#87800 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 7:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility upasaka_howard Hi, Dieter (and Nina, and all) - In a message dated 7/4/2008 2:26:28 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, moellerdieter@... writes: Hi Howard (and Nina), ' Nina used once the expression 'habitual tendencies' for cetasika . ============================= Dieter, do you perhaps mean 'cetana' (or 'sankhara' or 'anusaya') instead of 'cetasika'?' D: I recall writing to Nina appreciating this translation for cetasika ...acc. to my understanding a good and fitting one, especially in respect to get the point of (avijja-) sankhara and sankhara khanda .. do you see problems with this interpretation? -------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, in my understanding, a cetasika is any basic (i.e., paramatthic) mental operation other than vi~n~nana. The Pali word 'cetasika' is usually translated into English as '(mental) concomitant', and doesn't specifically mean "habitual tendency," whereas 'anusaya' definitely means that, and 'cetana' and 'sankhara' sometimes can. ---------------------------------------------- with Metta Dieter ======================= With metta, Howard #87801 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 12:06 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility nilovg Hi Dieter and Howard, Sankhaarakkhandha is sometimes translated as habitual tendencies, or activities, or mental formations. The main thing is remembering that they are all cetasikas except feeling and sa~n~naa. Sankhaara dhamma means: all conditioned dhammas, it includes all five khandhas. Also the term sankhata dhamma is used. This is what has been conditioned, sankhata. There is a slight difference with sankhaara dhammas; sankhata stresses: a phenomenon arises because it has been conditioned by other phenomena. Nina. Op 4-jul-2008, om 20:27 heeft Dieter Möller het volgende geschreven: > Nina used once the expression 'habitual tendencies' for cetasika . > ============================= > Dieter, do you perhaps mean 'cetana' (or 'sankhara' or 'anusaya') > instead of 'cetasika'?' > > D: I recall writing to Nina appreciating this translation for > cetasika ...acc. to my understanding a good and fitting one, > especially in respect to get the point of (avijja-) sankhara and > sankhara khanda .. #87802 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 4:33 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/4 sarah abbott : > Dear Rob M, > > .... > S: You may like to dip into the first section of the first chapter of the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (i.e. Dhammasangani). > > You'll have seen that there are strong reactions to the truth that unpleasant feelings never arise with wholesome states (or that unpleasant feelings and aversion must always be unwholesome. > > Such reactions are very common. Do you have any thoughts on why this is so? This is what was written by RobM: Acariya Buddhaghosa illustrates the difference between the two with the simile of an iron rod smeared with excrement at one end and heated to a glow at the other end: Hiri is like one's disgust at grabbing the rod in the place where it is smeared with excrement, Ottappa is like one's fear of grabbing it in the place where it is red hot. You wrote: "You'll have seen that there are strong reactions to the truth that unpleasant feelings never arise with wholesome states (or that unpleasant feelings and aversion must always be unwholesome." So I guess that you have a further commentary by Acariya Buddhaghosa that explains that grabbing a rod covered in excrement at one end and red hot at the other is accompanied by wholesome feelings? Frankly, I know of no greater shamelessness than foolishness, other than perhaps foolishness that doesn't acknowledge itself as foolishness. Cheers Herman #87803 From: "gazita2002" Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 7:31 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma story Vs Mahayana story. Why you chose the first one? gazita2002 Hello Alex, Personally, I dont think too much about either version 'cos as you say they cannt be proved one way or the other, however, my faith in the abhidhamma is based on the fact that it can be proved in the here and now. "my" world consists of the 5 senses and mind. what is experienced by these five senses and built upon by the mind is explained in the Abhidhamma and can be verified right now - providing there is mindfulness and wisdom - and this is stated in the Abhidhamma. Apologies if I caught the bull by the tail Alex. I dont get to read much on dsg these days but on this rare 'reading' occasion I read this and had to make a comment. Patience, courage, and good cheer, azita --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > > Hello all, > > I know that some of you believe the mythical (hsitorically & > scientifically unverifiable) of Buddha going to high Heaves to preach > Abhidhamma all in one session (few month) to the angels that "Hey, > you ain't go no soul!". > > Historically, linguistically, literal and scholastic analysis shows > that Abhidhamma (like the Mahayana) suttas is a later work. The story > of Abhidhamma and its origin itself came much later, at approximately > the same time as Mahayana Sutras (give or take a century or 2). > > Question: Why do you belive the (unverifiable) story of Buddha > teaching Theravada Abh to Devas rather than believing that he was > discriminative in his teaching and has left Mahayana sutras hidden in > a dragon realm to be discovered by Nagarjuna. Or more, according to > some Saṃdhinirmocana sûtra there were 3 turnings of the wheel of > Dharma. In the first turning he taught the "sravaka" doctrine, in the > 2nd and 3rd turning of the wheel of Dharma he has taught the Higher > Teaching (The Mahayana) - so the legend goes. > > > What makes you prefer to believe in one account versus the other? > Any important reasons? > > > Best wishes, > > > Alex > #87804 From: "buddhatrue" Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 7:35 pm Subject: Re: To Rob M..... buddhatrue Hi Herman (Sarah, Rob M, Howard), Thanks for your posts on this thread. --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Sarah, > > 2008/7/4 sarah abbott : > > Dear Rob M, > > > > .... > > S: You may like to dip into the first section of the first chapter of the first book of the Abhidhamma Pitaka (i.e. Dhammasangani). > > > > You'll have seen that there are strong reactions to the truth that unpleasant feelings never arise with wholesome states (or that unpleasant feelings and aversion must always be unwholesome. > > > > Such reactions are very common. Do you have any thoughts on why this is so? > > This is what was written by RobM: > > Acariya Buddhaghosa illustrates the difference > between the two with the simile of an iron rod smeared with excrement > at one end and heated to a glow at the other end: Hiri is like one's > disgust at grabbing the rod in the place where it is smeared with > excrement, Ottappa is like one's fear of grabbing it in the place > where it is red hot. > > You wrote: > "You'll have seen that there are strong reactions to the truth that > unpleasant feelings never arise with wholesome states (or that > unpleasant feelings and aversion must always be unwholesome." > > So I guess that you have a further commentary by Acariya Buddhaghosa > that explains that grabbing a rod covered in excrement at one end and > red hot at the other is accompanied by wholesome feelings? James: I wouldn't say "wholesome feelings" I would say "pleasant feelings"; because the question is whether unpleasant feelings can be wholesome, or lead to wholesome states- and you and I seem to be in agreement that yes they can. Let's take another quote from the Vism. which explains hiri and ottappa in great detail, not just using the iron rod metaphor: XIV, 142 Path of Purification It has conscientious scruples (hiriyati) about bodily misconduct, etc, this it is conscience (hiri). This is a term for modesty. It is ashamed (ottappati) of those same things, thus it is shame (ottappa). This is a term for anxiety about evil. Herein, conscience has the characteristic of disgust at evil, while shame has the characterisitic of dread of it...But these two states should be regarded as the Guardians of the World. James: Hmmm...well hiri and ottappa are described as having the feelings of ANXIETY, DISGUST, DREAD...would anyone in their right mind call those pleasant feelings? Of course, there does exist the general feelings of anxiety, disgust, and dread. Those are unarguably unwholesome. But, anxiety about evil, disgust at evil, and dread of evil are wholesome feelings! I don't know how much more plain this can get. James: #87805 From: upasaka@... Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 4:09 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... upasaka_howard Hi, James - In a message dated 7/4/2008 10:35:24 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, buddhatrue@... writes: Of course, there does exist the general feelings of anxiety, disgust, and dread. Those are unarguably unwholesome. But, anxiety about evil, disgust at evil, and dread of evil are wholesome feelings! ============================== I think you make an important point: Wholesome emotions may well be unpleasant! Conversely, plenty of unwholesome emotions can be extremely pleasant, which, in fact, is why we have them so often and cling to them! With metta, Howard #87806 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 9:41 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhist texts 101: part 2 egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/2 sarah abbott : > Hi Herman, > > H:>Well, we can say that for some the texts are a means to an > end, and that for others the texts are an end in themselves. > .... > S: Yes, usually what we all like to say/think is that for the others the texts "are an end in themselves", but for we, "the wise", they are "a means to an end". A great opportunity to understand the common conceit, arrogance and attachment at such times along with the ignorance - thinking that there really can be a judging/knowing of another's cittas when there's not even any knowing of the cittas which are readily apparent when there is such thinking. > ... There is something not quite right when householders appropriate the legacy of a forest-dweller, and use it to legitimise 21st century middle-class wayfaring. >>For those with a > sense of samvega, none of it is good. And therein lies the difference. > ... > S: I agree that none of its good and while times is wasted in comparisons and long stories about the others' useless studies, there certainly is no samvega, which of course never belongs to anyone. > > Regardless of whether you ever take up the organ again or not, there is seeing, there is hearing, there is thinking, there is attachment and many other common realities which can be directly known at the present moment. Samvega always comes back to now - never ME, WE and the OTHERS:-). The realisation of dukkha is very real, and not at all pleasant. Different people cope with it in different ways. Adapting the teachings of a sage prince, who left palace, family, wife, children, position, wealth, high regard, authority etc so that it now says "keep doing whatever you are doing, as long as you do it naturally" is one way of coping. I personally don't believe it is beneficial in the long run to translate renunciation as attachment. I feel a sense of responsibility towards those in an unborn and unknown future that, even though I choose to gamble today by just about everything I do and say that tomorrow will still be acceptable, to acknowledge that I am an idiot for doing that. Let nothing a Buddhist ever says detract from the following (I need the hope that Siddharta Gautama was right): Sn1:3 Renouncing violence for all living beings, harming not even a one, you would not wish for offspring, so how a companion? Wander alone like a rhinoceros. For a sociable person there are allurements; on the heels of allurement, this pain. Seeing allurement's drawback, wander alone like a rhinoceros. One whose mind is enmeshed in sympathy for friends & companions, neglects the true goal. Seeing this danger in intimacy, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Like spreading bamboo, entwined, is concern for offspring & spouses. Like a bamboo sprout, unentangling, wander alone like a rhinoceros. As a deer in the wilds, unfettered, goes for forage wherever it wants: the wise person, valuing freedom, wanders alone like a rhinoceros. In the midst of companions — when staying at home, when going out wandering — you are prey to requests. Valuing the freedom wander alone like a rhinoceros. There is sporting & love in the midst of companions, & abundant fondness for offspring. Feeling disgust at the prospect of parting from those who'd be dear, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Without resistance in all four directions, content with whatever you get, enduring troubles with no dismay, wander alone like a rhinoceros. They are hard to please, some of those gone forth, as well as those living the household life. Shedding concern for these offspring of others, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Cutting off the householder's marks,1 like a kovilara tree that has shed its leaves, the prudent one, cutting all household ties, wander alone like a rhinoceros. If you gain a mature companion, a fellow traveler, right-living & wise, overcoming all dangers go with him, gratified, mindful. If you don't gain a mature companion, a fellow traveler, right-living & wise, wander alone like a king renouncing his kingdom, like the elephant in the Matanga wilds, his herd. We praise companionship — yes! Those on a par, or better, should be chosen as friends. If they're not to be found, living faultlessly, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Seeing radiant bracelets of gold, well-made by a smith, clinking, clashing, two on an arm, wander alone like a rhinoceros, [thinking:] "In the same way, if I were to live with another, there would be careless talk or abusive." Seeing this future danger, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Because sensual pleasures, elegant, honeyed, & charming, bewitch the mind with their manifold forms — seeing this drawback in sensual strands — wander alone like a rhinoceros. "Calamity, tumor, misfortune, disease, an arrow, a danger for me." Seeing this danger in sensual strands, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Cold & heat, hunger & thirst, wind & sun, horseflies & snakes: enduring all these, without exception, wander alone like a rhinoceros. As a great white elephant, with massive shoulders, renouncing his herd, lives in the wilds wherever he wants, wander alone like a rhinoceros. "There's no way that one delighting in company can touch even momentary release." Heeding the Solar Kinsman's words, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Transcending the contortion of views, the sure way attained, the path gained, [realizing:] "Unled by others, I have knowledge arisen," wander alone like a rhinoceros. With no greed, no deceit, no thirst, no hypocrisy — delusion & blemishes blown away — with no inclinations for all the world, every world, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Avoid the evil companion disregarding the goal, intent on the out-of-tune way. Don't take as a friend someone heedless & hankering. wander alone like a rhinoceros. Consort with one who is learned, who maintains the Dhamma, a great & quick-witted friend. Knowing the meanings, subdue your perplexity, [then] wander alone like a rhinoceros, Free from longing, finding no pleasure in the world's sport, love, or sensual bliss, abstaining from adornment, speaking the truth, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Abandoning offspring, spouse, father, mother, riches, grain, relatives, & sensual pleasures altogether, wander alone like a rhinoceros. "This is a bondage, a baited hook. There's little happiness here, next to no satisfaction, all the more suffering & pain." Knowing this, circumspect, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Shattering fetters, like a fish in the water tearing a net, like a fire not coming back to what's burnt, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Eyes downcast, not footloose, senses guarded, with protected mind, not oozing — not burning — with lust, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Taking off the householder's marks,2 like a coral tree that has shed its leaves, going forth in the ochre robe, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Showing no greed for flavors, not careless, going from house to house for alms, with mind unenmeshed in this family or that, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Abandoning barriers to awareness, expelling all defilements — all — non-dependent, cutting aversion, allurement, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Turning your back on pleasure & pain, as earlier with sorrow & joy, attaining pure equanimity, tranquillity, wander alone like a rhinoceros. With persistence aroused for the highest goal's attainment, with mind unsmeared, not lazy in action, firm in effort, with steadfastness & strength arisen, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Not neglecting seclusion, absorption, constantly living the Dhamma in line with the Dhamma, comprehending the danger in states of becoming, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Intent on the ending of craving & heedful, learned, mindful, not muddled, certain — having reckoned the Dhamma — & striving, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Unstartled, like a lion at sounds. Unsnared, like the wind in a net. Unsmeared, like a lotus in water: wander alone like a rhinoceros. Like a lion — forceful, strong in fang, living as a conqueror, the king of beasts — resort to a solitary dwelling. Wander alone like a rhinoceros. At the right time consorting with the release through good will, compassion, appreciation, equanimity, unobstructed by all the world, any world, wander alone like a rhinoceros. Having let go of passion, aversion, delusion; having shattered the fetters; undisturbed at the ending of life, wander alone like a rhinoceros. People follow & associate for a motive. Friends without a motive these days are rare. They're shrewd for their own ends, & impure. Wander alone like a rhinoceros. Cheers Herman #87807 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 11:26 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Sundries egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/3 sarahprocterabbott : > Dear Ann, Scott (Herman, Nina & Lodewijk), > > > When I was reading the comments about the organ-playing, the textual > studies and so on, I thought of my mother's comments to me about how > I used to paint and read novels a lot when I was young. It's not that > I see anything wrong with either at all, it's just that I don't have > sufficient interest in them, whereas I do when it comes to > reading/reflecting on/listening to the Dhamma. (I also still enjoy > reading newspapers and many, many other activities I hasten to add)! > Changing accumulations from moment to moment, of course. Perhaps I'll > take up painting again in old age and Herman will take up the organ > again, who knows? Just conditions. A lot depends on the akusala and > far-less-common-kusala chanda (interest) at the time. If Herman takes up the organ again, there will be nothing in his past that he can point to, to jusitfy it. That's kamma for you. Nothing that anyone of us here does is explainable in terms of past conditions. So what are you doing now? And why on earth do you use the past to justify that? Cheers Herman #87808 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 12:00 am Subject: Re: To Rob M..... corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" wrote: > James: Hmmm...well hiri and ottappa are described as having the > feelings of ANXIETY, DISGUST, DREAD...would anyone in their right > mind call those pleasant feelings? > > Of course, there does exist the general feelings of anxiety, > disgust, and dread. Those are unarguably unwholesome. But, anxiety > about evil, disgust at evil, and dread of evil are wholesome > feelings! Dear James & Herman I understand why, at a certain level, you find the standard answers given on this topic to be nonsensical. However, might I suggest that you are not factoring into this issue a basic premise of Abhidhamma which, from your previous posts, I glean you simply do not accept. That basic premise (not just of Theravadan Abhidhamma BTW) is that moments of consciousness occur with extreme rapidity. The "general feelings" James refers to above are not single moments of consciousness but a conceptualisation of many moments over time. It is a doomed exercise to try to understand the principles applying to a moment of consciousness by forcing them willy nilly onto a conceptualised compound of consciousness moments. The shoe just won't fit - (without wishing to reify!), it is like suggesting that a compound of atoms must behave in the same way as protons do. Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa are wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a conceptualised "general feeling" of unpleasantness. As I understand it, that is the answer to your questions/complaints and we are all free to acknowledge, forget or discard it as we please. Regards Andrew #87809 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 12:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Metta, Ch 9, no 2. corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > Thus, while it is true that the mental factor of intention (cetana) is a > conditioned dhamma, actions performed do carry results (i.e., for the > consciousness stream). Hi Jon ... just waiting for KenH to jump in here and accuse you of belief in self! :-) He does that to me whenever I refer to a "consciousness stream". So watch out!! Hope you are well. Andrew #87810 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 12:58 am Subject: Re: Metta, Ch 9, no 2. kenhowardau Hi Andrew and Jon, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > > Thus, while it is true that the mental factor of intention (cetana) > is a > > conditioned dhamma, actions performed do carry results (i.e., for the > > consciousness stream). > > Hi Jon > ... just waiting for KenH to jump in here and accuse you of belief in > self! :-) He does that to me whenever I refer to a "consciousness > stream". So watch out!! > Ha! I thought of you when I read that line from Jon. But no, I am not about to accuse either of you of belief in self. Sloppy writing maybe but belief in self, never! :-) When a sense object is experienced by panna there is no idea of "this is my vipaka" is there? No, there isn't. But there is the understanding that the presently arisen citta was conditioned by its immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by its immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . by its immediately preceding citta, which was an impulsive (kamma- productive) citta the fruit of which is being experienced right now!" Corrections welcome! Ken H #87811 From: Jessica Mui Date: Fri Jul 4, 2008 8:35 pm Subject: Hello jessicamui Dear Dhamma Friends, It is nice to find this online group to share our understandings of Dhamma. My name is Jessica, living in HK now, and practicing Vipassana for a few years. If any of you happen to be in HK and would like to practice meditation together, please check out www.hkims.org. With Metta, Jessica. #87812 From: "Andrew" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:24 am Subject: Re: Metta, Ch 9, no 2. corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Andrew and Jon, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" > wrote: > > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott > > wrote: > > > Thus, while it is true that the mental factor of intention > (cetana) > > is a > > > conditioned dhamma, actions performed do carry results (i.e., for > the > > > consciousness stream). > > > > Hi Jon > > ... just waiting for KenH to jump in here and accuse you of belief > in > > self! :-) He does that to me whenever I refer to a "consciousness > > stream". So watch out!! > > > > Ha! I thought of you when I read that line from Jon. But no, I am not > about to accuse either of you of belief in self. Sloppy writing maybe > but belief in self, never! :-) > > When a sense object is experienced by panna there is no idea of "this > is my vipaka" is there? No, there isn't. But there is the > understanding that the presently arisen citta was conditioned by its > immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by its > immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by . . . > . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . by its > immediately preceding citta, which was an impulsive (kamma- > productive) citta the fruit of which is being experienced right now!" Hello KenH I thought you would surface! Sloppy writing? Perhaps you mean sloppy translation? How do you translate the Pali term "santana"? Do you disagree with Nyanatiloka's "continuity of consciousness"? Anyway, I am glad you are now accepting of relationships across mind moments and that this does not necessarily have to constitute evidence of atta belief. Seems you are "off the hook", Jon! :-)) I won't have to ask the other moderator to expel you from the list after all! Phew!! Regards Andrew #87813 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:38 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Hello sarahprocter... Dear Jessica, Welcome to DSG! Jon and I also live in Hong Kong! We're travelling quite a lot this summer, so just back briefly for now. Perhaps we'll meet up later:-). We live in Wanchai, how about you? --- On Sat, 5/7/08, Jessica Mui wrote: J:> It is nice to find this online group to share our understandings of Dhamma. My name is Jessica, living in HK now, and practicing Vipassana for a few years. .... S: That's interesting. How did you become interested in Vipassana and what does 'vipassana' mean to you? Do you mean that you follow the U Ba Khin meditation practice? I'll look forward to chatting more with you later. Metta, Sarah ========= #87814 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... sarahprocter... Dear Andrew T, (James, Herman, Howard & Rob M), A nice surprise to see you surfacing here again:-) I do hope you new joband home are going well. --- On Sat, 5/7/08, Andrew wrote: A:> Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa are wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a conceptualised "general feeling" of unpleasantness. ... S: I like the way you put it. Howard & Rob M also added helpful comments to the thread. Yes, there are always many more moments of akusala (including dosa accompanied by unpleasant feeling) than there are moments of kusala, accompanied by hiri and ottappa. James & Herman, as for the rod smeared with excrement at one end and burning hot at the other end, I see the simile as pointing to the appreciating the foulness/shamefulness of 'touching' any unwholesome states which occurs as a function of hiri and ottappa. They are the opposites of shamelessness and recklessness as the texts say. They support friendliness, generosity, kindness, morality, wisdom and all that's wholesome. Metta, Sarah ======== #87815 From: sarah abbott Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 4:48 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Levels of upacara samadhi sarahprocter... Dear Derek, --- On Wed, 2/7/08, derekacameron wrote: D:> Thank you, Sarah. This is great research. Since my post, I've learned that the term upacaara samaadhi is sometimes used to refer not only to the stage before the first jhaana, but also to the stage before the second jhaana, the third jhaana, and so on. .... S: That makes sense. Upacaara arises in proximity to each (initial)jhaana or path attainment, hence the name upacaara (access). .... D:> It may be that these were the different kinds of upacaara samaadhi I came across, though in this case there would have to be 8 of them rather than the 6 I remember. .... S: You'd have to take into account the upacaara in the processes before enlightenment too. It would also depend on how the jhaanas were being counted.... .... D:> As your references suggest, it may also have something to do with javana. For sure I will let you know if I find the source! Derek. .... S: Thanks for that. Just prior to the attainment of jhaana or enlightenment, there are usually 3 or 4 javana cittas, each with its own function: - preparation (parikamma) - access (upacaara) - conformity (anuloma) - change of lineage (gotrabhuu). The gotrabhuu citta marks the change from sense-sphere to sublime (jhana) or to supramundane (lokuttara). This is followed by the (first) appanaa (absorption) citta. This appanaa citta can be: a)any of the 5 rupa-brahma cittas. These can be kusala or kiriya (in the case of an arahant), hence = 10 b)any of the 4 arupa-brahma cittas. Again, these can be kusala or kiriya, hence = 8 c)any of the 4 path cittas = 4 Total: = 22 (by my counting). [While there can be 26 kinds of appanaa citta, also including 4 fruition (phala) cittas, these latter cittas immediately follow the path cittas, so no further upacaara cittas are involved]. Just playing with numbers. Let me know how you go with them. Happy to have any corrections. Can I also ask how you came to ask about this topic? Metta, Sarah ========== #87816 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 7:52 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma story Vs Mahayana story. Why you chose the first one? truth_aerator Hi Gazita & all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "gazita2002" wrote: > > Hello Alex, > > Personally, I dont think too much about either version 'cos as you > say they cannt be proved one way or the other, > > however, my faith in the abhidhamma is based on the fact that it > can be proved in the here and now. How do we know that there are 89, not 88 or 90 cittas? 121, not 120, nor 122 citas by another classification? Same with rupas, cetasikas, and 24 (why 24 rather than 23 or 25) conditions? >"my" world consists of the 5 > senses and mind. what is experienced by these five senses and built > upon by the mind is explained in the Abhidhamma and can be verified > right now - providing there is mindfulness and wisdom - and this is > stated in the Abhidhamma. > The 89/121 only can't be verified with full confidence (well, maybe not until Arahatship). But the thing is more important issue. They Buddha has told us "in the seen there will be merely what is seen... In the cognized, the cognized". For 99.9% of us, 99.9% of Abh stuff isn't directly percieved. Correction, it may be percieved in a way of food's taste being percieved through *reading* the menu or the cookbook. But is this what we are after? So isn't, for us, reading Abh is like engaging in Papanca (even of material of Abh is correct) that slows us down from magga-phala? Even a little child knows (or percieves) that there is "seeing, hearing, sensing, cognizing"? The child also doesn't plan any bank robberies, rapes, murders, and can't (or doesn't) yet engage in wrong livelihood or wrong action. ... > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" > wrote: > > > > Hello all, > > > > I know that some of you believe the mythical (historically & > > scientifically unverifiable) of Buddha going to high Heavens to > preach > > Abhidhamma all in one session (few month) to the angels that "Hey, > > you ain't go no soul!". > > > > Historically, linguistically, literal and scholastic analysis shows > > that Abhidhamma (like the Mahayana) suttas is a later work. The > story > > of Abhidhamma and its origin itself came much later, at > approximately > > the same time as Mahayana Sutras (give or take a century or 2). > > > > Question: Why do you belive the (unverifiable) story of Buddha > > teaching Theravada Abh to Devas rather than believing that he was > > discriminative in his teaching and has left Mahayana sutras hidden > in > > a dragon realm to be discovered by Nagarjuna. Or more, according to > > some Saṃdhinirmocana sûtra there were 3 turnings of the > wheel of > > Dharma. In the first turning he taught the "sravaka" doctrine, in > the > > 2nd and 3rd turning of the wheel of Dharma he has taught the Higher > > Teaching (The Mahayana) - so the legend goes. > > > > > > What makes you prefer to believe in one account versus the other? > > Any important reasons? > > > > Best wishes, Alex #87817 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 8:03 am Subject: Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling truth_aerator Hi James, Sarah, Rob, Howard and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" wrote: > > Hi Herman (Sarah, Rob M, Howard), > > James: I wouldn't say "wholesome feelings" I would say "pleasant > feelings"; because the question is whether unpleasant feelings can > be wholesome, or lead to wholesome states- and you and I seem to be > in agreement that yes they can. Let's take another quote from the > Vism. which explains hiri and ottappa in great detail, not just > using the iron rod metaphor: > > XIV, 142 Path of Purification > It has conscientious scruples (hiriyati) about bodily misconduct, > etc, this it is conscience (hiri). This is a term for modesty. It > is ashamed (ottappati) of those same things, thus it is shame > (ottappa). This is a term for anxiety about evil. Herein, > conscience has the characteristic of disgust at evil, while shame > has the characterisitic of dread of it...But these two states should > be regarded as the Guardians of the World. > > James: Hmmm...well hiri and ottappa are described as having the > feelings of ANXIETY, DISGUST, DREAD...would anyone in their right > mind call those pleasant feelings? > > Of course, there does exist the general feelings of anxiety, > disgust, and dread. Those are unarguably unwholesome. But, anxiety > about evil, disgust at evil, and dread of evil are wholesome > feelings! > > I don't know how much more plain this can get. > > James: > One doesn't need to look at VsM. In MN46 it says that unpleasant things can be wholesome. ========================================================== Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. Here, a certain one with displeasure abstains from destroying living things and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from taking what is not given and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from misbehaviour in sexuality and experiences unpleasantness.With displeasure abstains from telling lies and experiences unpleasantness.With displeasure abstains from telling malicious things and on account of it experiences unpleasantaness. With displeasure abstains from talking roughly and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from talking frivolously and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from coveting and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from bearing an angry mind and experiences unpleasantness.With displeasure maintains right view and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. He after death goes to increase and is born in heaven. This is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. http://www.budsas.org/ebud/majjhima/046-mahadhammasamadana-sutta- e1.htm ============= No aspect of the abhidhamma speaks so eloquently of the dismissal of experience asthe treatment of feeling. The abhidhamma says that `wholesome consciousness' is invariably associated with either pleasure or equanimity. This blatantly contradicts the Mahadhammasamadana Sutta (M46.16): `Here, someone in pain and grief abstains from killing living beings….' The theoretical mistake seems to arise from the abhidhamma habit of speaking primarily of the ethical quality of cognition (`wholesome consciousness'), and deriving the ethical quality of an intentional act from its `association' with a certain kind of cognition. Taking the cognition to be wholesome, the abhidhammikas seem to have found it uncomfortable to admit that a `wholesome consciousness' could be painful, or visa versa. But for the suttas it is the intention, not the consciousness, that is wholesome, and so the resulting happiness can be experienced at a later time: `One holds right view, and experiences pain and grief that have right view as condition. On the dissolution of the body, after death, one is reborn in a happy destination, even in a heavenly realm. This is called the way of undertaking principles that is painful now and ripens in the future as pleasure.' We need hardly be surprised that the abhidhammikas ignore the suttas; what is more worrying is how they ignore their own experience. We all, including the abhidhammikas too, have experienced suffering some time or other (too often!) while doing good. Yet rather than correct their theory in line with experience, the abhidhammikas chose to sideline experience in deference to theirtheory. It is all too easy to argue that the `mind-moments' are flashing by so quickly, we simply can't tell which `cittas' are wholesome and happy, and which are unwholesomeand sad. ---- Mystique of Abhidhamma by Ajahn Sujato ------------- Best wishes, Alex #87818 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 4:47 am Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Alex (and James, Sarah, Rob, and Andrew) - In a message dated 7/5/2008 11:04:17 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: ...cut... ---- Mystique of Abhidhamma by Ajahn Sujato ------------- Best wishes, Alex ================================ I'm inclined to think that the truth lies somewhere in the middle, with there being degree of validity to be found at both ends. I do think that Andrew's point about the rapid change of mental states, involving the interspersing of a wide variety states widely differing in character, may well serve to harmonize the positions. Nyanatiloka gives the following, which has relevance but doesn't directly address the relationship between wholesomeness and pleasantness of feeling: _________________ kusala: 'kammically wholesome' or 'profitable', salutary, morally good, (skillful) Connotations of the term, according to Com. (Aá¹¹?linÄ«), are: of good health, blameless, productive of favourable kamma-result, skillful. It should be noted that Com. excludes the meaning 'skillful', when the term is applied to states of consciousness. It is defined in M. 9 as the 10 wholesome courses of action (s. kammapatha). In psychological terms, 'kammically wholesome' are all those kammical volitions (kamma-cetanÄ?) and the consciousness and mental factors associated therewith, which are accompanied by 2 or 3 wholesome roots (s. mÅ«la), i.e. by greedlessness (alobha) and hatelessness (adosa), and in some cases also by non-delusion (amoha: wisdom, understanding). Such states of consciousness are regarded as 'kammically wholesome' as they are causes of favourable kamma results and contain the seeds of a happy destiny or rebirth. From this explanation, two facts should be noted: (1) it is volition that makes a state of consciousness, or an act, 'good' or 'bad'; (2) the moral criterion in Buddhism is the presence or absence of the 3 wholesome or moral roots (s. mÅ«la). The above explanations refer to mundane (lokiya, q.v.) wholesome consciousness. Supermundane wholesome (lokuttara-kusala) states, i.e. the four paths of sanctity (s. ariyapuggala), have as results only the corresponding four fruitions; they do not constitute kamma, nor do they lead to rebirth, and this applies also to the good actions of an Arahat (Tab. I, 73-80) and his meditative states (Tab. 1, 81-89), which are all kammically inoperative (functional; s. kiriya). Kusala belongs to a threefold division of all consciousness, as found in the Abhidhamma (Dhs.), into wholesome (kusala), unwholesome (akusala) and kammically neutral (avyÄ?kata), which is the first of the triads (tika) in the Abhidhamma schedule (mÄ?tikÄ?); s. Guide, pp. 4ff., 12ff; Vis.M. XIV, 83ff. __________________ I have examined MN 9 in this regard, and it does seem of interest. The relevant portion is the following: __________________ The Wholesome and the Unwholesome 3. "When, friends, a noble disciple understands the unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, in that way he is one of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma, and has arrived at this true Dhamma. 4. "And what, friends, is the unwholesome, what is the root of the unwholesome, what is the wholesome, what is the root of the wholesome? Killing living beings is unwholesome; taking what is not given is unwholesome; misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome; false speech is unwholesome; malicious speech is unwholesome; harsh speech is unwholesome; gossip is unwholesome; covetousness is unwholesome; ill will is unwholesome; wrong view is unwholesome. This is called the unwholesome. 5. "And what is the root of the unwholesome? Greed is a root of the unwholesome; hate is a root of the unwholesome; delusion is a root of the unwholesome. This is called the root of the unwholesome. 6. "And what is the wholesome? Abstention from killing living beings is wholesome; abstention from taking what is not given is wholesome; abstention from misconduct in sensual pleasures is wholesome; abstention from false speech is wholesome; abstention from malicious speech is wholesome; abstention from harsh speech is wholesome; abstention from gossip is wholesome; non-covetousness is wholesome; non-ill will is wholesome; right view is wholesome. This is called the wholesome. 7. "And what is the root of the wholesome? Non-greed is a root of the wholesome; non-hate is a root of the wholesome; non-delusion is a root of the wholesome. This is called the root of the wholesome. 