> Thanks for your note!  I basically agree, and am equally worried about the
> substantialist potentiality of 'realities'.  However, I think we have to 
> confront
> these sayings of the Buddha in order to understand whether the world is be
> realized or awakened from.  yes, a dream has an actual existence as dream, 
> just as
> concept does actually exist as concept.  Both have in common that their 
> referents
> do not actually exist outside the dream or concept.  So the question which 
> I am
> trying to face, and bring out is:  do the 'realities' of 'hardness' which 
> comes
> through a sense-door or a 'thought' which comes through a 'mind-door' have 
> any
> substantial existence outside of the mind which apprehends them?  This does 
> not
> mean they do not take place, it is asking where and on what basis they take 
> place.
> If Buddha says that this life is like a dream and should be regarded as an
> illusion, a magic trick, or whatever, all of these metaphors point in the 
> same
> direction: that our reality is seeming, not substantial.  To say that there 
> is a
> world of 'actual realities' hiding behind our delusions is indeed 
> substantialist. 
> I don't see how to avoid it.  When we are dreaming the details of such 
> dream can
> be clearly felt and reacted to, just as in our own lives.  I think Buddha 
> was
> helping us not just to discern, but by discerning, to awaken.  When we 
> awake from
> a dream, we can still go over many of the details, but we know they are not
> substantial, even though they did indeed occur, as you assert.  But we 
> shouldn't
> cling to them, either in their present or their 'authentic' state when seen 
> as
> dreamlike occurrences in the mind.
> 
> When Buddhaghosa states that the namas and rupas are the 'irreduceible 
> final
> entities' of experience, that seems pretty far in the other direction to 
> me.  How
> about you?
> 
> best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
> ==========================
       We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think that 
Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and most 
explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't countenance 
objects existing independently of experience. There is no hardness other than 
the experience of hardness, at least none that can be actually known. 
       But there is more to not being a self-existing entity or object with 
"own being" than just not being a mind-independent "external object". Even 
"internal phenomena" including such experiential phenomena as sights, sounds, 
sensed odors and touches, thoughts, emotions, mind images etc, all direct 
elements of experience, fail to be self-existing entities, being mere 
dependent arisings, mere fleeting things-in-relation, each being nothing more 
than its characteristics, and each arising in dependence on other similarly 
empty, fleeting conditions.
==========================
With metta,
Howard

> 
> --- Howard wrote:
> > Hi, Robert (and Nina) -
> > 
> >        The position you take here, Rob, seems to go a bit beyond mine. 
> > Something which is like a "star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of 
> 
> > lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream" 
> has a 
> > mirage-like quality, but it is not absolutely nothing. Dhammas exist, but 
> in 
> > a middle-way, dependent, and not self-supporting manner (despite the root 
> mean
> > ing of 'dhamma'). The question is exactly what does one mean by a 
> "reality". 
> > I do NOT see hardness as having to be hardness of "something". There are 
> just 
> > the characteristics and functionalities, but no "things" that possess 
> them, 
> > except conventionally (that is: only in a manner of speaking). The 
> > characteristics are real in the sense of being elements of experience, 
> but 
> > are unreal in the sense of not being self-existent. This is my take on 
> the 
> > matter. My fear is that the constant reference to "realities" tends 
> towards a 
> > substantialist perspective.
> > 
> > With metta,
> > Howard
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13367 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 2:49pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] concepts and realities.

 
  Dear Howard,
Well, I find your view on that reassuring, and if the resident expert
Abhidhammists concur with you, that will even more reassuring re. the Abhidhamma
view.  If I stretch myself in that direction, I can see the possible utility of
saying that we have a stream of 'fleeting *realities*' to discern, since this
would be a gigantic advance in discrimination.  One of the techniques for 'lucid
dreaming', to draw a somewhat spurious parallel, is to focus intently on the
details that arise within the dream, and to isolate them in order to see their
inherent quality.  By doing this, one is able to eventually align awareness with
the explicit details and sharpen up one's perception of the dream-events, to the
point where one becomes aware that they are taking place within a dream, and are
not real.

If the same holds true for our so-called waking state, which is mostly an exercise
in conceptualizing everything we experience, then focussing on the 'momentary
reality' of what is actually being experienced, and refraining from extrapolating
via our conditioned views, would be an equivalent doorway to undestanding the
mechanics of this 'waking dream'.  In Mahayana texts as well, Buddha has been
characterized as directing seekers to trace back their empirical experiences back
to the source in mind, seeing how those experiences rise in dependence on mental
and perceptual processes that emanate from the mind.  To see the rupa in its
relation to the citta and cetasikas and see how they dependently create our
experiences from moment to moment would be an equivalently valuable process.  

If one wants to understand how a film is created, one would first have to see
where the light is coming from that illuminates the film objects, then watch the
way the film is cut from shot to shot instead of just taking the stream of
occurrences for granted.  Eventually one would come to understand an almost
frame-by-frame analysis of how the visual forms were mechanically constituted.  I
think it would be fair to say that after such a process, one would no longer be
drawn into the emotional and conceptual reactivity that the average filmgoer is
prone to.  In other words, one would start to stand outside the dream, the film,
and watch its terms of production, rather than merely its resultant forms.

I still worry about calling the 'bits' of experience paramatha dhammas, and of
Buddhaghosa calling them 'final entities', a frightening choice of words to one
who wants to hear 'anatta' not 'atta'.  But for the time being I will take a
valium and await other responses.  Or perhaps a good dose of 'jhana' would do the
trick, and calm me down....

Best,
Robert Ep.

==========================================


--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Robert -
> 
> In a message dated 5/18/02 11:18:34 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> Robert Ep writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Hi Howard,
> > Thanks for your note!  I basically agree, and am equally worried about the
> > substantialist potentiality of 'realities'.  However, I think we have to 
> > confront
> > these sayings of the Buddha in order to understand whether the world is be
> > realized or awakened from.  yes, a dream has an actual existence as dream, 
> > just as
> > concept does actually exist as concept.  Both have in common that their 
> > referents
> > do not actually exist outside the dream or concept.  So the question which 
> > I am
> > trying to face, and bring out is:  do the 'realities' of 'hardness' which 
> > comes
> > through a sense-door or a 'thought' which comes through a 'mind-door' have 
> > any
> > substantial existence outside of the mind which apprehends them?  This does 
> > not
> > mean they do not take place, it is asking where and on what basis they take 
> > place.
> > If Buddha says that this life is like a dream and should be regarded as an
> > illusion, a magic trick, or whatever, all of these metaphors point in the 
> > same
> > direction: that our reality is seeming, not substantial.  To say that there 
> > is a
> > world of 'actual realities' hiding behind our delusions is indeed 
> > substantialist. 
> > I don't see how to avoid it.  When we are dreaming the details of such 
> > dream can
> > be clearly felt and reacted to, just as in our own lives.  I think Buddha 
> > was
> > helping us not just to discern, but by discerning, to awaken.  When we 
> > awake from
> > a dream, we can still go over many of the details, but we know they are not
> > substantial, even though they did indeed occur, as you assert.  But we 
> > shouldn't
> > cling to them, either in their present or their 'authentic' state when seen 
> > as
> > dreamlike occurrences in the mind.
> > 
> > When Buddhaghosa states that the namas and rupas are the 'irreduceible 
> > final
> > entities' of experience, that seems pretty far in the other direction to 
> > me.  How
> > about you?
> > 
> > best,
> > Robert Ep.
> > 
> > ==========================
>        We are in basic agreement on this Robert, but, actually, I think that 
> Abidhamma is as well. As I understand it, the Buddhist perspective, and most 
> explicitly so in Abhidhamma, is a phenomenalist one which doesn't countenance 
> objects existing independently of experience. There is no hardness other than 
> the experience of hardness, at least none that can be actually known. 
>        But there is more to not being a self-existing entity or object with 
> "own being" than just not being a mind-independent "external object". Even 
> "internal phenomena" including such experiential phenomena as sights, sounds, 
> sensed odors and touches, thoughts, emotions, mind images etc, all direct 
> elements of experience, fail to be self-existing entities, being mere 
> dependent arisings, mere fleeting things-in-relation, each being nothing more 
> than its characteristics, and each arising in dependence on other similarly 
> empty, fleeting conditions.
> ==========================
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> > 
> > --- Howard wrote:
> > > Hi, Robert (and Nina) -
> > > 
> > >        The position you take here, Rob, seems to go a bit beyond mine. 
> > > Something which is like a "star at dawn, a bubble in a stream, a flash of 
> > 
> > > lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a phantom, and a dream" 
> > has a 
> > > mirage-like quality, but it is not absolutely nothing. Dhammas exist, but 
> > in 
> > > a middle-way, dependent, and not self-supporting manner (despite the root 
> > mean
> > > ing of 'dhamma'). The question is exactly what does one mean by a 
> > "reality". 
> > > I do NOT see hardness as having to be hardness of "something". There are 
> > just 
> > > the characteristics and functionalities, but no "things" that possess 
> > them, 
> > > except conventionally (that is: only in a manner of speaking). The 
> > > characteristics are real in the sense of being elements of experience, 
> > but 
> > > are unreal in the sense of not being self-existent. This is my take on 
> > the 
> > > matter. My fear is that the constant reference to "realities" tends 
> > towards a 
> > > substantialist perspective.
> > > 
> > > With metta,
> > > Howard



 
13368 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 2:54pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 
  Dear Howard,
Re. your nice breakdown of the sutra below: Interesting, that the noble eightfold
path is clearly announced as a path of practice, and not merely a description of
what occurs under the right conditions, wouldn't you agree?

I would like to hear what Jon has to say about this:  is it descriptive or
prescriptive?

Best,
Robert Ep.

==============

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Jon (and all) -
> 
> In a message dated 5/18/02 7:23:50 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> <> writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Victor
> > 
> > --- yuzhonghao  wrote: 
> > > Hi Jon, Anders and all,
> > > 
> > > I would like to share some thoughts regarding the practice of 
> > > satipatthana.
> > ...
> > > The teaching in Satipatthana Sutta describes how satipatthana is 
> > > practiced; thus whether the teaching recommends sitting as a means to 
> > > the development of mindfulness is subject to speculation.  
> > > 
> > > Having read that the Buddha said:
> > > 
> > > "There is the case where a monk -- having gone to the wilderness, to 
> > > the shade of a tree, or to an empty building -- sits down folding his 
> > > legs crosswise, holding his body erect and setting mindfulness to the 
> > > fore [lit: the front of the chest]. Always mindful, he breathes in; 
> > > mindful he breathes out. "
> > > 
> > > the unnamed monk the Buddha mentioned in the discourse is a model 
> > > that I would emulate.  And this is how I learn how to establish 
> > > mindfulness from reading the Satipatthana Sutta: following the 
> > > examples in the discourse and emulate them.  It is a process 
> > > of "learning by doing" and takes repetitive practice.
> > 
> > I'm not sure about the approach of 'emulating' the monks mentioned in the
> > discourses.  Is it not better to seek to understand the essence of the
> > Buddha's words?  In any event, it is surely not possible to emulate the
> > wisdom of another (many of those monks were ready for enlightenment on
> > hearing the Buddha's teaching).
> > 
> > How about "learning by understanding and applying"?
> > 
> > Just my thoughts.
> > 
> > Jon 
> > 
> ====================================
>        I found a not-too-long sutta which I think is interesting in a couple 
> ways. The sutta is the following:
> 
> ***********************
> 
> Samyutta Nikaya XLVII.40
> 
> 
> 
> Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta
> 
> 
> 
> Analysis of the Frames of Reference
> 
> Translated from the Pali by Thanissaro Bhikkhu.
> For free distribution only.
>  
> "I will teach you the frames of reference, their development, and the path of 
> practice leading to their development. Listen & pay close attention. I will 
> speak. 
> 
> "Now, what are the frames of reference? There is the case where a monk 
> remains focused on the body in & of itself -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- 
> putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. He remains 
> focused on feelings in & of themselves... mind in & of itself... mental 
> qualities in & of themselves -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside 
> greed & distress with reference to the world. "This is called the frames of 
> reference.
> 
>  "And what is the development of the frames of reference? There is the case 
> where a monk remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to 
> the body, remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away 
> with regard to the body -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & 
> distress with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon 
> of origination with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon of 
> passing away with regard to feelings, remains focused on the phenomenon of 
> origination & passing away with regard to feelings -- ardent, alert, & 
> mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with reference to the world. "He 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, 
> remains focused on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard 
> to the mind -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress 
> with reference to the world. "He remains focused on the phenomenon of 
> origination with regard to mental qualities, remains focused on the 
> phenomenon of passing away with regard to mental qualities, remains focused 
> on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to mental 
> qualities -- ardent, alert, & mindful -- putting aside greed & distress with 
> reference to the world. "This is called the development of the frames of 
> reference.
>  
> "And what is the path of practice to the development of the frames of 
> reference? Just this noble eightfold path: right view, right resolve, right 
> speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, 
> right concentration. This is called the path of practice to the development 
> of the frames of reference." Revised: Mon 10 September 2001 <A
> HREF="http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html">
> http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn47-040.html</A>
> *******************************
>        The first section after the three introductory sentences defines what 
> "the frames of reference" (often called "the setting up of mindfulness") is, 
> namely the case where the practitioner remains directly focussed on the 
> various elements of experience "ardent, alert, & mindul - putting aside greed 
> & distress with reference to the world." We might note here that the activity 
> has two aspects: (1) the ardent, alert, and mindful focussing, and (2) the 
> putting aside of (what the translator gives as) "greed & distress with 
> reference to the world," this latter suggesting a state of equanimity.   
>        The second section deals with the (further?) development of this, 
> consisting of focussing on the aspects of origination and of cessation of 
> these phenomena. This would engender the clear seeing of anicca and anatta, 
> leading to disenchantment.
>        Most interesting to me is the final section which defines "the path of 
> practice to the development of the frames of reference," as specifically the 
> noble eightfold path. The straightforward reading of this takes satipatthana 
> more as something which "comes later", penultimate to liberation, rather than 
> as a technique to be practiced "all along". It would seem, on this reading, 
> that the entire eight-factored path is the path of practice culminating in 
> satipatthana (and then in awakening and liberation).
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 


 


 
13371 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:06pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  --- yuzhonghao  wrote:
> TG,
> 
> For the statement "there is no self",
> see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this 
> verse with you:
> 
> 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
> others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
> self-control.

Dear Victor,
Here we have a clear description of the Buddha advocating self-control.  Now, I
wonder if those who believe there is 'no control' because there is no 'self' will
explaint that this is merely conventional speech and does not refer to either a
'self' or an actual imperative to 'exercise control' over oneself?

One can always say that something the Buddha said was not actually what he meant
because it is merely conventional speech, while when the Buddha says something
that is in accord with what one regards as the path, one will say that the Buddha
meant it literally.  

It is a slippery slope, because it means that we are making distinctions between
different suttas, or even different statements in the same sutta, based on our
prior beliefs.

It is an equally slippery slope to maintain the opposite, that the Buddha was
being literal when he says that we should maintain self-control, but metaphoric or
conventional when he says something else that we disagree with.  To make these
kinds of distinctions at all is fraught with danger.

So what is the correct view?  We do not want to wind up like some interpreters of
the Bible who conclude based on taking it literally [according to their
interpretation of what is literal] that the earth is only 5,000 years old, in the
face of all scientific evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, we do not want
to wind up in the position of those who insist that the only experiences that are
believeable are those which can be scientifically tested.

It seems to me that in general, we should take the Buddha literally, unless we
have some evidence to the contrary.   What is the evidence that 'one should
practice self-control' is merely conventional, and not a true imperative?  Well,
since Buddha states clearly that none of the five khandas can be considered to
have the property of 'self', there are two possibilities:  what he considers
'self' is beyond the five kandhas, or:  he is asking practitioners to attempt to
control certain arising phenomena, in the understanding that such attempt will
have certain results which will be beneficial to their progress.  

I think it may satisfy both camps if we say that he is addressing the conventional
self and asking his listeners to attempt to exercise control over akusala
conditions, even though such control may not be possible, in the understanding
that this will have certain effects, though they are not caused directly by the
practitioner.  

This is very similar to other Buddhist practices.  If one practices meditation,
the worst form of such practice is to struggle directly with the mind and attempt
to control it, which leads to tension and frustration.  One follows certain
practices, trusting that eventually they will yield the fruit.  The practice is
voluntary, but the results are involuntary.  If one practices discernment in daily
life, it is the same thing:  one pays attention to the attempt to discern namas
and rupas, knowing that most of the time he or she will fail, but eventually the
attempt to do so will yield fruit.  There is intention, but not control. It
explains why the sutta is useful, without falling into the fallacy of an atta
which can take action.

Best,
Robert Ep.





> See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
> --- <> wrote:
> > <> writes:
> > 
> > 
> > > Dan and Robert,
> > > 
> > > Each and every aggregate is not self.  It does not mean that 
> there is 
> > > no self doing anything.  It does not mean that there is a self 
> doing 
> > > anything.  It does not mean "no control."  It simply means each 
> and 
> > > every aggregate is to be seen as it actually is with right 
> > > discernment thus:  "This is not mine.  This I am not.  This is 
> not my 
> > > self."
> > > 
> > > The characteristics of each and every aggregate being not self is 
> not 
> > > to be confused with the view "there is no self" or "no control."
> > > 
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor
> > > 
> > 
> > There is no-self, and there is no control.  Both Self and control 
> are a 
> > delusion and both delusions are "self view."
> > 
> > Things arise and cease due to conditions.  We might think its "our" 
> idea to 
> > study Buddhism.  Not without the condition of the Buddha's teaching 
> it isn't. 
> >  We might think its "our" idea to take a trip to Paris.  Not 
> without the 
> > condition of the travel industry, not without the European 
> continent, not 
> > without financial resources, or the job that provides them, or the 
> people who 
> > created the job, or the ancestors of those people, or our 
> ancestors, or with 
> > the heat from the sun, or without the gravity from mass, or without 
> oxygen, 
> > or without the elements generated by supernova, or without a 
> particular 
> > interest that makes Paris interesting, or without the conditions 
> that 
> > contacted that interest, or without a government that allows that 
> freedom, 
> > etc., etc., uncountable times over.
> > 
> > There is pushing and pulling of causal forces, there is an illusion 
> of self 
> > control, but ultimately there is no self control.
> > 
> > How then can an effort be made to practice dhamma?  Because of the 
> causality 
> > of education.  Plus uncountable supporting (conditional) phenomena.
> > 
> > TG



 
13372 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:07pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities? - Jon and Nina

 
  Thanks, Jon!

robert ep.

==========

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> Just a very quick note to say that the extracts in my earlier post are not
> from Nina's ADL but from CMA, the translatin of the Abhidhamattha Sangaha.
> 
> 
> More later, as i am out of time on this hotel computer.
> 
> Jon
> 
>  --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > 
> > --- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> 
> 
> > The quote from Abhidhamma in Daily Life troubles me, and not
> > coincidentally. 
> > Since this is Nina's book, I invite Nina to comment, and I apologize in
> > advance
> > for taking a tough view towards this quote.  I don't want to
> > misinterpret what she
> > says through ignorance, but this is what troubles me:
> > 
> > "Ultimate realities are things that exist by reason of their own
> > intrinsic
> > > nature
> > > (sabhaava).  



 
13373 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:20pm
Subject: RE: [dsg] satipatthana

 
  Hi Jon.
Comments below.

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob E
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: 
> > Dear Jon,
> > I guess what this particular issue comes down to is whether the Buddha is
> saying
> > to contemplate these characteristics of realities, or whether to contemplate
> > specific namas and rupas in a given category, and just, as you say, indicating
> the
> > areas within which the specific instances can be found.
> 
> I'm not quite clear on the distinction you are making here, Rob, so I'll just
> say
> that I take him to be indicating the contemplation of any presently arising
> phenomena.

What I was saying was that, if Buddha is saying to see the arising moments as
examples of one of the categories he's talking about, that is a conceptual
understanding.  If he is saying to discern particular moments that happen to be in
those categories, which is how you interpret it, that is pointing towards the
discernment of namas and rupas.  I'm not sure which one he is indicating by the
language of the sutta.  And I have a hard time seeing the discernment of anatta,
anicca and dukkha in the arising object as being a non-conceptual understanding. 
I mean, it is a realization that these qualities exist in the object, not
something that can be directly perceived.  Where does 'anatta' live in a rupa or
nama in the moment?  Anatta is the absence of something, it cannot be perceived as
a direct quality, same thing for anicca.  It is only upon reflection on the
momentary nature one has experienced, immediately afterwards perhaps, that one can
deduce anatta or anicca as a quality of the object.  It seems to me to be a very
direct but thought-related insight.  If I am used to assuming that an object has a
fixed and substantial nature, and I suddenly see with clear discernment that it
lasts only a moment and then changes into something else, then I can draw the
conclusion; 'there is no fixed entity here [anatta], and there is no permanent
reality but only a very fleeting one [anicca].  Buddha seems to describe this kind
of insight as a kind of statement in many, many suttas, and it seems to me that
this is an insight, an understanding, that is deductively drawn from a direct
discernment, rather than being directly discerned itself.

If you disagree with this, please explain how anatta or anicca can be perceived
through a sense-door.  If it is a nama, then it is a thought *about* a rupa that
has just been perceived and that has passed.  And this is different than
perceiving anatta, anicca and dukkha *in* the object in the moment.

The reason I am emphasizing this, is that I think the role of useful concepts may
be a very strong one, when they are based on direct discernment.

More below.

> > I also agree, and think it is an important point, that concepts as such can be
> > pointing towards other concepts or be pointing towards realities, and that
> > concepts that point to realities have a very special usefulness, even though
> they
> > themselves do not have a real object.  They are the only guide we have to
> direct
> > us towards real objects, other than direct discernment itself.
> > 
> > If the Sutta says "...takes hold of the aggregate of...", it is reasonable to
> say
> > that the Buddha is saying to take an arising example of the aggregate as an
> object
> > of discernment and see it for what it is.  I'm just not sure from the language
> of
> > the Sutta whether he is saying that or not.
> 
> Here are some further passages from the sutta that it might be useful to
> consider in
> that light:
> 
> "Here, O bhikkhus, a bhikkhu understands the consciousness with lust [or with
> hate
> or with ignorance], as with lust [or hate or ignorance]; the consciousness
> without
> lust [etc.], as without lust [etc.]; …"
> "Here, O bhikkhus, when sensuality [or any of the other of the 5 hindrances] is
> present, a bhikkhu knows with understanding: 'I have sensuality [or whichever of
> the
> 5 hindrances],' or when sensuality [etc.] is not present, he knows with
> understanding: 'I have no sensuality [etc.].'"
> 
> The commentary to the Satipatthana Sutta explains 'present' in the passage just
> above as "existing by way of occurrence, practice or repeated happening", and
> 'not
> present' as "not existing, by way of non-occurrence or because of rejection from
> the
> mind by way of reflection or concentration".
> 
> It then explains the terms "by way of occurrence" and "existing" as follows:
> "Since there is no state of yoking together of the good and the bad moral
> qualities
> similar to the yoking of two bulls to a cart, -- since the good and the bad do
> not
> exist together -- from the absence of sensuality at the time of seeing one's
> mind
> through knowledge it is said: 'by way of occurrence'. At the moment of seeing
> wisely
> the occurrence of sense-desire there is no sense-desire as good and bad states
> of
> mind cannot exist together 
> "Existing means: When it is found in one's own mental flux."
> 
> Some people really doubt whether there can be awareness of presently arising
> ('existing') akusala states.  Here it clearly assumes there can be, and explains
> that the akusala state and the moment of wisely seeing it are in reality 2
> separate
> mind moments.
> 
> I hope you find something here to reflect on.

Well I think that's great.  It seems that a kusala discernment trumps an akusala
state and disappears it?  So much for the search for good Dharma medicine for the
ills of ordinary life.  A moment of discernment replaces akusala with kusala,
which makes sense.  In that way, discernment and all the qualities which lead to
it:  samatha + vipassana, sati and panna, defeat the akusala qualities and
dissolve them in the moments in which they exist.  Which explains why when one
reaches arahantship, akusala has been completely rooted out of the system.  Rather
than trying to identify and eradicate akusala states, one need only focus on the
path, and the more one discerns, the more free one is from these states.

Am I misinterpreting the implications here?

Best,
Robert Ep.




 
13374 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:30pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] anicca

 
  Dear Sarah,
Hi!  Haven't spoken to you in a while.  How are you?

I am having trouble with the idea that concepts are not part of the five kandhas,
as I thought that everything that arises in mental and perceptual-physical
experience was included in the five kandhas, in other words, everything in this
life other than the experiencing of Nibbana.

How do concepts get exemption?  

I am also wondering what the exact delineation of the concept is.  If a thought
about a concept is a paramatha dhamma, but a concept is not, where does the
concept occur in the thought, as what part of the thought?

Let me propose an example:  

"I saw a tree yesterday."

I is a concept.  
saw is a concept.
tree is a concept
yesterday is a concept.

Is that not so?  Where is the reality of this thought?  Is the whole thing a
concept, a collection of concepts?  Or is it a string of concepts, but the thought
itself which holds them all together is not a concept?  So if I discern:
"I am thinking 'I saw a tree yesterday'", the discerning thought "I am
thinking..." etc. is a paramatha dhamma, but it's object, the concept "I saw a
tree yesterday" is a concept and is not a paramatha dhamma?

In the sentence:  "You are smiling right now", which I could be perceiving at this
very moment, 
You is a concept,
Are is a concept,
Smiling is a concept,
Right now is a concept,
no?

Where is the thought that is an actuality, and are these in fact all concepts?
Is the thought as a whole a concept?

Here is another thought:  "I am sad right now."
The experience of sadness is a paramatha dhamma, but when I think "I am sad", in
the thought, sadness is a concept, because the thought does not actually contain
the experience.  It takes place in another moment and refers to the sadness
second-hand.  So where is the actual thought that is an actuality, if all the
contained concepts are not real?  

The only thoughts I can think of that would qualify for paramatha dhamma status,
would be reflective thoughts that take a thought as an object.  These can be
referrred to in the present moment, because their objects are in language and
therefore not second-hand.  So if I say "I want to consider the thought "I am sad"
", the "I am sad" is a concept, but the statement "I want to consider..." etc., is
a thought which has a concept as an object, and is therefore a paramatha dhamma. 
Is this correct?  Perhaps you can help me sort this out.

Thanks, and hope you are well,
Robert Ep.

==================

--- Sarah  wrote:
> Hi Howard,
> 
> I have a couple of your posts which I delayed replying to;-)
> 
>  --- Howard wrote: > Hi, Sarah -
> 
> >        I have heard of no things that are neither conditioned nor 
> > unconditioned. If concepts are neither, then they are nothing at all -
> .....
> As I understand, when the texts discuss the conditioned and unconditioned,
> they are discussing the phenomena with sabhava that are formed up
> (sankhata) and not formed up (asankhata). In other words, the phenomena
> that can be directly known by wisdom (panna). It’s true that accordingly,
> in an ultimate (paramattha) sense, concepts are nothing at all, illusions
> conceived by the mind that are so often taken for being *real*. 
> .....
> > there 
> > are no concepts, and we waste our time talking about them. 
> .....
> Concepts (pannatti) are concepts only. It is not a waste of time using
> them and talking about them as long as they are not taken for *realities*.
> If there were an idea, however, that any wisdom will be gained merely by
> talking about and ‘working out’ the concepts, it would be rather like the
> analogy of moving the Titanic deck chairs thinking that this in itself
> might prevent the ‘sinking’ in samsara.
> ......
> >But concepts
> > are 
> > mind objects, they are constructed, conditioned by multiple senses
> > including 
> > mind, and not irreducible, but they are mind objects. If there is a
> > third 
> > category of things that are neither conditioned nor unconditioned, it is
> > a 
> > category that I have not heard of nor seen mentioned in any sutta.
> .....
> The Buddha makes it clear that often he is using ‘wordly’ language. The
> end of Nina’s translation of the commentary to the Savaka Sutta just
> posted, refers to this. Concepts are not included in the 5 khandhas, the
> ‘All’ to be directly known.
> .....
> 
>  >Sabbe sankhara anicca. Ideas, patterns, mind-constructed objects, as
> well as
> > all 
> > paramatthadhammas other than nibbana *do not remain*.
> .....
> What are ‘sabbe sankhara’? As I understand, the 5 khandhas or namas and
> rupas or any of the other classifications of paramattha dhammas. 
> .....
> I’ll be glad to look at any other references or comments. At this moment I
> think we agree that there can be awareness of thinking (thinking which
> thinks about concepts). Are you sure there can be awareness of the concept
> itself?
> 
> Let me finish with one quote from the Vism on sankhara (formations):
> Vism XX11, 22
> 
> “...He brings to bear the faculties, the powers, and the enlightenment
> factors, and he works over and turns up the same field of formations
> (sankhara), classed as materiality, feeling, perception, formations, and
> consciousness, with the knowledge that they are impermanent, painful,
> not-self, and he embarks upon the progressive series of insights.”
> 
> Thanks as usual for your points for consideration, Howard.
> 
> Sarah
> =====
>


 
13375 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:44pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 
  --- Howard wrote:
> Hi, Jon -

    Do you 
> > see a necessary
> > contradiction in these 2 attributes (conditionality vs. own essence)?
> > 
> -------------------------------------------------------
> Howard:
>        The problem I have here is with the adjectival phrase "of their own" 
> in the sentence "The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last for 
> only a brief moment doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their own 
> capable of being discerned by consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 
> 'individual essence')." Everything about these phenomena, including their 
> very existence, arises in total dependence on conditions, all of which are 
> equally empty of own-being. What arises in total dependence on other 
> conditions does not have own-being, and inasmuch as these other conditions 
> are equally without own-being, the emptiness is thoroughgoing.
> ----------------------------------------------------------
>
Dear Howard,
I would really like to pay a little more attention this important point of yours. 
Do the terms paramatha dhamma, own-being and dhammas having their own independent
characteristics not imply a substantial quality these fleeting appearances?  Is
there not an implication of substantiality, and is it not inherent in the terms
and the feeling that is created around them?

I keep seeing these terms as a kind of hidden life-raft within the philosophy of
Abhidhamma, and it is as much their implied feeling as it is their explicit
definition.  When you say 'the emptiness is thoroughgoing' it makes me heave a
sigh of relief, because the sense of own-being and independent characteristics
seems laden with the burden of substantiality.  It just carries that flavor.  One
can explain it differently, but why do those ideas exist? 

What is the sense of own-being if not a sense of substantiality?  What other
purpose does it serve?  It seems to implicitly undercut emptiness and anatta.  If
something has own-being, it has entity.  And if it has entity, it does not partake
of anatta.   Own-being seems to me to be nothing other than another way of saying
'entity' or 'being'.  It even has the word 'being' in it, and 'own', which means
that it belongs to one, ie, the entity in question.  Together with Buddhaghosa
saying that the paramatha dhammas are the 'final irreduceible entities of
experience', it really makes me feel that there is a hidden substantiality and
entity at play in these words.  How can something have an 'individual essence' and
not be identified as an entity?