8. "When a noble disciple has thus understood the unwholesome, the root of the unwholesome, the wholesome, and the root of the wholesome, he entirely abandons the underlying tendency to lust, he abolishes the underlying tendency to aversion, he extirpates the underlying tendency to the view and conceit 'I am,' and by abandoning ignorance and arousing true knowledge he here and now makes an end of suffering. In that way too a noble disciple is one of right view, whose view is straight, who has perfect confidence in the Dhamma and has arrived at this true Dhamma." _____________________ Note that the roots of the wholesome include non-greed and non-hate, i.e., absence of desire and of aversion. Now, since it is tanha, i.e., craving for presence or absence of something, that is the direct requisite for dukkha, i.e., mental pain, the position that a wholesome state is not unpleasant isn't so crazy. The thing, is, though, that such a state could well be immediately followed by distressing states - unhappy states, such as I alluded to when I spoke of how moral regret can easily slip into remorse, the regret being neutral or pleasant, but the remorse being anything but. With metta, Howard #87819 From: Dieter Möller Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 9:22 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility moellerdieter Hi Nina , Howard and KenH, you wrote: 'Sankhaarakkhandha is sometimes translated as habitual tendencies, or activities, or mental formations...snip D: thanks for your confirmation. please see below the context in order to understand the point of discussion.. quoting recent exchange: Ken: .. The path is just a fleeting moment of namas and rupas in which the cetasika-namas called Path Factors perform their supramundane functions. D: > In order that the cetasikas can perform their functions wholesome for the path factors, the mind needs (the 3fold N.P.) training. Nina used once the expression 'habitual tendencies' for cetasika .Our habit (pls compare with persona ) conditioned by ignorant kamma forces /will, ie. avijja - sankhara- .. is just this procedure as explained in the chain of D.O. and our attachment just that what identifies with self: that I am, that is mine etc.. Ken: Sorry, but I still can't follow. And I am trying! :-) D: good.. because habitual tendencies (cetasika) are difficult to change due to the power of avijja- sankhara in the background. with Metta Dieter #87820 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 9:18 am Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling truth_aerator Hi, Howard (and James, Sarah, Rob, and Andrew) > ================================ > I'm inclined to think that the truth lies somewhere in the middle, > with there being degree of validity to be found at both ends. I do >think that Andrew's point about the rapid change of mental states, >involving the interspersing of a wide variety states widely >differing in character, may well serve to harmonize the positions. >>>>>>> I'm also inclined in that direction. Yes, it is true that the eventual outcome of kusala will be kusala, and *eventual* outcome of akusala akusala. IMHO, if akusala actions (like fishing for example) felt bad immeadetely on performing (like puting a hand to the red hot iron stove) then none of the people would perform bad actions. Vice verse for wholesome states. As Ven. Sujato has eloquently stated: "The theoretical mistake seems to arise from the abhidhamma habit of speaking primarily of the ethical quality of cognition (`wholesome consciousness'), and deriving the ethical quality of an intentional act from its `association' with a certain kind of cognition. Taking the cognition to be wholesome, the abhidhammikas seem to have found it uncomfortable to admit that a `wholesome consciousness' could be painful, or visa versa. But for the suttas it is the intention, not the consciousness, that is wholesome, and so the resulting happiness can be experienced at a later time: " In MN#9, there are 6 kinds of consciousness. None of them are kusala or akusala. It is intention which can be skillful, unskillful, or neutral. Besides, citta (vinnana) is based on 4 aggregates so itself it can't do anything! In more precise terminology all and any citta is KAMMA-VIPAKA. Cetana is kamma, not kamma-vipaka. As MN46 has stated; Good intintions now may feel bad until their results ripen and bad intentions now may feel good until their fruit ripens. Best wishes, Alex #87821 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:13 am Subject: Re: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Alex - In a message dated 7/5/2008 12:18:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: As MN46 has stated; Good intintions now may feel bad until their results ripen and bad intentions now may feel good until their fruit ripens. ================================= This is a perfect example, Alex. It shows that an intentional state may be partake of any of the 4 pairings of pleasant or unpleasant with wholesome or unwholesome, and that the nature of the fruit of the state is determined not by its pleasantness or unpleasantness, but by its wholesomeness or unwholesomeness. I am eager to hear from the Abhidhamma enthusiasts as to whether this harmonizies with the Abhidhammic perspective or not. The relevant material in MN 46 is the following: ______________________________________________ Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings unpleasant results in the future. Here, a certain one with displeasure destroys living things and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure takes what is not given and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure misbehaves sexually and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure tells lies and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure says malicious things and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure talks roughly and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure talks frivolously and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure becomes covetous and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure bears an angry mind and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure maintains wrong view and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. He after death goes to decrease and is born in hell. This is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings unpleasant results in the future. Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is pleasant now and brings unpleasant results in the future. Here, a certain one with pleasure destroys living things and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure takes what is not given and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure misbehaves sexually and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure tells lies and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure says malicious things and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure talks roughly and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure talks frivolously and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure becomes covetous and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure bears an angry mind and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure maintains wrong view and experiences pleasantness. He after death goes to decrease and is born in hell. Bhikkhus, this is the observance that is pleasant now and brings unpleasant results in the future. Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. Here, a certain one with displeasure abstains from destroying living things and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from taking what is not given and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from misbehavior in sexuality and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from telling lies and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from telling malicious things and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from talking roughly and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from talking frivolously and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from coveting and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure abstains from bearing an angry mind and experiences unpleasantness. With displeasure maintains right view and on account of it experiences unpleasantness. He after death goes to increase and is born in heaven. This is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is pleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. Here, a certain one with pleasure abstains from destroying living things and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from taking what is not given and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from misbehavior in sexuality and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from telling lies and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from telling malicious things and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from talking roughly and experiences pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from talking frivolously and experiences pleasantness. With displeasure abstains from coveting and experiences pleasure and pleasantness. With pleasure abstains from bearing an angry mind and on account of it experiences pleasantness. With pleasure maintains right view and on account of it experiences pleasure and pleasantness. He after death goes to increase and is born in heaven. This is the observance that is pleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. Bhikkhus, these are the four observances in the Teaching. ______________________________________ With metta, Howard #87822 From: "m. nease" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 10:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... m_nease Hi Andrew, Andrew wrote: > Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa are > wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. > Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that > succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and > associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a > conceptualised "general feeling" of unpleasantness. > > As I understand it, that is the answer to your questions/complaints > and we are all free to acknowledge, forget or discard it as we please. > > Regards > Andrew Thanks for this--very well put, I thought. mike #87823 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:39 pm Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling kenhowardau --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > > > Hi, Alex - > > In a message dated 7/5/2008 12:18:46 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > truth_aerator@... writes: > > > As MN46 has stated; Good intintions now may feel bad until their > results ripen and bad intentions now may feel good until their fruit > ripens. > > > > ================================= > This is a perfect example, Alex. It shows that an intentional state may > be partake of any of the 4 pairings of pleasant or unpleasant with wholesome > or unwholesome, and that the nature of the fruit of the state is determined > not by its pleasantness or unpleasantness, but by its wholesomeness or > unwholesomeness. I am eager to hear from the Abhidhamma enthusiasts as to whether > this harmonizies with the Abhidhammic perspective or not. The relevant material > in MN 46 is the following: > Hi Alex, Howard and all, This is an interesting conversation. It would seem that Ven. Sujato (as quoted by Alex) has found an example of two different Dhammas - one in the Sutta-pitaka and one in the Abhidhamma-pitaka. There must be some mistake! :-) Could the suttas involved be primarily describing various realms of rebirth? In the human realm beings experience both desirable and undesirable sense objects (as vipaka), while in the heaven realm beings experience only desirable sense objects, and in the hell realm beings experience only undesirable sense objects. A wholesome action performed in the realm of both-pleasant-and-unpleasant vipaka could reault in rebirth in the realm of pleasant-only vipaka. An unwholesome action in the realm of both-pleasant-and-unpleasant vipaka could result in rebirth in the realm of unpleasant-only vipaka. (And so on.) I wonder if that could explain the confusion: but it might be too easy to be true. Needless to say, I haven't seen the official commentary to the sutta quoted by Ven. Sujato, but surely it would have settled the matter. And I can't imagine the venerable would have made such a controversial allegation (of two different Dhammas) without having checked the commentary. So, it will be interesting to hear more. Ken H #87824 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:47 pm Subject: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantness truth_aerator Hi Ken, Howard and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Alex, Howard and all, > Could the suttas involved be primarily describing various realms of > rebirth? >>> "With displeasure maintains right view and on account of it experiences unpleasantness." - mn46 The sutta specifically states that abstention from (unwholesome action) may feel bad! How can right view cause fully unpleasant rebirth?! Best wishes, Alex #87825 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 5:25 pm Subject: Re: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantness kenhowardau --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > > Hi Ken, Howard and all, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" > wrote: > > > > Hi Alex, Howard and all, > > Could the suttas involved be primarily describing various realms of > > rebirth? > >>> > "With displeasure maintains right view and on account of it > experiences unpleasantness." - mn46 > > The sutta specifically states that abstention from (unwholesome > action) may feel bad! > > Hi Alex, I feel sure that there must be another explanation. Most likely, DSG has discussed this sutta on previous occasions. Let's see what the others have to say. ------- A: > How can right view cause fully unpleasant rebirth?! ------- It can't. (At least, not directly.) Does one of those suttas say it can? I didn't see that. Ken H #87826 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 5:37 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantnes egberdina Hi KenH, 2008/7/6 kenhowardau : > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" > wrote: >> >> >> The sutta specifically states that abstention from (unwholesome >> action) may feel bad! >> >> > > > > ------- > A: > How can right view cause fully unpleasant rebirth?! > ------- > > It can't. (At least, not directly.) Does one of those suttas say it > can? I didn't see that. > This is an introduction to MN136, the great exposition on kamma. Introduction by Bhikkhu Khantipalo This celebrated sutta shows some of the complexities of kamma and its results. Beginning with a strange view expressed by a confused wanderer and a confused answer given by a bhikkhu, the Buddha then gives his Great Exposition of Kamma which is based upon four "types" of people: the evil-doer who goes to hell (or some other low state of birth), the evil-doer who goes to heaven, the good man who goes to heaven, and the good man who goes to hell (or other low birth). The Buddha then shows how wrong views can arise from only partial understanding of truth. One can see the stages of this: (1) a mystic "sees" in vision an evil-doer suffering in hell, (2) this confirms what he had heard about moral causality, (3) so he says, "evil-doers always go to hell," and (4) dogma hardens and becomes rigid when he says (with the dogmatists of all ages and places), "Only this is true; anything else is wrong." The stages of this process are repeated for each of the four "persons," after which the Buddha proceeds to analyze these views grounded in partial experience and points out which portions are true (because verifiable by trial and experience) and which are dogmatic superstructure which is unjustified. Finally, the Buddha explains his Great Exposition of Kamma in which he shows that notions of invariability like "the evildoer goes to hell" are much too simple. The minds of people are complex and they make many different kinds of kamma even in one lifetime, some of which may influence the last moment when kamma is made before death, which in turn is the basis for the next life. Cheers Herman #87827 From: "Alex" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 5:42 pm Subject: Re: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantness truth_aerator Hi Ken and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > >>> > > "With displeasure maintains right view and on account of it > > experiences unpleasantness." - mn46 > > > > Hi Alex, > >I feel sure that there must be another explanation. Good actions (kusala) may feel bad in the moment, while bring GOOD results later, and vice versa for akusala actions. > ------- > A: > How can right view cause fully unpleasant rebirth?! > ------- > > It can't. (At least, not directly.) Does one of those suttas say it > can? I didn't see that. No, but my quote was to show that the sutta meant more than simply "x will cause x sort of rebirth." In fact you sidelined the issue of "kusala may feel bad at the moment" and "akusala may feel good in the moment". The important part is *in the moment* . Best wishes, Alex #87828 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:03 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi James, Alex, Howard, KenH and all, 2008/7/3 buddhatrue : > Hi Rob M., > > > James: You can have a calm, pleasant feeling even when you are on a > murdering rampage. Just because it feels good that doesn't mean you > should do it! > > > James: Well, honestly, this didn't help at all. I am very > disappointed in your answer. But, I am tired of discussing this > issue so I am just going to drop it. So, go ahead: if it feels > good, do it!! :-(( > This bizarre Abhidhamma position, that has calmness as the barometer for ethical quality, on the side of action leads to the extreme of the master martial artist, who is able to skillfully execute his opponents, whilst remaining mentally serene and calm. What in Abhidhamma terms is a paragon of virtue, is no more than a psychopath. On the side of inaction, calmness as the barometer for ethical quality, leads to an ideal state of being unaffected by the joys and suffering of others. In the Abhidhamma, there are no others. In the world, a perfected Abhidhammika would be diagnosed as being autistic. Cheers Herman #87829 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:14 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - revised and corrected edition egberdina Hi KenH (and Howard), 2008/7/3 kenhowardau : > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > wrote: >> >> Hi KenH, > >> You're a funny fellow, KenH. It was only just the other day that you >> typed out a whole bunch of stuff on nonads and decads. No >> interrelations there, of course, only pure Theravada Dhamma that was >> as uplifting for me to read as it was for you to type :-) >> > > Hi Herman, > > I am sorry if I have given the wrong impression. My slowness in > typing out the Vissudhimagga thread has nothing to do with any > perceived dullness of the topic. > > Actually, I find the Vism. very inspiring *when* I can force myself > to read it. Long tacts of text are always off-putting for me, no > matter what the content. Even a newspaper is too much. (I get my > news from the radio.) But when I get into it, the Vism. is always - > to use your word - "uplifting." When reading that really ancient > commentary, I can see the exact same, obscure, perspective on the > Dhamma (in which anatta means no-control) as is still being discussed > here, thousands of years later, at DSG. What a blast! :-) > You do not address the main point of my post. I was pointing out that you typing out lots of stuff about nonads and decads is all kosher, because it is Dhhamma in your opinion, but Howard and I cannot talk about complex interrelations between namas and rupas because it is not Dhamma, in your opinion. Don't you think a nonad or decad is a complexly interrelated thingy? Cheers Herman #87830 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:16 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility egberdina Hi KenH, 2008/7/4 kenhowardau : > > I am glad you have mentioned Venerable Mahasi Saydaw and Ajahn Maha > Boowa. It is only from teachers such as these that we hear about > meditation retreats and formal vipassana practices. There is no > mention of such things in the Tipitaka or in the ancient > commentaries. > Have you heard about the Buddha and the arahants? Their lives were a meditation retreat. Cheers Herman #87831 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Practice is what counts! Practice vs studying. egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/4 sarah abbott : > Hi Alex, > .... > S: When one is instructed to follow any particular practice or focus on any particular dhammas, even 'whatever is arising', or to return to the breath or abdomen, I believe there is an idea of control and an ignorance of dhammas as anatta. It's a sensitive point, I know, Alex. When one is then encouraged to see the stages of insight being 'ticked off' through such a practice, basically motivated by attachment and self-view, it becomes very misleading. The desire for results can be very strong - don't be led astray by it. > .... One cannot be instructed without willfully participating in that process. For reasons to do with samvega, people go out in search for answers, and some go in search of instructors, hoping that they have the answers. One cannot be encouraged to do anything without willfully participating in that process. In the end, either one likes what one hears, and does it, or one doesn't like what is heard, and doesn't do it. Samvega is very strong for one who realises dukkha. Suggesting the possibility of being led astray by samvega amounts to questioning the First Noble Truth. Cheers Herman #87832 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:39 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Metta, Ch 9, no 2. egberdina Hi Jon, 2008/7/5 Jonothan Abbott : > Hi Herman > >> And, presumably, the person who causes harm is not responsible for >> their actions either. Their actions happened according to conditions >> only, right? > > As I expalined in an earlier post, the law of kamma is often stated in > the suttas in the form, "Beings are heirs of their actions". > > Thus, while it is true that the mental factor of intention (cetana) is a > conditioned dhamma, actions performed do carry results (i.e., for the > consciousness stream). > >> According to the teachings, kamma is the domain of Buddhas only. The >> problem is that we are not Buddhas. At best we can carefully >> scrutinise who said what and when about kamma, and decide on that >> basis whether it is of value, IMO. > > I think the remark about kamma being the domain of Buddhas was made in > reference to the intricacies of kamma and its ripening, and not in > reference to the broad principles. Indeed, the path-factor of Right > View is sometimes expalined in terms an understanding of kamma and vipaka. It has been my thesis from the beginning that anatta and kamma are irreconcilable. You have not convinced me that you understand what I am saying, or why I say it. Also, I have not been convinced by you that your conception of a "stream of consciousness" is not an atta-view. Therefore, I continue to believe that Right View cannot incorporate both anatta and kamma. No need to go over it again, I am happy to leave it :-) Cheers Herman #87833 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 6:56 pm Subject: Re: To Rob M..... scottduncan2 Dear Andrew, It was with pleasure that I read your post: A: "...Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa are wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a conceptualised 'general feeling' of unpleasantness. "As I understand it, that is the answer to your questions/complaints and we are all free to acknowledge, forget or discard it as we please." Scott: This is, of course, the answer. The other views are, without a shadow of a doubt, nothing more than Old School Christianity through and through. Sincerely, Scott. #87834 From: upasaka@... Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 3:35 pm Subject: Re: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Ken (and Alex) - In a message dated 7/5/2008 6:40:01 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, kenhowardau@... writes: Hi Alex, Howard and all, This is an interesting conversation. It would seem that Ven. Sujato (as quoted by Alex) has found an example of two different Dhammas - one in the Sutta-pitaka and one in the Abhidhamma-pitaka. There must be some mistake! :-) Could the suttas involved be primarily describing various realms of rebirth? In the human realm beings experience both desirable and undesirable sense objects (as vipaka), while in the heaven realm beings experience only desirable sense objects, and in the hell realm beings experience only undesirable sense objects. A wholesome action performed in the realm of both-pleasant-and-unpleasant vipaka could reault in rebirth in the realm of pleasant-only vipaka. An unwholesome action in the realm of both-pleasant-and-unpleasant vipaka could result in rebirth in the realm of unpleasant-only vipaka. (And so on.) I wonder if that could explain the confusion: but it might be too easy to be true. Needless to say, I haven't seen the official commentary to the sutta quoted by Ven. Sujato, but surely it would have settled the matter. And I can't imagine the venerable would have made such a controversial allegation (of two different Dhammas) without having checked the commentary. So, it will be interesting to hear more. Ken H ================================== I wasn't particularly interested in what the bhikkhu had to say, but in what the Buddha had to say in the sutta. It seemed rather straightforward to me - rather clear. With metta, Howard #87835 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 7:53 pm Subject: Re: response to hate mail etc - revised and corrected edition kenhowardau Hi Herman, ---- H: > > You do not address the main point of my post. I was pointing out that > you typing out lots of stuff about nonads and decads is all kosher, > because it is Dhhamma in your opinion, but Howard and I cannot talk > about complex interrelations between namas and rupas because it is not > Dhamma, in your opinion. > ---- I am very happy to talk to you and others about complex interrelated networks *if* you think they are in the Dhamma. (I suppose someone could introduce them into a DSG discussion even if he knew they weren't in the Dhamma. But that would be trolling. And we don't approve of trolling, do we, Herman?) :-) ------------------------- H: > Don't you think a nonad or decad is a complexly interrelated thingy? ------------------------- A nonad or a decad is something different altogether. What we are talking about (complex interrelated thingies) are an invention that some people have come up with in order to give efficacy to concepts where no so such efficacy exists. We hear people say, "I agree there is no self, but there is a complex network of interrelated namas and rupas that we call a self, and it can . . ." No there isn't. No it can't. :-) Ken H #87836 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 8:57 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - revised and corrected edition egberdina Hi KenH, 2008/7/6 kenhowardau : > Hi Herman, >> > ---- > > I am very happy to talk to you and others about complex interrelated > networks *if* you think they are in the Dhamma. > > (I suppose someone could introduce them into a DSG discussion even if > he knew they weren't in the Dhamma. But that would be trolling. And > we don't approve of trolling, do we, Herman?) :-) > > ------------------------- > H: > Don't you think a nonad or decad is a complexly interrelated > thingy? > ------------------------- > > A nonad or a decad is something different altogether. > What I don't approve of is evasion of a straightforward question. > What we are talking about (complex interrelated thingies) are an > invention that some people have come up with in order to give > efficacy to concepts where no so such efficacy exists. We hear people > say, "I agree there is no self, but there is a complex network of > interrelated namas and rupas that we call a self, and it can . . ." > > No there isn't. No it can't. :-) What is a nonad, or a decad, KenH? Cheers Herman #87837 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 9:20 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi Andrew, 2008/7/5 Andrew : > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "buddhatrue" > Dear James & Herman > > I understand why, at a certain level, you find the standard answers > given on this topic to be nonsensical. However, might I suggest that > you are not factoring into this issue a basic premise of Abhidhamma > which, from your previous posts, I glean you simply do not accept. > That basic premise (not just of Theravadan Abhidhamma BTW) is that > moments of consciousness occur with extreme rapidity. The "general > feelings" James refers to above are not single moments of > consciousness but a conceptualisation of many moments over time. It > is a doomed exercise to try to understand the principles applying to > a moment of consciousness by forcing them willy nilly onto a > conceptualised compound of consciousness moments. The shoe just > won't fit - (without wishing to reify!), it is like suggesting that a > compound of atoms must behave in the same way as protons do. > It is good to see you are still around. Given the nature of your past kamma, well, anything could have happened to you since last time we argued :-) I have no problems with the statement that moments of consciousness occur with extreme rapidity. I would not qualify that as an Abhidhamma position, though. SN12:61 Because this body composed of the four great elements is seen standing for a year, two years, three, four, five, ten, twenty, thirty, forty, fifty, a hundred years or more. But what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. Just as a monkey, swinging through a forest wilderness, grabs a branch. Letting go of it, it grabs another branch. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. Letting go of that, it grabs another one. In the same way, what's called 'mind,' 'intellect,' or 'consciousness' by day and by night arises as one thing and ceases as another. == What I believe to be a doomed exercise is to try to map the principles of daily life onto conceptualised moments of consciousness. > Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa are > wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. > Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that > succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and > associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a > conceptualised "general feeling" of unpleasantness. I accept that is standard Abhidhamma. What standard Abhidhamma cannot account for is action in a world full of other beings, actions like dana, or stealing, or killing, or harsh speech or right livelihood etc The notions of hiri and ottappa in a solipsistic universe in which action and others do not occur are quite meaningless. > > As I understand it, that is the answer to your questions/complaints > and we are all free to acknowledge, forget or discard it as we please. I like your last line, but the sentiment it expresses is also an impossibility in the Abhidhamma universe. Cheers Herman #87838 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sat Jul 5, 2008 11:55 pm Subject: Re: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantness kenhowardau Hi Alex, ---- <. . .> A: > No, but my quote was to show that the sutta meant more than simply "x > will cause x sort of rebirth." > > In fact you sidelined the issue of "kusala may feel bad at the > moment" and "akusala may feel good in the moment". > > The important part is *in the moment* . ---- Yes, the important part is 'in the moment.' I have no doubt that kusala citta can be accompanied - in the moment - by pleasant vedana or by equanimous vedana, but *never* by unpleasant vedana. I wasn't sidelining that issue; I was offering a possible interpretation of the quoted sutta. Only in the conventionally known world can wholesomeness seem to be accompanied by unpleasant feeling. But, as I was surmising, there might be a way in which it can be said to happen in the ultimately real world as well. Just to reiterate: I was suggesting that the suttas you and Howard quoted might be referring to kusala citta (with pleasant or equanimous vedana) when it arises in the human realm (where unpleasant things can happen) and later gives rise to rebirth in the heaven realm (where only pleasant things happen). But I was only guessing. Ken H #87839 From: "Andrew" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 12:17 am Subject: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... corvus121 Hi Herman (Alex, Howard & all) I agree with Howard that the sutta quoted by Alex (thanks Alex) does not *have* to be seen as inconsistent with the Abhidhamma. But, that being the case, Herman's point below raises what I think is a critical issue: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > What I believe to be a doomed exercise is to try to map the principles > of daily life onto conceptualised moments of consciousness. Yes, what is the purpose of Abhidhamma? What is the purpose of learning about these fleeting mind moments over which there is no control? As I see it, the purpose is to develop mundane understanding. The purpose is *not* to plan your daily life around your intellectual understanding of the jati of cittas. So much of the teeth-gnashing that goes on on DSG is caused by people wanting to use the Abhidhamma as a guide in conventional daily life (as if we were all endowed with the wisdom to make us masters of DO). Abhidhamma shows us the intellectual logic behind anatta and DO. It fosters saddha. It was never intended to be used to answer such conventional questions as "shall I sit cross-legged under a tree?" or "shall I go to a temple?" So my vote is: James is speaking conventionally and he is quite right that regreting bad actions is a good thing and invariably feels unpleasant. But if we put all that under the "mind moment" microscope and use the language and terminology of Abhidhamma, it is said we will find that the actual moments of hiri/ottappa are of kusala jati etc. We rest assured that anatta is not undermined by lasting consciousness of a type denied by the Buddha. This notion that either the suttas are right OR Abhidhamma is right is a complete misconception. So is Ken H's pet dogma that the suttas *must* be read in Abhidhamma terms (even when panna is so very weak). Doesn't make any sense to me and I don't buy it! I do, however, like the view that Abhidhamma is a good starting point when studying Dhamma, providing you don't negate the Abhidhamma by thinking you can use it as a manual to run your daily life in the same way that you use your car's manual to change the oil! Herman, I may have misinterpreted your point. I took you as suggesting that we mustn't pretend there is direct awareness where there is really only intellectual understanding. No doubt you will expand this if more was intended. Regards Andrew #87840 From: "Andrew" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 12:27 am Subject: A question on contiguity corvus121 Hello all A citta in the human realm can be related by contiguity to a citta in the animal realm (and vice versa). But one of the cittas must be cuti. Correct? If yes, why? Any thoughts? Regards Andrew #87841 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 12:51 am Subject: Re: response to hate mail etc - revised and corrected edition kenhowardau --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > . . . > > ------------------------- > > H: > Don't you think a nonad or decad is a complexly interrelated > > thingy? > > ------------------------- > > > > A nonad or a decad is something different altogether. > > > > What I don't approve of is evasion of a straightforward question. > > > What we are talking about (complex interrelated thingies) are an > > invention that some people have come up with in order to give > > efficacy to concepts where no so such efficacy exists. Hi Herman, I don't think my answer was evasive. I think you were unable (or unwilling) to understand it. ---- H: > What is a nonad, or a decad, KenH? ---- They are momentary arisings of rupas. On the other hand, the so called complex interrelated network is not momentary. It is portrayed as a kind of stream that persists over time. Well, maybe 'persists' is the wrong word. As I understand the concept, it is something that doesn't actually persist, but that fulfils all the requirements of something that persists. But why am I telling you? You are the one who believes in it! :-) Ken H #87842 From: sarah abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 1:07 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A question on contiguity sarahprocter... Dear Andrew, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Andrew wrote: A:> A citta in the human realm can be related by contiguity to a citta in the animal realm (and vice versa). But one of the cittas must be cuti. Correct? ..... S: Yes, the last citta of each life. Actually, it's just another bhavanga citta resulting from the same (past) kamma as all the other bhavanga cittas in that life, but cuti is the name given to the last one. .... A:> If yes, why? .... S: Past Kamma. Because of attachment and ignorance, there's kamma which results in birth (patisandhi) and death (cuti) and all the other vipaka cittas in between. Has that answered it? I think there's more behind your question.... Metta, Sarah ========== #87843 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 1:44 am Subject: Re: Co to: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling nilovg Dear Andrew, Scott, and all who are interested, Op 5-jul-2008, om 19:13 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Bhikkhus, what is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings > pleasant > results in the future. Here, a certain one with displeasure > abstains from > destroying living things and on account of it experiences > unpleasantness. .... He after death goes to increase and is born in heaven. This is the observance that is unpleasant now and brings pleasant results in the future. .. ----------- N: The Commentary I have in Thai: explains about fishermen or hunters who make a living by killing. They listen to a Bhikkhu they respect who explains the wrongness of killing and the benefit of abstinence. They accept this, but they have immediately dukkha and domanassa. After two or three days when they cannot observe this precept they have again dukkha. The first cetanaa (intention) and the following cetanaa (apara cetanaa) is together with dukkha. As to the cetanaa that is accomplished, this is together with sukha or with upekkhaa. And this has to be understood in this way in all these cases. The Buddha refers to cetanaa in the beginning and cetanaa at the end. -------- N: The method of the sutta is different form the method of the Abhidhamma. The sutta does not give the details about the different processes of cittas. For example we read in many suttas: he sees a pleasant object with happy feeling. This happy feeling does not arise at the moment of seeing which is accompanied only by indifferent feeling. It arises afterwards, but details are not given. I think of another example: a monk goes forth but he leads his monk's life with tears. He finds it so hard. There are different moments: keeping the precepts and also having aversion because of his hard life removed from sense pleasures. Nina. #87844 From: "Sukinder" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 5:51 am Subject: Re: Overview of KS 3: Her Faulty Teaching sukinderpal Hi Herman, I had written a long reply :-) to this post of yours. But by the time I was about to finish it, I realized that I was only repeating what I have said before. So I decided not to send it and to ask also to be excused from answering the one other letter of yours. I'll probably get into other discussions that you may have with other members hopefully with something new. I know that you won't mind. Metta, Sukin --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Sukin, > > 2008/6/26 Sukinder : > > Hi Herman, > > > > Sorry for the delay in responding. > > > > No worries. > > > > > > "Now we see a blurred image in a mirror. Then we will see very > > clearly. Now my knowledge is incomplete. Then I will have complete > > knowledge as God has complete knowledge of me." > > > > > > > S: I don't understand the quote. But taking clues from what you wrote > > elsewhere, I think your basic premise is that what is perceived is what > > is perceived and *that* is the truth. So when I distinguish perceptions > > rooted in ignorance from those that are not and those that are > > particularly conditioned by wisdom, you think that this is unnecessary > > value judgment which *denies* the truth. Is this it? If so further > > comments follow: > > What is perceived is perceived. What is experienced is experienced. It > is a confusion of levels to attribute truth or falsity to what is > experienced. There is no such thing as a true or a false experience. > Truth relates to knowledge or understanding, not to experience. > #87845 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 1:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... upasaka_howard Hi, Andrew (and Herman & Alex & James) - In a message dated 7/6/2008 3:18:02 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, windtrax@... writes: Hi Herman (Alex, Howard & all) I agree with Howard that the sutta quoted by Alex (thanks Alex) does not *have* to be seen as inconsistent with the Abhidhamma. But, that being the case, Herman's point below raises what I think is a critical issue: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > What I believe to be a doomed exercise is to try to map the principles > of daily life onto conceptualised moments of consciousness. Yes, what is the purpose of Abhidhamma? What is the purpose of learning about these fleeting mind moments over which there is no control? As I see it, the purpose is to develop mundane understanding. The purpose is *not* to plan your daily life around your intellectual understanding of the jati of cittas. So much of the teeth-gnashing that goes on on DSG is caused by people wanting to use the Abhidhamma as a guide in conventional daily life (as if we were all endowed with the wisdom to make us masters of DO). Abhidhamma shows us the intellectual logic behind anatta and DO. It fosters saddha. It was never intended to be used to answer such conventional questions as "shall I sit cross-legged under a tree?" or "shall I go to a temple?" So my vote is: James is speaking conventionally and he is quite right that regreting bad actions is a good thing and invariably feels unpleasant. But if we put all that under the "mind moment" microscope and use the language and terminology of Abhidhamma, it is said we will find that the actual moments of hiri/ottappa are of kusala jati etc. We rest assured that anatta is not undermined by lasting consciousness of a type denied by the Buddha. This notion that either the suttas are right OR Abhidhamma is right is a complete misconception. So is Ken H's pet dogma that the suttas *must* be read in Abhidhamma terms (even when panna is so very weak). Doesn't make any sense to me and I don't buy it! I do, however, like the view that Abhidhamma is a good starting point when studying Dhamma, providing you don't negate the Abhidhamma by thinking you can use it as a manual to run your daily life in the same way that you use your car's manual to change the oil! Herman, I may have misinterpreted your point. I took you as suggesting that we mustn't pretend there is direct awareness where there is really only intellectual understanding. No doubt you will expand this if more was intended. Regards Andrew ================================ I very much like this post of yours, Alex, in particular your distinguishing of conventional from ultimate discourse, and their purview. My only hesitation is with regard to "... these fleeting mind moments over which there is no control." And here, my restraint in running to approve is with regard to what the "control" that is denied actually refers to. There is no doubt, it seems to me, of the following: 1) There is no self/entity/agent/controller who is "in charge" or exists in any manner at all, 2) States that have arisen are exactly as they are, and cannot be transformed into what they are not, and 3) There is no intervening of mere will that in one fell swoop brings about major future developments. The following however, are also very clear to me: 1) Conditions including thought, growth in directed mental energy, and, most of all, volition, have immediate and "at-a-distance" effects, each of small consequence, and repeated occurrences of such conditions and the arising and compounding of their effects, do, in the longer run, result in effects of incredibly large consequence, even as large as full awakening. With metta, Howard #87846 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:09 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility nilovg Dear Dieter, In D.O. sankhaara (kamma-formations) stands for kamma, kusala kamma, akusala kamma, imperturbable kamma. Sankhaarakkhandha is mentioned in the context of khandha: all cetasikas, except feeling and sa~n~naa. Habitual tendencies is just one translation among many and we should not mind too much these words. Nina. Op 5-jul-2008, om 18:22 heeft Dieter Möller het volgende geschreven: > Our habit (pls compare with persona ) conditioned by ignorant kamma > forces /will, ie. avijja - sankhara- .. is just this procedure as > explained in the chain of D.O. and our attachment just that what > identifies with self: that I am, that is mine etc.. > > Ken: Sorry, but I still can't follow. And I am trying! :-) > > D: good.. because habitual tendencies (cetasika) are difficult to > change due to the power of avijja- sankhara in the background. #87847 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:22 am Subject: Re: To Rob M..... truth_aerator Hi Scott, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Scott Duncan" wrote: > > Dear Andrew, > > It was with pleasure that I read your post: > > A: "...Standard Abhidhamma tells us that moments of hiri and otappa >are wholesome and therefore not associated with unpleasant feeling. > Standard Abhidhamma accepts that there is every likelihood that > succeeding moments may be rooted in aversion or ignorance and > associated with unpleasant feeling - giving rise over time to a > conceptualised 'general feeling' of unpleasantness. > > "As I understand it, that is the answer to your >questions/complaints and we are all free to acknowledge, forget or >discard it as we please." > > Scott: This is, of course, the answer. The other views are, >without a shadow of a doubt, nothing more than Old School >Christianity through and through. > > Sincerely, > > Scott. > Scott, do you have anything meaningful, of your own, to add? Your answer reminds me of a dogmatic Christian: "The Bible tells me so, I believe it [unquestionably], that settles it." Replace the Bible with: Abh, Commentaries, Vinaya, Tradition (one of 18-20) and it exactly describes your attitude. Best wishes, Alex #87848 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:31 am Subject: Re: kusala & with displeasure experiencing unpleasantness truth_aerator Hi Ken and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > Hi Alex, > Yes, the important part is 'in the moment.' I have no doubt that > kusala citta can be accompanied - in the moment - by pleasant >vedana or by equanimous vedana, but *never* by unpleasant vedana. > Only in the conventionally known world can wholesomeness seem to be > accompanied by unpleasant feeling. But, as I was surmising, there > might be a way in which it can be said to happen in the ultimately > real world as well. > 1) Lets say that a person, Jack, knows that lets say "smoking, drinking alchohol or taking drugs" is unwholesome. 