Otherwise, why not just say that these experiences are insubstantial and
momentary, which would be in the direction of anatta and anicca?

Can you have something that is solid and empty at the same time?

Best,
Robert Ep.

=================================


 
13376 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:46pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 
  Dear Howard,
Exactly.  And well put.

Robert Ep.

====================

--- Howard wrote:
> Hi, TG -
> 
> In a message dated 5/5/02 4:13:21 AM Eastern Daylight Time, TG 
> writes:
> 
> 
> > I would be interested to know how "dhamma's," that are completely dependent 
> > on something else (Dependent Arising), are 'with its own characteristic.'  
> > How can something have "its own characteristic" if it doesn't have any self 
> > 
> > at all?  
> > 
> > The way I see it...it is "something else's characteristic" that is 
> > responsible for arisen states/dhammas.  But that "something else" had 
> > something else responsible for "its" characteristic, and so on and so on 
> > indefinitely.
> > 
> ==========================
>        This is exactly it! No core or self or self-nature at all in any 
> conditioned dhamma: When exactly the right assembly of conditions has 
> occurred, with none missing, the conditioned dhamma arises, but should any 
> one of these conditions be missing, the dhamma does *not* arise. So, in what 
> sense are any characteristics or even the bare existence of a conditioned 
> dhamma inherent in itself, in this which is totally dependent on other things 
> that are, themselves, equally empty. There are characteristics, yes, but not 
> *own* characteristics, nor borrowed. They are inherent in nothing, not in 
> themselves, not in anything else. Empty phenomena, rolling on. Phantoms 
> chasing phantoms. Foam bubbling upon foam. Nothing to hold onto, all 
> ungraspable, without anchor and footing. Nothing to do but *let go*.
>        It seems to me that if, in trying to see the impersonality of all 
> dhammas, an essential enterprise (!), one is led to a belief in ultimate 
> dhammas with own-being, then one has traded one aspect of atta-view for 
> another. It also seems to me that a mere intellectual understanding of the 
> truth that all dhammas other than nibbana arise in dependence on causes and 
> conditions still misses a full understanding of anatta. I think that the 
> truth of anatta is more fully realized when one contemplates the sheer 
> "magic" and wonder of the arising of conditioned phenomena. One moment dhamma 
> D is not to be seen. Then a group of ghostly conditions fleetingly traverse 
> the stage of awareness, and suddenly, where there was no dhamma D, there it 
> is, as if by a conjurer's power, and, then, poof, it's gone once again! What 
> an extraordinary magic show, especially because this display of empty 
> ephemera *looks* to us like something substantial!
>        
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> /Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
> in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
> phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    


 
13377 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 3:54pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration - Rob Ep - beware/incredibly long

 
  Thanks for your reply, Jon.

I always appreciate discussing these things with you, although as you know I would
rather exchange personal views than do sutta homework.     : - )

A sad admission on my part.
It's easier to rant than give evidence.

However, when I am able to do it, I will try to back up my comments that you have
selected below with sutta excerpts.

Just one point of clarification for now:

I did not mean to say that you have shown suspicion for any part of the
Satipatthana Sutta.  I believe that you take all the Buddha's Suttas with great
faith and seriousness.  What I meant to say was that the the type of meditation
which I believe is indicated in the Satipatthana Sutta is regarded by you with
some suspicion.  Obviously your interpretation of the Satipatthana Sutta and what
it advocates is a little different than mine, so of course you are not suspicious
of the Sutta itself.

Best,
Robert Ep.

============================

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob E
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: 
> > Dear Jon,
> > Well, I meant to answer you simply and somewhat in accord, but I wound up
> going on
> > a tremendous rant.  In the interest of science, I have not attempted to edit
> it. 
> > I hope there is something of value in there.
> > 
> > Below is the post as it was written, a few minutes ago:
> 
> I'm glad you decided to let it go as written.  It contains many useful areas for
> discussion.  I hope you don't mind if I select only a few to come back on.
> 
> A.  Jhanas and the true nature of realities
> I think the crux of our differences can be found in this passage from your post:
> > When we talk about the jhanas, and other 'practiced states' which clearly
> cause
> > specific changes to consciousness and the mind, and give rise to changes in
> the
> > way in which self and reality are perceived, it seems easier for me to see
> this as
> > a real mark of progress on the path.
> 
> It seems to be your view that the jhanas are a practice or technique for
> experiencing
> directly the true nature of realities.  I realise that this is a view shared by
> many,
> perhaps by a majority of those practising Buddhism today.  It's also most
> people's
> instinctive view when they first hear about jhana as part of the dhamma.  But is
> it
> something the Buddha said directly, or is it something that people readily infer
> from the
> suttas because it accords with their intuitive view (after all, it's so easy to
> go with
> our instincts and ignore the contrary evidence)?  I would be interested to know
> whether
> you can you point to a passage in the Tipitaka that positively supports this
> proposition.
> 
> B.  Contemplating objects vs. direct experience of realities
> You gave a description of contemplating a prized piano, as an analogy of there
> being
> direct awareness of a reality (dhamma) of the present moment.  However, the 2
> are not the
> same.  What you describe there is simply a form of *thinking about*, not the
> *direct
> experience of*, something.  So if as you suggest that process were to be
> 'applied to one
> reality after another', it would not lead to anything that I would associate
> with the
> development of satipatthana.
> 
> C.  Sitting vipassana
> You refer to long periods (3 years) sitting in vipassana meditation leading to
> obvious
> changes in one's sense of self.  Can you point to any instance in the texts of
> the Buddha
> recommending such a practice, or any mention at all of 'sitting vipassana
> meditation'.
> 
> D.  'Right' and 'wrong' approaches
> You say:
> >                                   To read the Suttas with great care
> > and to contemplate their meaning with great intent is also a form of
> meditation. 
> > I just don't make the distinctions between 'right' approaches and 'wrong' ones
> > that you do.  Of course I believe that there are wrong paths and pitfalls, but
> I
> > don't think that legitimate meditation, Sutta study, or discernment of
> everyday
> > realities as they arise, are among them.  These are not pitfalls, they are
> > pathways.  
> 
> What would be your criteria for identifying right paths from wrong paths and
> pitfalls?
> 
> E.  Satipatthana Sutta references
> You say:
> >        But I don't see the real rationale for this kind of
> > suspicion of the special efforts which seem to have been clearly described by
> the
> > Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta, in his discussions of the jhanas, etc.
> 
> I can't really comment unless I know what passages you are referring to here,
> Rob.  Can
> you give a reference, please.  Thanks.  I can only say at this stage that I'm
> not aware I
> have cast suspicion on any aspect of the Satipatthana Sutta.
> 
> 
> I'm sorry not to say a lot more in this post, but I think that the best way to
> discuss
> differences is in the context of excerpts from the teachings, rather than simply
> exchanging personal views.  So I hope you can give me some references to look at
> and
> discuss.  Thanks.
> 
> Jon
> 
> > ===========
> > 
> > I think it would be great to establish common ground, and I appreciate your
> wish
> > to identify where we can stand together.  That would make an even more useful
> > ground from which to depart on issues where we may have some differences.
> > 
> > Let me contemplate what you said:
> > 
> >   are we at least in agreement that the crux of the development of
> > > insight is the knowing of the true nature of the realities of the present
> > > moment, and that this includes any reality of any present moment, regardless
> of
> > > the nature of the reality (nama or rupa, wholesome or unwholesome, internal
> or
> > > external), on the basis that all realties are taken as being permanent,
> > > satisfactory and self (in one of the 3 aspects), yet in reality are not so?
> > 
> > First let me agree in my own language and see if that accords with the above: 
> I
> > think that knowing the true nature of the experienced moment, and thus gaining
> > insight into the nature of the experiencing mind, is the goal of all
> discernment.
> > 
> > Let's say we were to see that a prized piano, which we are attached to, is
> really
> > only a succession of sensations and qualities of hardness, smoothness,
> concept,
> > memory, etc., and we began to discern these 'realities' for what they were.
> > 
> > What would be the result?  That piano, which we were attached to, would begin
> to
> > lose its attraction, as it was deconstructed into simple elements of
> experience.  
> > 
> > If we also get direct insight into the piano's impermanence,  if we see that
> the
> > original finish has become worn, that the piano keys are old and yellowing,
> this
> > done with discernment and not nostalgia can also lessen attachment and
> ignorance. 
> > We begin to trade in the cherished object for the simple realities of what
> exists
> > in this actual moment.   Likewise, we begin to see that the piano has no fixed
> > identity as we thought it did, and that it is not an 'entity' that we can hold
> > onto.  
> > 
> > There can also be no satisfaction in holding onto an object that has changed,
> is
> > subject to further change, and will eventually perish.  
> > 
> > In being attached to the piano, we had made it part of our self-identity, and
> had
> > established our own entity by establishing its entity as part of us.  So our
> own
> > sense of entity, of self, is somewhat let go and relaxed by letting go of the
> > concept of the piano to which we were attached.
> > 
> > I can see this process, applied to one reality after another, as they arise,
> as
> > gradually wittling away at the sense of personal self which is the
> source-concept
> > of all suffering.  
> > 
> > However, I also believe that there are experiences to be discerned which
> dissolve
> > the sense of personal self more directly.  And I think that somehow these
> sorts of
> > discernments do not always seem to be included in the 'realities' to be
> discerned.
> > 
> > You have said in the past that seeing the 'anatta-ness' of the mind or
> personal
> > self is not really part of the practice because these 'concepts' are empty and
> > cannot be directly discerned, or something to that effect, am I correct?  So
> one
> > is left to contemplate the reality of objects that arise for perception or
> > mentation, rupas and namas.  To me, the rupas and namas are only artifacts of
> the
> > bodymind's apprehension of experience, and are secondary to the apprehension
> of
> > that which experiences.  But then we get into consciousness as something
> beyond
> > the cittas, and that whole realm of awareness.....    And I guess that is the
> > potential trap if one tries to discern the 'mind' or 'self' apart from
> individual
> > namas and rupas.
> > 
> > So, as I say above, the letting go of attachment through seeing the three
> > unwholesome or delusory attributes of arising objects, and their breakdown
> into
> > individual moments of actual apprehension of qualities, seems to me to be
> > something we can agree upon as a core activity.  But I am left somewhat
> > unsatisfied by this, as it doesn't seem to me to directly access the gradual
> > evolution, transformation of the overall state of the practitioner.  As Buddha
> > says, as one moves to higher levels of wisdom and refinement, the overall
> > experience of being alive is quite transformed, as one's false sense of self
> and
> > all the clingings associated with it are gradually loosened and eventually
> > dropped.  As more kusala develops and akusala becomes less and less present,
> the
> > experience of living must be quite different in quality.  I find it hard to
> > understand the direct relationship of all these changes to the simple
> discernment
> > of namas and rupas, which seems more like a kind of perceptual purity than a
> > transformation of mind and personality.  Does this simple though immensely
> > difficult act, in itself, lead to the transformative evolution of all the
> kandhas?
> >  
> > 
> > When we talk about the jhanas, and other 'practiced states' which clearly
> cause
> > specific changes to consciousness and the mind, and give rise to changes in
> the
> > way in which self and reality are perceived, it seems easier for me to see
> this as
> > a real mark of progress on the path.  My former teacher and friend, who went
> off
> > to sit in Vipassana meditation for almost three years straight, came back with
> > obvious changes to his sense of self.  He had through direct and uninterrupted
> > focus, discerned 'realities' and shed an enormous amount of the mental and
> > emotional junk which he had had before.  He was visibly and demonstrably
> altered
> > and didn't have the kind of reactivity he had had before.  He had gained
> > enormously in his ability to be in the moment without clinging and to discern
> > realities directly.  His Theravadan teachers approved of him, and basically
> > certified his transformation.
> > 
> > My question is what kind of involvement causes one to make great progress.  We
> may
> > not awaken in this lifetime, but I would think we want to be clear about what
> > maximizes our potentiality for ending suffering and reaching our goal.  It is
> also
> > clear to me that those of you who are committed, dedicated to Abhidhamma, have
> a
> > way of working, a method and a path, that is effective in discerning realities
> and
> > thus gradually freeing the mind.  In other words, though it is a philosophy of
> > everyday discernment without external strivings or special exercises, it is
> still
> > a form of meditation as far as I am concerned, and takes its place in the
> > legitimate forms of mediatation that exist.  To read the Suttas with great
> care
> > and to contemplate their meaning with great intent is also a form of
> meditation. 
> > I just don't make the distinctions between 'right' approaches and 'wrong' ones
> > that you do.  Of course i believe that there are wrong paths and pitfalls, but
> I
> > don't think that legitimate meditation, Sutta study, or discernment of
> everyday
> > realities as they arise, are among them.  These are not pitfalls, they are
> > pathways.  
> > 
> > So to say that 'there should be no special effort necessary' to discern
> realities,
> > still seems to me to be a philsophical bias against meditation.  When the
> rubber
> > meets the road, you really think that making a special effort outside of
> everyday
> > living and the study of the Suttas is a mistake and perhaps a negative
> influence,
> > since it may produce 'special states' that will seem like they are discerning
> when
> > in fact they are not.  But I don't see the real rationale for this kind of
> > suspicion of the special efforts which seem to have been clearly described by
> the
> > Buddha in the Satipatthana Sutta, in his discussions of the jhanas, etc.
> > 
> > To say that he was addressing those who were already well versed in the
> jhanas,
> > and that it was a sort of coincidence then that he instructed them about what
> to
> > do with those states, seems to me to be too dismissive of the amount of weight
> > that he accorded to these practices.  Do you really think that the Buddha's
> > disciples were practicing the jhanas on their own initiative, and that the
> Buddha
> > did not accept and promote this practice?  Even if we admit that we are too
> busy
> > and too unconcentrated to engage in jhana meditation, to say that samatha is
> not
> > an important component of the path seems again to fly in the face of the
> Buddha's
> > own words.  
> > 
> > I have offered an alternative possibility, that samatha can be developed
> through
> > concentration on the Dhamma and through concentrated discernment in everyday
> life,
> > just as insight can, and that wisdom can develop in many different ways *if
> the
> > right principles are adhered to* in whatever the practice is.
> > 
> > Our only real argument is whether the 'special practices' such as studied
> > meditation and the states of consciousness they produce are inherently in a
> less
> > natural, lower position in Buddhism than everyday discernment, Sutta study and
> the
> > advice of a wise spiritual friend.  It seems that Abhidhamma has discarded
> > meditation for reasons of its own philosophy, and has discounted the immense
> role
> > that is has played in the entire history of Buddhism.  When Buddha sat under
> the
> > Bodhi tree and reached the full flowering of enlightenment, he was clearly in
> > meditation.  Do you not agree?  Yet you regularly go back to the position that
> > meditation is both unnecessary and in some ways undesireable.  
> > 
> > Again, I think that the intention to discern arising realities in everyday
> life is
> > just as much a meditation technique as the jhanas.  There is no inherent
> > difference in value between them, unless one happens to think that one is more
> > effective than the other.  I have said before, and still feel, that both are
> the
> > ideal combination.  But it makes no sense to me that concentrated time spent
> in
> > meditation will yield an impure or unwholesome effect *if it is done
> properly*,
> > any more than everyday discernment will yield an unwholesome effect if it is
> done
> > in accord with the intentions of the Dhamma.  If it is done with force or
> > attachment, everyday discernement could be just as harmful and deluding as
> sitting
> > in meditation, so I don't see the inherent difference in their potentiality. 
> > Again, it seems like a philosophical prejudice to me, and I don't, haven't
> been
> > able to figure out, what Abhidhamma gains by having that view, or where that
> view
> > actually arises from philosophically.  It doesn't seem to register with me, or
> > else I have never heard a proper explanation.  What I usually hear in this
> regard
> > is 'why should a special effort be expended' when it is the moment as it
> arises in
> > life that is to be discerned, as if meditation is not part of life, and as if
> the
> > intention to discern anything doesn't spoil the naturalness of the moment in
> any
> > case.
> > 
> > We should accept the fact that just following the Dhamma obscures the
> naturalness
> > of the moment anyway, and what we are doing is specialized whether it is
> > Abhidhamma study or meditation or anything else that has an underlying
> 'special
> > intention' to it.  That is why i said in another post that we are stuck 'using
> the
> > false concept of self to get rid of the false concept of self.'    I think
> that
> > accepting this is a good starting point, and not pretending that anything we
> do is
> > going to be 'natural'.
> > 
> > Well, I've said too much, and perhaps not enough, but I hope it will be the
> basis
> > of a good honest dialogue that can get to the heart of the truth.  Where that
> > truth lies remains to be revealed, as we are all more or less treading water
> in
> > this sea of delusion.
> > 
> > May all creatures have a moment of insight soon, if not actual liberation.
> > 
> > Robert Ep.
> 
> 



 
13378 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:02pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Iddhi

 
  --- Sarah  wrote:
>  Dear Wynn,
> 
> Thanks for dropping by;-) Sorry for the delay and hope you're still
> reading all the posts. 
> .....
>  --- wynn  wrote: > Hi,
> > 
> > Sorry to interupt.
> .....
> You’re never interrupting and never any need to apologise. Your questions
> are fine ones, but difficult ones and I’ve been waiting to hear from
> someone who may know more;-)
> .....
> > Also, I am not sure this is the right place to ask these questions.
> > Before answering my questions, please take note that I am aware that
> > supranormal power is NOT a pre-requisite for enlightenment and it is not
> > necessary to have it all. I am just being curious after readings several
> > passages about it in several books.
> > 
> > First Question.
> > Are the KASINA MEDITATION mentioned in the Tipitaka?
> .....
> I’m glad you wrote that you appreciate that it is NOT a pre-requisite for
> enligtenment and that you are just curious. I can’t tell you where all the
> references are off-hand, but someone else may do a search on this.  One
> place in the Tipitaka I know of where there are some fairly detailed notes
> on kasina and supernormal powers is in the section on “Treatise on success
> (Supernormal Power) at the end of Patisambhidamagga (Path of
> discrimination).
> 
> To give one quote from it (PTS p379):
> 
> “He goes unhindered through walls, through enclosures, through mountains,
> as though in open space:  naturally he is an obtainer of the space kasina
> attainment.  He adverts: “Through the wall, through the enclosure, through
> the  mountain’;  having adverted, he decides with knowledge ‘Let there be
> space’.  there is space.  He goes unhindered through the wall, through the
> enclosure, through the mountain.  Just as men naturally not possessed of
> success (supernormal power) go unhindered where there is no obstruction or
> enclosure, so too this possessor of success (supernormal power) attained
> to mastery of will goes unhindered through the wall, through the
> enclosure, through the mountain, as though in open space.” <end quote>
> *****
> .....
> > 
> > Second Question
> > Visudhimagga do teaches how to develop supranormal powers. (see
> > Visudhimagga
> > Chapter XII & Chapter V, verse 27 onwards) But does the Tipitaka tell us
> > how? I have never come across it.
> > 
> > The nearest is this:
> > 
> > ".......And what is the miracle of psychic power? There is the case
> > where a
> > monk wields manifold psychic powers. Having been one he becomes many;
> > having
> > been many he becomes one. He appears. He vanishes. He goes unimpeded
> > through
> > walls, ramparts, and mountains as if through space. He dives in and out
> > of
> > the earth as if it were water. He walks on water without sinking as if
> > it
> > were dry land. Sitting cross-legged he flies through the air like a
> > winged
> > bird. With his hand he touches and strokes even the sun and moon, so
> > mighty
> > and powerful. He exercises influence with his body even as far as the
> > Brahma
> > worlds........." (Kevatta Sutta etc.)
> .....
> 
> I don’t know if you read my posts on Sri Lanka study corner, but in those
> I discussed a little about how Mahinda and the other enlightened followers
> used these powers, always for the benefit of others.
> 
> We read in the Vism in detail about the various kasinas and the
> development of jhanas in general. In Patisambhidamagga (same section as
> above), we read about the 16 roots of success and how the consciousness is
> not perturbed by indolence, agitation, greed, ill-will, (wrong) view, zeal
> and greed, greed for sensual-deaires, defilement and so on. We are talking
> about very fine and highly developed states of wholesomeness indeed, which
> are not related by a desire to experience jhanas or supernormal powers or
> concentration without very clear right understanding of how the ksaina in
> question conditions calm. 
> .....
> > 
> > Third Question
> > I understand that to have the supernormal power, one must have mastery
> > over
> > the 4 jhanas, right?
> .....
> Right.  This is clear in both the Vism and Patisambhid.
> .....
> > But, the Visudhimagga said we must have mastery of all the 8 jhanas. But
> > if
> > this is true, does that mean that those who have supranormal powers have
> > mastery of all the 8 jhanas?
> .....
> Sorry, would you give the reference. In Vism, V,27 uner “Limited Space
> Kasina’ there is a reference to the kasinas as basis of ‘fourfold and of
> fivefold jhana’.
> .....
> > 
> > How do you explain the levitation perform by the yogis of TM
> > (Transcendental
> > Meditation)
> .....
> 
> I don’t try;-) Let me know what you think!

Perhaps they have learned something akin to the jhanas.  While the Noble Eightfold
Path and the discernment of anatta may be unique to Buddhism, the development of
deep meditation states and psychic powers is not.

Hindu practice of samadhi/jhana is about 10 - 15,000 years old, and very
effective.  There is no doubt that the yogins of old, as exemplified by
Patanjali's yoga suttas, were masters of many of these states.  The word jhana is
the Pali for the Sanskrit dhyana, which is the core of the practice of the
Ashtanga [eight-limbed] path of yoga, leading to ultimate Samadhi states.  Dhyana,
while important for Theravadan Buddhism in its Pali form as jhana, became the
basis for the most important Mahayana sects as well:  dhyana practice was
transmitted from India to China by Bodhidharma, where they came to pronounce it
'Ch'an'.  Ch'an Buddhism was brought from China to Japan, where the Japanese
pronounced it....you guessed it:  Zen.  Jhana = Dhyana = Ch'an = Zen.  Those sects
which took their version of the name 'jhana or dhyana' as the name of their sect,
emphasized sitting meditation and direct realization of nibbana/nirvana.

Best,
Robert Ep.



Best,
Robert Ep.



 
13379 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:06pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Sutta commentary

 
  thanks, anders.

robert ep.

==========

--- anders_honore  wrote:
> The Dutthatthaka Sutta of the Sutta Nipata says:
> 
> One whose doctrines aren't clean -- 
> fabricated, formed, given preference
> when he sees it to his own advantage -- 
>     relies on a peace
>     dependent
>     on what can be shaken. 
> 
> -------------------------------
> Fabricated doctrines here refers to dcotrines that are of the nature 
> of views and not of true seeing of reality that comes from 
> enlightenment. Of course the minute you become a Buddhist, to avoid 
> giving preference to Buddhist doctrine over non-Buddhist ones is 
> virtually impossibe. In fact, it is needed initially in order to set 
> one up on the Buddhist path. However, for someone solidly grounded in 
> Buddhism, who knows what is means to be mindful and knows about the 
> doctrine of not-self and can work on one's own mind with this, 
> lending preference to this becomes and obstruction. Why? Because he 
> relies on a knowledge that can be shaken, due to its fabricated 
> nature. By giving preference to it, he clings to it, and sustains it, 
> obstructing the realisation of true knowledge.
> -------------------------------
> 
> Because entrenchments in views
> aren't easily overcome
> when considering what's grasped
> among doctrines,
>     that's why
> a person embraces or rejects a doctrine -- 
>     in light of these very
>     entrenchments. 
> 
> -------------------------------
> Almost self-explanatory. Because we have the tendency to entrench 
> ourselves in views, we naturally lend preference to one above the 
> other, and thus cling to it. So what can be done to avoid clinging to 
> it?
> -------------------------------
> 
> Now, one who is cleansed
>     has no preconceived view
> about states of becoming
>                 or not-
>     anywhere in the world.
> Having abandoned conceit & illusion,
> by what means would he go?
>         He isn't involved. 
> 
> For one who's involved
>     gets into disputes
>     over doctrines,
> but how -- in connection with what -- 
> would you argue
> with one uninvolved?
>     He has nothing
> embraced or rejected,
> has sloughed off every view
>     right here -- every one. 
> 
> -------------------------------
> This part should answer my question above. An Aryan has cast off all 
> views of anything in this world, has no preferences, and through 
> this, he is liberated.
> 



 
13380 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:10pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] re:anicca (do concepts arise and fall?)

 
  Hi, Gogler,
I guess you are off for a while.
Sorry I didn't acknowledge this sooner, but thanks for your breakdown of concepts
here.  I am going to look at it more thoroughly when I am able, and I think it
will be particularly helpful to me at this time, as I am wrestling with what is
and is not a concept.

Thanks again,
Robert Ep.

===============

--- goglerr  wrote:
> Hi Robert, Howard and all,
> 
> Knock! Knock! I would like to barge in for a moment, if u don't
> mind?
> 
> The discussion on `concept' caught my eye. I have checked out a few 
> things from some books to add in, just to make the discussion more 
> interesting (or perhaps more confusing!). smile
> 
> We understand that the 4 ultimate realities (paramattha dhamma) are 
> consisting of materiality, consciousness, mental factors and Nibbana. 
> And the `nature' of concepts (which are `natureless') are explained 
> from the by the excellent attachment posted by Robert 
> entitled`Philosophical Cornerstone of the ABHIDHAMMA' by Y. 
> Karunadasa, The Wheel Publication No. 412/413. 
> 
> Pa~n~nati (translated as concepts, idea or notion) are divided into 
> two categories.
> 
> A. Concept which is made known (pa~n~napiyatiti)
> It makes or fabricates a meaning for the mind.  For e.g. the notion 
> of `a piece of machine with lighted screen which you're starring at', 
> therefore that `notion' begins to fabricate a meaning for the mind. 
> In other word a notion is born. This concept is also known as attha 
> pa~n~nati (concept-as-meanings or meaning-concept)
> 
> B. Concepts which makes known (pa~n~napetiti)
> It means labeling the notion with a name or a designation. For e.g. 
> the above notion `a piece of machine with lighted screen which
> you're starring at', is mentally labeled as `monitor'. This
> concepts is also known as nama pa~n~nati (concept-as-name or name-
> concept). So the notion (attha pannati) is designated as `monitor' 
> (nama pannati). Then, this mental labeling is translated into 
> speech/words (sadda pannati), that means we actually say it out or 
> write it down. Just like what I understand (attha pannati) right now, 
> I put in down in words (nama/sadda pannati). Also we can translate 
> the notion into action like hand-sign.
> 
> Let's go back to Atthapannathi. There are 6 classes of concept-as-
> meaning.
> 
> 1) Formal concepts (santhana pannati)
> They correspond to form or configuration of things or the continuity 
> of things. They correspond to the 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional 
> world. For e.g. land, mountains, rivers etc. 
> 
> 2) Collective concept (samuha pannati) 
> They correspond to a collective or group of things. For e.g. house, 
> car, computer, man, woman, a being (satta pannati)  etc.
> 
> 3) Directional concepts (disa pannati)
> They correspond to a locality or direction, the relationship from one 
> thing to another. For e.g. east, west, there, up, down, upward, 
> right, left etc.
> 
> 4) Time concepts (kala pannati)
> They correspond to periods or unit of time. They also built upon 
> recurrent and continuous flow of material and mental phenomena. For 
> e.g. morning, noon, week, months etc. In material sense, they involve 
> light and darkness (as in day or night). In mental sense, they 
> involve mental activities such as sleeping time, lunch time, working 
> time etc. (There is a book `Abhidhamma Studies: Buddhist
> exploration of consciousness and time' by Nyanaponika Thera give wide
> coverage on the idea of time from the Buddhist perspective).
> 
> 5) Space concepts (akasa pannati)
> They correspond to open spaces or to spatial regions void of 
> perceptible matter. For e.g. well, cave, hall, window etc.
> 
> 6) Sign concepts (nimitta pannati)
> They correspond to visualized images such the learner's sign and 
> mirror image of tranquility meditation (such as color kasina). Many 
> hallucination and imageries also come this category.
>  
> Now we go to nama pannati (concept-as-name). They are also 6 ways of 
> labeling.
> 
> 1) A (direct) concept of what is real. (vijjamana pannati)
> Materiality, feelings, consciousness, greed, anger, mental factors, 
> Nibbana etc. really exist in ultimate sense, which can be directly 
> experienccs without conceptualisation. The concepts that designate 
> them (as in words) are called direct concepts of what is real. A 
> direct experience of the continous arising and ceasing of a real 
> phenomena (for e.g a painful feeling) is ultimate reality and terming 
> them as `impermanent' is a direct concept (of that painful feeling). 
> We have to convey the `activity' of a real phenomena to somebody, 
> therefore we have to the term `impermanent'.
> 
> 2) A (direct) concept of what is unreal. (avijjamana pannati)
> Land, river, hill, person, man, woman, etc. are not ultimate 
> realities but conventional entities established conceptually through 
> mental construction. Though these concepts are based on ultimate 
> realities, the meanings they convey are not things that are 
> themselves ultimate realities since they do not correspond to things 
> that exist of their own intrinsic nature (sabhavato). 
> 
> 3) A concept of the unreal by means of the real (vijjamanena 
> avijjamana pannati)
> The following no. 3, 4, 5 and 6 will be a combination of no 1 and 2. 
> E.g. the meditator (person) is mindful. The `meditator' is not real 
> but `mindful' (with mindfulness) is something real.
> 
> 4) A concept of the real by means of the unreal. (avijjamanena 
> vijjamana pannati)
> E.g. the voice of a man. The `voice' is real but the 'man' is not 
> real. 
> 
> 5) A concept of real by means of real (vijjamanena vijjamana pannati)
> E.g. the consciousness of greed. The `consciousness' and 'greed' are 
> real.
> 
> 6) A concept of unreal by means of unreal (avijjamanena vijjamana 
> pannati)
> E.g. Today is my birthday. `Today', `my', and 'birthday' are not real 
> ultimately.
> 
> There is also another 6 ways of description of concepts but they are 
> actually a mixture of both type of concepts (attha and nama pannati) 
> which are presented above.
> 
> So we may see from here how concepts are formed and conveyed to each 
> other. The world of concepts, without a doubt, still important in our 
> everyday life as we need to communicate with each other. We also need 
> to remind ourselves not to be too engrossed with them. Instead, we 
> need to look for the world of realities where the end of suffering 
> lies.
> 
> There are some references for `concepts'. Visuddhimagga (trans by 
> Nanamoli, VII, footnote 18), Comprehensive manual of Abhidhamma 
> (trans by B. Bodhi, VIII, pg 325-328), The psychology & philosophy of 
> Buddhism (by Jayasuriya), Compendium of Philosophy (PTS, 1979 
> Anuruddha), Essentials of Insight Meditation (Sujiva)
> 
> Ok. That all for now. 
> 
> Goglerr
> 
> 



 
13381 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:25pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: 'no control', kamma of the fourth kind, MN117

 
  hi Sukin.
Wow, it's taken me a long time to get back to you here.  I have to work backwards
in spurts, with long breaks.  I don't want my wife to beat my up, so I have to
sneak onto the computer and hope I can stay awake the next day.  [I am of course
exaggerating].