2) Jack used to be engaged in this unwholesome activity, is of a greedy type and as a matter of fact, has instinctual/biological craving for (drugs, alchohol, smoking, etc). 3) Jack's (former) friends at work invite him for the Friday evening party full of hot chicks, drugs & alchohol. 4) Jack in great internal pain rejects its, and perhaps get humiliated by being told "Get a life you perv!" 5) Rejection, abstention from the above activities is wholesome. Yet what sort of feelings predominate? Are you going to side with the suttas (and experience) or with Abhidhamma in this matter? Best wishes, Alex #87849 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Metta, Ch 9, no 2. jonoabb Hi Andrew Good to see you back! Andrew wrote: > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > >> Thus, while it is true that the mental factor of intention (cetana) >> is a conditioned dhamma, actions performed do carry results (i.e., >> for the consciousness stream). >> > > Hi Jon > ... just waiting for KenH to jump in here and accuse you of belief in > self! :-) He does that to me whenever I refer to a "consciousness > stream". So watch out!! > I was careful to indicate, in earlier posts in that thread, that there is no dhamma of 'stream of consciousness' (knowing that KenH is around ;-)) > Hope you are well. > I am, thanks. And I hope you are, too. Jon #87850 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:47 am Subject: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta truth_aerator Hi Andrew and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: > Yes, what is the purpose of Abhidhamma? What is the purpose of > learning about these fleeting mind moments over which there is no > control? As I see it, the purpose is to develop mundane > understanding. The purpose is *not* to plan your daily life around > your intellectual understanding of the jati of cittas. > > So much of the teeth-gnashing that goes on on DSG is caused by >people wanting to use the Abhidhamma as a guide in conventional >daily life (as if we were all endowed with the wisdom to make us >masters of DO). > If Abh cannot be used as a Guide to daily life (or any life for that matter), then what is the use of it? For comparison, Buddha's teaching can be used by laypeople and there have been Lay Anagamins (there was at least one lay person, Mahanama, who became an Arahat at death) Buddha has taught Dhamma and how to incorporate it into daily life even for householders with big Businesses. > >Abhidhamma shows us the intellectual logic behind anatta and DO. It >fosters saddha. I am happy if that is the case for you. Please tell me: a) Why does Atta has to be permanent to be Atta? Why can't Atta be ever changing? b) Why does Atta have to be only pleasant? Why can't it be partially happy partially unhappy depending on circumstances? c) Why does Atta have to be in control 100% of the time? Why can't it have some control, at least some of the time. You know co- determination? Sometimes the outside influences are so strong that Atta can't do anything, and sometimes the outside influences are weak enough for Atta to do something. Ex: a person thrown into a water current. If the water current is strong, then even an expert swimmer may be helples. If water current is weak, then an expert swimmer may be able to swim. And my fav questions: 1) Why 89 cittas? Why not 88 or 90? 2) Why 28 and not 27 or 29 rupas? 3) Why 24 and not 23 or 25 conditions? 4) Why 52 and not 51 or 53 Cetasikas? How does Abh answers the above questions? Best wishes, Alex #87851 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Metta, Ch 9, no 2. jonoabb Hi Ken > When a sense object is experienced by panna there is no idea of "this > is my vipaka" is there? No, there isn't. But there is the > understanding that the presently arisen citta was conditioned by its > immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by its > immediately preceding citta, which in turn was conditioned by . . . > . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . by its > immediately preceding citta, which was an impulsive (kamma- > productive) citta the fruit of which is being experienced right now!" > The way I see it, developed panna could know, say, seeing consciousness as being of a different jati than, say, the kusala or akusala cittas that think about what has been experienced (it could know, in other words, that seeing consciousness was not a kusala or akusala citta). > Corrections welcome! > Likewise (just my thoughts). Jon #87852 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:56 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Metta, Ch 9, no 2. jonoabb Hi Andrew > Seems you are "off the hook", Jon! :-)) I won't have to ask the > other moderator to expel you from the list after all! Phew!! > Not a chance, anyway. We have a mutual preservation accord!! Jon #87853 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] What is a question? was Re: Overview of KS 3: Her Faulty Teaching jonoabb Hi Herman > This may seem a flippant post. However, I actually believe it to > address something very fundamental that is rarely considered. We are > often prodded here with questions like "what is the reality of the > present moment?", as if something significant or useful is being said. > But I would like to suggest that without knowing what is happening > when a question is being asked, an answer to a question like "what is > the reality of the present moment?" that does not incorporate the > question itself, is based in ignorance. Do you perhaps mean that an answer that responds to the questioner's 'problem', rather than just to the question as an isolated set of words, is the more skilful? If so, I'd agree. > So, especially from a > paramattha dhamma point of view, what is a question? > A good question ;-)) I don't think I know the answer. Any thoughts of your own to share? Jon #87854 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:06 am Subject: Nonads, Decads - Concepts, reality, streams truth_aerator Hi Ken, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > P1) They are momentary arisings of rupas. > P2) On the other hand, the so called complex interrelated network > is not momentary. > P3) It is portrayed as a kind of stream that persists over time. > > P4) Well, maybe 'persists' is the wrong word. As I understand the > concept, it is something that doesn't actually persist, >P5) but that fulfils all the requirements of something that >persists. > > Ken H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> P1 and P2 contradict each other. P4 contradicts P1 By P4 you are vacillating between "they are momentary... is not momentary." P4 P5) . If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, behaves like a duck, looks like a duck, called a duck - it is not a duck. Are nonads concepts or not? Do they persist or not? Hum? Obliteration has ended, Best wishes Ken. Yours Trully, Alex #87855 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Jhana, path of pleasure seeking for magga-phala jonoabb Hi Alex > Hi Jon, Sarah and all, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > >> On the question of jhana as a prerequisite for the attainment of >> enlightenment as an anagami, rather than respond to your message >> point-by-point I'd like to try and summarise what you've said to >> date. >> >> As I read you, this is not something explicitly stated by the >> Buddha, but is to be inferred mainly from 2 references in the >> suttas, namely: >> - the mention of the anagami being 'perfected in concentration' >> > > Perfected, or accomplished (I don't want to argue about semantics) in > Samma-Samadhi khanda. > >> - the description of the destiny of the anagami after death. > Highest Rupa Lokas. Some ariyas can be reborn up to base of > nothingness. > Yes, understood. But my point was the rather weak basis for the view (i.e., just those 2 indirect references). >> [Jon] >> I don't think there's any text that says that jhana is necessary in >> order to prepare the mind for the development of insight. >> >> [Alex] >> > It may not be necessary, but it certainly IS helpful. >> >> I'd be interested to know what sutta passages you rely on for this >> statement. > > 24.2 "There are, Cunda, these four kinds of life devoted to pleasure, > which are conducive to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, > to tranquility, to realization, to enlightenment, to Nibbana. What > are they? First a monk detached from sense-desires, detached from > unwholesome mental states, enters and remains in the first > jhana...the fourth jhana, which is beyond pleasure and pain, and > purified by equanimity and mindfulness." ... > Thanks for the sutta passage (DN29). The sutta deals with, among other things, incorrect assertions that followers of other sects might make about the monks who are follows of the Buddha. The first of these is that the Buddha's followers are addicted to a life of devotion to to pleasure. In refuting the charge insofar as it could be taken to mean devotion to pleasures of the senses, the Buddha explains that there is one form of 'life devoted to pleasure' which is praiseworthy, namely the life of a follower who experiences the pleasant feeling associated with jhana. As we know, jhana is kusala and thus so is the pleasant feeling associated with it. In the dispensation of the Buddha (but not outside it), jhana may be a basis for enlightenment, and it is in that sense that jhana is 'conducive to enlightenment'. However, the passage does not indicate that jhana is helpful to the would-be developer of the path (such as you or me). It speaks only of those who, within the dispensation, have already attained jhana. Jon #87856 From: Dieter Möller Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility moellerdieter Dear Nina, you wrote: ....snip 'Habitual tendencies is just one translation among many and we should not mind too much these words' just to the contrary , just to the contrary .... ;-) with Metta Dieter ----- Original Message ----- From: Nina van Gorkom To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Sent: Sunday, July 06, 2008 3:09 PM Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility Dear Dieter, In D.O. sankhaara (kamma-formations) stands for kamma, kusala kamma, akusala kamma, imperturbable kamma. Sankhaarakkhandha is mentioned in the context of khandha: all cetasikas, except feeling and sa~n~naa. Habitual tendencies is just one translation among many and we should not mind too much these words. Nina. Op 5-jul-2008, om 18:22 heeft Dieter Möller het volgende geschreven: > Our habit (pls compare with persona ) conditioned by ignorant kamma > forces /will, ie. avijja - sankhara- .. is just this procedure as > explained in the chain of D.O. and our attachment just that what > identifies with self: that I am, that is mine etc.. > > Ken: Sorry, but I still can't follow. And I am trying! :-) > > D: good.. because habitual tendencies (cetasika) are difficult to > change due to the power of avijja- sankhara in the background. #87857 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:38 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Jhana, path of pleasure seeking for magga-phala truth_aerator Hi Jon, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Hi Alex > > Thanks for the sutta passage (DN29). The sutta deals with, among >other things, incorrect assertions that followers of other sects >might make about the monks who are follows of the Buddha. Read the Subject line. We aren't talking about other things, we are talking specifically about Jhana and its relation to magga-phala. In your quote of my quote, don't skip this line: "these four kinds of life devoted to pleasure, which are conducive to disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to tranquility, to realization, to enlightenment, to Nibbana. What are they? First a monk detached from sense-desires, detached from unwholesome mental states, enters and remains in the first jhana...the fourth jhana, which is beyond pleasure and pain, and purified by equanimity and mindfulness." And "25. Then such wanderers might ask: "Well then, those who are given to these four forms of pleasure-seeking - how many fruits, how many benefits can they expect?" And, you should reply: "They can expect four fruits, four benefits. What are they? The first is when a monk by destruction of three fetters has become a Stream-Winner," > > However, the passage does not indicate that jhana is helpful to the > would-be developer of the path (such as you or me). Pre Sotapanna? I'll quote again: "25. Then such wanderers might ask: "Well then, those who are given to these four forms of pleasure-seeking - how many fruits, how many benefits can they expect?" And, you should reply: "They can expect four fruits, four benefits. What are they? The first is when a monk by destruction of three fetters has become a Stream-Winner," http://tipitaka.wikia.com/wiki/Pasadika_Sutta >>> > It speaks only of > those who, within the dispensation, have already attained jhana. > > Jon > In part DUE to attainment of Jhana non sotopanna becomes sotopanna. Best wishes, Alex #87858 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:52 am Subject: Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? truth_aerator Hi Ken, Sarah, Scott, Jon, Nina and all Abhidhammikas, Does continuity exist? Yes or No. If Yes, Is is continuous or discrete? Best wishes, Alex #87859 From: "Scott Duncan" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:58 am Subject: Co to: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling scottduncan2 Dear Nina, Thanks for these elaborations: N: "...They listen to a Bhikkhu they respect who explains the wrongness of killing and the benefit of abstinence. They accept this, but they have immediately dukkha and domanassa. After two or three days when they cannot observe this precept they have again dukkha..." Scott: Just to clarify, 'they have immediately dukkha and domanassa' is reference to painful feeling - to vedanaa. Would this be correct? And in this case, cetasikaa dukkhaa-vedanaa, which is called domanassa. This is painful mental feeling. Is it correct to state that this painful mental feeling is akusala? If painful mental feeling is vedanaa and akusala, what is the 'mistake' in making the equation? The 'ethical quality' (akusala) is identical with the painful mental feeling since the painful mental feeling is akusala by virtue of being painful (and painful by virtue of being akusala). N: "...The first cetanaa (intention) and the following cetanaa (apara cetanaa) is together with dukkha..." Scott: Can you please say more on this 'first' and 'following' pattern here? To me, if cetanaa is together with domanassa, it is akusala centanaa. And, again, since we are dealing with the citta-viithi, and not at all with conceptualised wholes which are labelled 'feelings' we do not refer to the conventional experience of so-called 'emotional states'. Since this is the case, reference to equally conceptual fantasies such as 'psychopath' or 'autistic' is meaningless. We are dealing with the fact that kusala or akusala can be condition for either kusala or akusala in the process of consciousness. N: "...As to the cetanaa that is accomplished, this is together with sukha or with upekkhaa. And this has to be understood in this way in all these cases. The Buddha refers to cetanaa in the beginning and cetanaa at the end." Scott: Again, does this refer to citta-viithi, and to how wholesome states can be condition for unwholesome states and vice-versa? Sincerely, Scott. #87860 From: "abhidhammika" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 8:34 am Subject: Does Sarah Accept Formal Meditation Now? Re: Practice is what counts! abhidhammika Dear Sarah, Alex, Herman, Nina, Phil, Scott, Mike How are you? If you don't mind, I have a question for you. Sarah wrote: "The path is the same for us all, Alex. It starts with right understanding of dhammas even now as we speak without any attachment to results. And then, it starts again in just the same way and again and again..... This is what bhavana/meditation is all about." Sarah, you gave me an impression with the above statment that you accept formal development (bhaavnaa) of the Noble Eightfold Path (a.t.thangiko maggo) starting with right view (sammaadi.t.thi)(right understanding, as you put it), without attachment to anything, of course. Did I understand your statement correctly? Was the impression I got acceptable to you? Thanks in advance. Suan Lu Zaw www.bodhiology.org PS, Alex, keep up the good work. :-) --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > A:> And one of the best defence of KS, is that she teaches those kinds of > people whose character type isn't advised to meditate. To each his > own, I guess. > .... > S: The path is the same for us all, Alex. It starts with right understanding of dhammas even now as we speak without any attachment to results. And then, it starts again in just the same way and again and again..... > > This is what bhavana/meditation is all about. > > Metta, > > Sarah > =========== > #87862 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 9:34 am Subject: Obliteration, Or: Nonads, Decads, Concepts, reality, streams, logic truth_aerator Hi Ken and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > P1) They are momentary arisings of rupas. > P2) On the other hand, the so called complex interrelated network > is not momentary. > P3) It is portrayed as a kind of stream that persists over time. > > P4) Well, maybe 'persists' is the wrong word. As I understand the > concept, it is something that doesn't actually persist, >P5) but that fulfils all the requirements of something that >persists. > > Ken H >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> P1 and P2 contradict each other. P2&P3 contradicts P1. By P4 you are vacillating between "they are momentary... is not momentary." . So which is it? Momentary or not? P4 contradicts P5. By P4 & P5) Ken makes us believe that: "If it walks like a duck, quacks like a duck, behaves like a duck, looks like a duck, called a duck - it is not a duck." Questions: 1) Are nonads concepts or not? 2) Do they persist or not? ================================================================ Obliteration has ended, Best wishes, Ken. Yours Truly, Alex #87863 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 9:56 am Subject: Streams, identity & difference truth_aerator Hi Jon, Ken, Andrew and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > >> I was careful to indicate, in earlier posts in that thread, that >there is no dhamma of 'stream of consciousness' (knowing that KenH is >around ;-)) > Then how is conditionality of stream of consciousness explained? Or are you implying that things "just happen" from no cause? The A causes B, B causes C = {"A->C"} . Conceptually and conventionally {"A->C"} is called: a being, a person, a thing, a stream. But conditionality DOES exist, unless you are arguing for non- causality. Also, do you accept "Identity & difference" of Dhammas and of streams? If you reject the "self identity" of a stream then you preach pure an unadultered Nihilism where Arahats stream can end up Pujjhanas stream because there is no difference in their respective streams. Ex: p=Pujjhana a=Arahant Pujjhana (Worldling) Ap -> Bp , Bp->Cp thus self identical stream of Pujjhana can be neatly summarized as Ap->Cp or {Ap,Bp,Cp} Arahant Aa -> Ba , Ba->Ca thus self identical stream of Arahant can be neatly summarized as Aa->Ca or {Aa,Ba,Ca} {Ap,Bp,Cp} is self same to {Ap,Bp,Cp} and different from {Aa,Ba,Ca}. {Aa,Ba,Ca} is self same to {Aa,Ba,Ca} and different from {Ap,Bp,Cp} {Ap,Bp,Cp} NOT EQUAL to {Aa,Ba,Ca} Aa cannot possibly lead to Cp. So each stream has a certain "identity", especially the Arahat's stream which cannot possibly be the same (or end up) as Worldlings. Best wishes, Alex #87864 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:53 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference upasaka_howard Hi, Alex (and Jon, Ken, and Andrew) - In a message dated 7/6/2008 12:57:12 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: Hi Jon, Ken, Andrew and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > >> I was careful to indicate, in earlier posts in that thread, that >there is no dhamma of 'stream of consciousness' (knowing that KenH is >around ;-)) > Then how is conditionality of stream of consciousness explained? Or are you implying that things "just happen" from no cause? ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: Alex, why would you draw such an inference from the mere assertion that a stream of consciousness isn't a (paramattha) dhamma? In fact, it is not. It is a trans-temporal aggregation of mental activities, each of which is a dhamma. The dhammas that constitutes a stream of consciousness act in concert, and there is extaordinarily complex conditionality involved, some of which is preconditioning and some of which is co-conditioning. But why would you infer random occurrence from the assertion that a stream of consciousness is not a dhamma? ----------------------------------------------- The A causes B, B causes C = {"A->C"} . Conceptually and conventionally {"A->C"} is called: a being, a person, a thing, a stream. But conditionality DOES exist, unless you are arguing for non- causality. ------------------------------------------- Howard: ???? ------------------------------------------- Also, do you accept "Identity & difference" of Dhammas and of streams? If you reject the "self identity" of a stream then you preach pure an unadultered Nihilism where Arahats stream can end up Pujjhanas stream because there is no difference in their respective streams. -------------------------------------------- Howard: As I view the matter, "identity" is intimately related to self-view and substantialism, if not identical (LOL!), and the notion ignores conditionality/contingency. The diametric opposite of identity, though, is also contary to reality and is tantamount to nihilism. The reality is a subtle, hard-to-understand, middle-way one that skirts both unity and separateness. =========================== With metta, Howard #87865 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 1:15 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference truth_aerator Hi Howard, Jon, Ken, and Andrew, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Alex (and Jon, Ken, and Andrew) - > > > Then how is conditionality of stream of consciousness explained? >Or are you implying that things "just happen" from no cause? > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Alex, why would you draw such an inference from the mere assertion >that a stream of consciousness isn't a (paramattha) dhamma? Some people appear to say that only paramattha ultimately exist. I wanted to make sure that people don't start denying the differences between one "trans-temporal aggregation of mental activities" and another "trans-temporal aggregation of mental activities". > But why would you infer random occurrence from the assertion that a >stream of consciousness is not a >dhamma? > ----------------------------------------------- If conditionality is just a "concept" that doesn't exist in ultimate reality, then how do we distinguish that from an assertion that "things just happen and it us, worldlings, who create conditionalites and such relations." > > The A causes B, B causes C = {"A->C"} . > > Conceptually and conventionally {"A->C"} is called: a being, a > person, a thing, a stream. > > > But conditionality DOES exist, unless you are arguing for non- > conditionality [corrected last word]. > ------------------------------------------- > Howard: > ???? > ------------------------------------------- > This/That conditionality does exist. > Also, do you accept "Identity & difference" of Dhammas and of > streams? If you reject the "self identity" of a stream then you > >preach pure an unadultered Nihilism where Arahats stream can end >up Pujjhanas stream because there is no difference in their >respective streams. > -------------------------------------------- > Howard: > As I view the matter, "identity" is intimately related to self- >view and substantialism, if not identical (LOL!), Ok, self-identity may be called "sabhava" and since Commentarial sabhava isn't called atta - then maybe not all view it as such. But Commentaries aside, here is explanation of what I've meant. An Arahant is an Arahant. An Arahant isn't a non-Arahant. Kusala is Kusala. Kusala is not Akusala. A=A. A is different from (Not-A). A cannot be both A and not-A. The laws of Identity without which nothing could make any possible sense. Best wishes, Alex #87866 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 9:30 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference upasaka_howard Hi, Alex - In a message dated 7/6/2008 4:15:58 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: Ok, self-identity may be called "sabhava" and since Commentarial sabhava isn't called atta - then maybe not all view it as such. But Commentaries aside, here is explanation of what I've meant. An Arahant is an Arahant. An Arahant isn't a non-Arahant. Kusala is Kusala. Kusala is not Akusala. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Yes, I agree. It is possible to distinguish according to characteristics. I'm sure that Jon would agree with that as well, though I'm not sure what status he accords to aggregations. -------------------------------------------- A=A. A is different from (Not-A). A cannot be both A and not-A. ------------------------------------------- Howard: Now here you remind me of Ayn Rand! ;-)) ------------------------------------------ The laws of Identity without which nothing could make any possible sense. ========================== With metta, Howard #87867 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 1:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference truth_aerator Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Alex - > > In a message dated 7/6/2008 4:15:58 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > truth_aerator@... writes: > > Ok, self-identity may be called "sabhava" and since Commentarial > sabhava isn't called atta - then maybe not all view it as such. >But Commentaries aside, here is explanation of what I've meant. > > An Arahant is an Arahant. An Arahant isn't a non-Arahant. > Kusala is Kusala. Kusala is not Akusala. > --------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Yes, I agree. It is possible to distinguish according to > characteristics. I'm sure that Jon would agree with that as well, >though I'm not sure what status he accords to aggregations. > -------------------------------------------- > A=A. > A is different from (Not-A). > A cannot be both A and not-A. > ------------------------------------------- > Howard: > Now here you remind me of Ayn Rand! ;-)) > ------------------------------------------ > Actually a Basic Aristotelian logic. Those rules are fundamental to any coherent and useful system. If we reject that A = A and A is not equal to not-A, then we would have absurdities such as these: An Arahant could be a not-Arahant (Pujjhana) A Nibbana could be not-Nibbana (Samsara), Kusala could be Akusala Akusala could be Kusala. Dukkha could be Sukha Admit, the above 5 situations would have been very damaging to pragmatical Buddhist teaching, useless and incoherent statements would result. Best wishes, Alex #87868 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 11:25 am Subject: RE: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? dacostacharles Hi all, It has been a long time and now I have time again to post on DSG. Alex, I like what you wrote in the attached post. However, I would like to add, the concept of Self transcends thought. Most confuse it's opposite (on-such-thing-as-self), a level within Buddhist and Hindu understanding, with the eternal truth (a doctrine). Within Relative truth you can find selves. They are just impermanent. In this sense the Self is real. And yes, you can argue that "That is just a Label!" non-the-less, it is still a self. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Alex Sent: Friday, June 27, 2008 22:32 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? * In a message dated 6/27/2008 11:21:52 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > truth_aerator@... writes: > > Hello all, > > how could "Self" as a 1st person perspective be refuted? The Self is a 1st person perspective of Samsara or Nibbana from 1st person perspective. It is none of the 5 aggregates, it "witnesses" a particular causal line of aggregates arising and perishing. Thus anicca-dukkha-anatta of 5 aggregates don't touch it as it isn't > any or all of the aggregates. > Alex Ex: the bundle of aggregates that we call "John" is different from the bundle of aggregates we call "Jack" . When "John" accidentally walks into a furniture, John, not Jack experiences feeling in 1st person mode. Of course John & Jack are names attributed to two different 1st person perspectives of two different sets of 5 aggregates. This difference by which for John, "John" 5 aggregates is 1st person perspective and Jack's 5 aggregates is 3rd person. Of course the 1st person perspective isn't a Self like some imagine self to be. But then, when John achieves Parinibbana, John NOT Jack is parinibbana'ed. So this difference of 1st person perspectives is a qualitative difference between the two. ... If by a Self we mean unchanging Self, then none of the 5 aggregates count as one. But here is another stumbling block. Why does "Self" has to be unchanging and 100% powerful. Why can't Self be a) Changing b) Powerless in some or all things (those dictated by nature) and capable of some other things. 5 aggregates are not Self (in the assumptions that Self has to be permanent and in control) However, with all the impermanence and so on, there is a constant difference between sets of 5 aggregates in a sense of 1st person perspective. #87869 From: "Charles DaCosta" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 11:56 am Subject: RE: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? dacostacharles Hi Alex, The real problem with this subject is the definition of Self. During the Buddha's the self was defined as the eternal, unchanging, uncompounded, essence of a being (it was the). It was this essence that lives the rounds of rebirth. What the Buddha found was nothing was "eternal, unchanging, uncompounded, nor the essence." Therefore the self did not exist. So when you claim the self is ... something else, well you and the Buddha's teaching are talking about two different things. So yes there is no-such-thing as a self, and yes I have or am a self. --- are both truth. DSG members prefer to stick to the definition, of self, used during the Buddha's day. Charles DaCosta _____ From: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com [mailto:dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com] On Behalf Of Alex Sent: Saturday, June 28, 2008 01:16 To: dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? Dear Raymond, Howard and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@ yahoogroups.com, "Raymond Hendrickson" wrote: > Hi Alex, enjoying the discussion, you said........ So you are saying that there is a eternal unconditioned Self that somehow "witnesses" the aggregates but is not touched by the aggregates yet is > bound by the aggregates in Samsara due to ignorance? >>> I am talking about a 1st person perspective that either includes the aggregates (Samsara) or lack of them. >>>>>>> We know from DN 1 that the following views are incorrect. One cannot regard form as Self, cannot see Self as possessing form, cannot see form as in Self, or see Self as in form, and of course the same for the other aggregates. >>>> Thats something I kept in mind to rebuke the Self described here. However the thing is word "attached" . If we posit a Self that deluded (like a sun obscured by the clouds as seen from the earth) then does this negate the refutation at DN#1? ... #87870 From: upasaka@... Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 11:00 am Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? upasaka_howard Hi, Charles (and Alex) - Nice to hear from you, Charles! In a message dated 7/6/2008 5:13:09 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, dacostas@... writes: Hi Alex, The real problem with this subject is the definition of Self. During the Buddha's the self was defined as the eternal, unchanging, uncompounded, essence of a being (it was the). It was this essence that lives the rounds of rebirth. What the Buddha found was nothing was "eternal, unchanging, uncompounded, nor the essence." Therefore the self did not exist. So when you claim the self is ... something else, well you and the Buddha's teaching are talking about two different things. --------------------------------------------- Howard: Exactly! -------------------------------------------- So yes there is no-such-thing as a self, and yes I have or am a self. --- are both truth. DSG members prefer to stick to the definition, of self, used during the Buddha's day. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: As do Buddhists generally. Likewise, Buddhists use 'kamma' to mean "intention," because that was the Buddha's usage. --------------------------------------------- Charles DaCosta ======================== With metta, Howard #87871 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 4:22 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi Andrew, 2008/7/6 Andrew : > Hi Herman (Alex, Howard & all) > > So my vote is: James is speaking conventionally and he is quite right > that regreting bad actions is a good thing and invariably feels > unpleasant. > But if we put all that under the "mind moment" microscope and use the > language and terminology of Abhidhamma, it is said we will find that > the actual moments of hiri/ottappa are of kusala jati etc. We rest > assured that anatta is not undermined by lasting consciousness of a > type denied by the Buddha. I thought your post was very good. I agree with your expectations about what will be found under the "mind moment" microscope. (There is no need to spoil a perfectly good post, so I will not point out that we must not confuse Abhidhamma with Abhidhamma commentary :-)) > This notion that either the suttas are right OR Abhidhamma is right is > a complete misconception. So is Ken H's pet dogma that the suttas > *must* be read in Abhidhamma terms (even when panna is so very weak). > Doesn't make any sense to me and I don't buy it! I do, however, like > the view that Abhidhamma is a good starting point when studying Dhamma, > providing you don't negate the Abhidhamma by thinking you can use it as > a manual to run your daily life in the same way that you use your car's > manual to change the oil! > > Herman, I may have misinterpreted your point. I took you as suggesting > that we mustn't pretend there is direct awareness where there is really > only intellectual understanding. No doubt you will expand this if more > was intended. > You paraphrased me well. Thanks for your post, Andrew. Cheers Herman #87872 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 5:23 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Overview of KS 3: Her Faulty Teaching egberdina Hi Sukin, 2008/7/6 Sukinder : > Hi Herman, > > I had written a long reply :-) to this post of yours. But by the time > I was about to finish it, I realized that I was only repeating what I > have said before. So I decided not to send it and to ask also to be > excused from answering the one other letter of yours. > I think you made a good decision. > I'll probably get into other discussions that you may have with other > members hopefully with something new. > > I know that you won't mind. > You are right, and it will be good to discuss other things with you when it happens :-) Cheers Herman #87873 From: "m_nease" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:06 pm Subject: Does Sarah Accept Formal Meditation Now? Re: Practice is what counts! m_nease Hi Suan, I'm fine thanks, how's yourself? And thanks for including my name in your address. I'm always glad to see you here. I found your question to Sarah a good and interesting one. May I interject another? --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "abhidhammika" wrote: > Dear Sarah, Alex, Herman, Nina, Phil, Scott, Mike > > How are you? > > If you don't mind, I have a question for you. > > Sarah wrote: > > "The path is the same for us all, Alex. It starts with right > understanding of dhammas even now as we speak without any attachment > to results. And then, it starts again in just the same way and again > and again..... > > This is what bhavana/meditation is all about." > > Sarah, you gave me an impression with the above statment that you > accept formal development (bhaavnaa) of the Noble Eightfold Path > (a.t.thangiko maggo) starting with right view (sammaadi.t.thi)(right > understanding, as you put it), without attachment to anything, of > course. > > Did I understand your statement correctly? Was the impression I got > acceptable to you? Suan, do you think that it might help to further this discussion if someone could post a few examples (from the Tipi.tika of course) of the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching either samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or encouraging them to pursue these? Aside, I mean, from reflecting on the Buddha, the Dhamma, the Sangha, devas, brahmas, or their own sila during laypeoples' observance of uposatha for example. Examples of laypeople being exhorted to or instructed in aa.naapaa.nasati might be particularly useful, don't you think? Examples such as these might help to give us all some common ground for discussing our various understandings of ancient and modern practices. Well, just a thought. What do you think? Thanks in Advance, mike #87874 From: "Alex" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:43 pm Subject: Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami truth_aerator Hi, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "m_nease" wrote: > Suan, do you think that it might help to further this discussion if > someone could post a few examples (from the Tipi.tika of course) of > the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching either > samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or encouraging them to >>> Citta the householder could attain 4 Jhanas when he wished and for as long as he wished. He was also a non-returner. pg 1329 CDB . Cittasamyutta 41.9 Naked Ascetic Kassapa. =========================================== Judging by the sort of questions he asked a monk (regarding cessation of perception & feelings) shows that some laypeople knew quite a bit. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn41/sn41.006.than.html http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn41/sn41.007.than.html ============================================= Furthermore 4 Jhanas can lead to 4 fruits (stream entry, once returning, non returning, Arhatship). -DN29 There were many Ariya householders, some of which were Anagamis... - In MN52 Ananda explains 11 doorways to liberation to a layperson. ALL involve meditation. 7 Jhanas 4 involve Brahmaviharas that do lead to (either 4th or 7th) Jhana http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/mn/mn.052.than.html Best wishes, Alex #87875 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 6:44 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference egberdina Hi Alex, 2008/7/7 Alex : > Hi Howard, > >> -------------------------------------------- >> A=A. >> A is different from (Not-A). >> A cannot be both A and not-A. >> ------------------------------------------- >> Howard: >> Now here you remind me of Ayn Rand! ;-)) >> ------------------------------------------ >> > Actually a Basic Aristotelian logic. > > > Those rules are fundamental to any coherent and useful system. > If we reject that A = A and A is not equal to not-A, then we would > have absurdities such as these: I very much like the discussion. And I agree that without assuming the basic Aristotelian law, that for anything to be it must be identical with itself, all propositions (and therefore all intelligent dialogue) are meaningless. In the case where A is not identical with A there is no "ontological import", we are talking about something that isn't. I believe that vinnana is a case of A not being identical with itself. For "consciousness" is described as arising as one thing and ceases as another. It is never itself. > An Arahant could be a not-Arahant (Pujjhana) > A Nibbana could be not-Nibbana (Samsara), > Kusala could be Akusala > Akusala could be Kusala. > Dukkha could be Sukha > > Admit, the above 5 situations would have been very damaging to > pragmatical Buddhist teaching, useless and incoherent statements > would result. Exactly right. And that pragmatic teaching starts of with growing disenchanted with those things to which A=A applies, which is quite different to denying that A=A applies to them. Cheers Herman #87876 From: Sukinder Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:00 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sukinderpal Hi Alex and Andrew, ============= Andrew: > > Yes, what is the purpose of Abhidhamma? What is the purpose of > > learning about these fleeting mind moments over which there is no > > control? As I see it, the purpose is to develop mundane > > understanding. The purpose is *not* to plan your daily life around > > your intellectual understanding of the jati of cittas. > > > > So much of the teeth-gnashing that goes on on DSG is caused by > >people wanting to use the Abhidhamma as a guide in conventional > >daily life (as if we were all endowed with the wisdom to make us > >masters of DO). > > Alex: > If Abh cannot be used as a Guide to daily life (or any life for that > matter), then what is the use of it? Sukin: I think what Andrew is saying is that the nature of realities being that they are conditioned and already fallen away, it only makes sense that we try to understand better and better whatever appears. Instead of seeking results and being caught up with ideas involving control why not understand the moment which continually evades us? As we seek to ‘create conditions’ for projected results, the conditions involved in such thinking are never acknowledged let alone known. We believe that our aspirations are worthy and right and even insist on them; however it is not the concepts associated which determines “right cause”, but the associated roots, in particular wisdom, and this we are hardly ever interested in. The application of Abhidhamma is that of Dhamma. And the Dhamma is all about understanding the moment. No one can *use* Dhamma, because there is no ‘self’ apart from dhammas. Dhammas arise and perform functions but because we lack the wisdom to know this, what usually happens instead is that ignorance and craving conditions ideas about control. The object at those times is concepts of self, situations and ‘doings’. Here the “Abhidhamma” can help us to better discriminate and not be misled. ;-) On the other hand, when panna has been developed to the level of indriya and bala, there could be said to be then, “control”. Control not *of dhammas*, but the ability to insight any reality at anytime, and this would have been due to repeated mindfulness and understanding of the present moment, rather than what follows from ideas about self and ‘doings’. ============= Alex: > For comparison, Buddha's teaching can be used by laypeople and there > have been Lay Anagamins (there was at least one lay person, Mahanama, > who became an Arahat at death) > > Buddha has taught Dhamma and how to incorporate it into daily life > even for householders with big Businesses. Sukin: I think with the understanding of the nature of the present moment, questions about ‘how’ disappear and we will begin to read the Suttas not as ‘prescriptions for’ but instead as ‘descriptions of’. This helps to understand the ‘present moment’ what ever the conventional situation and it is here that application of ‘Dhamma’ truly takes place. In contrast when we are involved with thoughts about application to the situations of daily life, not only the application “now” never happens, but we remain trying to work things out in the realm of concepts only. ============= > a) Why does Atta has to be permanent to be Atta? Why can't Atta be > ever changing? > > b) Why does Atta have to be only pleasant? Why can't it be partially > happy partially unhappy depending on circumstances? > > c) Why does Atta have to be in control 100% of the time? Why can't it > have some control, at least some of the time. You know co- > determination? Sometimes the outside influences are so strong that > Atta can't do anything, and sometimes the outside influences are weak > enough for Atta to do something. > > Ex: a person thrown into a water current. If the water current is > strong, then even an expert swimmer may be helples. If water current > is weak, then an expert swimmer may be able to swim. Sukin: Instead of answering, I have a question for you. Is there any need to posit a ‘self’ in order to explain anything about the Dhamma? ============== Alex: > And my fav questions: > 1) Why 89 cittas? Why not 88 or 90? > 2) Why 28 and not 27 or 29 rupas? > 3) Why 24 and not 23 or 25 conditions? > 4) Why 52 and not 51 or 53 Cetasikas? > > > How does Abh answers the above questions? Sukin: I don’t know the Abh answer. But while you are seeking the answer have you also asked yourself, *why not* 89.., 28..., 24.., and 52..? Metta, Sukin #87877 From: "m. nease" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 7:25 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami m_nease Thanks, Alex, But that doesn't answer my question. Please post a specific example of the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching either samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or encouraging them to pursue these. No links or extrapolations, please. Best Wishes, mike #87878 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Sun Jul 6, 2008 9:17 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/7/7 : > DSG members prefer to stick to the definition, of self, used during the > Buddha's day. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > As do Buddhists generally. Likewise, Buddhists use 'kamma' to mean > "intention," because that was the Buddha's usage. > --------------------------------------------- I was quite surprised to read this statement from you, given that only a day or so you quoted the following in reference to kusala. "It is defined in M. 9 as the 10 wholesome courses of action (s. kammapatha)." And what does MN9 say specifically: Killing living beings is unwholesome; taking what is not given is unwholesome; misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome; false speech is unwholesome; malicious speech is unwholesome; harsh speech is unwholesome; gossip is unwholesome; covetousness is unwholesome; ill will is unwholesome; wrong view is unwholesome. This is called the unwholesome. and Abstention from killing living beings is wholesome; abstention from taking what is not given is wholesome; abstention from misconduct in sensual pleasures is wholesome; abstention from false speech is wholesome; abstention from malicious speech is wholesome; abstention from harsh speech is wholesome; abstention from gossip is wholesome; non-covetousness is wholesome; non-ill will is wholesome; right view is wholesome. This is called the wholesome. == The argument may be made that abstention is purely intentional, but no amount of intending amounts to akusala-kamma-patha. Cheers Herman #87879 From: "Andrew" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 4:23 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta corvus121 Hi Alex Unfortunately, I don't have enough time or knowledge to answer all your questions. Details aside, I think we have a different basic outlook on the Dhamma. You asked: > If Abh cannot be used as a Guide to daily life (or any life for that > matter), then what is the use of it? My answer to this is that the purpose of Abh is to foster understanding. All the Abh "rules" we study about what arises with what and what conditions what develop intellectual understanding of how things could possibly occur *without* a permanent self. They are not "rules" to be used in a ritualistic manner - remember that in the suttas the Buddha said it was impossible for us to dictate "now I will make my consciousness wholesome" etc. Consciousness is not controllable in that fashion. I get the impression, Alex, that you believe that you *can* control consciousness by dint of effort. Abh teaches us that effort without understanding is a path to nowhere. I agree with you that the Buddha's path *does* require effort. The right balance of understanding and effort is something that arises naturally - and without a permanent self controlling things. > For comparison, Buddha's teaching can be used by laypeople and there > have been Lay Anagamins (there was at least one lay person, Mahanama, > who became an Arahat at death) > > Buddha has taught Dhamma and how to incorporate it into daily life > even for householders with big Businesses. I think I agree with you that the Buddha did give advice at the conventional level. But it is like the bough of the plantain tree, isn't it - there are layers and you can always go deeper. Indeed, you *must* go deeper to attain the ariyan path. So why make a big fuss about the conventional stuff while we have a rare chance to gain even a feeble understanding of the deeper stuff? Step out of the zone, Alex! :-)) Regards Andrew #87880 From: "Andrew" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 4:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta corvus121 Hi Sukin Thank you for your post - very helpful to me. Just one quick question before I race off: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Sukinder wrote: > Sukin: I think with the understanding of the nature of the present > moment, questions about `how' disappear and we will begin to read the > Suttas not as `prescriptions for' but instead as `descriptions of'. This > helps to understand the `present moment' what ever the conventional > situation and it is here that application of `Dhamma' truly takes place. > In contrast when we are involved with thoughts about application to the > situations of daily life, not only the application "now" never happens, > but we remain trying to work things out in the realm of concepts only. Do you agree that trying to work things out is *always* in the realm of concepts? If so, you will agree that the realm of concepts is a vital part of the path (hearing and considering the true Dhamma)? On the prescriptive/descriptive issue, conditionality is such a complexity, it is foolish to think that, when wisdom is weak, we can follow a set of instructions and strike a target. But I still see prescriptive language in the English translations I read. Could it be that the Buddha at least turned people around so that they faced the target and said "well, if you shoot your arrow in that direction, you will at least be closer to the target than before"? Regards Andrew #87881 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 4:54 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - revised and corrected edition egberdina Hi KehH, 2008/7/6 kenhowardau : > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" > > I don't think my answer was evasive. I think you were unable (or > unwilling) to understand it. > Perhaps I am unable to understand you, but I wouldn't be unwilling, KenH. > ---- > H: > What is a nonad, or a decad, KenH? > ---- > > They are momentary arisings of rupas. On the other hand, the so > called complex interrelated network is not momentary. It is portrayed > as a kind of stream that persists over time. > > Well, maybe 'persists' is the wrong word. As I understand the > concept, it is something that doesn't actually persist, but that > fulfils all the requirements of something that persists. > > But why am I telling you? You are the one who believes in it! :-) As long as you are finding the letters on the keyboard in the places where you expect them to be, time and again, I cannot think of one reason why I would credit your line of argument with any validity, or sincerity. That doesn't mean I don't like you , being full of f*eces can be quite an endearing quality. :-) Cheers Herman PS It looks like it might snow here soon. Wouldn't it be terrible if there was the momentary arising of a "Road Closed" sign on the way to work :-) #87882 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 12:55 am Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/7/2008 12:17:37 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard, 2008/7/7 : > DSG members prefer to stick to the definition, of self, used during the > Buddha's day. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > As do Buddhists generally. Likewise, Buddhists use 'kamma' to mean > "intention," because that was the Buddha's usage. > --------------------------------------------- I was quite surprised to read this statement from you, given that only a day or so you quoted the following in reference to kusala. "It is defined in M. 9 as the 10 wholesome courses of action (s. kammapatha)." And what does MN9 say specifically: Killing living beings is unwholesome; taking what is not given is unwholesome; misconduct in sensual pleasures is unwholesome; false speech is unwholesome; malicious speech is unwholesome; harsh speech is unwholesome; gossip is unwholesome; covetousness is unwholesome; ill will is unwholesome; wrong view is unwholesome. This is called the unwholesome. and Abstention from killing living beings is wholesome; abstention from taking what is not given is wholesome; abstention from misconduct in sensual pleasures is wholesome; abstention from false speech is wholesome; abstention from malicious speech is wholesome; abstention from harsh speech is wholesome; abstention from gossip is wholesome; non-covetousness is wholesome; non-ill will is wholesome; right view is wholesome. This is called the wholesome. == The argument may be made that abstention is purely intentional, but no amount of intending amounts to akusala-kamma-patha. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: The root meaning of the word 'kamma' is, indeed, action. But action that is unintentional doesn't, according to the Buddha, count as kamma, and it doesn't condition those mind-stream effects called vipaka. What the Buddha considered the essence of the action to be construed as kammic is intention, and, in fact, it is exactly that intention, expressed in action, that he called "kamma". As the Buddha taught in AN 6.63, "Intention, I tell you, is kamma. Intending, one does kamma by way of body, speech, & intellect." Western law, as an aside, actually takes intention into account, BTW, in assigning degree and kind of guilt associated with an act. The moral value of an act, as opposed to civil liability associated with it, in line with the Buddha's take on the matter, is based in the moral quality of the intention motivating the act. As for kamma-patha, that is not kamma but is the course of action closely following upon, growing out of, and expressing the intention that the Buddha called "kamma." According to what I've read, the Buddha taught that when kamma is expressed in action, the resulting vipaka is magnified. The bottom line is that it is intent that the Buddha calls "kamma." As he taught in the Dhammapada, mind, intention specifically, is the forerunner. -------------------------------------------------- Cheers Herman =========================== With metta, Howard #87883 From: "Andrew" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 5:17 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A question on contiguity corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, sarah abbott wrote: > > Dear Andrew, > > --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Andrew wrote: > A:> A citta in the human realm can be related by contiguity to a citta in > the animal realm (and vice versa). But one of the cittas must be cuti. > Correct? > ..... > S: Yes, the last citta of each life. Actually, it's just another bhavanga citta resulting from the same (past) kamma as all the other bhavanga cittas in that life, but cuti is the name given to the last one. > .... > > A:> If yes, why? > .... > S: Past Kamma. Because of attachment and ignorance, there's kamma which results in birth (patisandhi) and death (cuti) and all the other vipaka cittas in between. > > Has that answered it? I think there's more behind your question.... Hi Sarah Thanks for this. Yes, there is more to the question arising from a reading of Rupert Gethin's "The Foundations of Buddhism". He explains why, during a human lifetime, there is not the momentary arising of animal cittas followed by a reversion to human cittas and so on. This he says is because cittas arise in "patterns". During a human lifetime, dhammas only arise in a human pattern. Sounds fair enough, doesn't it? Do you have a problem with this terminology? Regards Andrew #87884 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 6:08 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta truth_aerator Hi Andrew & all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: > > Hi Alex > >Consciousness is not controllable in that fashion. I get the >impression, Alex, that you believe that you *can* control >consciousness by dint of effort. Wrong impression, you have read too few of my posts. Consciousness can't be controlled. I do believe that it is possible to impersonally and through sati & panna to prevent, at least in some cases, vedana to produce tanha, and the other factors will impersonally fall into place. I believe that in some cases it is possible to "let go". > > So why make a big fuss about the conventional stuff while we have a > rare chance to gain even a feeble understanding of the deeper stuff? > Step out of the zone, Alex! :-)) > > Regards > Andrew > I am concerned that often people mistake book knowledge for their own knowledge. I am concerned about counting someone else's cows. Vipassana for example requires one to see nama-rupa arising in the present moment in you. Reading about all possible nama-rupas that may not apply to you right now is not doing Vipassana practice. Best wishes, Alex #87885 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 6:20 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami truth_aerator Hi Mike and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "m. nease" wrote: > > Thanks, Alex, > > But that doesn't answer my question. Please post a specific >example of the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching >either samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or >encouraging them to pursue these. No links or extrapolations, >please. > > Best Wishes, > > mike From whom did Citta learn Buddhism & Jhanas ? If you accept Dhammapada commentary, here is one mentioning lay women being taught meditation and becoming an Anagamin + analytical knowledges + mundane super powers (in few month). ====================== Verse 35 III (2) The Story of a Certain Bhikkhu While residing at the Jetavana monastery, the Buddha uttered Verse (35) of this book, with reference to a certain bhikkhu. On one occasion, sixty bhikkhus, after obtaining a subject of meditation from the Buddha, went to Matika village, at the foot of a mountain. There, Matikamata, mother of the village headman, offered them alms-food; she also built a monastery for them, so that they could stay in the village during the rainy season. One day she asked the group of bhikkhus to teach her the practice of meditation. They taught her how to meditate on the thirty-two constituents of the body leading to the awareness of the decay and dissolution of the body. Matikamata practised with diligence and attained the three Maggas and Phalas together with Analytical Insight and mundane supernormal powers, even before the bhikkhus did. Rising from the bliss of the Magga and Phala she looked with the Divine Power of Sight (Dibbacakkhu) and saw that the bhikkhus had not attained any of the Maggas yet. She also learnt that those bhikkhus had enough potentiality for the attainment of arahatship, but that they needed proper food. So, she prepared good, choice food for them. With proper food and right effort, the bhikkhus developed right concentration and eventually attained arahatship. At the end of the rainy season, the bhikkhus returned to the Jetavana monastery, where the Buddha was in residence. They reported to the Buddha that all of them were in good health and in comfortable circumstances and that they did not have to worry about food. They also mentioned about Matikamata who was aware of their thoughts and prepared and offered them the very food they wished for. A certain bhikkhu, hearing them talking about Matikamata, decided that he, too, would go to that village. So, taking a subject of meditation from the Buddha he arrived at the village monastery. There, he found that everything he wished for was sent to him by Matikamata, the lay-devotee. When he wished her to come she personally came to the monastery, bringing along choice food with her. After taking the food, he asked her if he knew the thoughts of others, but she evaded his question and replied, "People who can read the thoughts of others behave in such and such a way." Then, the bhikkhu thought, "Should I, like an ordinary worldling, entertain any impure thought, she is sure to find out." He therefore got scared of the lay-devotee and decided to return to the Jetavana monastery. He told the Buddha that he could not stay in Matika village because be was afraid that the lay-devotee might detect impure thoughts in him. The Buddha then asked him to observe just one thing; that is, to control his mind. The Buddha also told the bhikkhu to return to Matika village monastery, and not to think of anything else, but the object of his meditation only. The bhikkhu went back. The lay-devotee offered him good food as she had done to others before, so that he might able to practise meditation without worry. Within a short time, he, too, attained arahatship. With reference to this bhikkhu, the Buddha spoke in verse as follows: Verse 35.The mind is difficult to control; swiftly and lightly, it moves and lands wherever it pleases. It is good to tame the mind, for a well-tamed mind brings happiness. http://www.geocities.com/dhammapada2all/dhammapada1.html ===================================== Best wishes, Alex #87886 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 6:22 am Subject: Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. nilovg Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 Intro: Four kinds of defilements are classified as aasava: the canker of sense-desire, kaamaasava, the canker of clinging to rebirth, bhaavaasava, the canker of wrong view, di.t.thaasava and the canker of ignorance, avijjaasava. In the preceding section it was explained that the canker of sense- desire leads to sorrow. In the following sections, it is stated that the canker of wrong view, the canker of clinging to rebirth and the canker of ignorance lead to sorrow. ---------- Text Vis. 277: And all these come about with the arising of the canker of views, according as it is said: 'In one who possesses [the view] "I am materiality", "my materiality", with the change and transformation of materiality there arise sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair' (S.iii,3). ------- N: The Tiika explains pariyu.t.thaayii: one who possesses the view, who is possessed by wrong view, is established in (ti.t.thati) wrong view. There are three levels of defilements: anusaya, the latent tendencies accumulated in the citta; they do not arise but they condition the arising of akusala citta. Pariyutthaana kilesa, medium defilements that arise with akusala citta. Viitikkama kilesa, transgressions, coarse defilements which motivate evil deeds. As to the quoted text, "I am materiality", "my materiality", this refers to personality belief, sakkayadi.t.thi, wrong view with regard to each of the five khandhas. ------ Text Vis. 278: And as with the arising of the canker of views, so also with the arising of the canker of becoming, according as it is said: 'Then whatever deities there are, long-lived, beautiful, blissful, long- resident in grand palaces, when they hear the Perfect One's teaching of the Dhamma, they feel fear, anxiety and a sense of urgency' (S.iii, 85), as in the case of deities harassed by the fear of death on seeing the five signs.43 -------------------- Note 43, taken from the Tiika: Their flowers wither, their clothes get dirty, sweat comes from their armpits, their bodies become unsightly, and they get restless (see MA.iv,170). -------- N: They do not delight in the world of devas. The Tiika explains that when they have seen these signs, their strong clinging to becoming leads to strong sorrow. ---------- Text Vis. 279. And as with the arising of the canker of becoming, so also with the canker of ignorance, according as it is said: 'The fool, bhikkhus, experiences pain and grief here and now in three ways' (M.iii,163). -------- N: The fool: who is ignorant (avidvaa), the Tiika adds. The Vis. text refers to the Discourse on Fools and the Wise (M. III, 129.) The fool has done wrongly through body, speech and mind. He has a threefold anguish: he hears people talking about his akusala, he has anguish when he sees that the King inflicts the most gruesome punishments on evildoers, and he has fear and remorse when he remembers his evil deeds at the time he is dying. The Tiika adds that kamma as cause is shown, and that at the time of dying, due to the kamma that is present, he suffers. -------- Text Vis. Now these states come about with the arising of the cankers, and so when they are established, they establish the cankers which are the cause of ignorance. And when the cankers are established, ignorance is also established because it is present when its condition is present. This, in the first place, is how ignorance, etc., should be understood to be established by sorrow and so on. --------- N: As to, ‘they establish the cankers’ (aasave saadhenti), sorrow etc. establish the cankers. The Tiika states: they make the cankers evident. Thus, they make clear that there are cankers. -------- Conclusion: The first link of the Dependent Origination is ignorance and at the end of the teaching of the Dependent Origination it is stated: conditioned by birth, old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief and despair come into being. In the preceding sections it has been explained that all the cankers lead to sorrow, grief, lamentation etc. Sorrow etc. establishes the cankers and the cankers are the cause of ignorance. The cycle of birth and death is like a vicious circle with ignorance as the first link and ending with sorrow that also establishes ignorance. The cankers or intoxicants are like liquor that has fermented, they are like poisonous drugs. They keep on flowing. The arahat has eradicated all the cankers. The sotaapanna has eradicated the canker of wrong view, that is the first canker to be eradicated. The Visuddhimagga text refers to personality belief which leads to sorrow. It is important not merely to think of the words “I am ruupa, ruupa is mine”, but to realize when personality belief arises. When seeing arises, we believe that we see, but its characteristic should be known so that it is realized as a conditioned dhamma. This is the only way eventually leading to the eradication of personality belief. ******* Nina. #87887 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 6:55 am Subject: Addition: Buddha taught meditation to Lay people truth_aerator Addition: Kalama Sutta. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/an/an03/an03.065.than.html There the Buddha has taught 4 Brahmavihara to Lay people (Kalamas). Metta (used with 4NT) can lead all the way to Arahatship, and to the Jhanas (Bojjhanga factors accompanied by loving-kindness). Samyutta Nikaya. ======================================================= ...when universal love leading to liberation of mind is ardently practiced, developed, unrelentingly resorted to, used as one's vehicle, made the foundation of one's life, fully established, well consolidated and perfected,... one's mind gets quickly concentrated; ... and even if one fails to attain higher states, one will at least reach the state of the Brahma world. Monks, when universal love leading to liberation of mind is ardently practiced, developed, unrelentingly resorted to, used as one's vehicle, made the foundation of one's life, fully established, well consolidated and perfected, then these eleven blessings may be expected. Anguttara Nikaya, 11:16 http://www.accesstoinsight.org/lib/authors/buddharakkhita/wheel365.htm l#ch7 =========================================================== --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > > Hi Mike and all, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "m. nease" > wrote: > > > > Thanks, Alex, > > > > But that doesn't answer my question. Please post a specific > >example of the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching > >either samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or > >encouraging them to pursue these. No links or extrapolations, > >please. > > Best wishes, Alex #87888 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 7:23 am Subject: Re: Co to: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling nilovg Dear Scott, Op 6-jul-2008, om 16:58 heeft Scott Duncan het volgende geschreven: > N: "...They listen to a Bhikkhu they respect who explains the > wrongness of killing and the benefit of abstinence. They accept this, > but they have immediately dukkha and domanassa. After two or three > days when they cannot observe this precept they have again dukkha..." > > Scott: Just to clarify, 'they have immediately dukkha and domanassa' > is reference to painful feeling - to vedanaa. Would this be correct? > And in this case, cetasikaa dukkhaa-vedanaa, which is called > domanassa. This is painful mental feeling. Is it correct to state > that this painful mental feeling is akusala? If painful mental > feeling is vedanaa and akusala, what is the 'mistake' in making the > equation? The 'ethical quality' (akusala) is identical with the > painful mental feeling since the painful mental feeling is akusala by > virtue of being painful (and painful by virtue of being akusala). ------- N: No doubt. And we see that it is emphasized that skillful citta is accompanied by somanassa or upekkhaa. The fishermen and hunters listen to the monk who gives them the precept, who do not want it. And it is said: "and this very domanassa is dukkha." It is also said: dukkha vedanaa, as one of the three feelings. Sometimes feelings are classified as three, as you know. ------ > > N: "...The first cetanaa (intention) and the following cetanaa (apara > cetanaa) is together with dukkha..." > > Scott: Can you please say more on this 'first' and 'following' pattern > here? To me, if cetanaa is together with domanassa, it is akusala > centanaa. And, again, since we are dealing with the citta-viithi, and > not at all with conceptualised wholes which are labelled 'feelings' we > do not refer to the conventional experience of so-called 'emotional > states'. ------ N: I do not give much for emotional states. First and following, seem here in different processes. Formerly and later on. The fishermen get into trouble, since they need a living, thus, they cannot keep the precept, although they received it at first. ------- > > S: Since this is the case, reference to equally conceptual > fantasies such > as 'psychopath' or 'autistic' is meaningless. We are dealing with the > fact that kusala or akusala can be condition for either kusala or > akusala in the process of consciousness. ------ N: But it is also possible that kusala before conditions akusala later on, and vice versa.This is by way of natural decisive support- condition. ------- > > N: "...As to the cetanaa that is accomplished (sanni.t.thaapaka > cetanaa), this is together with sukha or with upekkhaa. And this > has to be understood in this way in > all these cases. The Buddha refers to cetanaa in the beginning and > cetanaa at the end." > > Scott: Again, does this refer to citta-viithi, and to how wholesome > states can be condition for unwholesome states and vice-versa? ------ N: I think in different processes, but also the Co is rather concise. In one process cetana accompanying the javanacittas is the same. I could not be very thorough, had only a quick look at the Pali Co and subco. Nina. #87889 From: "m. nease" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 7:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami m_nease Hi Alex, Excellent, thanks--just the sort of thing I was looking for. And yes, I do regard the commentaries as part of the Theravada tipi.taka, if that's what you meant. Alex wrote: > If you accept Dhammapada commentary, here is one mentioning lay women > being taught meditation and becoming an Anagamin + analytical > knowledges + mundane super powers (in few month). > > ====================== > Verse 35 > > III (2) The Story of a Certain Bhikkhu > > While residing at the Jetavana monastery, the Buddha uttered Verse > (35) of this book, with reference to a certain bhikkhu. > > On one occasion, sixty bhikkhus, after obtaining a subject of > meditation from the Buddha, went to Matika village, at the foot of a > mountain. There, Matikamata, mother of the village headman, offered > them alms-food; she also built a monastery for them, so that they > could stay in the village during the rainy season. One day she asked > the group of bhikkhus to teach her the practice of meditation. They > taught her how to meditate on the thirty-two constituents of the body > leading to the awareness of the decay and dissolution of the body. > Matikamata practised with diligence and attained the three Maggas and > Phalas together with Analytical Insight and mundane supernormal > powers, even before the bhikkhus did. > > Rising from the bliss of the Magga and Phala she looked with the > Divine Power of Sight (Dibbacakkhu) and saw that the bhikkhus had not > attained any of the Maggas yet. She also learnt that those bhikkhus > had enough potentiality for the attainment of arahatship, but that > they needed proper food. So, she prepared good, choice food for them. > With proper food and right effort, the bhikkhus developed right > concentration and eventually attained arahatship. > > At the end of the rainy season, the bhikkhus returned to the Jetavana > monastery, where the Buddha was in residence. They reported to the > Buddha that all of them were in good health and in comfortable > circumstances and that they did not have to worry about food. They > also mentioned about Matikamata who was aware of their thoughts and > prepared and offered them the very food they wished for. > > A certain bhikkhu, hearing them talking about Matikamata, decided > that he, too, would go to that village. So, taking a subject of > meditation from the Buddha he arrived at the village monastery. > There, he found that everything he wished for was sent to him by > Matikamata, the lay-devotee. When he wished her to come she > personally came to the monastery, bringing along choice food with > her. After taking the food, he asked her if he knew the thoughts of > others, but she evaded his question and replied, "People who can read > the thoughts of others behave in such and such a way." Then, the > bhikkhu thought, "Should I, like an ordinary worldling, entertain any > impure thought, she is sure to find out." He therefore got scared of > the lay-devotee and decided to return to the Jetavana monastery. He > told the Buddha that he could not stay in Matika village because be > was afraid that the lay-devotee might detect impure thoughts in him. > The Buddha then asked him to observe just one thing; that is, to > control his mind. The Buddha also told the bhikkhu to return to > Matika village monastery, and not to think of anything else, but the > object of his meditation only. The bhikkhu went back. The lay-devotee > offered him good food as she had done to others before, so that he > might able to practise meditation without worry. Within a short time, > he, too, attained arahatship. > > With reference to this bhikkhu, the Buddha spoke in verse as follows: > > Verse 35.The mind is difficult to control; swiftly and lightly, it > moves and lands wherever it pleases. It is good to tame the mind, for > a well-tamed mind brings happiness. mike #87890 From: "m. nease" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 7:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Addition: Buddha taught meditation to Lay people m_nease Hi Again Alex, Alex wrote: ... > Kalama Sutta. ... > ...when universal love leading to liberation of mind is ardently > practiced, developed, unrelentingly resorted to, used as one's > vehicle, made the foundation of one's life, fully established, well > consolidated and perfected,... one's mind gets quickly > concentrated; ... and even if one fails to attain higher states, one > will at least reach the state of the Brahma world. > > Monks, when universal love leading to liberation of mind is ardently > practiced, developed, unrelentingly resorted to, used as one's > vehicle, made the foundation of one's life, fully established, well > consolidated and perfected, then these eleven blessings may be > expected. > Anguttara Nikaya, 11:16 This is a favorite of mine (of everybody's, maybe). I've never thought of it as teaching--that is, it isn't really technical instruction, is it--but it can certainly be construed as "encouraging them to pursue these" can't it? Thanks again. mike #87891 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 8:30 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Addition: Buddha taught meditation to Lay people truth_aerator Hi Mike, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "m. nease" wrote: > Hi Again Alex, > > This is a favorite of mine (of everybody's, maybe). I've never >thought of it as teaching--that is, it isn't really technical >instruction, is it--but it can certainly be construed as "encouraging >them to pursue these" can't it? > > Thanks again. > > mike If that sutta isn't an encouragment, then I don't know what is. Maybe a duck isn't really a duck. Anyhow regarding briefness of instructions: a) Kalamas heard a lot of other teachers, some of which may have taught Metta as well. Same with Jhanas. Hence, why bigger instruction wasn't needed. b) He may have taught them in detail, but the sutta only captured bare outline, "cliff notes" of the event. This explains a lot of adverbatum block repeats found in the suttas. What is possible is that Suttas were formated during 1st Council by Ven. Ananda and 500 Arahants. =================================================================== In one of Buddha's first sermons he has said to non-Buddhist ascetics "in short 5 aggregates are suffering.". That has meant either a) The suttas were formatted such. and/or b) The above material wasn't precisely "Buddhist" innovation. ================================================================== Best wishes, Alex #87892 From: "m. nease" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 9:06 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Addition: Buddha taught meditation to Lay people m_nease Hi Alex, Alex wrote: > > Hi Mike, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com > , "m. nease" wrote: >> Hi Again Alex, >> >> This is a favorite of mine (of everybody's, maybe). I've never >>thought of it as teaching--that is, it isn't really technical >>instruction, is it--but it can certainly be construed as "encouraging >>them to pursue these" can't it? >> >> Thanks again. >> >> mike > > If that sutta isn't an encouragment, then I don't know what is. Maybe a > duck isn't really a duck. Sarcasm duly noted-- > Anyhow regarding briefness of instructions: > a) Kalamas heard a lot of other teachers, some of which may have taught > Metta as well. Same with Jhanas. Hence, why bigger instruction wasn't > needed. > > b) He may have taught them in detail, but the sutta only captured bare > outline, "cliff notes" of the event. This explains a lot of adverbatum > block repeats found in the suttas. What is possible is that Suttas were > formated during 1st Council by Ven. Ananda and 500 Arahants. Pure speculation. > =================================================================== > In one of Buddha's first sermons he has said to non-Buddhist > ascetics "in short 5 aggregates are suffering.". That has meant either > > a) The suttas were formatted such. > and/or > b) The above material wasn't precisely "Buddhist" innovation. I don't see that this follows at all. But I'm not at all interested in this kind of argument. Thanks again for the example(s). mike #87893 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 12:13 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami nilovg Hi Mike and Alex, I like your dialogue, keep it up! I enjoyed very much the Dhammapada Co, thanks. Nina. Op 7-jul-2008, om 16:35 heeft m. nease het volgende geschreven: > If you accept Dhammapada commentary, here is one mentioning lay women > > being taught meditation and becoming an Anagamin + analytical > > knowledges + mundane super powers (in few month). > > > > ====================== > > Verse 35 > > > > III (2) The Story of a Certain Bhikkhu > > > > While residing at the Jetavana monastery, the Buddha uttered Verse > > (35) of this book, with reference to a certain bhikkhu. > > > > On one occasion, sixty bhikkhus, after obtaining a subject of > > meditation from the Buddha, went to Matika village, at the foot of a > > mountain. There, Matikamata, mother of the village headman, offered > > them alms-food; #87894 From: upasaka@... Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 9:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami upasaka_howard Dear Nina (and Mike and Alex) - In a message dated 7/7/2008 3:13:59 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Mike and Alex, I like your dialogue, keep it up! I enjoyed very much the Dhammapada Co, thanks. Nina. ================================== Nina, I'm so happy that you wrote this. I had missed Alex's original posting of that commentary. I've traced the posts back, found it, and now I'm saving a copy of it for myself. There are several aspects of it that appeal a great deal to me: the magnificent achievement of this laywoman, surpassing that of the bhikkus at least for a while, the assigning of meditation subjects and the meditation practice, and the Buddha's instructing of the bhikkhu to control his mind, implying, of course, the possibility of doing so by a person adequately prepared. With metta, Howard #87896 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 3:09 pm Subject: Buddha taught meditation to Lay people: & Sutta formating truth_aerator Hi Mike and all, > Alex: > Anyhow regarding briefness of instructions: >a) Kalamas heard a lot of other teachers, some of which may have >taught Metta as well. Same with Jhanas. Hence, why bigger >instruction wasn't needed. > >b) He may have taught them in detail, but the sutta only captured >bare outline, "cliff notes" of the event. This explains a lot of >adverbatum block repeats found in the suttas. What is possible is >that Suttas were formated during 1st Council by Ven. Ananda and 500 >Arahants. > > =================================================================== >In one of Buddha's first sermons he has said to non-Buddhist >ascetics "in short 5 aggregates are suffering.". That has meant >either > > a) The suttas were formatted such. > > and/or > > b) The above material wasn't precisely "Buddhist" innovation. > > > Mike: I don't see that this follows at all. But I'm not at all >interested in this kind of argument. In Dhammacakkappavattana, the Awakened Buddha returned to his 5 non- Buddhist Ascetic friends and taught them discourse with this phrase: "In short, the five clinging-aggregates are stressful." http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn56/sn56.011.than.html That phrase could mean one of two things: A) These ascetics knew what 5 aggregates were. B) He did explain to them what 5 aggregates were, but for some formalities the sutta was formatted in the current concise form. In either case it helps my point that at least in some cases the briefness of instruction (especially re: Jhana and such) was either due to that the listeners KNEW them already, thus no need to repeat, or due to the fact that suttas were formatted in such concise and short form later on (during 1st Council led by Ananda). Best wishes, Alex #87898 From: "reverendaggacitto" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 3:53 pm Subject: re/Alex and Various Abhidhamma Myth Stories reverendagga... Hi Alex and all, i would like to ask this question,Why would anyone choose to believe EITHER Abhidhamma myth story? May the Buddha's, Deva and Angels bless all of you! bhikkhu/reverend aggacitto #87899 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 5:38 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddha taught meditation to Lay people: & Sutta formating egberdina Hi Alex, 2008/7/8 Alex : > Hi Mike and all, > >> >>b) He may have taught them in detail, but the sutta only captured >>bare outline, "cliff notes" of the event. This explains a lot of >>adverbatum block repeats found in the suttas. What is possible is >>that Suttas were formated during 1st Council by Ven. Ananda and 500 >>Arahants. According to the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism (2004), regarding the 1st Council: "... its historicity is questioned by virtually all Buddhist scholars. They argue that while it was not unlikely that a small group of Buddha's intimate disciples gathered after his death, a council held in the grand style described in the scriptures is almost certainly a fiction." >>Mike: Pure speculation. >> > > So are the Commentaries, Abhidhamma, etc.... > Cheers Herman #87900 From: "Alex" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 6:04 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddha taught meditation to Lay people: & Sutta formating truth_aerator Hi Herman and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Alex, > > 2008/7/8 Alex : > > Hi Mike and all, > > > >> > >>b) He may have taught them in detail, but the sutta only captured > >>bare outline, "cliff notes" of the event. This explains a lot of > >>adverbatum block repeats found in the suttas. What is possible is > >>that Suttas were formated during 1st Council by Ven. Ananda and >500 Arahants. > > According to the Macmillan Encyclopedia of Buddhism (2004), >regarding the 1st Council: > > "... its historicity is questioned by virtually all Buddhist > >scholars. > They argue that while it was not unlikely that a small group of > Buddha's intimate disciples gathered after his death, a council held > in the grand style described in the scriptures is almost certainly a > fiction." Sure that 500 parts and other elaborations are either symbolic or Fictional. If I remember correctly, the number 500 meant "many" in Indian culture. However as to basic teachings of the suttas, there are some indications of their authenticity. Chinese Agamas & Pali Nikayas are incredibly similiar, even though they have been separated by vast distances. It appears that they were based on same source. Furthermore when it comes to suttas of other Nikaya schools, there is considerable agreement. It seems that many independent archeological finds do support at least parts of early Nikayas, but not Abhidhamma. It all changes however on the matter of some abtruse Vinaya points and... !Abhidhamma! I wonder why. Could somebody tell me, please? :) Best wishes, Alex #87901 From: Sukinder Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 8:18 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sukinderpal Hi Andrew, Very happy to see you posting again. You wrote: ============= Thank you for your post - very helpful to me. Just one quick question before I race off: Sukin: I learn much from what you write and always also from the example of kindness and respect that you show to others. This in fact makes yours one of my favorite posts on dsg. ;-) I on the other hand am extremely muddle headed, except when I’m able to take a tablet of Ritalin belonging to my sons. I never find myself thinking things through (whatever that means). Sometimes I make my points happy for them to be just argument, knowing that I’m not very clear about the matter myself. By comparison you appear to think more carefully, taking into account not only more possibilities, but also with metta towards the other person. :-) ============== > Sukin: I think with the understanding of the nature of the present > moment, questions about `how' disappear and we will begin to read the > Suttas not as `prescriptions for' but instead as `descriptions of'. This > helps to understand the `present moment' what ever the conventional > situation and it is here that application of `Dhamma' truly takes place. > In contrast when we are involved with thoughts about application to the > situations of daily life, not only the application "now" never happens, > but we remain trying to work things out in the realm of concepts only. Andrew: Do you agree that trying to work things out is *always* in the realm of concepts? Sukin: Yes, it must be. But as you know, I was particularly meaning so called, ‘conventional reality’. ============== Andrew: If so, you will agree that the realm of concepts is a vital part of the path (hearing and considering the true Dhamma)? Sukin: I would say first, that it is inevitable, and this is not only because thinking never stops, but also that this is all we have been used to doing and know. The important point and decisive, I think, is that the object of “panna” is the present moment even at the level of suttamaya and cintamaya panna. This makes a difference to the concepts reasoned upon being the process of ‘straightening of view’ on one hand and remaining ‘abstraction’ on the other. The latter it seems must be due to ignorance and when later proliferated upon is the object of tanha and wrong view. ============== Andrew: On the prescriptive/descriptive issue, conditionality is such a complexity, it is foolish to think that, when wisdom is weak, we can follow a set of instructions and strike a target. But I still see prescriptive language in the English translations I read. Could it be that the Buddha at least turned people around so that they faced the target and said "well, if you shoot your arrow in that direction, you will at least be closer to the target than before"? Sukin: To deny this would be to deny some of the Buddha’s great wisdom and compassion. Whether I remember it or not, I speak only from my ‘speck of dust’ level of understanding which couldn’t possibly comprehend the extent of the Buddha’s level of wisdom and the effects of his compassion. But I’m stuck with what I’ve got; or rather move along at a pace dictated by accumulations and other conditions. ;-) Given that Dana, Sila and other forms of kusala, including the Brahmaviharas were not unknown, in fact they must have been known quite well, by most people at the time, I’m inclined to think that the Buddha would “add” what was characteristic of his dhamma, namely anatta and conditionality to the message. I mean, what would turn their attention to a direction different from one they already faced? Besides I’m sure that those to whom he spoke, they understood the message at a deeper level than we can. I haven’t read more than a few Suttas and perhaps I’m being idealistic about the whole thing. But as you have also suggested, one should go straight to considering conditionality and anatta. I keep in mind also that the arguments made here on dsg, are by people who have full view of the fact that the Buddha *did* teach these things. Those of the Buddha’s audience who perhaps were not taught the deeper teachings, they were at least spared the possibility of “wrong understanding” about these and other aspects of his Teachings. And this is what many arguments on dsg revolve around. Unlike many Buddhists today, those particular audiences did not proliferate to having wrong ideas about ‘practice’ and they did not read into the Teachings these same ideas. They heard what they did and lived and practiced in accordance to that without wrong view. But today people interpret those same words in a way which serves to justify self view. Keeping this in mind, perhaps it is better then not to try and determine whether particular Suttas are for people who wouldn’t otherwise have understood anatta and conditionality. Instead, given the fact that the Buddha taught the “Truth”, and there is a level of understanding which is Pariyatti and which can begin to see this, and that otherwise we are liable to misinterpret anything with self view, I think it safe to read *all* of the Teachings through the eye of anatta and conditionality. What do you think? Metta, Sukin. #87902 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 8:07 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami philofillet Hi Mike (and Alex and all) > > But that doesn't answer my question. Please post a specific example of the Buddha, Arahants or even ordinary bhikkhus teaching either > samatha- or vipassanaa- bhaavanaa to laypeople, or encouraging them to pursue these. No links or extrapolations, please. In one of those nice little coincidences, I was thinking of your question when picked up my AN sutta anthology to continue rereading it and this was the next sutta up! From my quick reading of this thread, don't see this one mentioned. Sorry if I'm repeating someone else, but it certainly answers your question and *might* put to rest any doubts about the matter. AN V, 176. Anatahapindika and his 500 lay followers are told by the Buddha: "Householder, you attend upon the Sanhgha of monks with robes, almsfood, lodgings and medicinal requisites for use in time of sickness. But you should not remain satisfied merely with this. Rather, householders, you should train yourselves thus: "'How can we enter and dwell from time to time in the rapture of seclusion?" (commentarial note by BB - pavivekaam piitim. AA: The rapture arising in dependence on the first and second jhaanas) Thus should you train yourself." "Thus should your train yourself" to "enter and dwell from time to time in the rapture of seclusion" "householders." Hope this is helpful. I wrote something sarcastic in anticipation of the "we do not live in the day of the Buddha so we cannot understand suttas" response that usually comes when there is a clearcut sutta that clearcuttedly contradicts the AS approach, but I erased it....or did I? Or perhaps there will be an objection that the above doesn't teach a specific, detailed method to "train yourself" to "enter and dwell from time to time in the rapture of seclusion" "householders." Those incredibly detailed methods are found in Vism, of course. Why are they not in the suttanta? I don't know. But since Vism is analyzed so lovingly in its sections on insight, I assume the detailed meditation instructions (including counting the breaths) found in the concentration section are also considered in line with the Buddha's teaching. Hope you and Rose are well. It's nice to see you active on the list these days. Metta, Phil p.s at some point, Mike, maybe in the fall when I have more time I'd like to discuss with you about why you came to distrust meditation (i.e choosing or being assigned a primary object of meditation and pursuing it with ongoing, diligent effort) because I find you to be a very reasonable fellow and I know you had experience in secluded meditation. Personally, I am finding the benefits of meditation so very, very good these days that it is hard for me to understand how anyone could give it up! Of course there is clinging to blissful feelings there, but that is so much better than being pretty to lust, hatred and gross and harmful forms of delusion and there is not an iota of doubt for me that the practice of meditation stills the raging of those fires. So at some point I'd like to hear what you have to say, because I like your reasonable, easygoing approach to the Dhamma. But not now. Still trying to stay off the 'net. (Which is one reason my meditation is so much more diligent these days, I think. I definitely recommend periods of abstinence from the internet to meditators out there!) #87903 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 8:43 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta philofillet Hi Andrew > So why make a big fuss about the conventional stuff while we have a > rare chance to gain even a feeble understanding of the deeper stuff? Because living our rare human life in accordance with the cnventional stuff provides better (if you will) or more supportive conditions for deepening our understanding of the deeper stuff. What I always encourage you guys to consider is whether you really believe that your understanidng of the deeper stuff is feeble, and are therefore content with that, or whether you don't cling to the deep teachings and try to get more out of it than your understanding can. I think it is inevitable for people to cling to the Dhamma. I cling to the conventional aspects because that is in accordance with my level of understanding. I just ask you guys to reflect on whether you are clinging beyond reason to the deep stuff. I am rereading my notebook on AS's Survey of Paramattha Dhammas these days and finding it fascinating to read about interesting aspects of what Abhidhamma teaches - there really is awe at the depth to which the great ones penetrated - but then there are sentences such as these: "When we have studied paramattha dhammas and understood what they are, we should investigate the paramattha dhammas that are appearing so that we can realize the true nature of their charateristics. In this way doubt and ignorance of the characterisics of paramattha dhammas cacn truly be abandoned." Does this sound like someone who really believes her understanding and that of her students is "feeble?" Doesn't reflection on the above make you wonder what kind of overshooting it is leading you into? Rhetorical questions, Andrew. Just put the above out for reflection... Abhidhamma should stay in the book, I think, or we put it to use for clinging and comfort. Again, that was my experience...now I am keeping it in the book, understanding that it refers to deep levels of understanding that are not comparable to my own. Intellectual understanding of what it teaches might in some way condition more direct understanding, I don't know, but I refuse to hurry the process in line with the above sort of exortation to "be aware of characterisitcs of realities in daily life" etc which amounts to being urged to get right away at the heart of the Buddha's teaching (satipatthana) by someone who mocks others for being too eager. Sorry, pent up need to rant. As usual I won't be discussing, but others may rebut my views if they care to...they can probably just cut and paste old posts to me that I was too irresponsible to respond to! Thanks and over and out for another week or so. Metta, Phil #87904 From: "Phil" Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 10:15 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta philofillet Hi again I wrote: >being > urged to get right away at the heart of the Buddha's teaching > (satipatthana) by someone who mocks others for being too eager. "Mock" is a bit strong. I was thinking of a talk in which she has a lengthy exchange with a Thai gent (Jack?) in which they very nicely discuss the way people are too eager to get at the heart of the teaching. There is a somewhat condescending tone, a "we don't do that, do we" feeling, but "mock" is too strong. There is often a condescending attitude expressed towards "the meditator" in the those recorded talks. I don't recall once hearing a compassionate word about the freedom (albeit not permanently liberating, of course) from intense suffering and harmful deeds meditation can bring people - not once, not from her or one of her students. This is what I was getting at when I wrote about the compassion wing and the wisdom wing, and how one wing can get a bit atrophied at times, I suspect. Metta, Phil #87905 From: LBIDD@... Date: Mon Jul 7, 2008 10:45 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, Thanks for all your excellent work. I really enjoy reading these every week. One alternate reading on "bhava asava" would be "desiring eternal existence" as in the Buddhist Dictionary, rather than clinging to rebirth, which seems to be pretty much a sure thing ;-)) I always thought it had something to do with eternalism and nihilism, but apparently not. Larry #87906 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:14 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... sarahprocter... Hi Herman, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Herman Hofman wrote: H:> This bizarre Abhidhamma position, that has calmness as the barometer for ethical quality, on the side of action leads to the extreme of the master martial artist, who is able to skillfully execute his opponents, whilst remaining mentally serene and calm. What in Abhidhamma terms is a paragon of virtue, is no more than a psychopath. ..... S: What is usually taken for calmness in a worldly sense, such as this, is very seldom calm, passaddhi cetasika, which arises at moments of dana, sila and bhavana only. It is ignorance which which takes attachment for calm, aversion for wholesome shame and so on. So, in Abhidhamma terms, this is not "the paragon on virtue", however calm and pleasant any qualities may seem or feel to be. It's like the examples given of worldly wisdom such as found in computer experts, linguists or inventors. They may be very wise, but it's lobha, not panna which predominates. .... H:> On the side of inaction, calmness as the barometer for ethical quality, leads to an ideal state of being unaffected by the joys and suffering of others. In the Abhidhamma, there are no others. In the world, a perfected Abhidhammika would be diagnosed as being autistic. ... S: Let's assume it's true calmness that you're referring to - the calmness and detachment that accompany the development of panna (whether that of samatha or vipassana). Yes, less susceptibility to the worldly conditions, a lot less selfish attachment and concern about one's own feelings and a lot more metta and compassion for others. This is the reason that the Buddha had the greatest metta and compassion of all. Metta, Sarah ======= #87907 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:31 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Alex wrote: >And my fav questions: 1) Why 89 cittas? Why not 88 or 90? 2) Why 28 and not 27 or 29 rupas? 3) Why 24 and not 23 or 25 conditions? 4) Why 52 and not 51 or 53 Cetasikas? .... S: Cittas, cetasikas and rupas can be counted and classified in an endless number of different ways. You can also refer to an infinite number of each of these kinds of dhammas. Each citta is different from each other citta, for example. Each rupa is different from each other rupa too. You'll find many other classifications, not just the ones you refer to above for these dhammas. Like any classification, it's just a way of being systematic and grouping various 'kinds' or categories together. That's all. Some people find one kind of classification, such as the 5 khandhas, helpful. Others find a different kind of classification, such as those you give above helpful. For example, when considering the cetasikas, I find it quite helpful to remember that say phassa (contact) is a universal cetasika, arising at each moment, accompanying the citta and contacting its object. If I consider the various other cetasikas and understand more about their qualities, I'll reach 52 if I count. However, I've never been interested in memorising lists or numbers. The details have to apply to present realities to be of any relevance or interest to me. Metta, Sarah ======== #87908 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:41 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Practice is what counts! Practice vs studying. sarahprocter... Hi Herman, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Herman Hofman wrote: H:> Samvega is very strong for one who realises dukkha. Suggesting the possibility of being led astray by samvega amounts to questioning the First Noble Truth. .... S: What do you mean by; a) samvega b) "Suggesting the possibility of being led astray by samvega" I've certainly never suggested any possibility of being "led astray by samvega". It makes no sense to me. Metta, Sarah ======== #87909 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:52 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does Sarah Accept Formal Meditation Now? Re: Practice is what counts! sarahprocter... Dear Suan, Always good to hear from you. --- On Sun, 6/7/08, abhidhammika wrote: Suan: >Sarah wrote: >"The path is the same for us all, Alex. It starts with right understanding of dhammas even now as we speak without any attachment to results. And then, it starts again in just the same way and again and again..... >This is what bhavana/meditation is all about." >Sarah, you gave me an impression with the above statment that you accept formal development (bhaavnaa) of the Noble Eightfold Path (a.t.thangiko maggo) starting with right view (sammaadi.t. thi)(right understanding, as you put it), without attachment to anything, of course. .... Sarah: As far as I'm concerned, bhavana can never be translated (as you do here) as "formal development". Formal development suggests a purposeful following of activities by self with wrong view, as far as I understand the phrase. If you understand it differently, I'll be glad to hear. At this moment, if there are the right conditions in place, such as sufficient wise reflection on dhammas, right understanding of the Path can arise, assisted by the other path factors. This is the beginning, again and again. At such moments of Path arising, there is no clinging to results and no expectation about any results. No self following any formal practice is involved. I hope this clarifies. Btw, where do you read the texts as suggesting bhavana can be translated as 'formal meditation'? .... Suan:> Did I understand your statement correctly? Was the impression I got acceptable to you? .... Sarah: Sorry to disappoint, but no. Panna is as conditioned as any other sankhara dhamma. Metta, Sarah =========== #87910 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:57 am Subject: Re: Co to: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling sarahprocter... Dear Scott, Alex & all, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Scott Duncan wrote: . Scott:> Since this is the case, reference to equally conceptual fantasies suchas 'psychopath' or 'autistic' is meaningless. We are dealing with the fact that kusala or akusala can be condition for either kusala or akusala in the process of consciousness. .... Sarah: This is the main point, i.e. that kusala can condition akusala and vice versa. Actually, I discussed these points before with Alex in some detail. We discussed the drinking urine metaphor which is given to indicate how kusala can be a condition for akusala by natural decisive suppot condition. A good example of how it helps to understand more about the complexity of those 24 conditions, Alex:-) Metta, Sarah ========= #87911 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Sun, 6/7/08, Alex wrote: A:> Does continuity exist? ... S: Continuity of cittas. Not continuity in a vacuum. Also an idea of continuity of consciousness and states in ignorance which blinds us to the impermanence of dhammas. .... A: >Yes or No. .... S: Yes and No! Metta, Sarah ======== #87912 From: sarah abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhist texts 101: part 2 sarahprocter... Hi Herman & all, --- On Sat, 5/7/08, Herman Hofman wrote: > The realisation of dukkha is very real, and not at all > pleasant. .... S: What is dukkha? Now, what is dukkha in an absolute sense? .... >I personally don't believe it is > beneficial in the long > run to translate renunciation as attachment. ... S: What is renunciation? Now, what is renunciation in an absolute sense? Where has it been translated as attachment? .... > Sn1:3 > > Renouncing violence > for all living beings, > harming not even a one, > you would not wish for offspring, > so how a companion? > Wander alone > like a rhinoceros. <...> > In the midst of companions > — when staying at home, > when going out wandering — > you are prey to requests. > Valuing the freedom > wander alone > like a rhinoceros. .... S: as Thanissaro makes clear in his notes, the commentary by Maha Kaccana (inc. from the outset in the Pali Canon) makes it clear that 'home' refers to the khandhas and 'companions' or 'society' refers to sense impressions. http://uwf.edu/wmikulas/Webpage/Leaves/website/canon/khuddaka/suttanipata/ Indeed, all the suttas are about learning to live alone, without clinging to 'home' and 'society', without clinging to what appears through the senses, regardless of whether we're a forest dweller or a middle-class wayfarer. The truths are universal, Herman - they are never about another time, place and lifestyle. They're always about the right understanding of the present dhamma. This is how we learn to "wander alone like a rhinoceros", alone with seeing, alone with hearing, alone with thinking. There's only ever one world at a time which can never be shared with another. Metta, Sarah ========= #87913 From: "Andrew" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:43 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta corvus121 --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Phil" wrote: > > Does this sound like someone who really believes her understanding > and that of her students is "feeble?" Doesn't reflection on the above > make you wonder what kind of overshooting it is leading you into? > Rhetorical questions, Andrew. Just put the above out for reflection... Hi Phil While you're at it, maybe some reflection on undershooting might lead to some balance? You could start by reading learned Buddhist authors who value both the Abhidhamma "ultimate outlook" and the conventional teachings of the suttas. What do they see that you don't? Is what they see of value? Think about it! Regards Andrew #87914 From: "Andrew" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 3:05 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta corvus121 Hi Sukin Thanks for your reply and kind words. For now, I will only comment on a few passages, if I may? > Given that Dana, Sila and other forms of kusala, including the > Brahmaviharas were not unknown, in fact they must have been known quite > well, by most people at the time, I'm inclined to think that the Buddha > would "add" what was characteristic of his dhamma, namely anatta and > conditionality to the message. I think we can all agree that, at the time of the Buddha, anatta was something new on the religious landscape. If there was a religious newspaper at the time, it would have been page one news and the subject of most of the letters to the editor! I always try to keep that in mind. Unlike many Buddhists today, those particular audiences > did not proliferate to having wrong ideas about `practice' and they did > not read into the Teachings these same ideas. They heard what they did > and lived and practiced in accordance to that without wrong view. But > today people interpret those same words in a way which serves to justify > self view. I have read this argument many times and have wanted to accept it. But when I read the suttas, I can't help but see a world very similar to my own - with warring kings, robbers, prostitutes, gamblers, drinkers and so on. I read in the Vinaya of monks having sex with animals and nuns. In all honesty, I find it hard to accept that these people would be any less in the grip of self view than I am today. >there is a level of understanding which > is Pariyatti and which can begin to see this, and that otherwise we are > liable to misinterpret anything with self view, I think it safe to read > *all* of the Teachings through the eye of anatta and conditionality. > What do you think? Yes, I agree with the last comment. But I am also very wary of pushing a line that one should not do things conventionally recommended by the Buddha in case the wrong cetasikas should arise (which of course they *will* if the conditions for their arising are present). That line is "control" slipping in via the back door! I hasten to add I am not saying this of you, Sukin! Or anyone in particular! Best wishes Andrew #87915 From: "sarahprocterabbott" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 3:19 am Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > IMHO, if akusala actions (like fishing for example) felt bad > immeadetely on performing (like puting a hand to the red hot iron > stove) then none of the people would perform bad actions. .... S: What about getting angry (to give an obvious example of akusala that feels bad)? Metta, Sarah ======== #87916 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 3:22 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? egberdina Hi Alex, 2008/7/7 Alex : > Hi Ken, Sarah, Scott, Jon, Nina and all Abhidhammikas, > > Does continuity exist? > Yes or No. > > If Yes, > > Is is continuous or discrete? > I know you didn't ask me specifically, but I didn't think you would mind my thoughts on yet more useful questions from you. >Does continuity exist? Yes!! >Is it continuous or discrete? Continuous!! Now for my question, and immediate reply. What is it that is continuously continuous? The past!! Now for the commentary. Regardless of whether it is known or unknown, remembered or unremembered, acknowledged or unacknowledged, the past IS what conditions the present. But what IS done in this present, is not a function of the past. I have the tiiiiiikaaa and tiiiiiikaaa-tiiiiiiikaaa handy if you need them :-) Cheers Herman #87917 From: "sarahprocterabbott" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 3:23 am Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling sarahprocter... Hi Ken H, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > In the human realm beings experience both desirable and > undesirable sense objects (as vipaka), while in the heaven realm > beings experience only desirable sense objects, .... S: I think we have to say *predominantly* desirable sense objects ... > and in the hell realm > beings experience only undesirable sense objects. .... S: Again, *predominantly* undesirable sense objects. Metta, Sarah ======= #87918 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 4:43 am Subject: Re: [dsg] What is a question? was Re: Overview of KS 3: Her Faulty Teaching egberdina Hi Jon, 2008/7/6 Jonothan Abbott : > Hi Herman >Do you perhaps mean that an answer that responds to the questioner's >'problem', rather than just to the question as an isolated set of words, >is the more skilful? If so, I'd agree. > >> So, especially from a >> paramattha dhamma point of view, what is a question? >> > > A good question ;-)) > > I don't think I know the answer. > > Any thoughts of your own to share? I have some thoughts, but nothing satisfactory, hence the question :-) In the context of knowledge, a question is an acknowledgment of not knowing [something]. An open question acknowledges both the possibilities of there being answers, or maybe not. A question wants answers, whether positive or negative. A question is an act in the service of getting those answers. In the context of reality, a question, as a wanting to know what is real, is a denial of itself, because it is that very wanting to know that is the reality. So is a question like "what is the reality of the present moment?" anything other than unacknowledged craving in action, and any subsequent advertence to a "reality" as a supposed answer to that question, anything other than a continuation of the cover-up of craving in action? Cheers Herman #87919 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 5:29 am Subject: Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 1.8, 1.81, 1.8.2 nichiconn Dear Friends, continuing the text and translations from #87700: CSCD Ekaka.m 303. < connie/Scott #87920 From: Sukinder Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 5:35 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sukinderpal Hi Andrew, Some quick comments. =========== > Unlike many Buddhists today, those particular audiences > did not proliferate to having wrong ideas about `practice' and they did > not read into the Teachings these same ideas. They heard what they did > and lived and practiced in accordance to that without wrong view. But > today people interpret those same words in a way which serves to justify > self view. Andrew: I have read this argument many times and have wanted to accept it. But when I read the suttas, I can't help but see a world very similar to my own - with warring kings, robbers, prostitutes, gamblers, drinkers and so on. I read in the Vinaya of monks having sex with animals and nuns. In all honesty, I find it hard to accept that these people would be any less in the grip of self view than I am today. Sukin: Yes we are talking about wrong (vs. right) view, and not one which the Buddha’s disciples may have had *before* hearing him teach, but one which arises in the case of Buddhists today upon hearing the same teaching. Regarding ‘bad’ monks, no one denies that there were many of them as there are today. As it is now, almost anyone could ordain and who would stop them? I’m sure on the other hand, the ones that came in direct contact with the Buddha and who were inspired to ordain in his presence, those were of totally different caliber, wouldn’t you think? As regards general akusala, I'm sure you agree that what is manifested cannot be taken as measure of any right view accumulated. This right view will express itself exactly when and if the Dhamma has been heard and may be to such an extent as to condition one or more stages of enlightenment. But for most people today, instead of even a little right view, it is wrong view which mostly arises. What say you……? :-) ================= > there is a level of understanding which > is Pariyatti and which can begin to see this, and that otherwise we are > liable to misinterpret anything with self view, I think it safe to read > *all* of the Teachings through the eye of anatta and conditionality. > What do you think? Andrew: Yes, I agree with the last comment. But I am also very wary of pushing a line that one should not do things conventionally recommended by the Buddha in case the wrong cetasikas should arise (which of course they *will* if the conditions for their arising are present). That line is "control" slipping in via the back door! I hasten to add I am not saying this of you, Sukin! Or anyone in particular! Sukin: That would happen only with wrong understanding and perhaps such tendency does arise from time to time. I’m sure it is your own experience that when you hear such conventional descriptions, you ‘think to follow’ similar good actions yourself even while taking into consideration anatta and conditionality. And yes, akusala alternates with kusala as you wrote in another letter. However I think that instead of taking this as an excuse to go ahead regardless, one should seek to understand and this *wouldn’t* stop us from going ahead with ‘doing’ the good anyway. Would an instance of right view *ever* hinder other forms of kusala through mind, speech or body? On the other hand it seems to me, that with 'to do' in mind rather than 'understanding', the danger of being deluded and mislead is directly or indirectly encouraged. The possibility of ‘control’ slipping in via the back door is again when there is wrong understanding. But I side with Ken, when he stresses the fact of there being only the present moment. ;-) Metta, Sukin #87921 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:36 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and Herman) - In a message dated 7/8/2008 4:15:06 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: H:> This bizarre Abhidhamma position, that has calmness as the barometer for ethical quality, on the side of action leads to the extreme of the master martial artist, who is able to skillfully execute his opponents, whilst remaining mentally serene and calm. What in Abhidhamma terms is a paragon of virtue, is no more than a psychopath. ..... S: What is usually taken for calmness in a worldly sense, such as this, is very seldom calm, passaddhi cetasika, which arises at moments of dana, sila and bhavana only. It is ignorance which which takes attachment for calm, aversion for wholesome shame and so on. ============================== Sarah, I agree with you that there are frequently misperceivings and misinterpretations of the nature of various mental states and other phenomena. However, I am uneasy in seeing the frequency with which well known mental phenomena are dismissed as not being the cetasikas pointed to by Abhidhamma. That can serve as an easy, unverifiable answer to all objections - a means to attempt to justify whatever one's belief is. Calm may be a calm accompanied by cold malice or a calm accompanied by warm lovingkindness. A true lunatic - and there are some - can, with smiling and joyful ease and not any actual aversion, tear apart a human being for the pure joy of it, and the calm he feels is a true calm accompanied by delight! It is that very perverse calm that is one of the most horrifying aspects of the behavior of such a monster. With metta, Howard #87922 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:40 am Subject: Re: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling upasaka_howard Hi, Sarah (and Alex) - In a message dated 7/8/2008 6:19:44 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, sarahprocterabbott@... writes: Hi Alex, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" wrote: > IMHO, if akusala actions (like fishing for example) felt bad > immeadetely on performing (like puting a hand to the red hot iron > stove) then none of the people would perform bad actions. .... S: What about getting angry (to give an obvious example of akusala that feels bad)? ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: But it does not always feel bad! So-called righteous anger, a misnomer and oxymoron, usually feels just wonderful!!! ----------------------------------------------------- Metta, Sarah ========================== With metta, Howard #87923 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 5:44 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami truth_aerator Hi Phil and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Phil" wrote: >AN V, 176. Anatahapindika and his 500 lay followers are told by the >Buddha: "Householder, you attend upon the Sanhgha of monks with >robes, almsfood, lodgings and medicinal requisites for use in time >of sickness. But you should not remain satisfied merely with this. >Rather, householders, you should train yourselves thus: "'How can we >enter and dwell from time to time in the rapture of seclusion?" >(commentarial note by BB - pavivekaam piitim. AA: The rapture >arising in dependence on the first and second jhaanas) Thus should >you train yourself." > Good sutta. Thank you for posting it. >>> >Those incredibly detailed methods are found in Vism, of course. Why >are they not in the suttanta? I don't know. >>> Anapanasati sutta really details the instructions on how to develop 4 satipatthanas, Jhana and so on. Some people will find any excuse to avoid doing what they don't want to. In this thread I have stated few possible reasons: a) People living in those times were very familiar with meditation so most basic instructions were un needed. b) Buddha did instruct those people, but the specific instructions were condensed later on when suttas were formatted. The instructions may be foun in other suttas, though. c) It is our fault that we try to overcomplicate things, and are not satisfied with brief, but enough information. === Best wishes, Alex #87924 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 5:48 am Subject: Lengthy Reply Re: [dsg] Abh mistake of equaling ethical quality = feeling truth_aerator Hi Sarah, Howard and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > > Hi, Sarah (and Alex) - > > In a message dated 7/8/2008 6:19:44 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > sarahprocterabbott@... writes: > > Hi Alex, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Alex" > wrote: > > IMHO, if akusala actions (like fishing for example) felt bad > > immeadetely on performing (like puting a hand to the red hot >iron > > stove) then none of the people would perform bad actions. > .... > S: What about getting angry (to give an obvious example of akusala >that feels bad)? > ------------------------------------------------------- > Howard: >But it does not always feel bad! So-called righteous anger, a >misnomer and oxymoron, usually feels just wonderful!!! > ----------------------------------------------------- > Exactly! Furthermore some ignorant people might claim that these things (like righteous anger, etc) adds "spice to life" and fix the wrongs, thus making a world a "better place". Best wishes, Alex #87925 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 1:49 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman (and Alex & all) - In a message dated 7/8/2008 6:23:30 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Alex, 2008/7/7 Alex : > Hi Ken, Sarah, Scott, Jon, Nina and all Abhidhammikas, > > Does continuity exist? > Yes or No. > > If Yes, > > Is is continuous or discrete? > I know you didn't ask me specifically, but I didn't think you would mind my thoughts on yet more useful questions from you. >Does continuity exist? Yes!! >Is it continuous or discrete? Continuous!! Now for my question, and immediate reply. What is it that is continuously continuous? The past!! Now for the commentary. Regardless of whether it is known or unknown, remembered or unremembered, acknowledged or unacknowledged, the past IS what conditions the present. But what IS done in this present, is not a function of the past. I have the tiiiiiikaaa and tiiiiiikaaa-tiiiiiiikaaa handy if you need them :-) Cheers Herman ============================== Continuity does not exist. There is no thing called continuity, and it is thus pointless to even consider whether "it" is continuous or discrete. What is true is that there are no gaps in consciousness, and we express that by saying that consciousness is continuous, and then we nominalize that adjective by saying that continuity exists for consciousness. By using that noun, 'continuity', we then fall into the error of thinking that it is the name of some "thing". What is also true is that impermanence does not exist, though nothing, including consciousness, remains unchanged for even an instant. Likewise, there is no thing called not-self-ness or emptiness, though all phenomena are not-self and empty. With metta, Howard #87926 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:16 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? truth_aerator Hi Howard, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: >Continuity does not exist. There is no thing called continuity, and >it is thus pointless to even consider whether "it" is continuous or >discrete. I can agree that a "thing" cannot be abstracted from the characeristics & qualities that make up the "thing". A continuity requires some "things" to appear in a certain way to be able to define "continuity exists". Am I right in that? Is that what you have tried to say in your post? >> >What is true is that there are no gaps in consciousness, >> It is impossible to percieve one's own gap in consciousness, other than by inference and indirect ways LATER ON when one is conscious. Subjectively, one's own unconsciousness cannot be cognized in the moment of unconsciousness. Actually uncosciousness can never be a direct object of awareness since it isn't an object and it isn't an awareness. Best wishes, Alex #87927 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:19 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. nilovg Hi Larry, Op 8-jul-2008, om 7:45 heeft LBIDD@... het volgende geschreven: > One alternate reading on "bhava asava" would be "desiring eternal > existence" as in the Buddhist Dictionary, rather than clinging to > rebirth, which seems to be pretty much a sure thing ;-)) > > I always thought it had something to do with eternalism and nihilism, > but apparently not. -------- N: Bhavaasava can be accompanied by wrong view or without wrong view. When accompanied by wrong view one clings to eternity belief. Expositor (p. 475): Bhavaasava without wrong view, I quote from my Cetasikas: Under the classification of ta.nhaa we find: bhava ta.nhaa and vibhava ta.nhaa, and vibhava ta.nhaa is always wrong view, annihilation belief. Nina. #87928 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:23 am Subject: [dsg] What is a question? was Re: Overview of KS 3: Her Faulty Teaching truth_aerator Hi Herman, Nina, Sarah, Jon, Scott, Sukinder, KenH and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > So is a question like "what is the reality of the present moment?" > anything other than unacknowledged craving in action, and any > subsequent advertence to a "reality" as a supposed answer to that > question, anything other than a continuation of the cover-up of > craving in action? If the thing is known, then it is useless to define & explain it again & again. If the thing is unknown, then it is even more useless and impossible, to properly define & explain it since it is uknown. =============================================================== What am I trying to say? It is not exactly a revelation that "there is seeing, hearing, smelling,tasting, touching, thinking&willing". What would be a better thing to say is: "How to get rid of suffering and what precise steps to take and in what situation." Here is where Bhavana (Meditation) comes in. Best wishes, Alex #87929 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility jonoabb Hi Alex > Hi Ken, Scott, Sukinder, Nina, Jon, Sarah, Dieter and all, > > ... > > Exactly. It is important to understand nama-rupa as they arise and > cease. For the beginners who aren't 100% certified homegrown > Arahants, it is important to sharpen this skill (at least in the > beginning) in intensive, and hopefully long, meditation retreats. I was interested to see you acknowledge the importance of an understanding of nama and rupa. A rare point of agreement between us ;-)) Would you agree that intellectual knowledge of the namas and rupas that arise in one's daily life is an important first step in this? > I hope nobody here is going to say that they know better than > Venerable Mahasi Saydaw or Ajahn Maha Boowa. > > Between KS and Ven Mahasi Sayadaw, who do you think is more learned > and experienced in Meditation? I think most people here prefer to discuss the texts and not the relative experience/attainments of absent third parties ;-)). Of course, it is fine to refer to another person's views on the texts, given our own limited knowledge, but those views will or course be considered on their merits. Talking of texts, I'd be interested to know the basis for your comment above about the importance of attending "intensive, and hopefully long, meditation retreats", in the development of understanding. Jon #87930 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:24 am Subject: Re: Commentary (part 1)[dsg] Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 1.8, 1.81, 1.8.2 nilovg Sutta: > RDs > What is the single doctrine? > [ 1.1 ]All beings persist through causes. > All beings persist through conditions.1.1 > [ 212 ] This 'single doctrine,' friends, has been perfectly set > forth by the Exalted One who knows, who sees. Hereon there should > be a chanting in concord, not a wrangling, that thus this holy life > may persist and be long maintained. That may be for the welfare and > happiness of many folk, for compassion on the world, for the good, > the welfare, the happiness of devas and of men. ----------- Commentarial Excerpts: N: There should not be a dispute as to meaning and letter. [Na vivaditabbanti atthe va byañjane va vivado na katabbo.] ------- N: All beings: those born in sensuous planes etc. , The word etc. refers to ruupabrahma planes and aruupa brahma planes. Those born with sa~n~naa and those born with one khandha. N: For whom there is only ruupakkhandha as result of ruupajhaana. All being in all becomings are included. [ Sabbe sattati kamabhavadisu saññabhavadisu ekavoharabhavadisu ca sabbabhavesu sabbe satta.] ------ N: All beings subsist through the food that is hetu or cause. [Iti sabbasattana? ?hiti hetu aharo nama eko dhammo...] ------ N: If this is so, the fact that the devas without perception are without roots (no sobhana or akusala hetus), without food, contact etc. is this not a contradiction? It is not, since for them jhaana is the nutriment. ------- [Nanu ca eva? sante ya? vutta? ‘‘asaññasatta deva ahetuka anahara aphassaka’’tiadi, (vibha. 