I really enjoy these dialogues.  does that mean they're kusala?  <evil grin>

--- sukinderpal  wrote:
> Dear Rob,
> 
> You said:
> ……. but I think the issue is still out as to whether the
> intention put into 
> consciousness at a given moment, which is then carried by the stream 
> of arising moments of consciousness, will at some point bear a
> positive 
> fruit.
> 
> Sukin:
> I think everything that we do and think has an effect on what we will
> do 
> and think in the future, as accumulated wrong view or wisdom or as 
> behavioral tendency. But whether it will be positive or negative is
> hard 
> to know.
> 
> You said:
> If we think right now: well I will commit myself to being more
> mindful; 
> does that thought bear a fruit for future mindfulness? 
> 
> Sukin:
> I think you will agree that different people with different
> backgrounds 
> will have different understanding of what is worthy and what is not.
> A 
> buddhist with a good knowledge of the Tipitaka will not necessary
> know 
> what the right object of mindfulness should be, let alone know what
> the 
> conditions are for sati to arise. Which is why I consider "right
> view"( I 
> speak of the intellectual level ) as the most important aspect of the 
> Buddha's teachings. What I've noticed is that even with one
> `right view' 
> many wrong practices are seen for what they are and hence discarded. 
> I think one of the greatest stumbling blocks in our progress towards
> more understanding of the Buddha's teachings, is our tendency to
> be 
> stuck in old thought habits. We have very little knowledge of our 
> accumulated wrong view and so we do not notice the fault in our 
> reasoning, which is based on premises we take for granted.
> For example this idea about trying to be mindful in all situations
> has 
> been so much  popularized by meditation teachers and writers of today 
> that we are stuck with the story about it. We never even try to
> question 
> about its validity or even go deeper into the meaning of samatha and 
> vipassana, there is so much superficial appeal that we quickly grab
> the 
> idea and follow any or all who speak with a voice of authority.
> My own brief encounter with Goenka style of practice has shown me 
> how I was attached to the `goal' set by myself regarding time
> and place 
> of practice, how on the day I manage to more or less reach that goal 
> was a day I felt pleased with myself and on other days I would be 
> somewhat disappointed. Would it have been different had I thought 
> along the lines "if I reach the goal good, if I don't reach
> the goal also 
> good"? I doubt it. Why, because if there is no right
> understanding in the 
> beginning about what is taking place, then there is a moving towards
> a 
> goal and attachment to the outcome. Part of what I would call
> `right 
> understanding' would be, "All dhammas are anatta, they arise
> because 
> of conditions, sati being a dhamma will arise only when the
> conditions 
> are right for it to. Intention is a dhamma, it will arise and have
> the right 
> object only when it arises with sati  and a host of other kusala 
> dhammas."( I'm just repeating myself here, sorry.)
> Also in looking back, when walking around trying to be mindful of my 
> bodily movement, my thoughts etc., I don't remember ever having a 
> sense of `letting go' in relation to  having an insight into
> a situation, but 
> instead I was often reminding myself about the need to `let
> go' and so 
> end up in `trying to let go'. Did I ever have any idea that I
> was dealing 
> with concepts? NO! In other words I was blissfully unaware of what 
> was going on. So am I now, but at least I don't believe otherwise.
> But this is only my experience and I cannot speak for another. 

You make some very very good points here, Sukin.  I agree with a lot of what you
say.  I think one of the main areas where we may disagree, as I find a similar
disagreement with Jon, is whether or not certain practices can be assumed to
eventually lead to kusala, sati, panna, and all the other positive qualities. 
Another point is whether putting forth intentions implies that there is a self,
and that the only way to acknowledge anatta is by admitting that nothing can be
done to either speed or slow the path.  One has to kind of sneak in Sutta study
and discernment in a passive, natural way, so that the notion of self won't get in
and ruin it.  [Hope you don't mind me being a little facetious to highlight the
point.]

I personally think [for whatever that's worth -- not much, I hear Jon saying...my
God, I've internalized him!] that sitting with attention to the breath or to the
present moment will eventually yield increased discernment, and lead to sati and
panna.  I add that of course if one does this in an unskillful way it may not lead
to any such results, but the practice itself, done with some reasonable
understanding and instruction, tends to lead in the right direction.  I think that
most Abhidhammists will tend to disagree with this, and say that we cannot
possibly predict the arising of kusala based on any given practice.

I also believe that intention can be put forth by cittas and that this cumulative
intention will eventually tend to yield positive fruit.  And I think some take
this to imply that there must be a self being posited that will both put this
effort forth and yield the fruit of that intention.  I contend that this is not
necessarily so, and that intention can be put forth, just as we put forth this or
that cause through the production of consciousness.  We have a moment of anger and
the intention arises to either hold it back and take a deep breath or to yell and
scream.  There is a moment of decision there as well.  There may also be a moment
where we say, 'okay, let's not act on this anger in future' and eventually this
may have an effect in that direction.  Can we choose to have an intention and then
have it?  I don't know.  But I do think the putting forth of intention can yield
an eventual result that arises from that intention.  My own life seems to give
evidence for this.

One more comment below.

  Let me 
> now go to your next point.
> 
> You said:
> And if the thought arises and is agreed to by subsequent 
> consciousnesses: `well there is no use in exerting mundane effort
> and 
> intention, since the results are really out of my control', what
> fruits will 
> that yield?
> 
> Sukin:
> If I am doing nothing, I am still doing something, viriya cetasika is
> still 
> there. Only its object will be different. I still have to consider
> what is 
> kusala and what is not. But what do I do? The cittas have already
> fallen 
> away before their affect have fallen into awareness, so there is 
> nothing to be done about those. What about the future cittas, akusala 
> can arise again?  So they will, if the conditions are there, if the
> kilesas 
> are still in plenty. Does this mean I do nothing about it? Yes! I
> cannot do 
> anything directly about my kilesas, but I can have `right
> understanding' 
> and this will influence the accumulated tendencies. Sati and panna
> can 
> arise in the future and whatever that can be done with regard to
> akusala
> will be done by these cetasikas, not by anything else. And is this
> control, 
> I don't think so. There is no trying to do anything directly with
> whatever 
> is arising now.  When I read the posts on dsg for instance, it's
> mostly a 
> desire to understand more but sometimes there is chanda to have more 
> understanding. But in either case there is no thinking that I will
> one day 
> be able to be mindful of all situations or that sati will arise more
> often. 
> Such thinking I think is based  on lobha, it will not lead to the goal.
> I think this answers (or at least I hope it does, since I'm
> already feeling 
> so tired, I type at snail's pace) your points below too.
> 
> You said:
>  So I don't think that trying to
> intervene in the process of delusion and ignorance necessarily
> implies 
> that one is promoting a self-concept, in and of itself. I think we
> can put 
> our minds in the right direction by `going along' with the
> proper thoughts 
> and intentions when they arise, and follow the Buddha's lead in 
> promoting the breakup of ignorance. 
> 
> As a last thought, if we try to study the Dhamma and practice 
> discernment, does this or does this not imply the idea that there is 
> a `self' to be enlightened?  If there weren't,
> wouldn't we just drop the 
> whole thing and go about our daily lives, knowing that there was no
> self 
> and therefore the path was unnecessary?
> 
> So I think there is virtually no escape from the idea that `we
> use the 
> idea of self to defeat the idea of self'. Since we are incapable
> of 
> dropping the idea of self, which would be the most convenient end to 
> suffering, we use it to eradicate itself, and have no other choice in
> life. I 
> think if we pretend that we will study Dhamma with no self-concept 
> influencing our intentions, we are being deluded about being deluded. 
> An interesting possibility.......
> 
> Sukin:
> The possibility of being deluded are plenty, especially for me. I
> hope I 
> can at least have good cheer arise whenever I'm confronted with the 
> truth and not feel discouraged. But this too arises with some level
> of 
> panna no? ..sigh....
> 
> Best wishes,
> Sukin

Good cheer is always of great value.  And I again appreciate the dialogue with
you.  Hope to have more.

best,
Robert Ep.




 
13382 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:27pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Samatha bhavana - Rob Ep

 
  Hi Jon,
Long time to get back to you on this.
Can you say a word on how the understanding of realities of the present moment
lead to the realisation of the Noble Eightfold Path?

I see that you say that this is the most difficult aspect of the dhamma to come to
terms with, and it seems that I cannot always make the connection between
discernment of realities and how this leads to the Noble Eightfold Path.

I agree that this is a most fruitful area for discussion.

Thanks,
Robert Ep.

=============================

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob E
> 
> I particularly liked your remarks that: 
> > … being present to the reality of the moment to the greatest extent
> > possible is … something that can be done at any time
> > and which is surely the correct practice in daily life.  So that may be
> > something we can all agree on, while we argue about everything else.  <g>
> 
> As you say, we can keep up the discussion on other (doctrinal) points, but
> let's not neglect giving each other support in understanding the reality of the
> present moment at any time.  
> 
> Personally, I see this as the most useful thing that can be discussed on this
> list.  It is the understanding of the realities ('dhammas') of the present
> moment that leads to the realisation of the Noble Eightfold Path.
> 
> In my view this is also by far the most difficult aspect of the teaching to
> come to terms with.
> 
> Jon
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: > 
> > --- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> > > Rob E
> > > 
> > > Needless to say, I fully agree with your closing remarks here, that 
> > > "> Certainly, there is nothing that
> > > > should lead us to wait to enquire into the reality of the moment through
> > > > direct seeing.  That is the ground upon which everything else pivots"
> > > and I would be interested to hear your thoughts on how this should proceed.
> > > 
> > > Jon
> > 
> > By any means necessary.  Including being present to whatever is arising in
> > the
> > moment with all currently available faculties, and anything else that is
> > within
> > the practitioner's predilections.
> > 
> > But my point was, I think [memory is not my strongest suit] that whether or
> > not
> > one wants to meditate or do anything else to maximize growth towards
> > enlightenment, being present to the reality of the moment to the greatest
> > extent
> > possible is, as you and others have said, something that can be done at any
> > time
> > and which is surely the correct practice in daily life.  So that may be
> > something
> > we can all agree on, while we argue about everything else.  <g>
> > 
> > > PS  While in a manner of speaking I admire your confidence in your own
> > sense of
> > > reasoning, nevertheless a well-developed sense of reasoning (whether it be
> > > reasoning based on a linear or a dialectic/synergistic view of the
> > world(!)) is
> > > not something that I would see a being particularly an asset in a person
> > when
> > > it comes to understanding the teachings.  As you know, I think the crucial
> > > thing is to ascertain exactly what the Buddha was saying about how things
> > are,
> > > and this may require the (temporary) suspension of one’s own, otherwise
> > > well-reasoned, views.
> > 
> > I'm not saying my way of reasoning is correct, only that I have this
> > tendency. 
> > Everyone else on the planet also has one or another tendency towards thinking
> > this
> > way or that way.  I agree that identifying and suspending one's own
> > 'automatic'
> > tendencies and looking directly at the Dhamma is a good practice.
> > 
> > Doesn't guarantee that we'll be successful, or that your or my view will be
> > more
> > or less correct.  So we're stuck doing the best we can, until things get
> > better.
> > 
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> 
> 



 
13383 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:32pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration - Rob Ep (II)

 
  Hi Jon.
Well, I never saw this post and I really enjoyed it.  Thanks for your kind
explanation of the emphases in Abhidhamma.  As I have been giving the Abhidhamma a
rather hard time on paramatha dhammas lately, and probably causing some akusala
reactions to arise towards myself, I would like to say that I think your
explanation for the emphasis on dry insight makes a lot of sense.  The belief that
there will be subsequent lifetimes when the dhamma will not be available also
helps to explain the current emphasis on dhamma study.

In any case, thanks.  I am trying to understand some of the points of emphasis
that seem to exist here, and this helps me quite a bit.

Best,
Robert Ep.

===============

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: 
> > Dear Jon,
> ....
> > If Abhidhamma has any seeming prejudice [and I would contend that every single
> > system, including every system of Buddhism does, including my own 'favorites']
> it
> > is the idea that discernment of realities alone is really of utmost value, and
> > that other efforts or practices are either distracting or ineffectual.   For
> > instance, there have been discussions lately about Right Concentration and
> whether
> > it is constituted of the jhanas.  Although the Buddha seems to explicitly
> state
> > that it is constituted by the jhanas, this is interpreted in an indirect way
> to
> > mean something else, because cultivation would take the factor out of the
> > exclusive realm of the stages of enlightenment.  It is also pointed out that
> the
> > difficulty of attaining the jhanas is beyond the capability of most people,
> > enormously difficult.  But I would say that the discernment of namas and rupas
> is
> > equally hard, and so why not cultivate the former as well as the latter? 
> However
> > many lifetimes it may take, if we are to follow the Buddha's advice, we should
> be
> > cultivating all that he advises, and let the process begin at the stage that
> we're at. 
> 
> 
> It's true that the abhidhamma does not support the view of *mundane jhana as a
> necessary
> prerequisite* for the arising of magga citta (enlightenment consciousness).  It
> does,
> however, support the description of Right Concentration as being *concentration
> of an
> intensity equivalent to that of mundane jhana* arising at moments of path
> consciousness
> (enlightenment).
> 
> To suggest that this indicates a prejudice against samatha is I think to
> prejudge the
> issue (no pun intended!).  It all depends on the view you take of the sutta
> passages,
> which is the very issue we are discussing here.  As I said in an earlier
> message, the
> sutta description of the 8 path factors is far from clearly being a 'how to
> cultivate'
> guide.
> 
> You might be interested to know that the abhidhamma contains extremely detailed
> descriptions of the different realities involved at the different levels of
> jhana.  One
> would almost say there was a disproportionately large amount of such detail.
> 
> Also, as you may have noticed, the suttas themselves contain relatively little
> about *how
> to cultivate* samatha/the jhanas (typically the references in the suttas either
> allude to
> someone who is developing or is already adept at this practice, or they describe
> the role
> of samadhi (concentration) in various attainments including but not exclusively
> insight).
>  The greatest detail on the 'how to' of samatha/concentration is to be found in
> that
> reputedly "abhidhammic" commentary the Visuddhimagga  (in my copy, pages 85 to
> 434 deal
> with concentration, vs. pages 435 to 740 for understanding) and there is also
> quite a lot
> of detail in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha .  
> 
> So I don't think there's any 'anti-samatha' bias in the abhidhamma .  ;-)) 
> 
> In another post (to Nina) you say:
> I wonder if there is a special reason why Abhidhamma followers seem to emphasize
> the 'dry insight' approach.
> 
> I think any apparent emphasis is simply the appreciation that, if the
> development of
> vipassana is something that can take place independently of the development of
> samatha
> (even though both may also be developed in parallel), then the priority should
> be to find
> out as much as possible about the former in the limited time available.  This
> does not
> mean ignoring samatha, any more than it means ignoring other forms of kusala,
> but it
> means appreciating the rarity of this opportunity of having the essence of the
> dhamma
> available (there will be plenty of lifetimes in the future when there will be no
> dhamma,
> only teachings on other forms of kusala, including the jhanas).
> 
> Nor does it mean that those who understand the subtlety of the Buddha's teaching
> on this
> point have no personal interest in the development of samatha.  But, to
> paraphrase
> Howard, if there was time for the study of only one or the other, is there any
> doubt as
> to what the choice should be?
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
> 



 
13384 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 4:33pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] Right Concentration - Rob Ep (II)

 
  I would also like to look into the Visudhimagga and see what is said about the
jhanas.  

Hmmn....that means homework......

Best,
Robert Ep.

==========

--- Jonothan Abbott  wrote:
> Rob Ep
> 
> --- Robert Epstein  wrote: 
> > Dear Jon,
> ....
> > If Abhidhamma has any seeming prejudice [and I would contend that every single
> > system, including every system of Buddhism does, including my own 'favorites']
> it
> > is the idea that discernment of realities alone is really of utmost value, and
> > that other efforts or practices are either distracting or ineffectual.   For
> > instance, there have been discussions lately about Right Concentration and
> whether
> > it is constituted of the jhanas.  Although the Buddha seems to explicitly
> state
> > that it is constituted by the jhanas, this is interpreted in an indirect way
> to
> > mean something else, because cultivation would take the factor out of the
> > exclusive realm of the stages of enlightenment.  It is also pointed out that
> the
> > difficulty of attaining the jhanas is beyond the capability of most people,
> > enormously difficult.  But I would say that the discernment of namas and rupas
> is
> > equally hard, and so why not cultivate the former as well as the latter? 
> However
> > many lifetimes it may take, if we are to follow the Buddha's advice, we should
> be
> > cultivating all that he advises, and let the process begin at the stage that
> we're at. 
> 
> 
> It's true that the abhidhamma does not support the view of *mundane jhana as a
> necessary
> prerequisite* for the arising of magga citta (enlightenment consciousness).  It
> does,
> however, support the description of Right Concentration as being *concentration
> of an
> intensity equivalent to that of mundane jhana* arising at moments of path
> consciousness
> (enlightenment).
> 
> To suggest that this indicates a prejudice against samatha is I think to
> prejudge the
> issue (no pun intended!).  It all depends on the view you take of the sutta
> passages,
> which is the very issue we are discussing here.  As I said in an earlier
> message, the
> sutta description of the 8 path factors is far from clearly being a 'how to
> cultivate'
> guide.
> 
> You might be interested to know that the abhidhamma contains extremely detailed
> descriptions of the different realities involved at the different levels of
> jhana.  One
> would almost say there was a disproportionately large amount of such detail.
> 
> Also, as you may have noticed, the suttas themselves contain relatively little
> about *how
> to cultivate* samatha/the jhanas (typically the references in the suttas either
> allude to
> someone who is developing or is already adept at this practice, or they describe
> the role
> of samadhi (concentration) in various attainments including but not exclusively
> insight).
>  The greatest detail on the 'how to' of samatha/concentration is to be found in
> that
> reputedly "abhidhammic" commentary the Visuddhimagga  (in my copy, pages 85 to
> 434 deal
> with concentration, vs. pages 435 to 740 for understanding) and there is also
> quite a lot
> of detail in the Abhidhammattha Sangaha .  
> 
> So I don't think there's any 'anti-samatha' bias in the abhidhamma .  ;-)) 
> 
> In another post (to Nina) you say:
> I wonder if there is a special reason why Abhidhamma followers seem to emphasize
> the 'dry insight' approach.
> 
> I think any apparent emphasis is simply the appreciation that, if the
> development of
> vipassana is something that can take place independently of the development of
> samatha
> (even though both may also be developed in parallel), then the priority should
> be to find
> out as much as possible about the former in the limited time available.  This
> does not
> mean ignoring samatha, any more than it means ignoring other forms of kusala,
> but it
> means appreciating the rarity of this opportunity of having the essence of the
> dhamma
> available (there will be plenty of lifetimes in the future when there will be no
> dhamma,
> only teachings on other forms of kusala, including the jhanas).
> 
> Nor does it mean that those who understand the subtlety of the Buddha's teaching
> on this
> point have no personal interest in the development of samatha.  But, to
> paraphrase
> Howard, if there was time for the study of only one or the other, is there any
> doubt as
> to what the choice should be?
> 
> Jon
> 
> 
> 



 
13385 From: christine_forsyth   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 5:02pm
Subject: Lunch with Azita was Re: [dsg] SE QLD

 
  Dear All,
Just a few of my impressions from Sunday Lunch with Azita and SarahF.:
It really looked like SarahF and I would make it on time to meet 
Azita in Maleny at 11.00 a.m.  SarahF had nominated herself as driver 
and appropriated the keys (due to an Entirely False myth about me 
driving 60 kms. in a southerly direction when I was supposedly going 
north.)  So we set off. An hour or so later, a slight query arose in 
my mind when we turned right at Mooloolaba (towards the ocean) rather 
than left (towards the hills and rainforest) - but, as I DO admit to 
a very occasional left hand/right hand confusion, I decided to say 
nothing.  Ten minutes later, SarahF decided she should have taken the 
Maroochydore turnoff, not the Mooloolaba one.  At this point, I 
regret my impulsive remark about 'genetics' as it didn't seem to help 
things... :-)  Eventually, going the 'scenic route', via surf beaches 
and hinterland towns, and one more detour up the long driveway of 
the "Word of Life" Church, we arrived at Maleny. Still speaking to 
each other. :-)
The grandeur and beauty along the rim road was worth the slight 
detours to get there.
Actually we were only  fifteen minutes late. Amazing how a slight 
anxiety can alter the impression of time passing....   Azita was at 
the designated meeting point (a bank) wearing the designated clothes, 
sitting on the footpath (casual town) and reading Nyanaponika Thera 
and Hellmuth Hecker's "Great Disciples of the Buddha"......who else 
could it be but her?  Too easy!
No awkwardness at all, hugs and smiles all round, and we decided to 
settle onto the verandah of The Maple 3 Cafe across the street. Warm 
sunshine and cool breezes. From that first moment, our discussions 
were as if we had known each other for years.... or :-) perhaps for 
lifetimes?:-)
Pacing ourselves carefully, with pots of tea, spreading luncheon 
courses out, and more pots of tea, we managed to occupy the table for 
about three and a half hours.   Discussions ranged over Jons' post to 
me that morning (Is Kamma unstoppable?),  Kamma in general, bodily 
pleasant feeling and mental unpleasant feeling - kusala kamma and 
accumulations of dosa, seeing and visible object and nama and rupa in 
general.  We also talked about meeting more Aussie's who are studying 
Dhamma and Abhidhamma and ways to increase our circle of 'admirable 
friends' before, oh so reluctantly, making our farewells.  I have 
included a couple of links (mainly for SarahA who has been to Maleny 
before it grew into a tourist town - 4,000 inhabitants nowadays, and 
Azita says many of the same people are living in the Community).  The 
community is named Manduka after the frog that listened to Dhamma 
before being squashed, and having a fortunate rebirth. I think the 
connection is environmental?
http://www.queensland-holidays.com.au/pfm/sites/0000737/main.htm
http://www.tourmaleny.com.au/
http://www.cybersayer.com/sunweb/places/maleny.html
We are really looking forward to the July Weekend (with our 
international visitors :-)) - and it looks like a couple of new 
friends may be coming too, as well as hopefully KenH and Stigan. 
Going home, SarahF acknowledged that she had enjoyed the day and not 
been bored for a moment. Considering she doesn't know much about 
Buddhism, I felt quite heartened.  She is happy to come on the July 
weekend as well. :-)

Oh, one thing I forgot to mention.  We may have to 'do something' 
about Azita and her computer knowledge.  Her Dhamma knowledge is 
great, but I.T.  comprehension is very sad.... :-)  Did you know she 
once had hundreds upon hundreds of messages in her email in-box - 
(didn't think they'd keep coming with the computer off?), and didn't 
know until today how to  read at the website?  Did you know that she 
hasn't been fussed on the photos in the photo section of dsg 
because 'who can really see what people look like when the photo is 
so infinitesimally small?'  Did you know she hasn't .... but I'll 
stop here, .... I'm going to try to help, but this could mean more 
trouble than she already has.... :-) 
 Sorry Azita - one thing I learned from the honoured list moderators 
is that you musn't trust Anyone when you are content and relaxed over 
shared meals and Dhamma discussions.  Remind me to tell you of my BKK 
experiences with 'them', preferably before July. :) :) :)
metta 
Christine  

---  "Jaran Jainhuknan"  wrote:
> Christine:
> Good to hear from you. Thanks for the explanation. Have fun. Looking
> forward to your account of the lunch-on.
> Good day,
> jaran
> 
> Hi Jaran,
> 
> SE QLD means 'South East Queensland'.  Azita is down from Cairns on
> holiday in Maleny - a couple of hours drive north of Brisbane.  She
> and I (plus SarahF) are meeting for Dhamma discussions overlunch on
> Sunday, which I am very much looking forward to. :-)
> 
> metta,
> Christine

 
13386 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 6:29pm
Subject: Re: Satipatthana-vibhanga Sutta Re: [dsg] Sitting and mindfulness [Anders]

 
  Hi, Robert -

In a message dated 5/19/02 2:55:12 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> Dear Howard,
> Re. your nice breakdown of the sutra below: Interesting, that the noble 
> eightfold
> path is clearly announced as a path of practice, and not merely a 
> description of
> what occurs under the right conditions, wouldn't you agree?
> 
-----------------------------------------------------
       I don't want to come on too strong, Rob. The sutta speaks for itself - 
I'm just putting it out there.
----------------------------------------------------

> 
> I would like to hear what Jon has to say about this:  is it descriptive or
> prescriptive?
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
==========================
With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13387 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 7:09pm
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  Hi, Rob and Victor -

       We use conventional expressions all the time that have meaning, but 
not literal meaning. If we say that our alarm clock turns itself on at the 
preset time or that a VCR turns itself off after recording, we are not 
assuming a "self" in these things. It is clear what we DO mean, and it is not 
a philosophical assertion.
       Whether or not there is something in, about, identical with, 
associated with, or underlying the khandhas which is properly called a "self" 
may be asserted or denied. However, so far no one seems to encounter such 
when looking for it. It not being found, a pragmatic approach takes it to be 
at least irrelevant, and, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. Moreover, 
the Buddha *did* teach that with stream entry a *belief* in 'self' is gone, 
and that with arahatta even any odor of 'self' is gone. Inasmuch as these are 
states of liberation and enlightenment, it certainly suggests to me that 
while *beliefs* in 'self' and in 'no-self' are just that - beliefs, the 
*fact* of the matter is that there is no self. 
       At this point, I have no belief in a self at all. All I find is 
impersonal, empty phenomena "rolling on". Included among these phenomena is 
the frequently arising "sense" of self, but that is all it seems to be, this 
"sense" - one more impersonal condition arising and ceasing from time to time 
as part of the ongoing flux of conditioned experience.

With metta,
Howard


In a message dated 5/19/02 3:07:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> --- yuzhonghao  wrote:
> > TG,
> > 
> > For the statement "there is no self",
> > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > 
> > For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this 
> > verse with you:
> > 
> > 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train 
> > others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is 
> > self-control.
> 
> Dear Victor,
> Here we have a clear description of the Buddha advocating self-control.  
> Now, I
> wonder if those who believe there is 'no control' because there is no 
> 'self' will
> explaint that this is merely conventional speech and does not refer to 
> either a
> 'self' or an actual imperative to 'exercise control' over oneself?
> 
> One can always say that something the Buddha said was not actually what he 
> meant
> because it is merely conventional speech, while when the Buddha says 
> something
> that is in accord with what one regards as the path, one will say that the 
> Buddha
> meant it literally.  
> 
> It is a slippery slope, because it means that we are making distinctions 
> between
> different suttas, or even different statements in the same sutta, based on 
> our
> prior beliefs.
> 
> It is an equally slippery slope to maintain the opposite, that the Buddha 
> was
> being literal when he says that we should maintain self-control, but 
> metaphoric or
> conventional when he says something else that we disagree with.  To make 
> these
> kinds of distinctions at all is fraught with danger.
> 
> So what is the correct view?  We do not want to wind up like some 
> interpreters of
> the Bible who conclude based on taking it literally [according to their
> interpretation of what is literal] that the earth is only 5,000 years old, 
> in the
> face of all scientific evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, we do 
> not want
> to wind up in the position of those who insist that the only experiences 
> that are
> believeable are those which can be scientifically tested.
> 
> It seems to me that in general, we should take the Buddha literally, unless 
> we
> have some evidence to the contrary.   What is the evidence that 'one should
> practice self-control' is merely conventional, and not a true imperative?  
> Well,
> since Buddha states clearly that none of the five khandas can be considered 
> to
> have the property of 'self', there are two possibilities:  what he 
> considers
> 'self' is beyond the five kandhas, or:  he is asking practitioners to 
> attempt to
> control certain arising phenomena, in the understanding that such attempt 
> will
> have certain results which will be beneficial to their progress.  
> 
> I think it may satisfy both camps if we say that he is addressing the 
> conventional
> self and asking his listeners to attempt to exercise control over akusala
> conditions, even though such control may not be possible, in the 
> understanding
> that this will have certain effects, though they are not caused directly by 
> the
> practitioner.  
> 
> This is very similar to other Buddhist practices.  If one practices 
> meditation,
> the worst form of such practice is to struggle directly with the mind and 
> attempt
> to control it, which leads to tension and frustration.  One follows certain
> practices, trusting that eventually they will yield the fruit.  The 
> practice is
> voluntary, but the results are involuntary.  If one practices discernment 
> in daily
> life, it is the same thing:  one pays attention to the attempt to discern 
> namas
> and rupas, knowing that most of the time he or she will fail, but 
> eventually the
> attempt to do so will yield fruit.  There is intention, but not control. It
> explains why the sutta is useful, without falling into the fallacy of an 
> atta
> which can take action.
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 


/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13388 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 11:17pm
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  Howard,

For the statement "there is no self"
see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

Regards,
Victor

---  <> wrote:
> Hi, Rob and Victor -
> 
>        We use conventional expressions all the time that have 
meaning, but 
> not literal meaning. If we say that our alarm clock turns itself on 
at the 
> preset time or that a VCR turns itself off after recording, we are 
not 
> assuming a "self" in these things. It is clear what we DO mean, and 
it is not 
> a philosophical assertion.
>        Whether or not there is something in, about, identical with, 
> associated with, or underlying the khandhas which is properly 
called a "self" 
> may be asserted or denied. However, so far no one seems to 
encounter such 
> when looking for it. It not being found, a pragmatic approach takes 
it to be 
> at least irrelevant, and, for all practical purposes, nonexistent. 
Moreover, 
> the Buddha *did* teach that with stream entry a *belief* in 'self' 
is gone, 
> and that with arahatta even any odor of 'self' is gone. Inasmuch as 
these are 
> states of liberation and enlightenment, it certainly suggests to me 
that 
> while *beliefs* in 'self' and in 'no-self' are just that - beliefs, 
the 
> *fact* of the matter is that there is no self. 
>        At this point, I have no belief in a self at all. All I find 
is 
> impersonal, empty phenomena "rolling on". Included among these 
phenomena is 
> the frequently arising "sense" of self, but that is all it seems to 
be, this 
> "sense" - one more impersonal condition arising and ceasing from 
time to time 
> as part of the ongoing flux of conditioned experience.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard
> 
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 3:07:09 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> <> writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > --- yuzhonghao  wrote:

 
13389 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 7:21pm
Subject: Re: [dsg] 4 Ultimate Realities?