1017) ta? vacana? virujjhatiti, na virujjhati. Tesañhi jhana? aharo hoti.] --------- N: The word etc. after contact refers to feeling and consciousness. Jhaana is the cause or condition for their life. --------- N: How are there four (kinds of food on which beings subsist)? They are: morsel like food, coarse or subtle, contact, volition and consciousness. [Co: Katame cattaro? Kaba?ikaro aharo o?ariko va sukhumo va, phasso dutiyo, manosañcetana tatiya, viñña?a? catuttha’’nti (sa?. ni. 2.11) idampi virujjhatiti, idampi na virujjhati. ] ---------- ------ N: The Commentary explains that food can be understood in a figurative sense, as condition or cause. Whatever produces fruit, that is called food. Ignorance is not without food, the five hindrances are its food. And unwise attention is food for the five hindrances. This is meant here. [So ca ya? ya? phala? janeti, ta? ta? aharati nama, tasma aharoti vuccati. Tenevaha ‘‘avijjampaha?, bhikkhave, sahara? vadami, no anahara?. Ko ca, bhikkhave, avijjaya aharo? Pañcanivara?atissa vacaniya?. Pañcanivara?epaha?, bhikkhave, sahare vadami, no anahare. Ko ca, bhikkhave, pañcanna? nivara?ana? aharo? Ayonisomanasikarotissa vacaniya’’nti (a. ni. 10.61). Aya? idha adhippeto.] ------------ N: Food in the sense of condition can be applied to the perceptionless being. Someone goes forth, develops the kasina meditation of wind, and attains the fourth rúpajhåna. When he has emerged he sees that being without citta is beneficial. Depending on citta there is bondage and dukkha arises, whereas when there is no citta there is no dukkha. He develops endurance and the jhåna does not decline before his death. After he has passed away it produces non-percipient becoming. In whatever posture he was in the human world, in that posture he remains for fivehundred kappas, be it sitting or lying down. [....pabbajita vayokasi?e parikamma? katva catutthajjhana? nibbattetva tato vu??haya dhi citta?, dhibbateta? citta? cittassa nama abhavoyeva sadhu, cittañhi nissayeva vadhabandhadipaccaya? dukkha? uppajjati. Citte asati natthetanti khanti? ruci? uppadetva aparihinajjhana kala?katva asaññabhave nibbattanti. Yo yassa iriyapatho manussaloke pa?ihito ahosi, so tena iriyapathena nibbattitva pañca kappasatani ?hito va nisinno va nipanno va hoti.] ---------- (to be continued) Nina. #87931 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [ dsg] Re: Kamma, was Death. jonoabb Hi Herman >> Of course, intention (the >> mental factor) is said to be a conditioned dhamma, but that is by no >> means the same as saying that action is a consequence of conditions. >> > > Ohh? A conditioned dhamma is not a dhamma that is a consequence of conditons? > I'm getting the distinct impression you'd like to hear me say that a dhamma is a consequence of conditions. OK then, consider it said ;-)) What next? >> When talking about deeds/action in the context of kamma, the dhamma in >> question is cetana/intention (the mental factor). > > Intention has no consequences in the world, Jon. It may be a fact not > to your liking, but your parents had to DO something other than > intending, to bring you about. I can draw pictures if that will help :-) > I'm of course aware that, in the conventional view of things, it is bodily or verbal action, rather than (mere) intention, that brings consequences. Nevertheless, it is the teaching of the Buddha (as I understand it) that in that conventional scenario the significant dhamma, for the purposes of the law of kamma, is the mental factor of intention, for it is this that gives rise to the bodily or mental action. The mental factor of intention, like all conditioned dhammas, has the characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta. It is one of the dhammas constituting 'the all' that, according to the suttas, is to be understood and abandoned. Bodily or verbal actions, on the other hand, cannot be the object of awareness/insight. So no need to explain any further about the facts of life ;-)) The teachings do not deny conventional truths, but they point to truths that operate at a different level to the conventional. Jon #87932 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:34 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Metta, Ch 9, no 2. jonoabb Hi Herman > It has been my thesis from the beginning that anatta and kamma are > irreconcilable. You have not convinced me that you understand what I > am saying, or why I say it. I readily admit that I haven't really 'got' your line of thought on the perceived anatta/kamma inconsistency. But then, I'm not aware that you've sought to explain the reasoning behind your 'thesis', at least not in terms that this simple mind can grasp ;-)) > Also, I have not been convinced by you > that your conception of a "stream of consciousness" is not an > atta-view. > I've tried to explain what I understand to be the the conception of stream of consciousness assumed in the teachings. I'm not sure whether what you are 'not convinced' about is my understanding of the teachings, or the teachings themselves (as you read them). > Therefore, I continue to believe that Right View cannot > incorporate both anatta and kamma. > Here I think you are saying there is an inconsistency within the teachings themselves as between (a) the characteristic of anatta and (b) the doctrine of kamma/vipaka (an inconsistency that has apparently gone unnoticed by students of the teachings and academics for the past 2500 + years ;-)). > No need to go over it again, I am happy to leave it :-) Agreed. We can leave it there for now ;-)) Jon #87933 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:59 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Jhana, path of pleasure seeking for magga-phala jonoabb Hi Alex > Read the Subject line. We aren't talking about other things, we are > talking specifically about Jhana and its relation to magga-phala. Agreed, it's the relevance of jhana to the development of insight and the attaining of enlightenment, as found in the teachings, that's the topic. > In your quote of my quote, don't skip this line: > > "these four kinds of life devoted to pleasure, which are conducive to > disenchantment, to dispassion, to cessation, to tranquility, to > realization, to enlightenment, to Nibbana. What are they? First a > monk detached from sense-desires, detached from unwholesome mental > states, enters and remains in the first jhana...the fourth jhana, > which is beyond pleasure and pain, and purified by equanimity and > mindfulness." > Yes. I summarised this in my post by saying: ".. the Buddha explains that there is one form of 'life devoted to pleasure' which is praiseworthy, namely the life of a follower who experiences the pleasant feeling associated with jhana." And I went on to refer to the life devoted to jhana as being being 'conducive to enlightenment'. > And > > "25. Then such wanderers might ask: "Well then, those who are given to > these four forms of pleasure-seeking - how many fruits, how many > benefits can they expect?" And, you should reply: "They can expect > four fruits, four benefits. What are they? The first is when a monk > by destruction of three fetters has become a Stream-Winner," > Yes. The fruit or benefit of a life devoted to jhana, in the case of a monk who is a follower of the Buddha, can be enlightenment. However, it is necessary to consider the precise nature of that relationship, since it is not fully spelt out in the sutta. All monks who are followers of the Buddha, whether living a life devoted to jhana or not, are living lives that are devoted to the development of mindfulness. In this respect, note that in the first of the passages quoted in your post (above) the jhana of the monks is said to be "purified by equanimity and mindfulness", indicating an already high level of mindfulness development. >> However, the passage does not indicate that jhana is helpful to the >> would-be developer of the path (such as you or me). > > Pre Sotapanna? No, I was not referring to the fact of being a worldling, but of being persons who have not yet attained jhana. My point was that the references to a life devoted to jhana being conducive to the attainment of enlightenment are to be read in the context of disciples of the Buddha who have *already attained* jhana (as well as being already of highly developed mindfulness). Thus the sutta cannot be taken as supporting a "jhana first" approach to the development of insight. >> It speaks only of >> those who, within the dispensation, have already attained jhana > > In part DUE to attainment of Jhana non sotopanna becomes sotopanna. > The precise nature of the connection needs to be considered. Jon #87934 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 8:00 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? jonoabb Hi Alex > Hi Ken, Sarah, Scott, Jon, Nina and all Abhidhammikas, > > Does continuity exist? > Yes or No. > > If Yes, > > Is is continuous or discrete? > Could you clarify what you mean by 'continuity'. The term 'continuity' is an abstract noun, so it could hardly have any existence (even conventionally ;-)). Do you mean continuity of some particular thing? Jon #87935 From: Jonothan Abbott Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 8:01 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Streams, identity & difference jonoabb Hi Alex > Hi Jon, Ken, Andrew and all, > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott > wrote: > >>> I was careful to indicate, in earlier posts in that thread, >>> that there is no dhamma of 'stream of consciousness' >>> (knowing that KenH is >around ;-)) > > Then how is conditionality of stream of consciousness explained? Or > are you implying that things "just happen" from no cause? To my understanding, conditionality applies to dhammas, thus, to the individual cittas, but not to the so-called 'stream of consciousness'. Does this make sense? Jon #87936 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 8:08 am Subject: [dsg] Re: response to hate mail etc - ... Credibility truth_aerator Hi Jon and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Jonothan Abbott wrote: > > Hi Alex > > > Hi Ken, Scott, Sukinder, Nina, Jon, Sarah, Dieter and all, > > > > ... > > > > Exactly. It is important to understand nama-rupa as they arise and > > cease. For the beginners who aren't 100% certified homegrown > > Arahants, it is important to sharpen this skill (at least in the > > beginning) in intensive, and hopefully long, meditation >retreats. > > I was interested to see you acknowledge the importance of an > understanding of nama and rupa. A rare point of agreement between >us ;-)) > > Would you agree that intellectual knowledge of the namas and rupas >that arise in one's daily life is an important first step in this? If the dhamma arising now can be directly known now as it arises with mindfulness & panna present, then it is useless to define it again&again in the books and internet posts. Talking about non-yet-arisen Dhammas is going beyond "observation of presently arisen dhammas" into a speculative (for the specific person at a specific time) territory not presently relevant. > > > I hope nobody here is going to say that they know better than > > Venerable Mahasi Saydaw or Ajahn Maha Boowa. > > > > Between KS and Ven Mahasi Sayadaw, who do you think is more learned > > and experienced in Meditation? > > I think most people here prefer to discuss the texts and not the > relative experience/attainments of absent third parties ;-)). Of > course, it is fine to refer to another person's views on the texts, > given our own limited knowledge, but those views will or course be > considered on their merits. > If somebody's teaching contradicts the core texts and doesn't lead to Nibbana, then we have all the right to question it. Since when did the KS's authority replaced Buddha's authority found in 4 Main Nikayas + first few KN works? > Talking of texts, I'd be interested to know the basis for your >comment above about the importance of attending "intensive, and >hopefully long, > meditation retreats", in the development of understanding. > > Jon Many suttas. ========================== DN2 ============================= "A householder or householder's son, hearing the Dhamma, gains conviction in the Tathagata and reflects: 'Household life is confining, a dusty path. The life gone forth is like the open air. It is not easy living at home to practice the holy life totally perfect, totally pure, like a polished shell. What if I were to shave off my hair and beard, put on the ochre robes, and go forth from the household life into homelessness?' "So after some time he abandons his mass of wealth, large or small; leaves his circle of relatives, large or small; shaves off his hair and beard, puts on the ochre robes, and goes forth from the household life into homelessness. "When he has thus gone forth, he lives restrained by the rules of the monastic code, seeing danger in the slightest faults. Consummate in his virtue, he guards the doors of his senses, is possessed of mindfulness and alertness, and is content. http://www.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/dn/dn.02.0.than.html ============= Short & intensive retreats are for those who cannot become meditative monks full time. It is better than nothing. Best wishes, Alex #87937 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 4:08 am Subject: Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma upasaka_howard Hi, all - In Abhidhamma, concentration is considered a universal - present at all times, accompanying every mind state. However, in the suttas there is frequent mention of the *development* of concentration. What is always present requires no development. How is this to be resolved? Also, in several suttas it is pointed out that concentration leads to calm. For example, in the Upanissa Sutta, concentration supports happiness, which, in turn, supports calm. Also, in the Anguttara Nikaya, there is the following chain of conditionality in which the last link also conditions the first, making the chain actually a cycle, hence making concentration and calm mutually dependent: Virtuous ways of conduct -> Non-remorse -> Gladness -> Joy -> Serenity -> Happiness -> Concentration of the mind -> Knowledge and vision of things as they really are -> Revulsion and dispassion -> Knowledge and vision of liberation What other cetasikas are requisite for the arising of calm? Concentration alone would be insufficient, else we would always be calm, given the claim that concentration is a universal. Given concentration as a universal, it becomes pointless to describe it as a condition for calm. What is always present is of no concern. It is there, and nothing more need be said. With metta, Howard #87938 From: Dieter Möller Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 8:58 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma moellerdieter Hi Howard and all, you wrote : 'In Abhidhamma, concentration is considered a universal - present at all times, accompanying every mind state. However, in the suttas there is frequent mention of the *development* of concentration. What is always present requires no development. How is this to be resolved?' D: concentration accompanying every mind state? The states of mind (we are requested to contemplate ) are desribed by Maha Satipatthana Sutta -pls see below. When the mind is 'scattered ' , or 'unconcentrated ' can we still speak of accompanying concentration, respectively must we assume that Abh. includes the whole spectrum of concentration from the lowest level to perfect one-pointedness ( ekagatta)? with Metta Dieter MN 10 ( transl. b. Thanissaro Bhikkhu) "And how does a monk remain focused on the mind in & of itself? There is the case where a monk, when the mind has passion, discerns that the mind has passion. When the mind is without passion, he discerns that the mind is without passion. When the mind has aversion, he discerns that the mind has aversion. When the mind is without aversion, he discerns that the mind is without aversion. When the mind has delusion, he discerns that the mind has delusion. When the mind is without delusion, he discerns that the mind is without delusion. "When the mind is restricted, he discerns that the mind is restricted. When the mind is scattered, he discerns that the mind is scattered. When the mind is enlarged, he discerns that the mind is enlarged. When the mind is not enlarged, he discerns that the mind is not enlarged. When the mind is surpassed, he discerns that the mind is surpassed. When the mind is unsurpassed, he discerns that the mind is unsurpassed. When the mind is concentrated, he discerns that the mind is concentrated. When the mind is not concentrated, he discerns that the mind is not concentrated. When the mind is released, he discerns that the mind is released. When the mind is not released, he discerns that the mind is not released. "In this way he remains focused internally on the mind in & of itself, or externally on the mind in & of itself, or both internally & externally on the mind in & of itself. Or he remains focused on the phenomenon of origination with regard to the mind, on the phenomenon of passing away with regard to the mind, or on the phenomenon of origination & passing away with regard to the mind. Or his mindfulness that 'There is a mind' is maintained to the extent of knowledge & remembrance. And he remains independent, unsustained by (not clinging to) anything in the world. This is how a monk remains focused on the mind in & of itself. unquote #87939 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 9:52 am Subject: Re: Sundries: DN33 1.1-5 nichiconn Dear Herman, Herman: In DN16, the Lord is invited to attend the hall at Pataligama, already having been in use. The intro proceeds as in DN33. This same account is to be found in Ud 8:6 connie: I like this, from the commentary to Ud 8:6, Masefield p.1038 -- << Approached the Lord (yena Bhagavaa ten' upasa'nkami.msu): in this connection, moreover, the villagers of Paa.tali who were layfollowers made ready not only that resthouse itself, but also the streets in that entire village, erected flags, had filled pitchers and plantain trees be placed at the doors of the houses, making that entire village like a star strewn with lamps and garlands, and then, having had there be proclaimed by beat of drum: "Have suckling children drink their milk, swiftly feed and put to bed young boys, and then make no loud sound, for today the Teacher will reside within our village for one night, and Buddhas, indeed, are those desiring little sound", [411] approached the Lord, each taking with them their own torch. >> peace, connie #87940 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:10 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma upasaka_howard Hi, Dieter - In a message dated 7/8/2008 11:55:04 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, moellerdieter@... writes: Hi Howard and all, you wrote : 'In Abhidhamma, concentration is considered a universal - present at all times, accompanying every mind state. However, in the suttas there is frequent mention of the *development* of concentration. What is always present requires no development. How is this to be resolved?' D: concentration accompanying every mind state? The states of mind (we are requested to contemplate ) are desribed by Maha Satipatthana Sutta -pls see below. When the mind is 'scattered ' , or 'unconcentrated ' can we still speak of accompanying concentration, respectively must we assume that Abh. includes the whole spectrum of concentration from the lowest level to perfect one-pointedness ( ekagatta)? ------------------------------------------- Howard: Possibly, but more likely, IMO, as seems to me to be the case with regard to numerous cetasikas, the one-pointedness of Abhidhamma is not the one-pointedness of the suttas. The one-pointedness of Abhidhamma appears to be no more than the fact of there being a unique object of consciousness at any moment, which is certainly not the one-pointedness of the suttas. (Actually, as I am really inclined to put the matter, the one-pointedness of Abhidhamma is not the one-pointedness about which the Buddha taught! But, hey, that's just me! ;-) ------------------------------------------- with Metta Dieter ========================= With metta, Howard #87941 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 11:33 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Citta the householder has 4 Jhanas and was an anagami nilovg Hi Howard, Op 7-jul-2008, om 22:29 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > There are several aspects of it that appeal a great deal to me: the > magnificent achievement of this laywoman, surpassing that of the > bhikkus at least > for a while, --------- N: We read: She attained the stage of anaagaami, but what is extraordinary: with the patisambidhas, the analytical insights. She prepared food for the monks, the right food. Elsewhere we read that the proper food is among the conditions for attaining arahatship. She never thought of herself, she practised dana and metta, as perfections, and the other perfections, such as renunciation, nekhamma. ------- > H:the assigning of meditation subjects and the meditation > practice, ------ N: We read that they attained arahatship and this means: they had to develop satipatthana, mindfulness and understanding of nama and rupa. Samatha together with vipassana. Without vipassana it is impossible to attain any stage of enlightenment, as you know. -------- > H: and the Buddha's instructing of the bhikkhu to control his mind, > implying, > of course, the possibility of doing so by a person adequately > prepared. ------- N: Yes, we read: Verse 35. In order to understand what control means I find it helpful to consider the five spiritual faculties, controlling faculties or indriyas. Indriya means leader, it is a leader in its own field. I wrote in my Conditions: < there are five faculties sometimes referred to as “spiritual faculties”. These are sobhana cetasikas (beautiful mental factors) included in the “factors of enlightenment” (bodhipakkiya dhammas) which should be developed for the attaining of enlightenment. They are: faith or confidence (saddhå), energy (viriya), mindfulness (sati), concentration (samådhi) and understanding (paññå). They control the accompanying dhammas and mind-produced rúpa, they condition them by way of faculty-condition... When we keep on listening to the Dhamma and considering what we heard, the five “spiritual faculties” can develop. They lead to the experiencing of the “Deathless”, of nibbåna, but we do not know in which life that will happen. It is useless to have desire for the attainment of enlightenment, desire is counteractive to the development of understanding. We should only be intent on our task of this moment: developing more understanding of the reality which appears now.> It is good to remember that these controlling faculties are cetasikas, that is, nama that is non-self. Knowing details is helpful for dull-minded worldlings. Nina. #87942 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 12:17 pm Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma nilovg Hi Howard, Op 8-jul-2008, om 19:10 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Possibly, but more likely, IMO, as seems to me to be the case with > regard to numerous cetasikas, the one-pointedness of Abhidhamma is > not the > one-pointedness of the suttas. The one-pointedness of Abhidhamma > appears to be no > more than the fact of there being a unique object of consciousness > at any > moment, which is certainly not the one-pointedness of the suttas. > (Actually, as I > am really inclined to put the matter, the one-pointedness of > Abhidhamma is > not the one-pointedness about which the Buddha taught! But, hey, > that's just > me! ;-) > ------------------------------------------- N: What about right concentration taught also in the Abhidhamma as one of the Path factors? What about the indriya of samaadhi, which is indriya paccaya? See Patthaana. See Book of Analysis, Ch 10: Analysis of the Enlightenment Factors, among them is right concentration. So many aspects of concentration also in the Abhidhamma, and these teach us about the development of concentration. The teaching is one, the teaching contained in the tipi.taka, the three baskets. Nina. #87943 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 10:06 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/8/2008 3:17:56 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, Op 8-jul-2008, om 19:10 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Possibly, but more likely, IMO, as seems to me to be the case with > regard to numerous cetasikas, the one-pointedness of Abhidhamma is > not the > one-pointedness of the suttas. The one-pointedness of Abhidhamma > appears to be no > more than the fact of there being a unique object of consciousness > at any > moment, which is certainly not the one-pointedness of the suttas. > (Actually, as I > am really inclined to put the matter, the one-pointedness of > Abhidhamma is > not the one-pointedness about which the Buddha taught! But, hey, > that's just > me! ;-) > ------------------------------------------- N: What about right concentration taught also in the Abhidhamma as one of the Path factors? What about the indriya of samaadhi, which is indriya paccaya? --------------------------------------------------- Howard: Well, what about these? Are they ekagatta cetasika or something else? And what about the questions I raised in my post, Nina? Don't they call for a response? ---------------------------------------------- See Patthaana. See Book of Analysis, Ch 10: Analysis of the Enlightenment Factors, among them is right concentration. So many aspects of concentration also in the Abhidhamma, and these teach us about the development of concentration. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Nina, I'm not really seeing an answer to the questions I raised. ------------------------------------------------ The teaching is one, the teaching contained in the tipi.taka, the three baskets. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: That is an assertion. Many things can be asserted. The mere asserting doesn't make it so. When there are reasonable questions, I think they call for answers. I will be extremely happy, truly(!), with an answer that shows complete consistency of Dhamma throughout the Tipitaka, but the answer needs to be more than just an assertion of that alleged consistency being the case. ------------------------------------------------- Nina. ========================== With metta, Howard #87944 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:26 pm Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma truth_aerator Hi Howard, Nina and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > Hi, Nina - > --------------------------------------------------- > Howard: >Well, what about these? Are they ekagatta cetasika or something >else? And what about the questions I raised in my post, Nina? Don't >they call for a response? > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: >Nina, I'm not really seeing an answer to the questions I raised. > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: >That is an assertion. Many things can be asserted. The mere >asserting doesn't make it so. When there are reasonable questions, I >think they call for answers. I will be extremely happy, truly(!), >with an answer that shows complete consistency of Dhamma throughout ? >the Tipitaka, but the answer needs to be more than just an assertion >of that alleged consistency being the case. I've found this. Is this true? =============================== Jhanananda's critique of Nina van Gorkom In the spring of 2003, I researched jhana on the web to see if anyone in Theravadan Buddhism understood the jhanas. At that time I joined every Yahoo group that was interested in the study of the Pali language and the Discourses of the Buddha. I joined a Yahoo group that was interested in the study of the Abhidhamma, which was led by Nina van Gorkom. When I posted my jhana sensitive mission statement Nina shredded it with quite some arrogance. In the course of dialog with her she happened to say that she did not meditate. She claimed she was waiting until she fully understood the dhamma before taking up the practice of meditation. Well, if she has been studying Buddhism for 40 years and still has not figured out enough about meditation to begin the practice, then what does she, a scholar who does not meditate, know about the Noble Eightfold Path, the practice of meditation and the attainments of the Buddha? So, why should we contemplative, who do meditate, look to one who does not meditate for our translations and commentaries? One who does not meditate does not follow the Noble Eightfold Path. One who does not follow the Noble Eightfold Path can never understand the way to enlightenment (dhamma). http://www.greatwesternvehicle.org/criticism/vangorkom.htm ============================================================= Am I missing something? Best wishes, Alex #87945 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 10:52 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma upasaka_howard Hi, Alex (and Nina) - In a message dated 7/8/2008 5:26:22 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: ...snip... http://www.greatwesternvehicle.org/criticism/vangorkom.htm ============================================================= Am I missing something? Best wishes, Alex ================================== I have a couple points to make in response: 1) While I have perfect comfort in critiquing positions and points of view, I have only disdain for ad hominem attacks. 2) An error of fact: Nina has not been a member of DSG from the outset, and she has never been the de jure or de facto "leader" of it. 3) I haven't witnessed Nina ever interact with anyone in an unkind or arrogant way. Quite the opposite! 4) The person quoted above is a self-proclaimed stream entrant and "Ecstatic Dhamma" teacher whom, out of deference to right speech, I will say nothing further about. Wit metta, Howard #87946 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 3:42 pm Subject: Re: Commentary (part 1)[dsg] Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 1.8, 1.81, 1.8.2 nichiconn dear friends, N: The Commentary explains that food can be understood in a figurative sense, as condition or cause. Whatever produces fruit, that is called food. Ignorance is not without food, the five hindrances are its food. And unwise attention is food for the five hindrances. This is meant here. connie: And it seems the 'commentarial additions' are also included in the list of Ones from the "Dasuttara Sutta", a kind of 'sister' to DN33: << DN 34.1.2. 'There is friends, (1) one thing that greatly helps (bahukaaro), (2) one thing to be developed (bhaavetabbo), (3) one thing to be thoroughly known (pari~n~neyyo), (4) one thing to be abandoned (pahaatabbo), (5) one thing that conduces to diminution (baana-bhaagiyo), (7) one thing hard to penetrate (duppa.tivijjho), (8) one thing to be made to arise (uppaadetabbo), (9) one thing to be thoroughly learnt (abhi~n~neyyo), and (10) one thing to be realised (sacchikaatabbo). (1) 'Which one thing greatly helps? Tirelessness in wholesome states (appamaado kusalesu dhammesu). (2) 'Which one thing is to be developed? Mindfulness with regard to the body, accompanied by pleasure (kaaya-gata sati saata-sahagataa). (3) 'Which one thing is to be thoroughly known? Contact as a condition of the corruptions and of grasping (phasso saasavo upaadaaniyo). (4) 'Which one thing is to be abandoned? Ego-conceit (asmimaana). (5) 'Which one thing conduces to diminution? Unwise attention (ayoniso manasikaaro). (6) 'Which one thing conduces to distinction? Wise attention (yoniso manasikaaro). (7) 'Which one thing is hard to penetrate? Uninterrupted mental concentration (aanantariko ceto-samaadhi). (8) 'Which one thing is to be made to arise? Unshakeable knowledge (akuppa'm ~naa.na'm). (9) 'Which one thing is to be thoroughly learnt? All beings are maintained by nutriment *(as Sutta 33, verse 1.8(1)).* (10) 'Which one thing is to be realised? Unshakeable deliverance of mind (akupppaa ceto-vimutti). 'That makes ten things that are real and true, so and not otherwise, unerringly and perfectly realized by the Tathaagata.' >> peace, connie #87947 From: "Sukinder" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 4:37 pm Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sukinderpal Hi Andrew, ===================== Sukin: That would happen only with wrong understanding and perhaps such tendency does arise from time to time. I'm sure it is your own experience that when you hear such conventional descriptions, you `think to follow' similar good actions yourself even while taking into consideration anatta and conditionality. And yes, akusala alternates with kusala as you wrote in another letter. However I think that instead of taking this as an excuse to go ahead regardless, one should seek to understand and this *wouldn't* stop us from going ahead with `doing' the good anyway. Would an instance of right view *ever* hinder other forms of kusala through mind, speech or body? On the other hand it seems to me, that with 'to do' in mind rather than 'understanding', the danger of being deluded and mislead is directly or indirectly encouraged. S> While writing the above I was struggling to recall the impression I had when I first read your comment on the alternating between akusala and kusala, and I thought to add that I think in fact that we agreed on how the development of panna takes place. Now I remember, so I add. When you suggested that acting on a prompt to kusala action would invariably be followed and alternate with akusala cittas, you were not suggesting a disregard for `understanding', but it was in fact *with* understanding that you stated it. So it seems that indeed our positions are the same, only that I stress `understanding' while you are stressing `kusala action' but neither of us is `disregarding' the other factor. Would that be right? Metta, Sukin #87948 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 5:46 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/7/7 : > Hi, Herman - > As for kamma-patha, that is not kamma but is the course of action > closely following upon, growing out of, and expressing the intention that the > Buddha called "kamma." According to what I've read, the Buddha taught that when > kamma is expressed in action, the resulting vipaka is magnified. > The bottom line is that it is intent that the Buddha calls "kamma." As > he taught in the Dhammapada, mind, intention specifically, is the forerunner. > -------------------------------------------------- I seem to recollect that only recently we discussed this line from the Dhammapada, and in that context intention was rendered as citta, and not as kamma. It seems that in just about all matters worthy of discussion in the Suttas, there are diverse teachings on the same topic, and not all of them say the same thing consistently. I accept that in certain suttas kamma is defined as cetana, but in others is quite different. The following from Sn, for example, leaves me in no doubt that kamma is indeed action, not intention. 650. By birth a brahmin is not born, by birth a non-brahmin is not born, By actions a brahmin is born, by actions a non-brahmin is born.. 651. By actions a farmer is born, by actions a craftsman is born, By actions a merchant is born, by actions a workman is born.. 652. By actions a robber is born, by actions a soldier too, By actions an adviser is born, by actions a king too. 653. Thus the wise see action as it really is, Seeing it dependently arising become clever in the results of actions. 654. By actions the world rolls on, by actions the populace roll on, Beings bound to actions, go on, like the linch pin of the wheel. === Cheers Herman #87949 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:08 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? egberdina Hi Howard and Alex, 2008/7/8 : > > ============================== > Continuity does not exist. There is no thing called continuity, and it > is thus pointless to even consider whether "it" is continuous or discrete. If this was a semantical discussion, about how words are used, then I would agree with you. Continuity is not a thing, and the word existence is therefore not the right word to denote the reality of continuity, by convention. But continuity is a process, and there certainly are processes. > What is true is that there are no gaps in consciousness, and we express > that by saying that consciousness is continuous, Alex has already pointed it out, but consciousness cannot know the absence of consciousness, so what you say certainly cannot be known to be true. > What is also true is that impermanence does not exist, though nothing, > including consciousness, remains unchanged for even an instant. Likewise, > there is no thing called not-self-ness or emptiness, though all phenomena are > not-self and empty. > Consciousness is the primary means by which phenomena are known. And when it is known that consciousness is never the same, it follows from there that nothing can be said about the permanence or otherwise of what is known [by consciousness]. But we also know by inference, and it is a safe bet for me that the past is the benchmark for what is continuously continuous. If it was otherwise, the Tipitaka would need to be revised, with all references to kammavipaka, as well as the recollection of former lives, removed. Cheers Herman #87950 From: "Alex" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 6:10 pm Subject: Kamma, intention or Action (Jainism)? truth_aerator Hi Herman and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > -------------------------------------------------- > >I seem to recollect that only recently we discussed this line from >the Dhammapada, and in that context intention was rendered as citta, >and not as kamma. > > It seems that in just about all matters worthy of discussion in the > Suttas, there are diverse teachings on the same topic, and not all >of them say the same thing consistently. >>> When you spot inconsistencies please post them, ok? I accept that in certain suttas > kamma is defined as cetana, but in others is quite different. The > following from Sn, for example, leaves me in no doubt that kamma is > indeed action, not intention. > Could the below quotes meant to say that by Kamma (or intentional action) one is born here or there? Look, if by Kamma we meant PHYSICAL action as opposed to motive/intention, then that teaching would be like the Jain teaching on Kamma. If I understood it correctly, Jains believe that Kamma includes physical action. Best wishes, Alex #87951 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/8/2008 8:46:38 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard, 2008/7/7 : > Hi, Herman - > As for kamma-patha, that is not kamma but is the course of action > closely following upon, growing out of, and expressing the intention that the > Buddha called "kamma." According to what I've read, the Buddha taught that when > kamma is expressed in action, the resulting vipaka is magnified. > The bottom line is that it is intent that the Buddha calls "kamma." As > he taught in the Dhammapada, mind, intention specifically, is the forerunner. > -------------------------------------------------- I seem to recollect that only recently we discussed this line from the Dhammapada, and in that context intention was rendered as citta, and not as kamma. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: By "we," do you mean you & me? I don't recall discussing this. In any case, while the word is citta/mind, I think the context makes it clear that intention is meant, and not just consciousness. Look at the 3rd sentence in each of the following two paragraphs: Mind is the forerunner of (all evil) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with wicked mind, suffering follows one, even as the wheel follows the hoof of the draught-ox. Mind is the forerunner of (all good) states. Mind is chief; mind-made are they. If one speaks or acts with pure mind, AFFECTION follows one, even as one's shadow that never leaves. ------------------------------------------------- It seems that in just about all matters worthy of discussion in the Suttas, there are diverse teachings on the same topic, and not all of them say the same thing consistently. I accept that in certain suttas kamma is defined as cetana, but in others is quite different. The following from Sn, for example, leaves me in no doubt that kamma is indeed action, not intention. 650. By birth a brahmin is not born, by birth a non-brahmin is not born, By actions a brahmin is born, by actions a non-brahmin is born.. 651. By actions a farmer is born, by actions a craftsman is born, By actions a merchant is born, by actions a workman is born.. 652. By actions a robber is born, by actions a soldier too, By actions an adviser is born, by actions a king too. 653. Thus the wise see action as it really is, Seeing it dependently arising become clever in the results of actions. 654. By actions the world rolls on, by actions the populace roll on, Beings bound to actions, go on, like the linch pin of the wheel. -------------------------------------------------- Howard: I admit that 'kamma' can mean either intention or the intentional action following upon the volition, but the intention is always central to it. -------------------------------------------------- === Cheers Herman ====================== With metta, Howard #87952 From: upasaka@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 2:30 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/8/2008 9:08:57 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard and Alex, 2008/7/8 : > > ============================== > Continuity does not exist. There is no thing called continuity, and it > is thus pointless to even consider whether "it" is continuous or discrete. If this was a semantical discussion, about how words are used, then I would agree with you. Continuity is not a thing, and the word existence is therefore not the right word to denote the reality of continuity, by convention. But continuity is a process, and there certainly are processes. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: I honestly do not think that continuity is a process. I think it is just a word that points to the fact of the absence of gaps in various contexts, consciousness being perhaps the most important example. ---------------------------------------------- > What is true is that there are no gaps in consciousness, and we express > that by saying that consciousness is continuous, Alex has already pointed it out, but consciousness cannot know the absence of consciousness, so what you say certainly cannot be known to be true. ---------------------------------------------------- Howard: There is no absence of consciousness to be known within a mind stream. There is, on occasion, awareness of a rapid fading of consciousness followed immediately, without gap, by continued consciousness often with radical change in content. But within a stream of consciousness there are no gaps. --------------------------------------------------- > What is also true is that impermanence does not exist, though nothing, > including consciousness, remains unchanged for even an instant. Likewise, > there is no thing called not-self-ness or emptiness, though all phenomena are > not-self and empty. > Consciousness is the primary means by which phenomena are known. And when it is known that consciousness is never the same, it follows from there that nothing can be said about the permanence or otherwise of what is known [by consciousness]. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't follow this. The only change in consciousness *per se* that there is, is its intensity. What we *call* change in consciousness, other than fluctuations in intensity, are changes in other things, specifically the content of consciousness and concomitant factors. Of course, since nothing exists except in relation to a host of other phenomena, we can properly say, I suppose, that every change in content and concomitant factors is also a change in consciousness - I give you that. ---------------------------------------------- But we also know by inference, and it is a safe bet for me that the past is the benchmark for what is continuously continuous ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm not understanding what you are saying here. --------------------------------------------- . If it was otherwise, the Tipitaka would need to be revised, with all references to kammavipaka, as well as the recollection of former lives, removed. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm sorry - I'm missing your point. --------------------------------------------- Cheers Herman ========================== With metta, Howard #87953 From: "connie" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 7:30 pm Subject: Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 - Ones nichiconn dear friends, Another One: << Eka naama ki"m? Sabbe sattaa ahaara.t.thitikaa. >> ~Naa.namoli used 'creatures' and I wonder, a bit, why TB has "animals" for "sattaa" but since Olds' already quoted "The Novice's Questions" in one of his footnotes to DN33's Ones: <<"What is one? All animals subsist on food. There are these four nutriments for the establishing of beings who have taken birth or for the support of those in search of a place to be born. Which four? Physical food, gross or refined; contact as the second, intellectual intention the third, and consciousness the fourth. >> Introducing the Commentary on them, Illustrator ch.IV's early paragraphs explain that 'the need arisen' for "The Boy's Questions" (Kumaarapa~nha'm), concerned the 7 year old Sopaaka's Full Admission and << are placed here in order to show the classes of that Understanding which belongs among the several ideas that constitute the equipment of concentrated cognizance. >> Therein, we read that the question in question here was << with reference to that one idea, by becoming completely dispassionate towards which a bhikkhu might eventually make an end of suffering, or [that one idea], by becoming dispassionate towards which this venerable one had eventually made an end of suffering. 5. The Elder replied: All creatures subsist by nutriment. He did so [employing] the mode of teaching in terms of a person. And here, in working out the construing of the answer, it is such Suttas as 'And what is right mindfulness? Here, bhikkhus, a bhikkhu abides contemplating the body as a body' (D ii 313) that establish it. >> As far as the sattaa goes, the Commentary declares << this [term 'creatures'] is a metaphor for the categories. - Why? - Because they must be described derivatively upon the categories. - How? - In the same way as 'village' is a metaphor for houses. Just as, when one or two or three of a village's houses have been burnt, it is said that 'the village has been burnt' because 'village' is describable [as such] derivatively upon the houses, and thus the metaphor of 'village' is established with respect to a house, so too, this metaphor, namely 'creatures subsist by nutriment' is established with respect to the categories, which subsist by nutriment in the sense of the conditions [without which they cannot arise]. >> peace, connie N: All beings: those born in sensuous planes etc. , The word etc. refers to ruupabrahma planes and aruupa brahma planes. Those born with sa~n~naa and those born with one khandha. N: For whom there is only ruupakkhandha as result of ruupajhaana. All being in all becomings are included. [ Sabbe sattati kamabhavadisu saññabhavadisu ekavoharabhavadisu ca sabbabhavesu sabbe satta.] #87954 From: LBIDD@... Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 8:13 pm Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, Thanks for the clarification on bhava asava. So desire to keep living _isn't_ bhava asava? Larry #87955 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 11:50 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/7/9 : > Hi, Herman - > > I seem to recollect that only recently we discussed this line from the > Dhammapada, and in that context intention was rendered as citta, and > not as kamma. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > By "we," do you mean you & me? I don't recall discussing this. From a few posts on the 6th of June this year. Howard> "As I see it, 'mind' in those verses refers to intention, an activity." Howard> "I've read in more than one place that 'mind' means intention in those verses. It makes good sense to me that it either means that, or more generally, "mental state," "mode of thinking," or "attitude." In Dhammapada III the meaning of 'mind' is clearly either that of the conventional "mental state" or of the entire aggregate of mental functions." I only remind you of this so I can use it in another thread, where my point is that the past is there, all the time, regardless of whether one remembers it :-) Cheers Herman #87956 From: "S.Ganesh" Date: Tue Jul 8, 2008 9:36 am Subject: Dhamma Brothers - A Film behappy.metta Dear Dhamma Friends, A Movie about Vipassana is released. You can find the details here : http://www.dhammabrothers.com/trailer.html With Metta Ganesh #87957 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 12:42 am Subject: Sangiitisutta corner, Commentary, to the Ones, part 2. nilovg Commentary, to the Ones, part 2. N: What is the food for the inhabitants of the hell planes? Kamma. Paccaya is food. By whatever kamma they are born in Hell, that is food, the condition by which they subsist. [Tasmaa yena kammena te niraye nibbattaa, tadeva tesa.m .thitipaccayattaa aahaaro hoti] ------------------ N: To begin with morsellike food one should not dispute this. Saliva that comes inside the mouth accomplishes for them the function of food. In the Hell saliva is also a conditon since it is to be felt as painful feeling, whereas in heaven it is to be felt as pleasant feeling. [Kaba.liikaara.m aahaara.m aarabbha cettha vivaado na kaatabbo. Mukhe uppanno khe.lopi hi tesa.m aahaarakicca.m saadheti. Khe.lopi hi niraye dukkhavedaniyo hutvaa paccayo hoti, sagge sukhavedaniyo.] ------------------ Food can be considered in a literal sense and in a figurative sense. Sa.nkhaarapaccayo is food as condition. It causes its own fruit. ----- N: There is no dhamma without conditions, and this goes for what is endowed with indriyas (faculties) and what is without indriyas, such as plants. Plants are dependent on the juices of earth and water. As to living beings, for them ignorance, clinging, kamma are food, they are conditions. [Indriyabaddhassapi hi anindriyabaddhassapi paccayo laddhu.m va.t.tati. Vinaa paccayena dhammo naama natthi. Tattha anindriyabaddhassa ti.narukkhalataadino pathaviiraso aaporaso ca paccayo hoti. Deve avassante hi ti.naadiini milaayanti, vassante ca pana haritaani honti. Iti tesa.m pathaviiraso aaporaso vassante ca pana haritaani honti. Iti tesa.m pathaviiraso aaporaso aahaaroti evamaadayo paccayaa] -------- N: This, friends, is the Dhamma on the One taught by our teacher, after he sat down on the throne of enlightenment and realized it by his omniscience. [Aya.mkho, aavusoti aavuso amhaaka.m satthaaraa mahaabodhima.n.de nisiiditvaa saya.m sabba~n~nuta~n~naa.nena sacchikatvaa aya.m ekadhammo desito.] ---------- The Co repeats the words of the sutta: Herein there should be a chanting by all in concord, not a wrangling, that thus this holy life may persist and be long maintained. That may be for the welfare and happiness of many folk, for compassion on the world, for the good, the welfare, the happiness of devas and of men. The Co explains: How one dhamma? All beings subsist by food, all beings subsist by conditions (sa.nkhaara-.t.thitikaa). Saariputta, the General of the dhamma taught in unity about the One . ------- The Commentary to the Boy’s Questions (In the Co to the Minor Readings, IV) explains that beings or creatures is a metaphor for the khandhas. ’creatures subsist by nutriment’ is established with respect to the categories [N: the khandhas] which subsist by nutriment in the sense of the condition[without which they could not arise]” It is stated: “Now whether it is nutriment or subsistence by nutriment, it is a reason for dispassion because of the aspect of impermanence. And then one who comes to dispassion by seeing impermanence in these determinations [N: sankhaaras] called ‘all creatures’ is one who eventually makes an end of suffering and reaches purity in the ultimate sense, according as it is said: ‘Impermanent are all determinations: ‘And so when he sees thus with understanding, ‘He then dispassion finds in suffering; ‘This path it is that leads to purification (Dh. 277). ******* N: Conclusion: Food can be seen in a wider sense as condition. There isn't any dhamma that arises without there being conditions, as we read. What arises because of conditions has to fall away, it is impermanent. Understanding this must lead to detachment. It seems that seeing lasts and that we see people, but in fact we think of people because of remembrance of different experiences. Seeing, hearing, thinking, all realities of daily life arise because of their appropriate conditions. They arise and fall away immediately. The Buddha penetrated all the conditions for all dhammas that arise. Nina. #87958 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 12:47 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma nilovg Hi Howard and Alex, I was quite surprised by Ven. Janananda's remarks, never read them before. Of course he is free to critizise. Howard, it is kind of you to straighten out some points. NIna. Op 8-jul-2008, om 23:52 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > 1) While I have perfect comfort in critiquing positions and points of > view, I have only disdain for ad hominem attacks. > 2) An error of fact: Nina has not been a member of DSG from the > outset, > and she has never been the de jure or de facto "leader" of it. > 3) I haven't witnessed Nina ever interact with anyone in an unkind or > arrogant way. Quite the opposite! > 4) The person quoted above is a self-proclaimed stream entrant and > "Ecstatic Dhamma" teacher whom, out of deference to right speech, I > will say > nothing further about. #87959 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 1:02 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma nilovg Hi Howard, my answer was short, lack of time. I shall reread your post and try to say more later on. Too much work, too many mails, that is a problem to me. Nina. Op 8-jul-2008, om 23:06 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > Well, what about these? Are they ekagatta cetasika or something else? > And what about the questions I raised in my post, Nina? Don't they > call for a > response? #87960 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 2:23 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. nilovg Hi Larry, Op 9-jul-2008, om 5:13 heeft LBIDD@... het volgende geschreven: > > Thanks for the clarification on bhava asava. So desire to keep living > _isn't_ bhava asava? ------- N: It may be clinging to life, and this is actually desire for sense objects in the sensuous plane of existence. It may also be eternalism, and then there is wrong view: one may believe in an eternal soul that will go on existing, or one hopes that this is so. This is very common in the world. Nina. #87961 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 3:21 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma nilovg Hi Howard, Op 8-jul-2008, om 17:08 heeft upasaka@... het volgende geschreven: > In Abhidhamma, concentration is considered a universal - present at > all > times, accompanying every mind state. However, in the suttas there is > frequent mention of the *development* of concentration. What is > always present > requires no development. How is this to be resolved? ------- N: Concentration arises with each citta. But, we also learn that it varies greatly as it accompanies different cittas with their associated cetasikas. In the Patthaana we learn about conascence- condition, mutuality condition, and other conditions that are conascent. Concentration is entirely different when it accompanies akusala citta or kusala citta; when it accompanies citta of the sense- sphere, jhaanacitta, or lokuttara citta. That is why I gave you examples of concentration being an indriya, a controlling factor, a factor of enlightenment. It is also a jhana- factor, a path-factor. All these classifications show different degrees of development of concentration. It has a different quality in all these cases. -------- > > H: Also, in several suttas it is pointed out that concentration > leads to > calm. For example, in the Upanissa Sutta, concentration supports > happiness, > which, in turn, supports calm. Also, in the Anguttara Nikaya, there > is the > following chain of conditionality in which the last link also > conditions the > first, making the chain actually a cycle, hence making > concentration and calm > mutually dependent: > > Virtuous ways of conduct -> > Non-remorse -> > Gladness -> > Joy -> > Serenity -> > Happiness -> > Concentration of the mind -> > Knowledge and vision of things as they really are -> > Revulsion and dispassion -> > Knowledge and vision of liberation > > What other cetasikas are requisite for the arising of calm? -------- N: Calm is actually two kinds of cetasikas: kaaya passaddhi and citta- passaddhi. Kaaya passaddhi refers to the mental body, the cetasikas. Calm accompanies each sobhana citta. But again: many degrees, many varieties , depending on the conascent dhammas which influence its quality. When concentration is more developed also calm has grown. As Pa~n~naa develops there will be more calm. Think of the adversities of life, we may lament and think: why does that happen to me, why such a great loss. But, when pa~n~naa understands the deeper cause of such adversities, one can face losses with calm. When there is no idea of you and me, who is there to blame? Through satipatthana above all there will be more calm, less disturbance. ------ > H: Concentration alone would be insufficient, else we would always > be calm, given the claim > that concentration is a universal. Given concentration as a > universal, it > becomes pointless to describe it as a condition for calm. What is > always present > is of no concern. It is there, and nothing more need be said. ------ N: I refer back to the beginning of my explanation. We have to take into consideration all the different texts of the Abhidhamma, in all of the different parts. Not just the mere summing up of the universals. There is much more to it. I do not know whether I sufficiently answered your question and I can add more if you like. Nina. #87962 From: "Andrew" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 3:22 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta corvus121 Hi Sukin Yes, I think we do agree at the end of the day. But a few more comments: --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Sukinder" wrote: > Would an instance of right view *ever* hinder other forms > of kusala through mind, speech or body? On the other hand it seems to > me, that with 'to do' in mind rather than 'understanding', the danger > of > being deluded and mislead is directly or indirectly encouraged. Do you see the problem with this type of reasoning (which we all use) when assessed against a world-view of there only being the present (lightning fast) moment? In that world-view, understanding is a cetasika that lasts a millionth of a second and then is gone - forever! How can we talk about *that* cetasika going on to hinder future (conventional) acts of body, speech and mind? Handing over money to a pauper is a (conventional) act spanning millions of mind moments. Whilst we can say that the (conventional) act is wholesome, we can also be mindful of the teachings that tell us many of the constituent mind-moments would have been neutral or unwholesome. When some people on this list make conventional statements that are conventionally true, others will attempt to rebut them by pointing out that the picture is not so clearcut at an ultimate level. In my experience, conventional "to do" reasoning (emphasising identity over time) leads towards eternalism. Conventional "ultimate" reasoning (emphasing separateness over time) leads towards annihilationism. Buddhaghosa himself warned about this - see Vibhanga Atthakathaa 198- 199. Our hearing and discussing Dhamma is IMHO a conventional activity highly recommended by the Buddha. Sorting out thoughts about Dhamma takes millions of mind moments i.e. it is conventional. Sure, we can try to translate it into ultimate terms ... but why bother? I no longer believe that the purpose of the ultimate teachings is to inform conventional decision-making. That's what "conventional truth" is for! The purpose of the ultimate teachings is to explain that anatta and DO make theoretical sense. Of course, the picture changes as panna intensifies and, instead of seeing the reflections on the lake's surface, it sees the fishes and crabs moving about underneath. Worldlings who believe Abhidhamma study gives them the ability to follow the movements of fishes and crabs are kidding themselves IMHO. All they really know is that the lake ecosystem includes things called fishes and crabs moving about - so they will know what to look for and where (and they may identify these things earlier). But when we see a ripple on the lake's surface and we shout out "Look, a fish!!!!", we are just guessing that a fish is there. This is Phil's "overshooting", I think. And I can see what he is saying. To be honest, I don't really understand *how* a cetasika of understanding affects successive cittas to the extent of tending them towards patterns of cittas constituting a conventional "act of dana". But I have growing confidence that it does occur. I do feel that understanding affects future citta in a wholesome way - and ultimately in a liberating way (as Howard nicely puts it!). Like you, I emphasise understanding rather than "doing". This is because I accept the DO theory and the premise you expressed that wholesome never hinders wholesome. I am interested in the Buddha's conventional advice and am happy to follow it, even though I accept that the cittas will be mixed and conditioned "selflessly" in the present. Must shut up here or people will mistake me for "rambling Phil"! ;-)) Bye for now Andrew #87963 From: "Andrew" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 3:55 am Subject: Each presently arisen state corvus121 Hi all When the Buddha recommended that a person "see each presently arisen state" [MN131], was the "present" he was referring to conventional or ultimate? If ultimate, in the human realm, does that not mean vedana + sanna + sankhara + vinnana + one seventeenth of rupa? ... because rupa lasts for 17 mind-moments. Regards Andrew #87964 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 4:26 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/8 sarah abbott : > Hi Herman, > ..... > S: What is usually taken for calmness in a worldly sense, such as this, is very seldom calm, passaddhi cetasika, which arises at moments of dana, sila and bhavana only. It is ignorance which which takes attachment for calm, aversion for wholesome shame and so on. > > So, in Abhidhamma terms, this is not "the paragon on virtue", however calm and pleasant any qualities may seem or feel to be. > > It's like the examples given of worldly wisdom such as found in computer experts, linguists or inventors. They may be very wise, but it's lobha, not panna which predominates. > .... > > H:> On the side of inaction, calmness as the barometer for ethical > quality, leads to an ideal state of being unaffected by the joys and > suffering of others. In the Abhidhamma, there are no others. In the > world, a perfected Abhidhammika would be diagnosed as being autistic. > ... > S: Let's assume it's true calmness that you're referring to - the calmness and detachment that accompany the development of panna (whether that of samatha or vipassana). Yes, less susceptibility to the worldly conditions, a lot less selfish attachment and concern about one's own feelings and a lot more metta and compassion for others. This is the reason that the Buddha had the greatest metta and compassion of all. > Howard has already said as much, and I too get the feeling from your last few threads that you are saying that the mental states of the Abhidhamma are not anything like what the words used to refer to them suggest. In other words, we are not speaking the same language. I get all sorts of alarm bells going off when someone tells me there is a very special "true" X they know about. Cheers Herman #87965 From: "Andrew" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 5:11 am Subject: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... corvus121 Hi Herman and Sarah --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Herman Hofman" wrote: > > Hi Sarah, > > 2008/7/8 sarah abbott : > > Hi Herman, > > ..... > > S: What is usually taken for calmness in a worldly sense, such as this, is very seldom calm, passaddhi cetasika, which arises at moments of dana, sila and bhavana only. It is ignorance which which takes attachment for calm, aversion for wholesome shame and so on. > > > > So, in Abhidhamma terms, this is not "the paragon on virtue", however calm and pleasant any qualities may seem or feel to be. > > > > It's like the examples given of worldly wisdom such as found in computer experts, linguists or inventors. They may be very wise, but it's lobha, not panna which predominates. > > .... > > > > H:> On the side of inaction, calmness as the barometer for ethical > > quality, leads to an ideal state of being unaffected by the joys and > > suffering of others. In the Abhidhamma, there are no others. In the > > world, a perfected Abhidhammika would be diagnosed as being autistic. > > ... > > S: Let's assume it's true calmness that you're referring to - the calmness and detachment that accompany the development of panna (whether that of samatha or vipassana). Yes, less susceptibility to the worldly conditions, a lot less selfish attachment and concern about one's own feelings and a lot more metta and compassion for others. This is the reason that the Buddha had the greatest metta and compassion of all. > > > > Howard has already said as much, and I too get the feeling from your > last few threads that you are saying that the mental states of the > Abhidhamma are not anything like what the words used to refer to them > suggest. In other words, we are not speaking the same language. EXACTLY! You are not talking about the same things at the same level. So the conversation has only limited value (IMHO). > I get all sorts of alarm bells going off when someone tells me there > is a very special "true" X they know about. In that case, Herman, Buddhism may not be your cup of tea. The Arahants use worldly expressions knowing that they are "mere expressions" i.e. there is another reality behind them that the worldly cannot see. The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what is the value in it? Can anyone tell me? [Be ready for me to ask you if you can correctly identify a presently arisen cetasika! ;_) ] Regards Andrew #87966 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 5:12 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? egberdina Hi Howard, 2008/7/9 : > Hi, Herman - > >> >> ============================== >> Continuity does not exist. There is no thing called continuity, and it >> is thus pointless to even consider whether "it" is continuous or discrete. > > If this was a semantical discussion, about how words are used, then I > would agree with you. Continuity is not a thing, and the word > existence is therefore not the right word to denote the reality of > continuity, by convention. But continuity is a process, and there > certainly are processes. > ------------------------------------------------ > Howard: > I honestly do not think that continuity is a process. I think it is just > a word that points to the fact of the absence of gaps in various contexts, > consciousness being perhaps the most important example. > ---------------------------------------------- OK. But that OK extends only to the accepted meanings of words, and not to any reality these words may point to. > >> What is true is that there are no gaps in consciousness, and we express >> that by saying that consciousness is continuous, > > Alex has already pointed it out, but consciousness cannot know the > absence of consciousness, so what you say certainly cannot be known to > be true. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > There is no absence of consciousness to be known within a mind stream. > There is, on occasion, awareness of a rapid fading of consciousness followed > immediately, without gap, by continued consciousness often with radical change > in content. But within a stream of consciousness there are no gaps. > --------------------------------------------------- Moving from the meaning of words to reality, I would say that "stream of consciousness", "within" and "gaps" / "no gaps" are self-fulfilling assertions only. >> What is also true is that impermanence does not exist, though nothing, >> including consciousness, remains unchanged for even an instant. Likewise, >> there is no thing called not-self-ness or emptiness, though all phenomena > are >> not-self and empty. >> > > Consciousness is the primary means by which phenomena are known. And > when it is known that consciousness is never the same, it follows from > there that nothing can be said about the permanence or otherwise of > what is known [by consciousness]. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I don't follow this. > The only change in consciousness *per se* that there is, is its > intensity. What we *call* change in consciousness, other than fluctuations in > intensity, are changes in other things, specifically the content of consciousness > and concomitant factors. Of course, since nothing exists except in relation to > a host of other phenomena, we can properly say, I suppose, that every change > in content and concomitant factors is also a change in consciousness - I give > you that. > ---------------------------------------------- Why assume that in change it is the content of consciousness that is changing, and not consciousness? For me, a change in consciousness is simply an adverting to something else, or nothing at all, and not a change in what was being attended to. > But we also know by inference, and > it is a safe bet for me that the past is the benchmark for what is > continuously continuous > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm not understanding what you are saying here. > --------------------------------------------- The past is there all the time, and it cannot change. It only grows with ongoing action. Because our unchangeable past conditions the present, we have a predictable world. Conditions do not change much. This is why you end up sleeping in the same bed every night, next to the same wife, and you do not wake up in other worlds, speaking fluent Magadhi :-) > > . If it was otherwise, the Tipitaka would need > to be revised, with all references to kammavipaka, as well as the > recollection of former lives, removed. > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm sorry - I'm missing your point. > --------------------------------------------- The point is that the Buddha remembered umpteen thousand previous lives. That past has to be there to remember it. The point is that past action conditions future results. That past action needs to be there for that to be possible. Cheers Herman #87967 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 1:29 am Subject: Re: [dsg] "Self" as a 1st person perspective - How to refute? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/9/2008 2:50:29 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: Hi Howard, 2008/7/9 : > Hi, Herman - > > I seem to recollect that only recently we discussed this line from the > Dhammapada, and in that context intention was rendered as citta, and > not as kamma. > ---------------------------------------------------- > Howard: > By "we," do you mean you & me? I don't recall discussing this. From a few posts on the 6th of June this year. Howard> "As I see it, 'mind' in those verses refers to intention, an activity." Howard> "I've read in more than one place that 'mind' means intention in those verses. It makes good sense to me that it either means that, or more generally, "mental state," "mode of thinking," or "attitude." In Dhammapada III the meaning of 'mind' is clearly either that of the conventional "mental state" or of the entire aggregate of mental functions." I only remind you of this so I can use it in another thread, where my point is that the past is there, all the time, regardless of whether one remembers it :-) Cheers Herman ================================ I misunderstood you. I thought you meant that we had previously discussed this and agreed that the meaning was consciousness (i.e., specifically just vi~n~nana) rather than intention (which is my main meaning for 'kamma') or general mind set. In any case, no problem. With metta, Howard #87968 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 1:43 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma upasaka_howard Hi, Nina - In a message dated 7/9/2008 4:02:35 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, vangorko@... writes: Hi Howard, my answer was short, lack of time. I shall reread your post and try to say more later on. Too much work, too many mails, that is a problem to me. Nina. =============================== No rush at all, Nina. Not of central importance anyway. Really, to me only the tilakkhana, conditionality, mindfulness, and especially relinquishment are of central importance. Oh, and one more thing that makes one's life worth living: metta. With metta, Howard #87969 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 6:04 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... egberdina Hi Andrew, 2008/7/9 Andrew : > Hi Herman and Sarah > >> I get all sorts of alarm bells going off when someone tells me there >> is a very special "true" X they know about. > > In that case, Herman, Buddhism may not be your cup of tea. The > Arahants use worldly expressions knowing that they are "mere > expressions" i.e. there is another reality behind them that the > worldly cannot see. That is no way disqualifies me from Buddhism. I don't believe for a moment that the Arahants said what they said to impart knowledge of another world, they imparted how to experience that world. No Arahant ever suggested that there is knowledge of very special "true" dhammas that readers of the Visudh. could judge each other on as a gateway to cessation. What they did suggest was to seek out seclusion, stop thinking and stop craving. And what they said would be experienced when that happened, one can find to be so. What will not qualify as Buddhism is a failure to find it so. > The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what > is the value in it? Can anyone tell me? [Be ready for me to ask you > if you can correctly identify a presently arisen cetasika! ;_) ] All the talk of the very special true dhammas ought not to be mistaken for Buddhism. And I do believe an insistence on negotiating the Theravadin thicket will ensure an eternity of talk. And that, is their cup of tea. Two lumps. no milk, that's how I like my samsara, thanks. :-) Cheers Herman #87970 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 2:13 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... upasaka_howard Hi, Andrew (and Herman & Sarah) - In a message dated 7/9/2008 8:11:52 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, windtrax@... writes: > Howard has already said as much, and I too get the feeling from your > last few threads that you are saying that the mental states of the > Abhidhamma are not anything like what the words used to refer to them > suggest. In other words, we are not speaking the same language. EXACTLY! You are not talking about the same things at the same level. So the conversation has only limited value (IMHO). > I get all sorts of alarm bells going off when someone tells me there > is a very special "true" X they know about. In that case, Herman, Buddhism may not be your cup of tea. The Arahants use worldly expressions knowing that they are "mere expressions" i.e. there is another reality behind them that the worldly cannot see. ================================= There are no arahants here, Andrew - just folks who seem to think they understand what the Buddha *really* meant. I'm content to muddle along doing the best I can in trying to understand the Dhamma. My understanding may range from way off base to right on target, but wherever it falls, the Dhamma is certainly *my* cup of tea, and I presume that is so for Herman as well. With metta, Howard #87971 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 2:19 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? upasaka_howard Hi, Herman - In a message dated 7/9/2008 8:12:16 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: > But we also know by inference, and > it is a safe bet for me that the past is the benchmark for what is > continuously continuous > ---------------------------------------------- > Howard: > I'm not understanding what you are saying here. > --------------------------------------------- The past is there all the time, and it cannot change. It only grows with ongoing action. Because our unchangeable past conditions the present, we have a predictable world. Conditions do not change much. This is why you end up sleeping in the same bed every night, next to the same wife, and you do not wake up in other worlds, speaking fluent Magadhi :-) ============================== We see this particular matter very differently. I don't believe in any past, and certainly not in one that "is there all the time." I believe that there *were* prior events and they were conditions for current reality, and I also believe that those prior events are now nonexistent. With metta, Howard #87972 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 2:23 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Does continuity exist? Is is continuous or discrete? upasaka_howard Hi again, Herman - In a message dated 7/9/2008 8:12:16 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time, hhofmeister@... writes: The point is that the Buddha remembered umpteen thousand previous lives. That past has to be there to remember it. ------------------------------------------------- Howard: Not at all. that is a Sarvastivadin position that I don't agree with. Past events occurred, and at the very moment of occurrence were conditions for (then) future events. Past event are *gone* and no-longer existent. The past is gone, the future only imagined, and the present ungraspable. Time, like consciousness, is a magic show. ------------------------------------------------ The point is that past action conditions future results. ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Indeed! We agree on that. :-) ----------------------------------------------- That past action needs to be there for that to be possible. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: No. ======================== With metta, Howard #87973 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 6:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Each presently arisen state nilovg Dear Andrew, Op 9-jul-2008, om 12:55 heeft Andrew het volgende geschreven: > When the Buddha recommended that a person "see each presently arisen > state" [MN131], was the "present" he was referring to conventional or > ultimate? > > If ultimate, in the human realm, does that not mean vedana + sanna + > sankhara + vinnana + one seventeenth of rupa? > > ... because rupa lasts for 17 mind-moments. -------- N: Here is another translation: Vision is actually a translation of insight, vipassana. Present reality: what appears now. Not exactly catching the arising of a dhamma. Its characteristic can be known when it presents itself now here, now there, , thus not: each present dhamma. Now here, now there is literally from the Pali: tattha, tattha. When it presents itself. The Buddha was referring to vipassana, thus, to ultimate realities. No need to think of the seventeen moments of citta, that is impossible. This fact merely indicates that rupa does not fall away as fast as citta. Does this make sense to you? Nina. #87974 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 6:45 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Temporality & Spatiality truth_aerator Hi Howard, Herman and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > We see this particular matter very differently. I don't believe in >any past, and certainly not in one that "is there all the time." >>> If the past doesn't exist, then how can it condition the future? How can something non-existent condition "existent"? Furthermore, if past (from whose POV?) doesn't exist, then it means that Buddha and other people don't exist! >Ibelieve that there *were* prior events and they were conditions for >current reality, and I also believe that those prior events are now >nonexistent. If prior events are requirements for the causes of the present, the if these events do not exist, the causes they bring do not exist as well. How could Buddha, The Arahants, even non-Buddhists recollect former lives? How can we recollect the past (or past knowledge, past events) if it doesn't exist? For a person living in 5BC, he would say "Now exists" and the now would be 5BC, while 2008 would not exist for him. But for us living in 2008, "Now exists" and now is 2008. The thing is that we forget about relativity issue. Time may be like distance (space & time are related according to Einstein) and temporal events "laid out" like spatial ones. Just because John is located in New York, and doesn't see Kathmandu, it doesn't mean that Kathmandu doesn't exist. It exists and is felt "here" by someone living in Kathmandu. John feels "here" to be NY and Kathmandu to be "there" (or not percieved in his mind at all). Some guy in Kathmandu feels "here" to be Kathmandu, and doesn't percieve NY which according to this perspective is "there" or not percieved at all. Similiar with time-dimension. I do NOT say that "past, present, future" exist "now". The subjective and relative "nowness" is subjective and relative, rather than objective and absolute. The artificial delimitation of time into "past, present, future" is relative and depends on the subject. It isn't absolute like "here" isn't absolute either. Some people reify mere subjective references of "here" or "now" as having an absolute value. ... Best wishes, Alex #87975 From: Nina van Gorkom Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 11:43 am Subject: Re: Commentary (part 1)[dsg] Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 1.8, 1.81, 1.8.2 nilovg Dear Connie, Op 9-jul-2008, om 0:42 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > (9) 'Which one thing is to be thoroughly learnt? All beings are > maintained by nutriment *(as Sutta 33, verse 1.8(1)).* ------ N: This reminds us not to just quickly read this over. If one does not realize that whatever arises, whatever experience, feeling, sound, colour arises, does so because there are conditions for its arising, one takes them for self and believes that one is the possessor of them. Nina. #87976 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 12:02 pm Subject: Re: Commentary (part 1)[dsg] Sangiitisutta Corner DN 33 1.8, 1.81, 1.8.2 truth_aerator Dear Nina and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, Nina van Gorkom wrote: > > Dear Connie, > Op 9-jul-2008, om 0:42 heeft connie het volgende geschreven: > > > (9) 'Which one thing is to be thoroughly learnt? All beings are > > maintained by nutriment *(as Sutta 33, verse 1.8(1)).* > ------ > N: This reminds us not to just quickly read this over. If one does > not realize that whatever arises, whatever experience, feeling, > sound, colour arises, does so because there are conditions for its > arising, one takes them for self and believes that one is the > possessor of them. > Nina. > How do we directly know that there are conditions that causes unarisen experience to arise? Can we directly know conditionality at all? We definately can directly "know" seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, bodily feeling, & some most basic mental states. But can we directly, without using inferences to see "conditions"? How do these conditions look like? Best wishes, Alex #87977 From: "kenhowardau" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 2:38 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... kenhowardau Hi Andrew > The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what > is the value in it? Can anyone tell me? [Be ready for me to ask you > if you can correctly identify a presently arisen cetasika! ;_) ] > > If, by "trying" you mean the momentary arising of panna with samma- viriya (etc) then the value is just that. (The value is just the momentary arising of panna with samma-viriya etc). In anticipation of your next question, yes, I can correctly identify a presently arisen cetasika. Phassa, for example, is the cetasika that is presently contacting namas with their object. Is there a prize? :-) Ken H #87981 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 3:38 pm Subject: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... Just present moment existing? truth_aerator Hi Ken, Howard and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "kenhowardau" wrote: > > In anticipation of your next question, yes, I can correctly identify > a presently arisen cetasika. Phassa, for example, is the cetasika > that is presently contacting namas with their object. > Do each dhammas exist only for a mind moment? How long does that moment lasts? Furthermore since the act of perception takes more than 1 Dhamma to arise, it means that one is percepient of what is not existent and the perception process itself is based on something non existent... And the process itself can't reasonably happen since it takes more than 1 mind moment to happen... A pure undiluted Nihilism or solipsism of the present moment. If I understand correctly, you believe that only "now" exists. If the duration of present moment is >0 s, then it is divisible in at least 3 parts, "past", "present", "future" . Since you believe (if I understand correctly) that only "now" exists, then the other two parts of a dhamma do not exist NOW. "Contacting" is present continuous if I understand English grammar properly. But in any case, "ing" ending implies that it is spanning more than 1 "indivisible" mind moment. But this cannot happen in the "presentism" teaching. Furthermore, how can "Nama" interact with "rupa"? Interaction implies not changing for at least 2 moments (same dhamma before contact, same dhamma during contact). You know the teaching of Heraclitus (everything changes) so one can't step into same river twice. Well, his student was more consistent and has said "you can't step into the same river once". Same is here. Unless we posit multiple "nows" existing, it isn't possible for anything to be interacting with anything in a case of: >>Phassa, for example, is the cetasika that is presently contacting >namas with their object Too many solipsistic paradoxes arise. When contact happens, the original object (dhamma) of contact has passed away, the subsequent arising javana moments aren't based on anything real and by the time I have finishing writing this the previous letters no longer exist so nothing could make sense. But hey, there is more. Kamma & Kammavipaka cannot occur simulteneously. But neither can they be in two different moments since KammaVipaka depends on Kamma, and Kammavipaka cannot appear from non- existent Kamma. When Kamma is done (an impossibility according to presentism), Kamma-Vipaka doesn't exist. When Kamma-Vipaka exists (again, word exists is impossible in presentism as it implies more than 1 mind moment) its cause, Kamma, doesn't exist... In (ultimate "now" is existing) any word implying action, or process, or anything is self-contradictory. Best wishes, Alex #87982 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 4:29 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Kamma, intention or Action (Jainism)? egberdina Hi Alex, 2008/7/9 Alex : > Hi Herman and all, > > > Could the below quotes meant to say that by Kamma (or intentional > action) one is born here or there? > No, not if you read the whole sutta. Here is the context. I'll highlight what I think makes it especially clear that it has nothing to do with birth as result, which is a commentarial spin on DO. == 599. The world is enlightened, we ask Gotama, does one become a brahmin by birth or else by actions We do not know this, enlighten us so that we may know the brahmin." 