 
  Hi, Rob -

In a message dated 5/19/02 3:45:58 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Robert Ep writes:


> 
> --- Howard wrote:
> > Hi, Jon -
> 
>     Do you 
> > > see a necessary
> > > contradiction in these 2 attributes (conditionality vs. own essence)?
> > > 
> > -------------------------------------------------------
> > Howard:
> >        The problem I have here is with the adjectival phrase "of their 
> own" 
> > in the sentence "The fact that these phenomena are conditioned and last 
> for 
> > only a brief moment doesn't mean that they lack characteristics of their 
> own 
> > capable of being discerned by consciousness accompanied by panna (termed 
> > 'individual essence')." Everything about these phenomena, including their 
> 
> > very existence, arises in total dependence on conditions, all of which 
> are 
> > equally empty of own-being. What arises in total dependence on other 
> > conditions does not have own-being, and inasmuch as these other 
> conditions 
> > are equally without own-being, the emptiness is thoroughgoing.
> > ----------------------------------------------------------
> >
> Dear Howard,
> I would really like to pay a little more attention this important point of 
> yours. 
> Do the terms paramatha dhamma, own-being and dhammas having their own 
> independent
> characteristics not imply a substantial quality these fleeting appearances? 
>  Is
> there not an implication of substantiality, and is it not inherent in the 
> terms
> and the feeling that is created around them?
> 
> I keep seeing these terms as a kind of hidden life-raft within the 
> philosophy of
> Abhidhamma, and it is as much their implied feeling as it is their explicit
> definition.  When you say 'the emptiness is thoroughgoing' it makes me 
> heave a
> sigh of relief, because the sense of own-being and independent 
> characteristics
> seems laden with the burden of substantiality.  It just carries that 
> flavor.  One
> can explain it differently, but why do those ideas exist? 
> 
> What is the sense of own-being if not a sense of substantiality?  What 
> other
> purpose does it serve?  It seems to implicitly undercut emptiness and 
> anatta.  If
> something has own-being, it has entity.  And if it has entity, it does not 
> partake
> of anatta.   Own-being seems to me to be nothing other than another way of 
> saying
> 'entity' or 'being'.  It even has the word 'being' in it, and 'own', which 
> means
> that it belongs to one, ie, the entity in question.  Together with 
> Buddhaghosa
> saying that the paramatha dhammas are the 'final irreduceible entities of
> experience', it really makes me feel that there is a hidden substantiality 
> and
> entity at play in these words.  How can something have an 'individual 
> essence' and
> not be identified as an entity?
> 
> Otherwise, why not just say that these experiences are insubstantial and
> momentary, which would be in the direction of anatta and anicca?
> 
> Can you have something that is solid and empty at the same time?
> 
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> 
=============================
       I agree that terminology is *very* important. How we think is strongly 
influenced by the descriptive terms used. I will not second-guess the 
motivation of using sabhava-like terminology in some Theravadin writings - 
there may be no substantialist motivation at all, and the intention may be, 
as Robert K points out, nothing more than the ascription of characteristics 
to elements of experience. However, I do think that the pragmatics of such 
language use is harmful, controversial, and misleading.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13390 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 7:45pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi, Victor -

In a message dated 5/19/02 11:18:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
Victor writes:


> 
> Howard,
> 
> For the statement "there is no self"
> see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 
> 
===========================
       Yes. This well known sutta is a great example of the Buddha not 
replying to a person out of kindness and knowledge, knowing that the state of 
that person's mind is such that any answer will be misunderstood.

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         



 
13391 From: Howard 
Date: Sun May 19, 2002 7:57pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi, all -

In a message dated 5/19/02 11:46:03 AM Eastern Daylight Time, Howard 
ambiguously writes:


> This well known sutta is a great example of the Buddha not 
> replying to a person out of kindness and knowledge, knowing that the state 
> of 
> that person's mind is such that any answer will be misunderstood.
> 
============================
       The foregoing could be read as saying that the Buddha did not reply 
out of kindness and knowledge (that is, replied unkindly and ignorantly!), 
which, of course, is not at all what I meant. I should have formulated this 
as follows:
***************
This well known sutta is a great example of the Buddha, out of kindness and 
knowledge, and knowing that the state of a person's mind was such that any 
answer would be misunderstood, choosing to not reply to that person.
**************

With metta,
Howard

/Thus is how ye shall see all this fleeting world: A star at dawn, a bubble 
in a stream, a flash of lightning in a summer cloud, a flickering lamp, a 
phantom, and a dream./            (From the Diamond Sutra)                    
            
                                         

 
13392 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 0:05am
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Howard,

"Ananda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is 
a self -- were to answer that there is a self, that would be 
conforming with those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of 
eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If 
I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with 
those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism 
[the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness].

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html

Regards,
Victor

---  <> wrote:
> Hi, Victor -
> 
> In a message dated 5/19/02 11:18:26 AM Eastern Daylight Time, 
> <> writes:
> 
> 
> > 
> > Howard,
> > 
> > For the statement "there is no self"
> > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> > 
> ===========================
>        Yes. This well known sutta is a great example of the Buddha 
not 
> replying to a person out of kindness and knowledge, knowing that 
the state of 
> that person's mind is such that any answer will be misunderstood.
> 
> With metta,
> Howard

 
13393 From: yuzhonghao   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 0:13am
Subject: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  Another quote I would like to share with the group:

"[1] Of those, right view is the forerunner. And how is right view 
the forerunner? One discerns wrong view as wrong view, and right view 
as right view. This is one's right view. And what is wrong 
view? 'There is nothing given, nothing offered, nothing sacrificed. 
There is no fruit or result of good or bad actions. There is no this 
world, no next world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously reborn 
beings; no priests or contemplatives who, faring rightly & practicing 
rightly, proclaim this world & the next after having directly known & 
realized it for themselves.' This is wrong view. 

"And what is right view? Right view, I tell you, is of two sorts: 
There is right view with fermentations [asava], siding with merit, 
resulting in the acquisitions [of becoming]; and there is noble right 
view, without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of the path. 

"And what is the right view that has fermentations, sides with merit, 
& results in acquisitions? 'There is what is given, what is offered, 
what is sacrificed. There are fruits & results of good & bad actions. 
There is this world & the next world. There is mother & father. There 
are spontaneously reborn beings; there are priests & contemplatives 
who, faring rightly & practicing rightly, proclaim this world & the 
next after having directly known & realized it for themselves.' This 
is the right view that has fermentations, sides with merit, & results 
in acquisitions. 

"And what is the right view that is without fermentations, 
transcendent, a factor of the path? The discernment, the faculty of 
discernment, the strength of discernment, analysis of qualities as a 
factor for Awakening, the path factor of right view in one developing 
the noble path whose mind is noble, whose mind is free from 
fermentations, who is fully possessed of the noble path. This is the 
right view that is without fermentations, transcendent, a factor of 
the path. 

"One tries to abandon wrong view & to enter into right view: This is 
one's right effort. One is mindful to abandon wrong view & to enter & 
remain in right view: This is one's right mindfulness. Thus these 
three qualities -- right view, right effort, & right mindfulness -- 
run & circle around right view. 

See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/majjhima/mn117.html

Regards,
Victor

 
13394 From: Ray Hendrickson   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 3:33am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when talking about
self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the Connected
Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu Bodhi we
read on page102 #64
"No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
He still might say, 'I speak,'
He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
He uses such terms as mere expressions."

The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, but I
forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the passage.  So as
well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence from the
Canon that the Buddha does use such terms as a "mere expressions."

----- Original Message -----
From: "Robert Epstein" 
Sent: Sunday, May 19, 2002 12:06 AM
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]


>
> --- yuzhonghao  wrote:
> > TG,
> >
> > For the statement "there is no self",
> > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> >
> > For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share this
> > verse with you:
> >
> > 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would train
> > others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, indeed, is
> > self-control.
>
> Dear Victor,
> Here we have a clear description of the Buddha advocating self-control.
Now, I
> wonder if those who believe there is 'no control' because there is no
'self' will
> explaint that this is merely conventional speech and does not refer to
either a
> 'self' or an actual imperative to 'exercise control' over oneself?
>
> One can always say that something the Buddha said was not actually what he
meant
> because it is merely conventional speech, while when the Buddha says
something
> that is in accord with what one regards as the path, one will say that the
Buddha
> meant it literally.
>
> It is a slippery slope, because it means that we are making distinctions
between
> different suttas, or even different statements in the same sutta, based on
our
> prior beliefs.
>
> It is an equally slippery slope to maintain the opposite, that the Buddha
was
> being literal when he says that we should maintain self-control, but
metaphoric or
> conventional when he says something else that we disagree with.  To make
these
> kinds of distinctions at all is fraught with danger.
>
> So what is the correct view?  We do not want to wind up like some
interpreters of
> the Bible who conclude based on taking it literally [according to their
> interpretation of what is literal] that the earth is only 5,000 years old,
in the
> face of all scientific evidence to the contrary. On the other hand, we do
not want
> to wind up in the position of those who insist that the only experiences
that are
> believeable are those which can be scientifically tested.
>
> It seems to me that in general, we should take the Buddha literally,
unless we
> have some evidence to the contrary.   What is the evidence that 'one
should
> practice self-control' is merely conventional, and not a true imperative?
Well,
> since Buddha states clearly that none of the five khandas can be
considered to
> have the property of 'self', there are two possibilities:  what he
considers
> 'self' is beyond the five kandhas, or:  he is asking practitioners to
attempt to
> control certain arising phenomena, in the understanding that such attempt
will
> have certain results which will be beneficial to their progress.
>
> I think it may satisfy both camps if we say that he is addressing the
conventional
> self and asking his listeners to attempt to exercise control over akusala
> conditions, even though such control may not be possible, in the
understanding
> that this will have certain effects, though they are not caused directly
by the
> practitioner.
>
> This is very similar to other Buddhist practices.  If one practices
meditation,
> the worst form of such practice is to struggle directly with the mind and
attempt
> to control it, which leads to tension and frustration.  One follows
certain
> practices, trusting that eventually they will yield the fruit.  The
practice is
> voluntary, but the results are involuntary.  If one practices discernment
in daily
> life, it is the same thing:  one pays attention to the attempt to discern
namas
> and rupas, knowing that most of the time he or she will fail, but
eventually the
> attempt to do so will yield fruit.  There is intention, but not control.
It
> explains why the sutta is useful, without falling into the fallacy of an
atta
> which can take action.
>
> Best,
> Robert Ep.
> > See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> >
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> >
> >
> > ---  <> wrote:

 
13395 From: TG 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:31am
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  In a message dated 5/19/2002 9:06:34 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
Victor writes:


> Howard,
> 
> "Ananda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is 
> a self -- were to answer that there is a self, that would be 
> conforming with those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of 
> eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If 
> I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
> were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with 
> those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism 
> [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness].
> 
> See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> 
> Regards,
> Victor
> 

Victor

It is misleading to leave out the most important part of this quote which 
follows immediately where you ended it.  This Sutta is particularly important 
because it proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Buddha "meant" to teach 
that "all things are not self."  I'll quote in full...

"Ananda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self 
-- were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those 
priests & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there 
is an eternal, unchanging soul]. 

If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- were 
to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those priests &
 contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is 
the annihilation of consciousness]. 

If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self -- were to 
answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of 
knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?" "No, lord." 

"And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become 
even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'" 

TG



 
13396 From: TG 
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 2:38am
Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  Thanks for supplying such a super appropriate quote rhen.  :)

In a message dated 5/19/2002 12:34:27 PM Pacific Daylight Time, 
<> writes:


> 
>   The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when talking about
> self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the Connected
> Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu Bodhi we
> read on page102 #64
> "No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
> For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
> Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
> He still might say, 'I speak,'
> He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
> Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
> He uses such terms as mere expressions."
> 
> The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, but I
> forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the passage.  So as
> well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence from the
> 





 
13397 From: robertkirkpatrick.rm   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 9:13am
Subject: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]

 
  ---

Dear Ray,
Thanks for the good points. There is a similar quote when the Buddha 
explains his use of terms like self or person: 
"These, Citta, are merely names, expressions, turns of speech,
designations in common use in the world. And of these a Tathagata 
makes
use indeed, but he does not misapprehend them" Digha 9.

Right view, of course understands that: "The mental and physical are 
really here
But here there is no human being to be found
for it is void and merely fashinoned like a doll
just suffering piled up like grass and sticks" (visuddhimagga XVIII)

And 
"There is no doer of a deed
Or one who reaps the deeds result
Phenomena alone flow on
No other view than this is right" (vis. XIX,19)
best wishes
robert



  "Ray Hendrickson"  
wrote:
>   The other evidence we have about speaking conventally when 
talking about
> self-control, etc comes from the Suttas themselves.  In the 
Connected
> Discourse, "A New Translation of the Samyutta Nikaya" by Bhikkhu 
Bodhi we
> read on page102 #64
> "No knots exist for one with conceit abandoned;
> For him all knots of conceit are consumed.
> Though the wise one has transcended the conceived,
> He still might say, 'I speak,'
> He might say too, 'They speak to me.'
> Skilful, knowing the world's parlance,
> He uses such terms as mere expressions."
> 
> The Buddha says the same thing about himself in a Sutta from MN, 
but I
> forget which number, but I am sure others here will know the 
passage.  So as
> well as the evidence you supplied, there is also this evidence 
from the
> Canon that the Buddha does use such terms as a "mere expressions."
> 
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Robert Epstein" 
> Sent: Sunday, May 19, 2002 12:06 AM
> Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Robert K.]
> 
> 
> >
> > --- yuzhonghao  wrote:
> > > TG,
> > >
> > > For the statement "there is no self",
> > > see http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > >
> > > For the statement "there is no control", I would like to share 
this
> > > verse with you:
> > >
> > > 159. One should do what one teaches others to do; if one would 
train
> > > others, one should be well controlled oneself. Difficult, 
indeed, is
> > > self-control.
> >
> > Dear Victor,
> > Here we have a clear description of the Buddha advocating self-
control.
> Now, I
> > wonder if those who believe there is 'no control' because there 
is no
> 'self' will
> > explaint that this is merely conventional speech and does not 
refer to
> either a
> > 'self' or an actual imperative to 'exercise control' over 
oneself?
> >
> > One can always say that something the Buddha said was not 
actually what he
> meant
> > because it is merely conventional speech, while when the Buddha 
says
> something
> > that is in accord with what one regards as the path, one will 
say that the
> Buddha
> > meant it literally.
> >
> > It is a slippery slope, because it means that we are making 
distinctions
> between
> > different suttas, or even different statements in the same 
sutta, based on
> our
> > prior beliefs.
> >
> > It is an equally slippery slope to maintain the opposite, that 
the Buddha
> was
> > being literal when he says that we should maintain self-control, 
but
> metaphoric or
> > conventional when he says something else that we disagree with.  
To make
> these
> > kinds of distinctions at all is fraught with danger.
> >
> > So what is the correct view?  We do not want to wind up like some
> interpreters of
> > the Bible who conclude based on taking it literally [according 
to their
> > interpretation of what is literal] that the earth is only 5,000 
years old,
> in the
> > face of all scientific evidence to the contrary. On the other 
hand, we do
> not want
> > to wind up in the position of those who insist that the only 
experiences
> that are
> > believeable are those which can be scientifically tested.
> >
> > It seems to me that in general, we should take the Buddha 
literally,
> unless we
> > have some evidence to the contrary.   What is the evidence 
that 'one
> should
> > practice self-control' is merely conventional, and not a true 
imperative?
> Well,
> > since Buddha states clearly that none of the five khandas can be
> considered to
> > have the property of 'self', there are two possibilities:  what 
he
> considers
> > 'self' is beyond the five kandhas, or:  he is asking 
practitioners to
> attempt to
> > control certain arising phenomena, in the understanding that 
such attempt
> will
> > have certain results which will be beneficial to their progress.
> >
> > I think it may satisfy both camps if we say that he is 
addressing the
> conventional
> > self and asking his listeners to attempt to exercise control 
over akusala
> > conditions, even though such control may not be possible, in the
> understanding
> > that this will have certain effects, though they are not caused 
directly
> by the
> > practitioner.
> >
> > This is very similar to other Buddhist practices.  If one 
practices
> meditation,
> > the worst form of such practice is to struggle directly with the 
mind and
> attempt
> > to control it, which leads to tension and frustration.  One 
follows
> certain
> > practices, trusting that eventually they will yield the fruit.  
The
> practice is
> > voluntary, but the results are involuntary.  If one practices 
discernment
> in daily
> > life, it is the same thing:  one pays attention to the attempt 
to discern
> namas
> > and rupas, knowing that most of the time he or she will fail, but
> eventually the
> > attempt to do so will yield fruit.  There is intention, but not 
control.
> It
> > explains why the sutta is useful, without falling into the 
fallacy of an
> atta
> > which can take action.
> >
> > Best,
> > Robert Ep.
> >
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > > See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/khuddaka/dhp1/12.html
> > >
> > > Regards,
> > > Victor
> > >
> > >
> > > ---  <> writes:


 
13398 From: Jonothan Abbott   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 11:03am
Subject: Re: Lunch with Azita was Re: [dsg] SE QLD

 
  Christine

Thanks very much for these reflections on your (you and SarahF)lunch with
Azita.  Entertaining reading in the taxi on a long and rain-soaked trip to
the airport.  Looking forward to seeing you all in July.

Jon
Bangkok

 --- christine_forsyth  wrote: > Dear All,
> Just a few of my impressions from Sunday Lunch with Azita and SarahF.:
> It really looked like SarahF and I would make it on time to meet 
> Azita in Maleny at 11.00 a.m.  SarahF had nominated herself as driver 
> and appropriated the keys (due to an Entirely False myth about me 
> driving 60 kms. in a southerly direction when I was supposedly going 
> north.)  So we set off. An hour or so later, a slight query arose in 
> my mind when we turned right at Mooloolaba (towards the ocean) rather 
> than left (towards the hills and rainforest) - but, as I DO admit to 
> a very occasional left hand/right hand confusion, I decided to say 
> nothing.  Ten minutes later, SarahF decided she should have taken the 
> Maroochydore turnoff, not the Mooloolaba one.  At this point, I 
> regret my impulsive remark about 'genetics' as it didn't seem to help 
> things... :-)  Eventually, going the 'scenic route', via surf beaches 
> and hinterland towns, and one more detour up the long driveway of 
> the "Word of Life" Church, we arrived at Maleny. Still speaking to 
> each other. :-)
> The grandeur and beauty along the rim road was worth the slight 
> detours to get there.
> Actually we were only  fifteen minutes late. Amazing how a slight 
> anxiety can alter the impression of time passing....   Azita was at 
> the designated meeting point (a bank) wearing the designated clothes, 
> sitting on the footpath (casual town) and reading Nyanaponika Thera 
> and Hellmuth Hecker's "Great Disciples of the Buddha"......who else 
> could it be but her?  Too easy!
> No awkwardness at all, hugs and smiles all round, and we decided to 
> settle onto the verandah of The Maple 3 Cafe across the street. Warm 
> sunshine and cool breezes. From that first moment, our discussions 
> were as if we had known each other for years.... or :-) perhaps for 
> lifetimes?:-)
> Pacing ourselves carefully, with pots of tea, spreading luncheon 
> courses out, and more pots of tea, we managed to occupy the table for 
> about three and a half hours.   Discussions ranged over Jons' post to 
> me that morning (Is Kamma unstoppable?),  Kamma in general, bodily 
> pleasant feeling and mental unpleasant feeling - kusala kamma and 
> accumulations of dosa, seeing and visible object and nama and rupa in 
> general.  We also talked about meeting more Aussie's who are studying 
> Dhamma and Abhidhamma and ways to increase our circle of 'admirable 
> friends' before, oh so reluctantly, making our farewells.  I have 
> included a couple of links (mainly for SarahA who has been to Maleny 
> before it grew into a tourist town - 4,000 inhabitants nowadays, and 
> Azita says many of the same people are living in the Community).  The 
> community is named Manduka after the frog that listened to Dhamma 
> before being squashed, and having a fortunate rebirth. I think the 
> connection is environmental?
> http://www.queensland-holidays.com.au/pfm/sites/0000737/main.htm
> http://www.tourmaleny.com.au/
> http://www.cybersayer.com/sunweb/places/maleny.html
> We are really looking forward to the July Weekend (with our 
> international visitors :-)) - and it looks like a couple of new 
> friends may be coming too, as well as hopefully KenH and Stigan. 
> Going home, SarahF acknowledged that she had enjoyed the day and not 
> been bored for a moment. Considering she doesn't know much about 
> Buddhism, I felt quite heartened.  She is happy to come on the July 
> weekend as well. :-)
> 
> Oh, one thing I forgot to mention.  We may have to 'do something' 
> about Azita and her computer knowledge.  Her Dhamma knowledge is 
> great, but I.T.  comprehension is very sad.... :-)  Did you know she 
> once had hundreds upon hundreds of messages in her email in-box - 
> (didn't think they'd keep coming with the computer off?), and didn't 
> know until today how to  read at the website?  Did you know that she 
> hasn't been fussed on the photos in the photo section of dsg 
> because 'who can really see what people look like when the photo is 
> so infinitesimally small?'  Did you know she hasn't .... but I'll 
> stop here, .... I'm going to try to help, but this could mean more 
> trouble than she already has.... :-) 
>  Sorry Azita - one thing I learned from the honoured list moderators 
> is that you musn't trust Anyone when you are content and relaxed over 
> shared meals and Dhamma discussions.  Remind me to tell you of my BKK 
> experiences with 'them', preferably before July. :) :) :)
> metta 
> Christine  
> 
> ---  "Jaran Jainhuknan"  wrote:
> > Christine:
> > Good to hear from you. Thanks for the explanation. Have fun. Looking
> > forward to your account of the lunch-on.
> > Good day,
> > jaran
> > 
> > Hi Jaran,
> > 
> > SE QLD means 'South East Queensland'.  Azita is down from Cairns on
> > holiday in Maleny - a couple of hours drive north of Brisbane.  She
> > and I (plus SarahF) are meeting for Dhamma discussions overlunch on
> > Sunday, which I am very much looking forward to. :-)
> > 
> > metta,
> > Christine


 
13399 From: Robert Epstein   
Date: Mon May 20, 2002 1:55pm
Subject: Re: Convention, Beliefs, and Pragmatics of Self Re: [dsg] Re: "ritual" [Rober...

 
  Hi TG.
Well I still think it's interesting that the Buddha never says, even to these
disciples who presumably would *not* become bewildered if he were to say it:
"There is no Self".  Why does he repeat over and over again that all things within
the five kandhas - the entire content of *this* life - are 'not self', but refuses
to ever say that 'there is not a self of any kind'?

If the reason is in fact that to make such a statement would be adhering to
annihilationism, one must ask:  What is wrong with the view that the Buddha has
here said that he wants to avoid?  Why does the Buddha *not* want to promote the
view that death, to quote the Sutta itself, 'is the annihilation of
consciousness'.  Certainly there been quite a few discussions on this list in
which the Buddha's words in other Suttas have been interpeted to mean precisely
that:  that consciousness is totally annihilated at the death of an Arahant who
has realized Nibbana.  So is the only view the Buddha wishes to avoid the view
that the ordinary person has his consciousness annihilated at death?

It seems to me that the Buddha is saying here that the annihilationists are wrong.
 The eternatlists are wrong too, but we can talk about that after looking at the
annihilationists a little more closely.  One would hope that if the Buddha were
merely saying the unenlightened person does *not* have their consciousness
annihilated at death - because of course the tendencies of the kandhas' karma
still unresolved will cause him to be reborn - but that the enlightened person's
consciousness, having no more such tendencies - *is* annihilated at death
[Parinibbana], he would say so and make this explicit.  If such a distinction
exists anywhere in the canon, I would appreciate being pointed to it.  This is not
my sense of what the Buddha is saying.  It seems apparent that he is saying that
the annihilationists are deluded and that consciousness is *not* annihilated at
death.  But if the Buddha were to assert that there is no self, this is the
conclusion that the annihilationists would draw, and he would be leading them into
deeper delusion.

The eternalists on the other hand say that there *is* a self, and if Buddha were
to assert that there *is* a self, he would be leading the eternalists to the
conclusion that there is an immortal soul which survives death and continues
beyond the body.  I think it is fair to say that the Buddha does not agree with
this view and does not want to promote it.  

There are two possibilities that this allows: One is that there is a self that is
beyond the kandhas, a very unpopular view in the Theravadin community, but one
never explicitly ruled out by the Buddha.  I know he has clearly said that there
is no 'consciousness' that survives death, and that there is no 'eternal
consciousness' that constitutes a kind of selfless self, but these are all still
within the limits of the kandhas as we know them in this life.  In other words,
there is no self that we as human beings can imagine.  Still, the Buddha never
says:  'There is no self of any kind', and I don't think the implication is that
he will only not assert this because he doesn't want to confuse the
annihilationists.  Again, in his conversations with Ananda and other advanced
Arahants, there is no reason why he could not say:  'Just between us, by the way,
there is no self of any kind, but please don't tell the annihilationists as they
will confuse the issue.'  Even if this was the case, saying that 'there is no
self' does not explain why he refuses to say that consciousness is extinguished at
death, which he clearly announces here as a wrong view that the annihilationists
hold.  It seems clear to me that he is saying that the annihilationists view is
wrong, otherwise, why not support it?  Why not just say:  'yes, consciousness *is*
extinguished at death'.  But he does not want the annihilationists to think this,
because it is clearly a wrong view.

The other possibility is that there is no self of any kind, but that something
beyhond consciousness and the kandhas survives in a form that is beyond anything
we can know or imagine.  This seems to be implied by the Buddha's refusal to rule
out *some* kind of self, or *some* kind of consciousness surviving beyond death. 
Otherwise, why not just let the eternalists and the annihilationists know the
truth:  that there is no self, and that there is no consciousness beyond death? 
In what way would it confuse them or lead them into wrong views if in fact these
two direct statements were true?  It seems obvious to me that Buddha refrains from
saying this because to make these blunt statements would be promoting wrong view,
and that it is not correct to say that there is no self of any kind, and it is not
correct to say that consciousness is extinguished at death.  These are the exact
views that he is saying are wrong.

Now, the two important verses which you say that Victor left out make the
following points:

1/  In the first one Buddha states bluntly that 'all phenomena are not-self'  That
is that all *phenomena*, everything we experience in this life, are 'not-self'. 
Again this does not say 'there is no self'.  It says phenomena do not contain a
self or constitute a self.  So we must not look to phenomena to find a 'self'. 
The right view of anatta is always stated this way, isn't it?  That when regarding
phenomena we are not to cling to them and identify with them as 'self'.  Isn't
that right?  Nowhere does the Buddha say: 'Look at yourself and be clear that
there is no self of any kind that is your self'.  He never rules out the
possibility, never, of some kind of self beyond phenomena.  Now, I am not saying
that there is a self, but what I do want to point out is that Buddha's purpose in
the doctrine of anatta does not seem to be to convince us that there is no self of
any kind.  Rather it seems to be to direct us to look at all the things of this
life as 'not-self', 'impermanent' and 'unable to grant satisfaction' and thus not
worthy of clinging to.  When we stop clinging to all of these 'not-self'
phenomena, we become free to travel the Noble Eightfold Path to liberation.  And
this seems to be Buddha's intent.  

I think this is why Victor keeps pointing out the form in which the Buddha
addresses the subject of anatta, because many of us draw the conclusion, perhaps
erroneously, that Buddha is preaching a kind of delayed annihilationism.  If we
say that 'there is no self and no property of self that exists beyond death, and
only the kandhas' tendencies keep consciousness from dying out', then we aim for a
kind of annihilationism that is delayed until Parinibbana, but is still directly
in line with the view of the annihilationists none-the-less, that 'consciousness
is extinguished at death', the view that the Buddha here explicitly rejects.  how
can we adopt a view that is explicitly rejected by the Buddha, and say that it is
Buddhist doctrine?

2/ In the second verse that you have added to the post, Buddha makes it clear that
the self one thinks one has is not real, and is not annihilated by the doctrine of
anatta:
 
> "And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
> were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become 
> even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'" 

The most that we can draw from this is that our *idea* of self is totally wrong. 
Vacchagotta is bewildered - he has the wrong idea of self.  If told there is no
self, he would think, well, 'I know I *do* have a self', and he has a fixed idea
of what that self is, so if he were to accept the Buddha's assurance that there is
'no' self, he would become more bewildered and think the self he knows he has has
been challenged, annihilated, by the Buddha's teaching.  This is how many of us
take the doctrine of anatta.  We try to see that we have no self, and it is like a
self struggling to annihilate itself.  Instead of letting go of our wrong views
about self, which Buddha says have to be completely let go - he says to let go of
every last view we have, because every conceptual view is inherently wrong, an
overlay on the truth - we think we really *do* have a self, and that we have to
somehow destroy it in order to realize the goal of Buddhism.  This is like
fighting with a shadow, because our idea of what our self is is conceptual and
based on mental and emotional attachments to ideas and objects.

So Buddha is definitely saying that our *idea* of self is wrong, but he nowhere
states either positively or negatively that is no self of any kind, just that we
don't know and that we don't get it.  

In fact, isn't the point of what Buddha is saying here that 'everything we think
we know is wrong', and that he doesn't want to feed any of our tendencies to
falsely conceptualize about self and not-self?  If we accept that as the premise,
then we will focus on our own views of self, and let them go.  My experience in
the moment is that I am conscious of phenomena.  I know this consciousness is
present, and that it has one or another object.  That is my present reality. 
There is a sense of self, which I do not what to make of, and cannot until
enlightenment.  I should neither accept nor reject this sense of self, but focus
on letting go of false concepts that may arise about this sense of self, while
trying to discern truly the functions of mind and the nature of arising objects to
gain insight and wisdom, gradually refraining from creating new kammic tendencies,
and letting go of attachments.  

But I think that Victor's basic view that the Buddha is telling us what to let go
of, since it is 'anatta', that is:  phenomena, is correct.  And to think that
Buddha has made any statement as to whether there is in fact some kind of self or
not, or that consciousness is completely extinguished in all forms at death, is
wrong.

Best,
Robert Ep.

=======================================

--- TG wrote:
> In a message dated 5/19/2002 9:06:34 AM Pacific Daylight Time, 
> Victor writes:
> 
> 
> > Howard,
> > 
> > "Ananda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is 
> > a self -- were to answer that there is a self, that would be 
> > conforming with those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of 
> > eternalism [the view that there is an eternal, unchanging soul]. If 
> > I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
> > were to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with 
> > those priests & contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism 
> > [the view that death is the annihilation of consciousness].
> > 
> > See http://www.accesstoinsight.org/canon/samyutta/sn44-010.html
> > 
> > Regards,
> > Victor
> > 
> 
> Victor
> 
> It is misleading to leave out the most important part of this quote which 
> follows immediately where you ended it.  This Sutta is particularly important 
> because it proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that the Buddha "meant" to teach 
> that "all things are not self."  I'll quote in full...
> 
> "Ananda, if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self 
> -- were to answer that there is a self, that would be conforming with those 
> priests & contemplatives who are exponents of eternalism [the view that there 
> is an eternal, unchanging soul]. 
> 
> If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- were 
> to answer that there is no self, that would be conforming with those priests &
>  contemplatives who are exponents of annihilationism [the view that death is 
> the annihilation of consciousness]. 
> 
> If I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is a self -- were to 
> answer that there is a self, would that be in keeping with the arising of 
> knowledge that all phenomena are not-self?" "No, lord." 
> 
> "And if I -- being asked by Vacchagotta the wanderer if there is no self -- 
> were to answer that there is no self, the bewildered Vacchagotta would become 
> even more bewildered: 'Does the self I used to have now not exist?'" 
> 
> TG
> 
> 
> >