600. The Blessed One said: Vaseññha I will tell you step by step how it happens, The classification of living things in this and other births 601. Look at the grass and trees, although they are not aware, This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births 602. So also insects, grass hoppers and ants This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births.. 603. Look at the animals small and large This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births. 604. Look at the serpents with long backs going on their bellies, This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births. 605. Look at the fish too, who find food in the water. This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births. 606. Look at the birds flying through the air. This and the other has attributes peculiar to their births. ****607. Although at the birth of these, there are various attributes In humans various attributes are not evident at birth.**** 608. They are not in the hair, head, ears or eyes Not in the mouth, nose, lips or eye-lashes 609. Not in the neck, flanks stomach or back, Not in the buttocks, chest, puedendum, and not in the sexual intercourse. 610. Not in the hands, feet, fingers or nails, nor in the knees and calves, Not in the hue or voice are there attributes by which to know their birth. ***611. In the individual bodies of humans, these are not evident, They are designated by the activites of humans.*** 612. Among humans whoever makes a livelihood by looking after cattle, Vàseññha, he is a farmer, not a brahmin. 613. Among humans whoever makes a livelihood doing a craft, Vàseññha, he is a craftsman, not a brahmin 614. Among humans whoever makes a livelihood by trading, Vàseññha , he is a merchant, not a brahmin. 615. Among humans whoever makes a livelihood working for others, Vàseññha, he is a workman, not a brahmin. etc etc The commentators who have applied their 3-life interpretation to this sutta, have had little regard for what was actually said. > Look, if by Kamma we meant PHYSICAL action as opposed to > motive/intention, then that teaching would be like the Jain teaching > on Kamma. If I understood it correctly, Jains believe that Kamma > includes physical action. > I'm sure that you understand, given what you have written in previous posts, that you know as well as I do that Jainism and Buddhism have the same roots. I think it is reasonable to say that early Buddhism - anatta + stringent ascetism = Jainism. Cheers Herman #87983 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 4:51 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Buddhist texts 101: part 2 egberdina Hi Sarah, 2008/7/8 sarah abbott : > Hi Herman & all, > > .... > S: What is dukkha? > I'm sure you know the following words of by heart, but I'll write them anyway :-) "Birth is stress, aging is stress, death is stress; sorrow, lamentation, pain, distress, & despair are stress; association with the unbeloved is stress; separation from the loved is stress; not getting what is wanted is stress. In short, the five clinging-aggregates are stress." > Now, what is dukkha in an absolute sense? > .... That is a leading question, a demonstration of a certain preconception. There is nothing knowable in an absolute sense. >>I personally don't believe it is >> beneficial in the long >> run to translate renunciation as attachment. > ... > S: What is renunciation? Sn 5:11 Subdue greed for sensual pleasures, & see renunciation as rest. Let there be nothing grasped or rejected by you. Burn up what's before, and have nothing for after. If you don't grasp at what's in between, you will go about, calm. One completely devoid of greed for name & form, brahman, has no effluents by which he would go under Mara's sway. > > Now, what is renunciation in an absolute sense? Nibbana. > > Where has it been translated as attachment? > .... It is translated as attachment all day everyday by anyone who says they know the First Noble Truth, but keep doing exactly what they have always done. > >> Sn1:3 >> >> Renouncing violence >> for all living beings, >> harming not even a one, >> you would not wish for offspring, >> so how a companion? >> Wander alone >> like a rhinoceros. > <...> >> In the midst of companions >> — when staying at home, >> when going out wandering — >> you are prey to requests. >> Valuing the freedom >> wander alone >> like a rhinoceros. > > .... > S: as Thanissaro makes clear in his notes, the commentary by Maha Kaccana (inc. from the outset in the Pali Canon) makes it clear that 'home' refers to the khandhas and 'companions' or 'society' refers to sense impressions. > http://uwf.edu/wmikulas/Webpage/Leaves/website/canon/khuddaka/suttanipata/ > I was already commenting on Maha Kaccana in my next thrilling episode on Buddhist texts. Give it a day or so and it should be posted. > Indeed, all the suttas are about learning to live alone, without clinging > to 'home' and 'society', without clinging to what appears through the senses, regardless of whether we're a forest dweller or a middle-class wayfarer. > > The truths are universal, Herman - they are never about another time, place and lifestyle. They're always about the right understanding of the present dhamma. This is how we learn to "wander alone like a rhinoceros", alone with seeing, alone with hearing, alone with thinking. There's only ever one world at a time which can never be shared with another. > SN 47:19 and numerous others like it "Monks, a frame of reference is to be practiced with the thought, 'I'll watch after myself.' A frame of reference is to be practiced with the thought, 'I'll watch after others.' When watching after oneself, one watches after others. When watching after others, one watches after oneself. "And how does one, when watching after oneself, watch after others? Through pursuing [the practice], through developing it, through devoting oneself to it. This is how one, when watching after oneself, watches after others. "And how does one, when watching after others, watch after oneself? Through endurance, through harmlessness, and through a mind of kindness & sympathy. This is how one, when watching after others, watches after oneself." Cheers Herman #87984 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 1:15 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... Presentism any multiple temporality upasaka_howard Hi, Alex (and Ken) - In a message dated 7/9/2008 6:34:25 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: Kamma & Kammavipaka cannot occur simulteneously. But neither can they be in two different moments since KammaVipaka depends on Kamma, and Kammavipaka cannot appear from non- existent Kamma. ========================== You cannot conceive of something arising without its "cause" being present. But I have no problem with that. I just don't. And, in fact, as I see it, that is exactly the way things are: this being now is condition, right now, for something arising at a time that this no longer exists! With metta, Howard #87985 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 1:16 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... Just present moment existing? upasaka_howard Hi, Alex - I've now received about 4 copies of this post of yours. Are you trying to show how the past moves into the present? LOLOL! With metta, Howard #87986 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 5:51 pm Subject: Presentism & multiple temporality truth_aerator Hi Howard, Ken, and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > Hi, Alex (and Ken) - > > In a message dated 7/9/2008 6:34:25 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > truth_aerator@... writes: > > Kamma & Kammavipaka cannot occur > simulteneously. But neither can they be in two different moments >since KammaVipaka depends on Kamma, and Kammavipaka cannot appear >from non-> existent Kamma. > ========================== >P1) You cannot conceive of something arising without its "cause" >being present. True. So you are saying the cause (which happens prior to effect) is present, which I take to mean as "exists". >P2) that is exactly the way things are: this being now is >condition, right now, for something arising at a time that this no >longer exists! When "this" no longer exists, can it really be a condition "for something arising at a time that "this" no longer exists!" It is almost like saying that non-existent unicorns are cause for currently existing events. And the very language itself implies more than one moment happening at the time. Present continuous forms, infinitives, verbs, even nouns. You can't have object + bare sense-input + perception process happening in radical momentariness view without falling into some sort of Nihilism. It is very hard, if possible at all, to reconcile conditionality with momentariness of the present moment. Furthermore what is "Now" for person A isn't "now" for the person who is on a spaceship traveling at very high speed. "Now" isn't a universal and absolute "moment". Best wishes, Alex #87987 From: "Alex" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 5:59 pm Subject: Almost all, if not all, words are conceptual. truth_aerator Hi Andrew & all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: > The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what > is the value in it? I have strong suspicion that all manners of talking, even "ultimate", are still conventional since they use the same conventional language & words, just different vocabulary of the language. Linguistically speaking there is no reason why word "X" is more ultimate than word "Y". Conventional terms use language, and "ultimate" terms use the SAME language. Language is conventional, or at least most of it is. It is quite possible that Arahants do not attach to ANY words, meaning of the words or letters. Best wishes, Alex #87988 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 6:18 pm Subject: Vism.XVII,280 Vism.XVII,281 lbidd2 "The Path of Purification" (Visuddhimagga), Ch. XVII 280. 2. But when ignorance is established since it is present when its condition is present, and when 'with ignorance as condition there are formations; with formations as condition, consciousness', there is no end to the succession of cause and fruit in this way. Consequently, the Wheel of Becoming with its twelve factors, revolving with the linking of cause and effect, is established as having 'no known beginning'. 281. This being so, are not the words 'With ignorance as condition there are formations', as an exposition of a simple beginning, contradicted?--This is not an exposition of a simple beginning. It is an exposition of a basic state (see par. 107). For ignorance is the basic state for the three rounds (see par. 298). It is owing to his seizing ignorance that the fool gets caught in the round of the remaining defilements, in the rounds of kamma, etc., just as it is owing to seizing a snake's head that the arm gets caught in [the coils of] the rest of the snake's body. But when the cutting off of ignorance is effected, he is liberated from them just as the arm caught [in the coils] is liberated when the snake's head is cut off, according as it is said, 'With the remainderless fading away and cessation of ignorance' (S.ii,1), and so on. So this is an exposition of the basic state whereby there is bondage for him who grasps it, and liberation for him who lets it go: it is not an exposition of a simple beginning. This is how the Wheel of Becoming should be understood to have no known beginning. ************************* 280. yasmaa pana eva.m paccayabhaave bhaavato avijjaaya siddhaaya puna avijjaapaccayaa sa"nkhaaraa, sa"nkhaarapaccayaa vi~n~naa.nanti eva.m hetuphalaparamparaaya pariyosaana.m natthi. tasmaa ta.m hetuphalasambandhavasena pavatta.m dvaadasa"nga.m bhavacakka.m aviditaadiiti siddha.m hoti. 281. eva.m sati avijjaapaccayaa sa"nkhaaraati ida.m aadimattakathana.m virujjhatiiti ce. nayida.m aadimattakathana.m. padhaanadhammakathana.m paneta.m. ti.n.nanna.m hi va.t.taana.m avijjaa padhaanaa. avijjaaggaha.nena hi avasesakilesava.t.ta~nca kammaadiini ca baala.m palibodhenti. sappasiraggaha.nena sesasappasariira.m viya baaha.m. avijjaasamucchede pana kate tehi vimokkho hoti. sappasiracchede kate palibodhitabaahaavimokkho viya. yathaaha ``avijjaayatveva asesaviraaganirodhaa sa"nkhaaranirodho´´tiaadi (sa.m0 ni0 1.2.1; mahaava0 1). iti ya.m ga.nhato bandho, muccato ca mokkho hoti, tassa padhaanadhammassa kathanamida.m, na aadimattakathananti. evamida.m bhavacakka.m aviditaadiiti veditabba.m. #87989 From: LBIDD@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 6:30 pm Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Visuddhimagga, Ch XVII, 277-279 and Tiika. lbidd2 Hi Nina, Nina: "This is very common in the world." Larry: That's what I was looking for. Most of us aren't intoxicated with the idea of being reborn as a god. But we are still subject to bhava asava. Larry #87990 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 7:10 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: [ dsg] Re: Kamma, was Death. egberdina Hi Jon, 2008/7/9 Jonothan Abbott : > Hi Herman > > I'm getting the distinct impression you'd like to hear me say that a > dhamma is a consequence of conditions. OK then, consider it said ;-)) > What next? As Nina is pointing out in her commentary quotes on the DN33 thread, food is one of the conditions for dhammas. Food, you know, as in morsel food. >>> When talking about deeds/action in the context of kamma, the dhamma in >>> question is cetana/intention (the mental factor). >> >> Intention has no consequences in the world, Jon. It may be a fact not >> to your liking, but your parents had to DO something other than >> intending, to bring you about. I can draw pictures if that will help :-) >> > > I'm of course aware that, in the conventional view of things, it is > bodily or verbal action, rather than (mere) intention, that brings > consequences. There's nothing conventional about putting morsel food into your mouth, nor the certain death that will follow from a consistent failure to do that. > > Nevertheless, it is the teaching of the Buddha (as I understand it) that > in that conventional scenario the significant dhamma, for the purposes > of the law of kamma, is the mental factor of intention, for it is this > that gives rise to the bodily or mental action. > > The mental factor of intention, like all conditioned dhammas, has the > characteristics of anicca, dukkha and anatta. It is one of the dhammas > constituting 'the all' that, according to the suttas, is to be > understood and abandoned. Bodily or verbal actions, on the other hand, > cannot be the object of awareness/insight. Ohhh, really? The eating of food can be known, and commentated on, as a necessary condition for dhammas to arise, but that condition cannot be known by awareness or insight??? I think someone has played a joke on you, and forget to tell you :-) > > So no need to explain any further about the facts of life ;-)) The > teachings do not deny conventional truths, but they point to truths that > operate at a different level to the conventional. > I think the facts of life are an inconvenient truth to those who desire an "ultimate" understanding. Cheers Herman #87991 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 3:27 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Presentism & multiple temporality upasaka_howard Hi, Alex - In a message dated 7/9/2008 8:51:45 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: Hi Howard, Ken, and all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, upasaka@... wrote: > Hi, Alex (and Ken) - > > In a message dated 7/9/2008 6:34:25 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, > truth_aerator@... writes: > > Kamma & Kammavipaka cannot occur > simulteneously. But neither can they be in two different moments >since KammaVipaka depends on Kamma, and Kammavipaka cannot appear >from non-> existent Kamma. > ========================== >P1) You cannot conceive of something arising without its "cause" >being present. True. So you are saying the cause (which happens prior to effect) is present, which I take to mean as "exists". ------------------------------------------------------- Howard: I'm sorry, Alex. I wasn't clear. I meant that literally *you*, not "one", cannot conceive of something arising without its "cause" being present. I, however, see no need for the causal conditions to be present, and, in fact, they typically are not present. ----------------------------------------------- >P2) that is exactly the way things are: this being now is >condition, right now, for something arising at a time that this no >longer exists! When "this" no longer exists, can it really be a condition "for something arising at a time that "this" no longer exists!" ------------------------------------------------ Howard: Yes, and in fact that's how things are. ------------------------------------------------- It is almost like saying that non-existent unicorns are cause for currently existing events. ---------------------------------------------- Howard: Er, no, it's not. ;-) -------------------------------------------- And the very language itself implies more than one moment happening at the time. Present continuous forms, infinitives, verbs, even nouns. --------------------------------------------- Howard: I don't follow this at all. ----------------------------------------- You can't have object + bare sense-input + perception process happening in radical momentariness view without falling into some sort of Nihilism. ------------------------------------------ Howard: I have been an opponent of discrete momentarism for a long, long time. I simply don't have the same view of causality as you, and I don't think the Buddha did either. One thing, though, is certain as to my position: As far as I'm concerned, nothing of past or possible future exists. What was no longer is, what will be is merely imagined, and what is present doesn't remain for any time at all, making everything utterly ungraspable. And yet we grasp! ------------------------------------------ It is very hard, if possible at all, to reconcile conditionality with momentariness of the present moment. Furthermore what is "Now" for person A isn't "now" for the person who is on a spaceship traveling at very high speed. "Now" isn't a universal and absolute "moment". Best wishes, Alex ============================== With metta, Howard #87992 From: "connie" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 8:59 pm Subject: Vism.XVII,280 Vism.XVII,281 nichiconn Path of Purity, p.695: The wheel of life, unknown in beginning. But because, when, the cause thus existing, ignorance is effected, there is no end to the series of cause and effect which again runs as "Conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass, conditioned by activities consciousness comes to pass," therefore in effect the wheel of life, proceeding in twelve parts through the series of cause and effect, is without a beginning. But if this be so, does it not contradict the statement that ignorance is just the beginning in "Conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass"? The statement is not just about the beginning. It is a statement about the ground-work. For of the threefold round of births {i.e. of the vices, of karma and of result}, ignorance is the ground-work. The round of births of the remaining vices and karma and so on impede the fool, who clings to ignorance, just as a snake being seized by the head, entwines the body round the seizing arm. But when ignorance is cut off, there is a release from the rounds of births, just as when the snake's head is cut off, the man's arm is released from the coils of the snake. As it is said: "But from the utter fading out and ceasing of ignorance is the ceasing of activities" {Sa.myutta ii, 4, 12, 17} and so on. Thus bondage comes of clinging to ignorance, and release from letting it go. And the above statement is about its being the ground-work, not just the beginning: - thus should the expression "The wheel of life, unknown in beginning" be understood. #87993 From: upasaka@... Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 5:11 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Almost all, if not all, words are conceptual. upasaka_howard Hi, Alex (and Andrew) - In a message dated 7/9/2008 8:59:53 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, truth_aerator@... writes: Hi Andrew & all, --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: > The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what > is the value in it? I have strong suspicion that all manners of talking, even "ultimate", are still conventional since they use the same conventional language & words, just different vocabulary of the language. Linguistically speaking there is no reason why word "X" is more ultimate than word "Y". Conventional terms use language, and "ultimate" terms use the SAME language. Language is conventional, or at least most of it is. It is quite possible that Arahants do not attach to ANY words, meaning of the words or letters. Best wishes, Alex ================================= Alex, it's true that all speech is a matter if convention, which is exactly why I don't like the terminology "conventional speech". Nonetheless, some speech is literal, and other speech is figurative. When we speak about "the sky" as if it were some objective thing and when we speak of "a rainbow in the sky" as if that multi-colored "bow" is really something arching across that alleged thing we call "the sky", all that speech is figurative. But when we say that there was just a sound heard or warmth felt, that is literal. So, I think in terms more along the lines of literal vs figurative, with paramattha vaca being literal speech, and sammuti vaca being figurative speech. With metta, Howard #87994 From: "Herman Hofman" Date: Wed Jul 9, 2008 10:35 pm Subject: Re: [dsg] Almost all, if not all, words are conceptual. egberdina Hi Alex, 2008/7/10 Alex : > Hi Andrew & all, > > > --- In dhammastudygroup@yahoogroups.com, "Andrew" wrote: >> The worldly trying to talk in ultimate terms, however ... well, what >> is the value in it? > > I have strong suspicion that all manners of talking, even "ultimate", > are still conventional since they use the same conventional language & > words, just different vocabulary of the language. > > Linguistically speaking there is no reason why word "X" is more > ultimate than word "Y". Conventional terms use language, and "ultimate" > terms use the SAME language. Language is conventional, or at least most > of it is. > I agree with you. And at least language that is acknowledged as being conventional can be trusted as refering to knowable things, because that is what makes any convention possible. But the referents of ultimate language are only alleged referents, because they are not open to public inspection or investigation. For those who lack the necessary skill or training, the listening to those who use ultimate language requires faith that the speaker does really know what they are talking about, and is not just unskillfully repeating what they themselves have taken in faith. > It is quite possible that Arahants do not attach to ANY words, meaning > of the words or letters. True. Cheers Herman #87995 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:06 am Subject: Re: Q. [dsg] Concentration: Apparent Difference Between Sutta and Abhidhamma sarahprocter... Hi Alex, --- On Wed, 9/7/08, Alex wrote: >I've found this. Is this true? ============ ========= ========= = >Jhanananda's critique of Nina van Gorkom <....> ========= ========= ========= ========= ========= ==== >Am I missing something? ..... S: Missing something? Perhaps on Right Speech. Hmm, how about DN 30, "The Marks of a Great Man" (Lakkha.na Sutta)? I find it packed with helpful reminders about the qualities developed by the bodhisatta with wisdom: (Walshe transl.): "219 'Monks, in whatever former life the Tathaagata,......rejecting slander, abstained from it, not repeating there what he had heard here to the detriment of these, or repeating what he had heard there to the detriment of those..... [172] Thus he was a reconciler of those at variance and an encourager of those at one, rejoicing in peace, loving it, delighting in it, one who spoke up for peace (as Sutta 1, verse 1.9*).... "About this it was said: " 'He's no speaker of wicked words That cause dissension or increase it, Prolonging strife and bitterness, Leading to good friendship's end. What he spoke was all for peace, And relinking severed bonds. His power he used to end all strife, Harmony was his delight....... * S: The sutta reference mentioned here is, of course, to the Brahmajaala Sutta. From the same translation: "1.9 "Abandoning false speech, the ascetic Gotama dwells refraining from false speech, a truth-speaker, one to be relied on, trustworthy, dependable, not a deceiver of the world. Abandoning malicious speech, he does not repeat there what he has heard here to the detriment of these, or repeat here what he has heard there to the detriment of those. Thus he is a reconciler of those at variance and an encourager of those at one, rejoicing in peace, loving it, delighting in it, one who speaks up for peace. Abandoning harsh speech, he refrains from it. He speaks whatever is blameless, pleasing to the ear, agreeable, reaching the heart, urbane, pleasing, and attractive to the multitude. Abandoning idle chatter, he speaks at the right time, what is correct and to the point, of Dhamma and discipline. He is a speaker whose words are to be treasured, seasonable, reasoned, well-defined and connected with the goal. Thus the wordling would praise the Tathaagata." S: Of course we are not the bodhisatta or Tathaagata, but I think we can all learn from the examples and carefully consider what our purpose is when we repeat others' harsh words. Metta, Sarah p.s Howard made some good points (#87945). You are also quite smart enough to know that it's easy to put in 2 or 3 search words on the home-page or full back-up of the archives on www.dhammastudygroup.org to check anything for yourself. I think you'll quickly find that that there isn't a grain of truth in any of the assertions made. ============= #87996 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:28 am Subject: Re: [dsg] A question on contiguity sarahprocter... Hi Andrew, --- On Mon, 7/7/08, Andrew wrote: >> A:> A citta in the human realm can be related by contiguity to a citta in > the animal realm (and vice versa). But one of the cittas must be cuti. > Correct? > ..... >> S: Yes, the last citta of each life. Actually, it's just another bhavanga citta resulting from the same (past) kamma as all the other bhavanga cittas in that life, but cuti is the name given to the last one. > .... > >> A:> If yes, why? > .... >> S: Past Kamma. Because of attachment and ignorance, there's kamma which results in birth (patisandhi) and death (cuti) and all the other vipaka cittas in between. > > Has that answered it? I think there's more behind your question.... A:> Hi Sarah Thanks for this. Yes, there is more to the question arising from a reading of Rupert Gethin's "The Foundations of Buddhism". He explains why, during a human lifetime, there is not the momentary arising of animal cittas followed by a reversion to human cittas and so on. .... S: First of all, what are 'animal cittas' and 'human cittas'? Let's say strong lobha arises, such as whilst eating a delicious meal, how does it help to refer to it as 'animal lobha' or 'human lobha'. Isn't lobha, just lobha of varying degrees? .... A: >This he says is because cittas arise in "patterns". During a human lifetime, dhammas only arise in a human pattern. Sounds fair enough, doesn't it? Do you have a problem with this terminology? .... S: We can talk about certain kinds of cittas predominating in particular realms. So, in an animal realm, lobha, dosa and moha predominate with very few opportunities for any kusala and none for the development of right understanding. (As I stressed before in a discussion with Rob K, I'm not referring to the bodhisatta or very occasional moments of wisdom that might arise as a result of past accumulations, such as possibly during the last javana cittas of the famous bats when the kamma-nimitta appeared). In the human realm, lobha, dosa and moha also predominate, but I assume generally, with more lobha and less dosa on account of the pleasanter objects being experienced. However, there are more opportunities for accumulations of kusala to arise, especially of dana and sila. For those who are fortunate to have heard about the benefit and development of samatha and vipassana, there are also opportunities for these to develop. I still don't quite see what the question is. In an ultimate sense, animals, humans and realms are all concepts. There are only cittas, cetasikas and rupas. The last citta of this life (cuti citta) is followed by the first citta (patisandhi citta) of the next life. What kind of roots that vipaka citta will have (and thereby, how is 'designated'), depends on kamma. I expect I'm being dense here, so please persist until satisfied. Metta, Sarah ======== #87997 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:32 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sarahprocter... Hi Alex (& Andrew), --- On Mon, 7/7/08, Alex wrote: --- In dhammastudygroup@ yahoogroups. com, "Andrew" wrote: > > Hi Alex > >Consciousness is not controllable in that fashion. I get the >impression, Alex, that you believe that you *can* control >consciousness by dint of effort. Alex: >Wrong impression, you have read too few of my posts. Consciousness can't be controlled. .... S: I'm glad to hear you say that "consciousness can't be controlled". I have read pretty much all of your posts and have to say I've been left with the same impression as Andrew. .... Alex: >Vipassana for example requires one to see nama-rupa arising in the present moment in you. Reading about all possible nama-rupas that may not apply to you right now is not doing Vipassana practice. .... S: What is "doing Vipassana practice" if not an attempt at controlling consciousness? Metta, Sarah ======= #87998 From: "Sukinder" Date: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:36 am Subject: Re: Abhidhamma, Logic, Anatta sukinderpal Hi Andrew (and Phil), Thanks for bringing up these points; they make me consider more even if I may in fact have misunderstood some of your comments. I leave it to you to decide whether a response is required. ================= Old Sukin: > > Would an instance of right view *ever* hinder other forms > > of kusala through mind, speech or body? On the other hand it seems to > > me, that with 'to do' in mind rather than 'understanding', the danger of > > being deluded and mislead is directly or indirectly encouraged. Sukin: Before I proceed I'd like to point out that I was somewhat hesitant about comparing `to do' with `understand'. It made the latter sound like the former when in fact it is about accumulated understanding and seeing the value of it. ============= Andrew: > Do you see the problem with this type of reasoning (which we all use) > when assessed against a world-view of there only being the present > (lightning fast) moment? In that world-view, understanding is a > cetasika that lasts a millionth of a second and then is gone - > forever! How can we talk about *that* cetasika going on to hinder > future (conventional) acts of body, speech and mind? Sukin: I'm not sure whether I understand what you are trying to get across. It is not so much about momentariness and speed, nor is it about trying to determine what the present moment is. It is more to do with the fact of `understanding' being a conditioned reality which has a present moment reality as object. In contrast, `to do' has concept of self and other as object and while this is going on and no due consideration has been given to `understanding', there lies the probability of being misled. On the other hand when understanding does arise, even if it is only pariyatti, the point again is not to be able to correctly identify the dhammas, but a beginning understanding of the fact of the moment being conditioned and anatta. With this, it then does not matter whether there is precise understanding, little understanding or no understanding. It is what it is, conditioned and beyond control. This applies to every situation; the realities involved may be kusala or akusala through body, speech or mind, there is no stopping conditions and we are left with `developing understanding' as the only sensible option. And not only this, I see the effect of `clearing the way' for other forms of kusala being developed as well. Sensual desire, ill will, sloth and torpor, restlessness and doubt, these arise by conditions beyond control. Are you suggesting that one or more of these is behind the kind of reasoning that I am involved with? You may be right, I don't know, but in the end, wouldn't these be just another conditioned reality to be known for what it is? Besides, the parami, these are developed by virtue of them being known for what they are and along the way one is expected to be able to recognize the various `cheating dhammas' which come disguised. Wouldn't all this imply that kusala of all kinds are encouraged and being accumulated? In prompting oneself to `do it', there may be viriya and chanda, but what if these are rooted in ignorance? I have a feeling Andrew, that I am missing your point. In which case, please explain more in a way befitting my simple mind. :-) =================== Andrew: > Handing over money to a pauper is a (conventional) act spanning > millions of mind moments. Whilst we can say that the (conventional) > act is wholesome, we can also be mindful of the teachings that tell > us many of the constituent mind-moments would have been neutral or > unwholesome. Sukin: Yes! ================== Andew: > When some people on this list make conventional statements that are > conventionally true, others will attempt to rebut them by pointing > out that the picture is not so clearcut at an ultimate level. In my > experience, conventional "to do" reasoning (emphasising identity over > time) leads towards eternalism. Conventional "ultimate" reasoning > (emphasing separateness over time) leads towards annihilationism. > Buddhaghosa himself warned about this - see Vibhanga Atthakathaa 198-199. Sukin: I don't know it, but I'm happy to see that you do read these books. If it is not too much trouble, could you share one or two passages from there about this? I'll make a comment nevertheless, which will probably only serve to expose any weakness in my reasoning even more, but here it is: The interest in `ultimate' reasoning does not have to be denying conventional actions of which these realities are behind. The interest in knowing what Dana is in ultimate terms is in fact an encouragement to knowing dana by its characteristic whereby it be then developed even more and which would no doubt involve the conventional act over time. However, should we be happy with just vague idea about dana based on a conventional description? What of the chance of being mislead by the outer act and any unwholesome dhammas into coming to a wrong conclusion about what in fact dana is? On the other hand, an interest in making a distinction between wholesome and unwholesome dhammas, this does not have to be translated as being an eagerness to `know' at the expense of a potential wholesome course of conduct, but instead can be seen as an instance of seeing the importance of *panna* and its role in leading the way to the development of any and all wholesome dhammas…..? =================== Andrew: > Our hearing and discussing Dhamma is IMHO a conventional activity > highly recommended by the Buddha. Sorting out thoughts about Dhamma > takes millions of mind moments i.e. it is conventional. Sure, we can > try to translate it into ultimate terms ... but why bother? Sukin: We listen and discuss and whether we reflect on what is heard or about the process itself, this would be due to conditions. In either case the ideal would be to understand what the reality of the moment is, namely the `thinking'. Besides, not all listening, discussing and reasoning around Dhamma concepts involves panna, be this suttamaya or cintamaya. The chance is that we are misled if we do not acknowledge this, as in the case of holding the snake by the wrong end. True, whatever the realities involved in the whole mix, the conventional activity itself is one in which the chance for right understanding can arise, so yes, we just go ahead. And we do this without even needing to tell ourselves that, but by accumulations and other conditions. The sankhara dhammas work their way, but then how do we truly know this if not by repeatedly coming back to the present moment? And would not this at least at some point necessitate thinking in terms of ultimate realities? ============= Andrew: > I no longer believe that the purpose of the ultimate teachings is to > inform conventional decision-making. That's what "conventional > truth" is for! Sukin: "Inform decision making", no. But while you do what you do, including when involved in the conventional decision making, what could be of greater value than to understand whatever arises, after all there is no one who decides, but there *are* paramattha dhammas. ============= Andrew: > The purpose of the ultimate teachings is to explain > that anatta and DO make theoretical sense. Of course, the picture > changes as panna intensifies and, instead of seeing the reflections > on the lake's surface, it sees the fishes and crabs moving about > underneath. > > Worldlings who believe Abhidhamma study gives them the ability to > follow the movements of fishes and crabs are kidding themselves > IMHO. All they really know is that the lake ecosystem includes > things called fishes and crabs moving about - so they will know what > to look for and where (and they may identify these things earlier). > But when we see a ripple on the lake's surface and we shout > out "Look, a fish!!!!", we are just guessing that a fish is there. Sukin: Yes we are, but knowing that we are guessing, wouldn't this be itself due to an `understanding' the kind which needs to be developed more and more? Would this not have made a difference? While seeking to distinguish between deeper and direct understanding from what is mere `intellectual', are we then suggesting a path which puts the two against each other and even appear to disagree, when they should in fact be agreeing and mutually supportive? I know that you are not suggesting this, but I just wanted to state what came to my mind. :-P ============= Andrew; > This is Phil's "overshooting", I think. And I can see what he is > saying. Sukin: I know, and this is why I thought that he was mischaracterizing and sought to discuss the process of the development of panna, namely pariyatti > patipatti > pativedha with him. ============= Andrew: > To be honest, I don't really understand *how* a cetasika of > understanding affects successive cittas to the extent of tending them > towards patterns of cittas constituting a conventional "act of > dana". But I have growing confidence that it does occur. I do feel > that understanding affects future citta in a wholesome way - and > ultimately in a liberating way (as Howard nicely puts it!). Sukin: I don't know what you have in mind. But I believe that generally speaking, with the arising of panna which knows the characteristic of dana as dana, and recognizing on the other hand, instances when it is taken as `my dana', in seeing the value of the one and limitation of the other, this is leaning towards one and away from the other and accumulated. Any objection to this view….? =========== Andrew: > Like you, I emphasise understanding rather than "doing". This is > because I accept the DO theory and the premise you expressed that > wholesome never hinders wholesome. I am interested in the Buddha's > conventional advice and am happy to follow it, even though I accept > that the cittas will be mixed and conditioned "selflessly" in the > present. Sukin: And that would be *with* understanding, not without. :-) =========== Andrew: > Must shut up here or people will mistake me for "rambling Phil"! ;-)) Sukin: Very useful rambling as far as I'm concerned. :-) But phew! This letter has taken me the longest time to write. Metta, Sukin #87999 From: sarah abbott Date: Thu Jul 10, 2008 1:39 am Subject: Re: [dsg] Re: To Rob M..... sarahprocter... Hi Herman, --- On Wed, 9/7/08, Herman Hofman wrote: > S: Let's assume it's true calmness that you're referring to - the calmness and detachment that accompany the development of panna (whether that of samatha or vipassana). Yes, less susceptibility to the worldly conditions, a lot less selfish attachment and concern about one's own feelings and a lot more metta and compassion for others. This is the reason that the Buddha had the greatest metta and compassion of all. ... Herman: >Howard has already said as much, and I too get the feeling from your last few threads that you are saying that the mental states of the Abhidhamma are not anything like what the words used to refer to them suggest. In other words, we are not speaking the same language. .... S: I think the teachings are very, very subtle and we have to examine each word very carefully. Naturally, our usual vocabulary and the meanings we are used to attaching to such terms such as 'calm' or 'moral shame' or 'concentration' all come with their own baggage. To understand what particular wholesome qualities, such as samatha (calm) or hiri (moral shame) are, requires a development of undestanding of such qualities after having listened and considered in some detail. .... H:> I get all sorts of alarm bells going off when someone tells me there is a very special "true" X they know about. .... S: So when the "alarm bells" go off, what is the reality? What is the reality now? That's all that counts. Metta, Sarah ========